fix(netio): bug-1447 same-batch endpoint use-after-free in io_worker dispatch
Raft-drive-async's reconnect-offload burst (Task 2.1/2.2) exposed a latent race in io_worker's epoll dispatch loop: ha.c's on_standby_connected() evicts a stale duplicate peer channel via iomgr_unmonitor()+endpoint_unref(), but epoll_ctl(DEL) only stops FUTURE epoll_wait() calls -- it does not invalidate an event for that same endpoint already sitting in the CURRENT batch's events[] array. A later event in the same batch then dereferences the freed endpoint_t/SSL*, producing the ASAN SEGV observed deep inside OpenSSL's ssl3_read_bytes during raft-drive-async's round-9 soak. The original "concurrent SSL_do_handshake from two io_worker threads" hypothesis was wrong and is retracted -- iomgr_start() creates exactly one io_worker thread per iomgr_t. Fix: extract io_worker_dispatch_batch(), which takes endpoint_ref() on every endpoint in the batch before dispatching any of them and endpoint_unref()s each only after the whole batch completes -- the same lock-free ref/unref bracket already used for bug-1298 and INVOKE_MSG_HANDLER, just never applied to io_worker's own loop. Pure atomics, no locks, no blocking added to the hot path. Adds test_netio_batch_dispatch_uaf.c, which drives the real dispatch loop with a synthetic epoll_event[] batch (TDD RED confirmed via ASAN heap-use-after-free before the fix, GREEN after). Verified further with two independent clean 10-round live sequential HA soaks (33 and 36 jobs, zero loss) and full ASAN suite runs (xcelib_test 294/0, controller_unit_test 972/0). raft-drive-async's kiro-validate-impl re-run flips NO-GO to GO.
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6 changed files with 249 additions and 8 deletions
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src/lib/testsuite/test_netio_batch_dispatch_uaf.c
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src/lib/testsuite/test_netio_batch_dispatch_uaf.c
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/*
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* test_netio_batch_dispatch_uaf.c — regression test for bug-1447.
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*
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* bug-1447: an ASAN DEADLYSIGNAL SEGV (near-null READ) was observed inside
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* OpenSSL's ssl3_read_bytes <- tls_get_message_header <- state_machine <-
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* handle_ssl_handshake (netio.c) <- io_handler <- io_worker, during a
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* raft-drive-async reconnect-offload burst right after a new primary
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* election.
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*
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* Root cause: io_worker's epoll dispatch loop processes ALL ready events
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* from ONE epoll_wait() batch in a plain for-loop calling io_handler() per
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* event. A handler for an EARLIER event in the batch (in production: ha.c's
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* on_standby_connected(), which evicts a stale duplicate outbound channel to
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* the same peer via iomgr_unmonitor() + endpoint_unref()) can drop the LAST
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* reference on a DIFFERENT endpoint that also has a ready event LATER in the
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* SAME batch. iomgr_unmonitor()'s epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_DEL) only stops a
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* FUTURE epoll_wait() from returning events for that fd — it does not
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* invalidate an event already sitting in the batch's stack-local
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* `events[]` array. endpoint_unref() reaching refcnt 0 immediately
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* SSL_free()s ep->ssl and free()s the endpoint_t itself, so the later
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* io_handler() call in the SAME loop dereferences freed memory — a
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* heap-use-after-free that manifests deep inside OpenSSL when the freed
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* (or poisoned/reused) ep->ssl pointer is handed to SSL_do_handshake().
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*
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* This test reproduces the SAME-BATCH mechanism deterministically, without
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* any real socket/SSL/epoll machinery, by driving
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* io_worker_dispatch_batch_for_test() (the XCE_TESTING seam exposing
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* io_worker's real batch-dispatch loop) with a synthetic 2-event batch:
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*
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* events[0] -> ep_evictor: a conn_handler that endpoint_unref()s ep_victim,
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* simulating on_standby_connected's stale-duplicate eviction.
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* events[1] -> ep_victim: refcnt==1 (its only ref is the one dropped by
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* ep_evictor's handler) — a conn_handler stub that just
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* records that it ran.
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*
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* RED (pre-fix): ep_evictor's handler drops ep_victim's refcount to 0,
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* freeing it (SSL_free + free(ep)) DURING events[0]'s processing. Processing
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* events[1] then dereferences the freed ep_victim inside io_handler() — under
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* this project's mandatory ASAN build this aborts the process
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* (heap-use-after-free), which is the expected RED failure mode for this
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* exact bug class (the original bug was itself only caught by ASAN).
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*
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* GREEN (post-fix): io_worker_dispatch_batch takes a reference on every
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* endpoint in the batch before dispatching any of them and releases it only
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* after the whole batch is processed, so ep_evictor's endpoint_unref() drops
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* ep_victim from 2 (owner + batch) to 1 (batch only) — not to 0. ep_victim
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* survives to have events[1] safely dispatched, and is only freed by
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* io_worker's own trailing unref after the whole batch completes.
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*/
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#define _GNU_SOURCE
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/epoll.h>
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#include <unity/unity.h>
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#include "netio.h"
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/* ── Static state for the injected conn_handlers ─────────────────────── */
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static endpoint_t *g_victim_ep = NULL;
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static int g_victim_ran = 0;
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static int g_evictor_ran = 0;
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static void reset_state(void)
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{
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g_victim_ep = NULL;
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g_victim_ran = 0;
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g_evictor_ran = 0;
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}
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/* Simulates ha.c's on_standby_connected: while handling ITS OWN event, tears
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* down a DIFFERENT, already-batched endpoint (the stale duplicate). */
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static int evictor_conn_handler(struct epoll_event *p)
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{
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(void)p;
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g_evictor_ran = 1;
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/* Drop the victim's only ref — pre-fix this frees it immediately. */
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endpoint_unref(g_victim_ep);
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return 0;
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}
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/* The "stale duplicate" endpoint's handler — if this runs on a still-valid
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* endpoint, the fix held. If ep was already freed, this call itself is
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* running on freed memory (the crash already happened by the time we get
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* here, or ASAN has already aborted the process). */
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static int victim_conn_handler(struct epoll_event *p)
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{
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(void)p;
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g_victim_ran = 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Test: processing an earlier batch event that evicts a later-batched
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* endpoint's last reference must NOT free that endpoint before its own
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* event is dispatched.
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*/
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static void test_batch_dispatch_survives_cross_endpoint_eviction(void)
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{
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reset_state();
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endpoint_t *ep_evictor = endpoint_get();
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endpoint_t *ep_victim = endpoint_get();
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(ep_evictor);
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TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(ep_victim);
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/* Both endpoints are past handshake and dispatch through conn_handler
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* (the msg_handler-less path in io_handler), exactly like an established
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* outbound standby control channel. */
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ep_evictor->ssl_handshake_done = 1;
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ep_evictor->msg_handler = NULL;
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ep_evictor->conn_handler = evictor_conn_handler;
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ep_victim->ssl_handshake_done = 1;
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ep_victim->msg_handler = NULL;
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ep_victim->conn_handler = victim_conn_handler;
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/* ep_victim starts with exactly ONE reference (its "owner" ref from
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* endpoint_get()) — the same ref on_standby_connected's eviction path
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* drops via endpoint_unref() in production (ha.c:8327). */
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(1, atomic_load(&ep_victim->refcnt));
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g_victim_ep = ep_victim;
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struct epoll_event events[2];
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memset(events, 0, sizeof(events));
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events[0].events = EPOLLIN;
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events[0].data.ptr = ep_evictor;
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events[1].events = EPOLLIN;
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events[1].data.ptr = ep_victim;
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/* Drive the REAL io_worker batch-dispatch loop (via the XCE_TESTING
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* seam) with this synthetic 2-event batch. */
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io_worker_dispatch_batch_for_test(events, 2);
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/* Both handlers must have run... */
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(1, g_evictor_ran,
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"the evictor's own event must have been dispatched");
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TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(1, g_victim_ran,
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"bug-1447: the victim endpoint's event must be safely dispatched "
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"even though an EARLIER event in the same batch dropped its last "
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"reference — reaching this point without an ASAN heap-use-after-free "
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"abort IS the regression proof");
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/* ...and ep_victim must be gone now (unref'd to 0 exactly once the whole
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* batch finished), not leaked and not double-freed. Nothing further to
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* assert on it directly (it is freed memory), but a clean process exit
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* (no ASAN report) for the whole test binary is the authoritative check,
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* verified by the test harness's exit code. */
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endpoint_unref(ep_evictor);
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printf("test_batch_dispatch_survives_cross_endpoint_eviction: PASS\n");
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}
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/* ── Test suite entry point ───────────────────────────────────────── */
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void test_netio_batch_dispatch_uaf(void)
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{
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printf("\n>> netio io_worker batch-dispatch UAF tests (bug-1447)\n\n");
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RUN_TEST(test_batch_dispatch_survives_cross_endpoint_eviction);
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}
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