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fix(ha): first-boot promotion evaluated eligibility before its own WAL recovery ran (bug-1696)

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Chaotic HA soak (post-bug-1695) reported committed_job_loss every
round. raft_cb_become_leader() computed the promotion WAL-truncation
floor and evaluated the full promotion-eligibility gate (durable_floor/
recovery_truncated/apply_verdict) BEFORE cluster_init_phase2() -- the
only call that runs persist_recover() on this process's first-ever
boot. Those fields all come from persist_recover(); read before it
runs, a freshly persist_init()'d struct reports durable_lsn=0, making
the eligibility gate wrongly judge a genuinely corrupt/divergent node
ELIGIBLE. Unreachable before bug-1695's fix (a restarted node's stale
term previously always made it defer to a peer instead of re-electing
on the same boot with real data at stake) -- bug-1695 correctly
restored real re-election on restart and newly exposed this
pre-existing boot-ordering flaw.

Reordered raft_cb_become_leader() so cluster_init_phase2()/
persist_recover() runs before the eligibility gate and truncation-floor
computation. Split the pure vote-derived safe_committed_lsn computation
(reads only ha->elect_ctx, safe pre-recovery) from the truncation-floor
computation (needs post-recovery persist state) -- the former stays
early, the latter moves to run after phase2. New regression test
CRC-corrupts a real on-disk WAL and confirms first-boot promotion now
correctly refuses instead of destroying committed data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
This commit is contained in:
Rongsong Shen 2026-08-27 08:26:09 +00:00
parent f886c80930
commit 47532f0a76
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2 changed files with 575 additions and 126 deletions
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268
src/controller/ha.c
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@ -1633,67 +1633,149 @@ static void raft_cb_become_leader(void *ctx, uint64_t term)
/* Task 4.1 (ha-repl-hardening): compute safe_committed_lsn from vote replies.
* Uses voter LSNs collected during election (ha->elect_ctx->votes[]) to find
* the highest LSN held by a majority without an extra round-trip.
* Design §Flow 0: Post-Election — Determine Safe Commit Point. */
{
ha_elect_ctx_t *ectx = (ha_elect_ctx_t *)atomic_load_explicit(
&ha->elect_ctx, memory_order_acquire);
if (ectx) {
uint64_t safe_lsn = 0;
uint64_t safe_tag = 0;
ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn(ectx, &safe_lsn, &safe_tag);
promotion_safe_lsn = safe_lsn;
/* Store results for use in WAL truncation and post-election commit.
* safe_lsn is the highest LSN on a majority; entries above it
* may not have been committed on all nodes and must be truncated.
*
* bug-1060 (Leader Completeness, Raft §5.4): the truncation cutoff is
* clamped to the leader's OWN durable tip so it never destroys entries
* this node holds durably — those were acked by this node as a standby
* and so were committed by the prior leader. Truncating to the bare
* majority element (which can sit BELOW the leader's durable tip when
* a slower peer is in the granting majority) diverged WALs and dead-
* locked the next election. With the clamp, persist_truncate_wal_above
* is a no-op on the leader's durable log; safe_lsn only governs removal
* of a non-durable divergent tail strictly above the durable tip. */
if (c) {
uint64_t durable_tip = persist_durable_floor(&c->persist);
uint64_t trunc_floor =
ha_promotion_truncate_floor(safe_lsn, durable_tip);
persist_truncate_wal_above(&c->persist, trunc_floor);
/* 2026-07-10 (chaotic-soak finding): persist_truncate_wal_above
* only advances persist->committed_lsn on the branches that
* perform a REAL truncation; its no-op path (this leader's own
* log already covers safe_lsn -- the common case) leaves
* committed_lsn untouched at its pre-election value, stalling
* commit-gated apply until the normal ack-driven commit path
* organically catches up seconds later. See
* persist_promotion_advance_committed's doc comment. */
persist_promotion_advance_committed(&c->persist, safe_lsn);
}
/* Task 4.2 (ha-repl-hardening): set committed_lsn = safe_lsn.
* persist_promotion_advance_committed (above) advances
* c->persist.committed_lsn in the production path (c != NULL),
* durable-capped and monotonic. Also update
* ha->last_known_committed_lsn so the test-mode decision loop
* (XCE_TESTING path in standby heartbeat reply handler) and any
* code reading ha->last_known_committed_lsn see the safe commit
* point immediately after promotion.
* Design §Flow 0 step 5: committed_lsn = safe_committed_lsn.
* Req 2.3 (ha-repl-hardening). */
atomic_store_explicit(&ha->last_known_committed_lsn, safe_lsn,
memory_order_release);
/* Update committed config tag baseline for the post-election decision
* loop. bug-1462: clamp to the leader's OWN loaded config tag —
* unlike WAL LSN, a node's actively-loaded config is never
* speculative, so the bare majority floor (correct for LSN) must
* not be allowed to strand a real config behind an all-zero floor
* reported by voters that never received a live config push.
* See ha_promotion_config_tag_floor's doc comment (ha.h). */
uint64_t committed_tag_floor =
ha_promotion_config_tag_floor(safe_tag, ectx->self_tag);
atomic_store_explicit(&ha->committed_config_tag, committed_tag_floor,
memory_order_release);
* Design §Flow 0: Post-Election — Determine Safe Commit Point.
*
* bug-1696: this computation is PURE — it reads only ha->elect_ctx (votes
* already collected during the election), never c->persist — so it is safe
* and deliberately kept BEFORE cluster_init_phase2()/persist_recover()
* below. The truncation step that DOES need post-recovery persist state
* (persist_durable_floor()/persist_truncate_wal_above()) is split out
* further down, AFTER phase2 has run — see the bug-1696 comment there for
* why: reading persist_durable_floor() before this process's own
* persist_recover() has ever run for this boot returns a bogus 0, and
* truncating the WAL to that bogus floor destroys real durably-committed
* data (bug-1696 root cause). */
ha_elect_ctx_t *promo_ectx = (ha_elect_ctx_t *)atomic_load_explicit(
&ha->elect_ctx, memory_order_acquire);
if (promo_ectx) {
uint64_t safe_lsn = 0;
uint64_t safe_tag = 0;
ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn(promo_ectx, &safe_lsn, &safe_tag);
promotion_safe_lsn = safe_lsn;
/* Task 4.2 (ha-repl-hardening): set committed_lsn = safe_lsn.
* persist_promotion_advance_committed (called below, after phase2)
* advances c->persist.committed_lsn in the production path (c !=
* NULL), durable-capped and monotonic. Also update
* ha->last_known_committed_lsn so the test-mode decision loop
* (XCE_TESTING path in standby heartbeat reply handler) and any
* code reading ha->last_known_committed_lsn see the safe commit
* point immediately after promotion.
* Design §Flow 0 step 5: committed_lsn = safe_committed_lsn.
* Req 2.3 (ha-repl-hardening). */
atomic_store_explicit(&ha->last_known_committed_lsn, safe_lsn,
memory_order_release);
/* Update committed config tag baseline for the post-election decision
* loop. bug-1462: clamp to the leader's OWN loaded config tag —
* unlike WAL LSN, a node's actively-loaded config is never
* speculative, so the bare majority floor (correct for LSN) must
* not be allowed to strand a real config behind an all-zero floor
* reported by voters that never received a live config push.
* See ha_promotion_config_tag_floor's doc comment (ha.h). */
uint64_t committed_tag_floor =
ha_promotion_config_tag_floor(safe_tag, promo_ectx->self_tag);
atomic_store_explicit(&ha->committed_config_tag, committed_tag_floor,
memory_order_release);
}
/* ── bug-1696 fix: cluster_init_phase2()/persist_recover() MUST run before
* anything below reads persist_durable_floor()/persist_recovery_truncated()/
* persist_apply_verdict() or calls persist_truncate_wal_above() ──────────
* Moved up from its original position (after the truncation-floor
* computation and the full promotion-eligibility gate) so that this
* process's first-ever persist_recover() for THIS boot always runs BEFORE
* any of that code reads recovery-derived persist state. Before this
* reorder, a freshly-persist_init()'d persist_t (durable_lsn=0) could be
* read as the "durable floor" and truncated to on a restart that won its
* own promotion on the very same boot it recovered on — physically
* destroying real committed WAL data before it was ever read
* (Leader Completeness violation, bug-1696). is_first_boot/phase2_done
* semantics are unchanged: still computed here, still latched only on a
* successful phase2 call, still a once-per-process-lifetime call. */
int is_first_boot = !ha->phase2_done;
/* First boot: call cluster_init_phase2 */
if (is_first_boot) {
int p2rc = 0;
#ifdef XCE_TESTING
if (ha_phase2_hook != NULL)
p2rc = ha_phase2_hook(c);
#else
if (c != NULL)
p2rc = cluster_init_phase2(c);
#endif
if (p2rc == 0) {
ha->phase2_done = 1;
} else {
/* bug-1477: do NOT latch phase2_done on failure, and do NOT
* proceed to CTRL_PRIMARY with an unwired commit engine — the
* member stays ALIVE, non-promotable, and retries (a later
* promotion attempt succeeds once ha_schedule_phase2_retry
* completes). Preserved verbatim from the pre-bug-1696 refusal
* path: no truncation/eligibility-gate code has run yet at this
* point (it has all been moved below this block), so there is
* nothing to undo on this refusal. */
WARN("HA: promotion REFUSED — cluster_init_phase2 failed "
"(rc=%d); member stays ALIVE, non-promotable, retrying "
"(bug-1477, never self-terminate)", p2rc);
if (c != NULL)
ha_schedule_phase2_retry(c);
return; /* do NOT become CTRL_PRIMARY with an unwired commit engine */
}
/* bug-1445 fix (kept post-bug-1696-reorder as an inert defense-in-
* depth double-check — see below): cluster_init_phase2() above just
* ran this process's very FIRST persist_recover()/replay_wal() -- the
* ONLY thing that can engage the Live Apply Resource Fence (job-
* array-single-wal-record tasks 4.1/4.2, extended to boot replay by
* task 7.2) for THIS node. Originally (pre-bug-1696) the main
* eligibility gate ran BEFORE this phase2 call and so necessarily
* read persist_apply_resource_fenced() as false (a fresh persist_t
* defaults to unfenced); this re-check compensated for that
* blindness immediately after the only call that could have changed
* the answer. Post-bug-1696-reorder, the main eligibility gate below
* now runs AFTER phase2 and already reads the correct, current
* apply_resource_fenced value directly -- so this block can no
* longer diverge from that gate's own answer (nothing async runs in
* between) and is strictly redundant. Left in place rather than
* deleted: zero behavioral risk (same flag, same logic, same refusal
* shape as the gate below) and removing it is not needed to fix
* bug-1696. */
if (c != NULL && persist_apply_resource_fenced(&c->persist)) {
WARN("HA: promotion REFUSED — this node's own first-ever boot "
"replay (cluster_init_phase2, just completed) engaged the "
"Live Apply Resource Fence; the earlier eligibility check "
"in this same election evaluation necessarily missed it "
"(bug-1445) — member stays ALIVE, non-promotable, "
"retrying apply (job-array-single-wal-record Req 9.4/9.5)");
ha_arm_promotion_fence_timer(ha, c,
persist_recovery_truncated(&c->persist),
persist_durable_floor(&c->persist),
promotion_safe_lsn);
return;
}
}
/* bug-1696 fix: the truncation-floor computation split out from the pure
* safe_lsn computation above -- see that comment for why. Reads
* persist_durable_floor(&c->persist) only now, AFTER cluster_init_phase2()/
* persist_recover() has run above, so it reflects the REAL on-disk WAL
* tip for this boot (never a bogus pre-recovery 0). Gated on promo_ectx
* (matches the original code: no ectx means no vote-derived safe_lsn, so
* no truncation was ever computed) and c (production-only). */
if (promo_ectx && c) {
uint64_t durable_tip = persist_durable_floor(&c->persist);
uint64_t trunc_floor =
ha_promotion_truncate_floor(promotion_safe_lsn, durable_tip);
persist_truncate_wal_above(&c->persist, trunc_floor);
/* 2026-07-10 (chaotic-soak finding): persist_truncate_wal_above
* only advances persist->committed_lsn on the branches that
* perform a REAL truncation; its no-op path (this leader's own
* log already covers safe_lsn -- the common case) leaves
* committed_lsn untouched at its pre-election value, stalling
* commit-gated apply until the normal ack-driven commit path
* organically catches up seconds later. See
* persist_promotion_advance_committed's doc comment. */
persist_promotion_advance_committed(&c->persist, promotion_safe_lsn);
}
/* ── ha-commit-durability task 4.3: pre-promotion eligibility gate ───────
@ -1868,72 +1950,6 @@ static void raft_cb_become_leader(void *ctx, uint64_t term)
return; /* do NOT become CTRL_PRIMARY; never self-exit */
}
int is_first_boot = !ha->phase2_done;
/* First boot: call cluster_init_phase2 */
if (is_first_boot) {
int p2rc = 0;
#ifdef XCE_TESTING
if (ha_phase2_hook != NULL)
p2rc = ha_phase2_hook(c);
#else
if (c != NULL)
p2rc = cluster_init_phase2(c);
#endif
if (p2rc == 0) {
ha->phase2_done = 1;
} else {
/* bug-1477: do NOT latch phase2_done on failure, and do NOT
* proceed to CTRL_PRIMARY with an unwired commit engine — mirror
* the upgrade_materialization_fenced refusal just above (stay
* ALIVE, non-promotable, retry; a later promotion attempt
* succeeds once ha_schedule_phase2_retry completes). Before this
* fix, phase2_done was latched unconditionally, so this failure
* path never existed for the code below to worry about. */
WARN("HA: promotion REFUSED — cluster_init_phase2 failed "
"(rc=%d); member stays ALIVE, non-promotable, retrying "
"(bug-1477, never self-terminate)", p2rc);
if (c != NULL)
ha_schedule_phase2_retry(c);
return; /* do NOT become CTRL_PRIMARY with an unwired commit engine */
}
/* bug-1445 fix: cluster_init_phase2() above just ran this process's
* very FIRST persist_recover()/replay_wal() -- the ONLY thing that
* can engage the Live Apply Resource Fence (job-array-single-wal-
* record tasks 4.1/4.2, extended to boot replay by task 7.2) for
* THIS node. The eligibility gate above (~line 1337) necessarily
* read persist_apply_resource_fenced() as false: a fresh persist_t
* defaults to unfenced (persist_init) and this is the first replay
* that could ever have set it -- so that gate's ELIGIBLE decision
* was made blind to whatever this first replay just did. Re-check
* here, once, right after the only call that could have changed the
* answer: if this node's own first-ever replay just fenced it,
* refuse promotion now instead of falling through to CTRL_PRIMARY
* below on a decision that is now stale. Every later election in
* this process's lifetime is unaffected -- is_first_boot is false
* by then, so the gate above already covers it correctly (this is
* exactly what the sibling test,
* test_replay_wal_engages_fence_on_resource_exhaustion_failure,
* proves). Mirrors the existing refusal branch above verbatim (same
* WARN shape, same ha_arm_promotion_fence_timer() call, same
* unconditional-refuse treatment as apply_divergent/
* self_restart_pending) rather than inventing a second mechanism. */
if (c != NULL && persist_apply_resource_fenced(&c->persist)) {
WARN("HA: promotion REFUSED — this node's own first-ever boot "
"replay (cluster_init_phase2, just completed) engaged the "
"Live Apply Resource Fence; the earlier eligibility check "
"in this same election evaluation necessarily missed it "
"(bug-1445) — member stays ALIVE, non-promotable, "
"retrying apply (job-array-single-wal-record Req 9.4/9.5)");
ha_arm_promotion_fence_timer(ha, c,
persist_recovery_truncated(&c->persist),
persist_durable_floor(&c->persist),
promotion_safe_lsn);
return;
}
}
/* ha-single-leader-role (Req 1.1): enter CTRL_PRIMARY directly — there is
* no transitional COMMITTING state. New-leader safety comes from the
* own-term commit rule (the WAL_NOOP + writable_lsn gate armed below),

433
src/controller/testsuite/test_job_array_replay_fence.c
View file

@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <capnp_c.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdatomic.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
@ -657,6 +658,436 @@ test_first_boot_promotion_evaluates_own_first_replay_fence(void)
"PASS\n");
}
/* ── bug-1696 (positive-path sanity check, NOT the RED/GREEN discriminator
* -- see test_first_boot_promotion_refuses_when_own_first_recovery_finds_
* corruption below for that): a node's very FIRST-EVER promotion evaluation
* must still succeed and preserve its own genuinely durable WAL when that
* WAL is intact ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
*
* IMPORTANT CORRECTION (found while proving this test's RED phase against
* the unfixed ha.c -- do not re-introduce the original hypothesis this
* comment used to state): the original bug-1696 write-up hypothesized that
* the pre-recovery promotion-truncation-floor computation
* (persist_durable_floor()==0 before recovery) would make
* persist_truncate_wal_above() PHYSICALLY DESTROY real durable WAL data left
* over from a prior life of this process. Source-tracing
* truncate_wal_above_locked() (persist.c) disproves that specific mechanism:
* its own no-op guard is `if (p->current_lsn == 0 || cutoff_lsn + 1 >=
* p->current_lsn) return 0;`, and persist_init() unconditionally resets
* current_lsn=1 on every fresh boot regardless of what is physically on
* disk -- so a truncate call issued BEFORE persist_recover() has ever
* re-derived current_lsn from the real WAL scan is ALWAYS a no-op (nothing
* looks "written this boot" yet to truncate). This test proves that
* empirically: it reproduces the exact fixture the original hypothesis
* described (N real, fsynced entries from a prior life, then a truly fresh
* persist_t on the same workdir, is_first_boot=true) and confirms the data
* survives with or WITHOUT the bug-1696 reorder fix applied -- i.e. this
* specific scenario was never actually destructive. It is kept as a
* regression/sanity guard (the reorder must not newly break the healthy
* first-boot-promotion path) but does NOT discriminate the bug.
*
* The REAL, mechanically-provable bug-1696 hazard is different: the
* promotion-ELIGIBILITY GATE (persist_recovery_truncated()/persist_
* durable_floor()/persist_apply_verdict()) is ALSO evaluated before
* cluster_init_phase2()/persist_recover() has run, so it can wrongly judge
* a genuinely CORRUPT or DIVERGENT node ELIGIBLE (reading the fresh-
* persist_init "clean" defaults) and let it become CTRL_PRIMARY -- only
* discovering the real corruption a few lines later, too late to matter.
* See test_first_boot_promotion_refuses_when_own_first_recovery_finds_
* corruption below for the actual RED/GREEN proof of that hazard, and
* buglog.json's bug-1696 entry for the full corrected root-cause writeup.
*/
static void test_first_boot_promotion_never_truncates_own_durable_wal(void)
{
char tmp[256];
strcpy(tmp, "/tmp/xce_trf_nodataloss_XXXXXX");
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(mkdtemp(tmp));
const uint64_t n_committed_entries = 5;
/* ── "boot 1": physically append N real, fsynced WAL_NOOP entries, then
* tear down -- no cluster needed (persist_wal_async is a physical-write
* -only path when p->cluster is NULL, mirrors the sibling test's phase
* 1 and test_replicated_apply_chain_survives_cold_restart's writer). ── */
{
persist_config_t cfg1 = persist_config_defaults();
cfg1.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
persist_t *p1 = calloc(1, sizeof(persist_t));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(p1);
persist_set_workdir(p1, tmp, "ctrl-test");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_init(p1, &cfg1, NULL));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_start(p1));
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < n_committed_entries; i++) {
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
persist_wal_async(p1, WAL_NOOP, NULL, 0));
}
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_flush(p1));
persist_stop(p1);
persist_fini(p1);
free(p1);
}
/* ── "boot 2" / restart: fresh cluster_t + its EMBEDDED persist_t point
* at the SAME on-disk workdir. Fresh persist_t -> durable_lsn=0 until
* persist_recover() runs -- exactly a real restart. ─────────────────── */
trf_build_cluster();
persist_config_t cfg2 = persist_config_defaults();
cfg2.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
persist_set_workdir(&g_trf_c.persist, tmp, "ctrl-test");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
persist_init(&g_trf_c.persist, &cfg2, &g_trf_c));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_start(&g_trf_c.persist));
g_trf_c.persist.recovery_verdict = RECOVER_CLEAN;
/* Precondition: never recovered yet -- durable_floor reads 0 regardless
* of the N real entries physically on disk. This is the exact blind
* spot bug-1696 exploits. */
uint64_t durable_floor_precondition =
persist_durable_floor(&g_trf_c.persist);
ha_config_t hcfg = {
.heartbeat_interval_ms = 3000,
.heartbeat_timeout_ms = 10000,
.election_timeout_ms = 2000,
.probe_connect_timeout_ms = 500,
.max_promotion_retries = 5,
};
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ha_init(&g_trf_c.ha, &hcfg, 0));
g_trf_c.ha.raft_c = &g_trf_c;
g_trf_c.ha.repl = NULL; /* no healthy peer reachable at this level */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
delaymgr_init(&g_trf_c.delaymgr, 5, trf_run_delay_task));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, delaymgr_start(&g_trf_c.delaymgr));
/* raft_cb_become_leader's tail (on a successful promotion) reaches
* ha_arm_own_term_gate -> commit_submit/commit_set_writable_lsn, which
* needs a wired commit engine -- unlike the sibling REFUSAL tests above,
* THIS test drives promotion all the way through to CTRL_PRIMARY, so it
* must be initialized (mirrors test_convergence_verification.c's
* cv_setup, the only other fixture in this suite that reaches a
* successful raft_cb_become_leader_with_cluster_for_test promotion). */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
commit_engine_init(&g_trf_c.commit, &g_trf_c.persist,
/*n_peers=*/0, /*n_vcpus=*/4));
/* Single-node-shaped elect_ctx: n_peers=0, self_lsn=0 -- required to even
* exercise the truncation code path (gated on ha->elect_ctx != NULL) and
* reproduces the bug narrative's "self also advertises ~0 before its own
* recovery" condition. */
ha_elect_ctx_t *ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(ctx);
ctx->n_peers = 0;
ctx->self_lsn = 0;
ctx->self_tag = 0;
pthread_mutex_init(&ctx->lock, NULL);
sem_init(&ctx->done, 0, 0);
atomic_store_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.elect_ctx, (void *)ctx,
memory_order_release);
/* The crux of the reproduction: ha->phase2_done is 0 (fresh ha_init
* above), so raft_cb_become_leader's is_first_boot block fires and calls
* this hook -- which calls persist_recover() for real, from INSIDE this
* same election evaluation, racing the truncation/eligibility code
* exactly like production. */
ha_phase2_hook = trf_phase2_hook_calls_persist_recover;
raft_cb_become_leader_with_cluster_for_test(&g_trf_c, /*term=*/1);
ha_phase2_hook = NULL; /* restore -- shared process-global test seam */
int32_t role_after_promotion =
atomic_load_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.role, memory_order_acquire);
uint64_t durable_floor_after_promotion =
persist_durable_floor(&g_trf_c.persist);
bool truncated_after_promotion =
persist_recovery_truncated(&g_trf_c.persist);
atomic_store_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.elect_ctx, NULL, memory_order_release);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&ctx->lock);
sem_destroy(&ctx->done);
free(ctx);
delaymgr_stop(&g_trf_c.delaymgr);
delaymgr_fini(&g_trf_c.delaymgr);
ha_fini(&g_trf_c.ha);
commit_engine_fini(&g_trf_c.commit);
persist_stop(&g_trf_c.persist);
persist_fini(&g_trf_c.persist);
trf_teardown_cluster();
/* ── Independent THIRD-boot verification: a brand fresh persist_t (no
* cluster involved at all, so this reflects ONLY what is physically on
* disk after everything above) recovering the SAME workdir -- the
* `waldump`-equivalent proof the real bug was confirmed with. ────────── */
uint64_t third_boot_recovered_current_lsn = 0;
{
persist_t *p3 = calloc(1, sizeof(persist_t));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(p3);
persist_set_workdir(p3, tmp, "ctrl-test");
persist_config_t cfg3 = persist_config_defaults();
cfg3.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_init(p3, &cfg3, NULL));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_start(p3));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_recover(p3));
third_boot_recovered_current_lsn = p3->current_lsn;
persist_stop(p3);
persist_fini(p3);
free(p3);
}
char cmd[512];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "rm -rf %s", tmp);
if (system(cmd) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "cleanup warning: rm -rf %s failed\n", tmp);
/* ── Assertions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64_MESSAGE(0, durable_floor_precondition,
"fixture precondition: a never-recovered persist_t must read "
"durable_floor=0 regardless of the N real entries on disk -- this "
"is the exact blind spot bug-1696 exploits");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE((int32_t)CTRL_PRIMARY, role_after_promotion,
"this node is structurally healthy (clean recovery, no faults) and "
"must actually become CTRL_PRIMARY on this election -- the bug is "
"that it used to get there by first destroying its own WAL, not "
"that it fails to promote");
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(truncated_after_promotion,
"a clean recovery of genuinely-intact WAL data must never be "
"reported as recovery-truncated");
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_OR_EQUAL_UINT64_MESSAGE(
n_committed_entries, durable_floor_after_promotion,
"bug-1696: promotion must NEVER truncate this node's own durable "
"WAL to a bogus pre-recovery floor -- durable_floor after promotion "
"must still reflect the N entries committed before this restart, "
"not collapse to ~0/1 because the truncation floor was computed "
"before cluster_init_phase2()/persist_recover() ever ran");
TEST_ASSERT_GREATER_OR_EQUAL_UINT64_MESSAGE(
n_committed_entries + 1, third_boot_recovered_current_lsn,
"bug-1696 (independent physical proof): a THIRD boot recovering the "
"SAME on-disk workdir after everything above must still find all N "
"originally-committed entries physically present -- current_lsn == "
"N+1 (one past the highest surviving LSN) proves the real on-disk "
"WAL was never truncated away by the second boot's promotion");
printf("test_first_boot_promotion_never_truncates_own_durable_wal: "
"PASS\n");
}
/* ── bug-1696 (ACTUAL RED/GREEN proof): the promotion-eligibility gate must
* NEVER judge a node ELIGIBLE using pre-recovery-blind defaults when its own
* first-ever replay (racing this SAME election evaluation) would have
* discovered the log is genuinely CORRUPT ───────────────────────────────────
*
* raft_cb_become_leader()'s main eligibility gate reads persist_recovery_
* truncated()/persist_durable_floor()/persist_apply_verdict() to decide
* ELIGIBLE vs REFUSE. Before the bug-1696 fix, that gate ran BEFORE cluster_
* init_phase2()/persist_recover() -- the ONLY call that can discover a real
* on-disk WAL is structurally corrupt for THIS process's first-ever boot.
* A freshly persist_init()'d persist_t defaults recovery_verdict=
* RECOVER_CLEAN (persist.c ~1168) and durable_lsn=0 (persist.c ~1163) --
* "clean and empty", not "unknown" -- so the gate necessarily judged a node
* whose WAL is ACTUALLY corrupt as ELIGIBLE, let it fall through to
* CTRL_PRIMARY, and only discovered the real corruption a few lines later
* (too late: the bug-1445 re-check immediately after phase2 only re-checks
* persist_apply_resource_fenced(), never persist_recovery_truncated()).
* This is the general form of the hazard bug-1445 already patched narrowly
* for ONE flag; bug-1696 is the same hazard for the far more consequential
* durable_floor/recovery_truncated gate inputs.
*
* Fixture: "boot 1" writes two real, fsynced WAL entries, then the FIRST
* entry's on-disk CRC is corrupted (identical technique to test_commit_
* durability.c's test_recover_verdict_crc_break_first_entry_truncated) --
* persist_recover(), once it actually runs, will classify this as
* RECOVER_TRUNCATED. "boot 2" points a fresh cluster_t + persist_t at the
* SAME corrupted workdir with ha->phase2_done fresh (0, is_first_boot=true)
* and ha_phase2_hook wired to call persist_recover() for real, from INSIDE
* this same election evaluation -- exactly production's ordering. A single-
* node-shaped ha_elect_ctx_t (n_peers=0, self_lsn=0, no reachable peer)
* isolates the recovery_truncated conjunct: promotion_safe_lsn=0 means the
* HWM comparison alone could never explain a refusal, so if this node is
* refused, recovery_truncated is what did it.
*
* RED before the fix: role_after_election == CTRL_PRIMARY (the gate judged
* this node ELIGIBLE while blind, and nothing after phase2 re-checked
* recovery_truncated before falling through to CTRL_PRIMARY) despite
* persist_recover() -- which DID run moments later, inside the very same
* call -- correctly detecting RECOVER_TRUNCATED.
* GREEN after the fix: phase2/persist_recover() runs BEFORE the gate, so the
* gate sees the real RECOVER_TRUNCATED verdict and REFUSES promotion (stays
* alive, fenced, in_catch_up=1, never self-exits).
*/
static void
test_first_boot_promotion_refuses_when_own_first_recovery_finds_corruption(void)
{
char tmp[256];
strcpy(tmp, "/tmp/xce_trf_corruptboot_XXXXXX");
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(mkdtemp(tmp));
/* ── "boot 1": two real, fsynced WAL_NOOP entries, then die. ─────────── */
{
persist_config_t cfg1 = persist_config_defaults();
cfg1.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
persist_t *p1 = calloc(1, sizeof(persist_t));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(p1);
persist_set_workdir(p1, tmp, "ctrl-test");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_init(p1, &cfg1, NULL));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_start(p1));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_wal_async(p1, WAL_NOOP, NULL, 0));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_wal_async(p1, WAL_NOOP, NULL, 0));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_flush(p1));
persist_stop(p1);
persist_fini(p1);
free(p1);
}
/* Corrupt the FIRST entry's on-disk CRC -- breaks the chain at LSN 1
* (identical technique to test_commit_durability.c's
* test_recover_verdict_crc_break_first_entry_truncated). A future
* persist_recover() over this workdir will classify RECOVER_TRUNCATED. */
{
char seg_path[512];
snprintf(seg_path, sizeof(seg_path),
"%s/ctrl-test/data/wal/seg-%016" PRIx64 ".wal", tmp,
(uint64_t)1);
int fd = open(seg_path, O_RDWR);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(fd >= 0, "first WAL segment must exist");
wal_entry_hdr_t hdr;
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT((int)sizeof(hdr),
(int)pread(fd, &hdr, sizeof(hdr), 0));
hdr.crc ^= 0xDEADBEEFu; /* corrupt the entry CRC */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT((int)sizeof(hdr),
(int)pwrite(fd, &hdr, sizeof(hdr), 0));
fsync(fd);
close(fd);
}
/* ── "boot 2" / restart: fresh cluster_t + persist_t on the SAME
* corrupted workdir. Never recovered yet -- the pre-recovery defaults
* (recovery_verdict=RECOVER_CLEAN, durable_lsn=0) read "clean and
* empty" regardless of the real on-disk corruption. This is the exact
* blind spot bug-1696 exploits. ──────────────────────────────────────── */
trf_build_cluster();
persist_config_t cfg2 = persist_config_defaults();
cfg2.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
persist_set_workdir(&g_trf_c.persist, tmp, "ctrl-test");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
persist_init(&g_trf_c.persist, &cfg2, &g_trf_c));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_start(&g_trf_c.persist));
bool recovery_truncated_precondition =
persist_recovery_truncated(&g_trf_c.persist);
recover_verdict_t recovery_verdict_precondition =
persist_recovery_verdict(&g_trf_c.persist);
ha_config_t hcfg = {
.heartbeat_interval_ms = 3000,
.heartbeat_timeout_ms = 10000,
.election_timeout_ms = 2000,
.probe_connect_timeout_ms = 500,
.max_promotion_retries = 5,
};
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ha_init(&g_trf_c.ha, &hcfg, 0));
g_trf_c.ha.raft_c = &g_trf_c;
g_trf_c.ha.repl = NULL; /* no healthy peer reachable at this level */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
delaymgr_init(&g_trf_c.delaymgr, 5, trf_run_delay_task));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, delaymgr_start(&g_trf_c.delaymgr));
ha_set_promotion_fence_window_ms(60);
/* Single-node-shaped elect_ctx: n_peers=0, self_lsn=0, no reachable peer
* -- isolates the recovery_truncated conjunct (promotion_safe_lsn=0
* means the HWM comparison alone can never explain a refusal here). */
ha_elect_ctx_t *ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(ctx);
ctx->n_peers = 0;
ctx->self_lsn = 0;
ctx->self_tag = 0;
pthread_mutex_init(&ctx->lock, NULL);
sem_init(&ctx->done, 0, 0);
atomic_store_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.elect_ctx, (void *)ctx,
memory_order_release);
/* The crux of the reproduction: ha->phase2_done is 0 (fresh ha_init
* above), so raft_cb_become_leader's is_first_boot block fires and calls
* this hook -- which calls persist_recover() for real, from INSIDE this
* same election evaluation, racing the eligibility gate exactly like
* production. */
ha_phase2_hook = trf_phase2_hook_calls_persist_recover;
raft_cb_become_leader_with_cluster_for_test(&g_trf_c, /*term=*/1);
ha_phase2_hook = NULL; /* restore -- shared process-global test seam */
int32_t role_after_election =
atomic_load_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.role, memory_order_acquire);
int in_catch_up_after_election =
atomic_load_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.in_catch_up, memory_order_acquire);
bool recovery_truncated_after_election =
persist_recovery_truncated(&g_trf_c.persist);
recover_verdict_t recovery_verdict_after_election =
persist_recovery_verdict(&g_trf_c.persist);
atomic_store_explicit(&g_trf_c.ha.elect_ctx, NULL, memory_order_release);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&ctx->lock);
sem_destroy(&ctx->done);
free(ctx);
ha_set_promotion_fence_window_ms(0); /* restore default */
ha_cancel_promotion_fence_timer(&g_trf_c.ha);
delaymgr_stop(&g_trf_c.delaymgr);
delaymgr_fini(&g_trf_c.delaymgr);
ha_fini(&g_trf_c.ha);
persist_stop(&g_trf_c.persist);
persist_fini(&g_trf_c.persist);
trf_teardown_cluster();
char cmd[512];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "rm -rf %s", tmp);
if (system(cmd) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "cleanup warning: rm -rf %s failed\n", tmp);
/* ── Assertions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(recovery_truncated_precondition,
"fixture precondition: a never-recovered persist_t must read "
"recovery_truncated=false (the fresh-persist_init default) "
"regardless of the real on-disk corruption -- this is the exact "
"blind spot bug-1696 exploits");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(RECOVER_CLEAN, recovery_verdict_precondition,
"fixture precondition: the pre-recovery default verdict reads CLEAN, "
"not the real corruption");
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(recovery_truncated_after_election,
"this node's own first-ever replay (triggered from inside this SAME "
"election evaluation) must have discovered and recorded the real "
"on-disk corruption by the time this call returns");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(RECOVER_TRUNCATED,
recovery_verdict_after_election,
"the real recovery verdict must be RECOVER_TRUNCATED once this "
"node's own replay has actually run");
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_MESSAGE((int32_t)CTRL_PRIMARY, role_after_election,
"bug-1696: a node whose OWN first-ever replay (racing this SAME "
"election evaluation) discovers a genuinely CORRUPT/TRUNCATED WAL "
"must be refused promotion -- not silently become CTRL_PRIMARY on "
"an eligibility decision made blind, before that first replay ever "
"ran");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(1, in_catch_up_after_election,
"a node refused for this reason must be fenced via the SAME "
"existing in_catch_up mechanism every other refusal reason uses, "
"and stay ALIVE (never self-exit)");
printf("test_first_boot_promotion_refuses_when_own_first_recovery_finds_"
"corruption: PASS\n");
}
#endif /* XCE_TESTING */
void test_job_array_replay_fence(void)
@ -665,6 +1096,8 @@ void test_job_array_replay_fence(void)
#ifdef XCE_TESTING
RUN_TEST(test_replay_wal_engages_fence_on_resource_exhaustion_failure);
RUN_TEST(test_first_boot_promotion_evaluates_own_first_replay_fence);
RUN_TEST(test_first_boot_promotion_never_truncates_own_durable_wal);
RUN_TEST(test_first_boot_promotion_refuses_when_own_first_recovery_finds_corruption);
#else
printf("test_job_array_replay_fence: skipped (no XCE_TESTING)\n");
#endif