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@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ XCE is in the persistence + HA transformation (branch `persistent_ha`). Governin
## In Flight
- **scheduler-framework** — NEW 2026-07-06 (`/kiro-discovery`). Iterator-driven allocation architecture: lazy plan iterator + host iterator, combinatorial parallel job allocation, configurable job picker, session-level unsatisfiable resreq cache. Brief: `.kiro/specs/scheduler-framework/brief.md`. Dependencies: none hard (builds on existing plugin framework + select expression evaluator). Next: `/kiro-spec-requirements scheduler-framework`.
- ~~**scheduler-framework** — NEW 2026-07-06 (`/kiro-discovery`). Iterator-driven allocation architecture: lazy plan iterator + host iterator, combinatorial parallel job allocation, configurable job picker, session-level unsatisfiable resreq cache. Brief: `.kiro/specs/scheduler-framework/brief.md`.~~ **DECOMPOSED 2026-07-27** into three child specs (`.kiro/specs/scheduler-framework/spec.json` `child_specs`): **scheduler-core** — core/driver separation, pluggable job picker interface, and simulation mode; **IMPLEMENTATION-COMPLETE**, GO/NO-GO validation 2026-08-07/08 (2 non-blocking follow-ups), 45/45 sub-tasks done. **scheduler-allocation** — lazy iterator-driven allocation architecture, parallel job support, session-level unsatisfiable resreq cache; requirements generated, `blocked_on: [scheduler-core]` — now unblocked. **scheduler-preemption** — SIGSTP-based victim selection + controller→worker pipeline; requirements generated, `blocked_on: [scheduler-core]` — now unblocked. The parent `scheduler-framework` spec is retained only for discovery-context provenance and is no longer in flight itself. Next: `/kiro-spec-design scheduler-allocation` and `/kiro-spec-design scheduler-preemption`.
- ~~**ha-consistency-invariants** — UMBRELLA CONTRACT (requirements + design + research approved/complete). Implementation decomposed 2026-06-11 into the four sub-specs below; the umbrella generates NO tasks itself. Each sub-spec brief references the umbrella docs as authoritative.~~ **COMPLETE 2026-07-13** — all four sub-specs (ha-commit-engine, ha-commit-barrier-rollout, ha-single-leader-role, ha-convergence-recovery) implemented; Criterion 2.9 (Facts-Apply invariant) satisfied via raft-apply-decoupling. No longer in flight.
- ~~ha-wal-replication — implemented except task 5.4 (live 3-node integration test; needs `/xce-deploy-ha` cluster); sub-spec 4's E2E extends it~~ **task 5.4 CLOSED 2026-07-18** via `/kiro-validate-impl`'s live 10-round sequential soak (972/972 tests, zero loss). Spec is GO, no longer in flight.
- ~~**libxce-failover** — CLIENT-SIDE transparent controller failover (requirements generated 2026-06-16). Wires all libxce production request paths through the (already-built-but-orphaned) `xce_request_with_retry()` primitive + adds multi-master rotation; classifies on the real controller status taxonomy `E_XCE_REDIRECT` / `E_XCE_NOMASTER` / `E_XCE_NOT_READY` / `E_XCE_STANDBY` (`errnox.h:22-25`); bounded retry → distinct cluster-not-ready (no more opaque EINVAL); includes one small controller change so redirect replies carry the primary host/port (schema fields already exist, `controller.capnp:568-569`, just unpopulated in `join.c`). Verified E2E via `xce_test` (the original reproduction). Closes the integration gap left by `ha-config-bootstrap` Req 7 (tasks 10/10.1/10.2 shipped only the standalone primitive). See bug-608. Dependencies: ha-config-bootstrap (primitive + error codes), ha-commit-barrier-rollout (write idempotency makes write-retry safe).~~ **IMPLEMENTED, validate-impl GO 2026-07-18** (all 19 tasks were done since 2026-06-18; the `ready_for_implementation` flag was just never flipped — administrative staleness, not a real block). No longer in flight. `component-failover-adoption` (backlog, below) is the next layer on top of this.
- ~~**libxce-failover** — CLIENT-SIDE transparent controller failover (requirements generated 2026-06-16). Wires all libxce production request paths through the (already-built-but-orphaned) `xce_request_with_retry()` primitive + adds multi-master rotation; classifies on the real controller status taxonomy `E_XCE_REDIRECT` / `E_XCE_NOMASTER` / `E_XCE_NOT_READY` / `E_XCE_STANDBY` (`errnox.h:22-25`); bounded retry → distinct cluster-not-ready (no more opaque EINVAL); includes one small controller change so redirect replies carry the primary host/port (schema fields already exist, `controller.capnp:598-599`, just unpopulated in `join.c`). Verified E2E via `xce_test` (the original reproduction). Closes the integration gap left by `ha-config-bootstrap` Req 7 (tasks 10/10.1/10.2 shipped only the standalone primitive). See bug-608. Dependencies: ha-config-bootstrap (primitive + error codes), ha-commit-barrier-rollout (write idempotency makes write-retry safe).~~ **IMPLEMENTED, validate-impl GO 2026-07-18** (all 19 tasks were done since 2026-06-18; the `ready_for_implementation` flag was just never flipped — administrative staleness, not a real block). No longer in flight. `component-failover-adoption` (backlog, below) is the next layer on top of this.
## Raft TLA+ Conformance — raft-library enhancement series (NEW 2026-06-21)
@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ XCE is in the persistence + HA transformation (branch `persistent_ha`). Governin
> **ha-term-safety** (`.kiro/specs/ha-term-safety/`) is the XCE-side INTEGRATION + REGRESSION umbrella for this family: it wires the controller WAL / commit-barrier into the new raft callbacks (thin adapter — protocol delegated to the library), owns the **config-change marker** (R7 — config changes as `(term,lsn)` log markers; bytes via the existing out-of-band config-push transport, hash-verified against the marker), and holds the live **bug-851 chaotic-failover regression**. Its protocol invariants R1–R6 are realized by the library specs above (not re-implemented in the controller). **Scope: R1–R7 only.** The former R8 (config-upgrade full-snapshot consistency, bug-857) was **descoped 2026-06-21 to the independent `config-upgrade-snapshot` spec** (below), because it requires entity-bearing snapshots that do not exist yet. **IMPLEMENTED, validate-impl GO 2026-07-17** (20/20 tasks; closed bug-1445, a first-boot promotion-check race with job-array-single-wal-record's Live Apply Resource Fence, as an out-of-boundary follow-up fix).
## Raft Apply-Ordering & Hook Decoupling — NEW 2026-06-24 (`/kiro-discovery`)
> **raft-adapter-conformance** (`.kiro/specs/raft-adapter-conformance/`) — NEW 2026-07-29, sibling audit to the library-side conformance work above: a systematic, action-by-action pass over the controller's Raft **adapter** (the wire-level send/receive/reply code in `ha.c`/`repl.c`/`config_repl.c`) against `raft.tla`'s actions — distinct from `raft-sim-conformance`'s in-process library harness. Motivated by a live-soak finding that the controller's `WalAckReply` constructor hardcoded success (no failing reply ever reached the primary) plus a standby catch-up streaming-range self-deadlock, both already fixed (bug-1479) before this spec was seeded. This pass found and fixed two more instances of the same defect class: configuration-push rejects previously sent no reply at all (bug-1480), and a vote/PreVote endpoint failure arriving *after* connect routed through a legacy tally path instead of the production one (extending bug-1423's connect-time fix to that remaining timing window). Also records, as a single explicit decision, which `AppendEntries` mechanism is production-authoritative (`repl_broadcast` + `ha_stream_wal_to_standby`; the per-peer index-driven `raft_send_append_entries` stays dormant by documented design, not oversight). Requirements/design/tasks generated and approved, all 15 leaf tasks (1–7.3) checked; `src/controller/CLAUDE.md`'s Protocol Verification Checklist marks the corresponding invariants "post `raft-adapter-conformance`, landed 2026-07-29" — `spec.json` phase (`tasks-generated`) has not been flipped to reflect this, same administrative-staleness pattern seen elsewhere in this doc (cf. the former libxce-failover entry above). Dependencies: raft-log-replication, raft-commit-safety, ha-term-safety, raft-sim-conformance (adjacent/informational — this spec fixes the adapter layer those validate underneath).
**Goal:** make the controller follow canonical Raft ordering — *pre-hooks → raft commit → apply → notify* — with the raft protocol step lifted OUT of the notification hook fan-out. Today `persist_job_hook_fun` (an `AFTER_EVENT` hook) performs the WAL append + synchronous majority-commit barrier inline, and `create_job()` mutates in-memory state BEFORE that commit (`job.c:558` before `job.c:593`; `persist.c:2532`/`persist.c:2198`/`ha.c:3080`). A failed/timed-out commit does not cleanly revert the optimistic mutation — the structural root of the bug-795/828/851/1060 divergence family. Decision (user, 2026-06-24): **apply-after-commit (canonical)** — a single shared `apply_committed_entry()` seam mutates the state machine only after commit, reused by restart replay so online-apply and replay-apply are identical. Hooks demote to notification-only. Decompose via Path E (2 new specs + touchpoints).
## Raft Apply-Ordering & Hook Decoupling — NEW 2026-06-24 (`/kiro-discovery`); IMPLEMENTED — see `raft-apply-decoupling` below
**Goal (historical — achieved):** make the controller follow canonical Raft ordering — *pre-hooks → raft commit → apply → notify* — with the raft protocol step lifted OUT of the notification hook fan-out. At the time this family was opened, `persist_job_hook_fun` (an `AFTER_EVENT` hook) performed the WAL append + synchronous majority-commit barrier inline, and `create_job()` mutated in-memory state BEFORE that commit — the structural root of the bug-795/828/851/1060 divergence family. A failed/timed-out commit did not cleanly revert the optimistic mutation. Decision (user, 2026-06-24): **apply-after-commit (canonical)** — a single shared `apply_committed_entry()` seam mutates the state machine only after commit, reused by restart replay so online-apply and replay-apply are identical. Hooks demote to notification-only. Decomposed via Path E (2 new specs + touchpoints), delivered as `raft-apply-decoupling` (**IMPLEMENTED 2026-07-07**, see below). Current code reflects the fix: `persist_job_hook_fun` (`persist.c` ~6509-6553) now explicitly returns early for `WAL_MODE_WAIT` entries, with a comment noting job-submit durability is invoked directly by `handle_jobsubmit` — `persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit()`, called strictly before any job object is constructed — never from this hook; `create_job()` is now defined at `job.c:48`.
### Async-drive prerequisites (surfaced 2026-06-25 by blocking audit; thread-role contract now in `ha-async-io.md`)
@ -60,34 +62,34 @@ The protocol **drive** is NOT fully event-driven. Root cause: `peer_ctrl_msg_han
## Future Specs / Backlog (dependency order)
- [ ] config-upgrade-snapshot — **descoped from `ha-term-safety` R8 on 2026-06-21 (requirements generated; `.kiro/specs/config-upgrade-snapshot/`).** Closes **bug-857**: a configuration upgrade can leave members with DIVERGENT materialized state because today it does config-push + restart + per-node WAL replay under the new config (`config_repl.c` `do_upgrade_config_with_bytes` ~1001-1163), with no snapshot pinning an identical post-upgrade state (replay is config-dependent — `lost_and_found` re-homes orphaned entities). Approach: an upgrade materializes a **full entity-bearing state snapshot at the config-change marker's `(term,lsn)` boundary**, embeds the new config, and installs it on every member via the `snapshot_transfer_s` transport — no per-node re-derivation; supersedes `ha-term-safety` R7's interim config-push byte delivery for upgrades. **HARD dependency: `entity-bearing-snapshots`** (today snapshots are a 16-byte LSN sentinel; the entity payload does not exist) AND `ha-term-safety` (the config-change marker it anchors on). Verify by reproducing bug-857 (upgrade during chaotic multi-kill, diff materialized state). Promote to design once `entity-bearing-snapshots` lands.
- [ ] config-upgrade-snapshot — **descoped from `ha-term-safety` R8 on 2026-06-21 (requirements generated; `.kiro/specs/config-upgrade-snapshot/`).** Closes **bug-857**: a configuration upgrade can leave members with DIVERGENT materialized state because today it does config-push + restart + per-node WAL replay under the new config (`config_repl.c` `do_upgrade_config_with_bytes` ~1001-1163), with no snapshot pinning an identical post-upgrade state (replay is config-dependent — `lost_and_found` re-homes orphaned entities). Approach: an upgrade materializes a **full entity-bearing state snapshot at the config-change marker's `(term,lsn)` boundary**, embeds the new config, and installs it on every member via the `snapshot_transfer_s` transport — no per-node re-derivation; supersedes `ha-term-safety` R7's interim config-push byte delivery for upgrades. **Former HARD dependency `entity-bearing-snapshots` is CLEARED** — it shipped as spec `ha-entity-snapshots` (**IMPLEMENTATION-COMPLETE, validate-impl GO 2026-07-18**; see Future Specs/Backlog below), and `ha-term-safety` (the config-change marker it anchors on) is also implemented. `config-upgrade-snapshot`'s own `spec.json` now has `blocked_on: []`. Verify by reproducing bug-857 (upgrade during chaotic multi-kill, diff materialized state). **Ready to promote to design.**
- [ ] component-failover-adoption — **recorded 2026-06-16; depends on libxce-failover (HARD).** Make the C daemons and the Go apiserver actually exercise libxce's transparent failover. The mechanism reaches them for free (worker/scheduler/controller link `libxce_dep`; apiserver uses it via cgo, `src/frontend/apiserver/backend/clib.go`), but two per-component integration items remain: (1) each component must hand libxce the **full master list** instead of a single endpoint (today even the CLI uses only `conf->masters[0]`, `client.c:122`); (2) bounded retry makes the already-blocking `xce_request` block **longer** (seconds of backoff) — for the async C daemons (worker `controller_connector.c`, scheduler `handler.c`) this must be verified **liveness-safe**, i.e. it must not stall a thread that also drives heartbeats (the "never block the iomgr thread" rule). Scope: per-component master-list config + retry policy + liveness-safe blocking + per-component E2E failover for **scheduler, worker, apiserver**. (`xce_test` is NOT here — it is the in-spec verification client of libxce-failover.) Promote via `/kiro-spec-init component-failover-adoption` after libxce-failover lands.
- [ ] worker-rejoin-resync — **planned long ago, no effort yet (recorded 2026-06-10).** When a worker rejoins after disconnect or controller failover, it shall re-report its running/finished job states so the controller recovers facts whose notifications were lost. Evidence of the gap (ha-consistency-invariants research deep-dive §A): `xce_join_req` carries only `hostattrs_t` (src/lib/request.c:1154-1181) — no job state; worker notify is fire-and-forget with zero redelivery (bug-396), so any job start/finish/fail sent during a disconnect or failover window is permanently lost today. Scope sketch: extend the join/hello exchange (or a post-join message) with a running+recent job-state report; controller reconciles against its job table through the commit barrier (entries go through majority commit like any state change); requires the `mark_job_*` idempotency guards (shared need with ha-consistency-invariants' pending-facts queue). Complements — does not replace — the primary-side pending-facts queue: the queue covers quorum-loss windows while connected; resync covers disconnect/failover windows. **Elevated 2026-06-11**: designated as the official backstop in ha-consistency-invariants Req 2.8 / boundary context — facts the controller received are retained-and-retried until committed; facts that never arrived (or died with the controller) are recovered only by this resync. Dependencies: ha-consistency-invariants (commit barrier + idempotency guards). Extends: worker-join-refactor (implemented — covers attribute/endpoint update on rejoin only).
- [ ] **admin-config-tool** — **PROMOTED from backlog to spec 2026-07-06** (`/kiro-discovery`; brief at `.kiro/specs/admin-config-tool/brief.md`). **NEW: `xceadmin` Python CLI** for cluster operators — builds and deploys cluster configuration via direct TCP+TLS capnp wire to controller (NOT through apiserver). Two subcommands: **(a) `config build`** — directory scan: parse `configs/{hosts,queues,resources,users}.yaml`, validate against JSON schemas (`configs/schema/*.schema.json`), serialize `ClusterConfig` capnp struct to `cluster.bin` with SHA-256; **(b) `config push`** — zero-config dev (default `localhost:9991`, same as xce_test), single `--controller` flag for production, auto-discovers peers + primary from controller reply, sends `OP_upgradeConfig`, displays `{versionTag,ackedCount,error}`. **Single dependency: `controller.capnp`.** Pure Python (pycapnp + yaml + jsonschema + click), open-source ready (`pip install`). The tool is the client-side trigger for `config-upgrade-snapshot`'s controller-side path. MUST validate against reserved name `"lost_and_found"` for queue/host (defence-in-depth). xcecli comparison: `xcecli` = user tool (HTTP/HTTPS → apiserver → CGO → controller, JWT auth); `xceadmin` = operator tool (direct TCP+TLS → controller, zero-config, same trust model as controller peers). Shared future: `xcecommon` Python package with capnp schema + wire protocol reusable by both tools. Dependencies: `controller.capnp` schema only. **Blocks: nothing — ships independently.** Controller-side upgrade snapshot path (`config-upgrade-snapshot`) remains blocked on `entity-bearing-snapshots` (pre-existing). Next: `/kiro-spec-requirements admin-config-tool`.
- [ ] **admin-config-tool** — **PROMOTED from backlog to spec 2026-07-06** (`/kiro-discovery`; brief at `.kiro/specs/admin-config-tool/brief.md`). **NEW: `xceadmin` Python CLI** for cluster operators — builds and deploys cluster configuration via direct TCP+TLS capnp wire to controller (NOT through apiserver). Two subcommands: **(a) `config build`** — directory scan: parse `configs/{hosts,queues,resources,users}.yaml`, validate against JSON schemas (`configs/schema/*.schema.json`), serialize `ClusterConfig` capnp struct to `cluster.bin` with SHA-256; **(b) `config push`** — zero-config dev (default `localhost:9991`, same as xce_test), single `--controller` flag for production, auto-discovers peers + primary from controller reply, sends `OP_upgradeConfig`, displays `{versionTag,ackedCount,error}`. **Single dependency: `controller.capnp`.** Pure Python (pycapnp + yaml + jsonschema + click), open-source ready (`pip install`). The tool is the client-side trigger for `config-upgrade-snapshot`'s controller-side path. MUST validate against reserved name `"lost_and_found"` for queue/host (defence-in-depth). xcecli comparison: `xcecli` = user tool (HTTP/HTTPS → apiserver → CGO → controller, JWT auth); `xceadmin` = operator tool (direct TCP+TLS → controller, zero-config, same trust model as controller peers). Shared future: `xcecommon` Python package with capnp schema + wire protocol reusable by both tools. Dependencies: `controller.capnp` schema only. **Blocks: nothing — ships independently.** Controller-side upgrade snapshot path (`config-upgrade-snapshot`) was blocked on `entity-bearing-snapshots`; that blocker is now cleared (see Future Specs/Backlog above — `ha-entity-snapshots` implemented, `config-upgrade-snapshot` `blocked_on: []`). Next: `/kiro-spec-requirements admin-config-tool`.
- [ ] lightweight rejoin re-attach (failover optimization) — **recorded 2026-06-16; deferred (YAGNI).** Today, on controller failover a reconnecting daemon does a full re-join and apiserver/scheduler receive **full** state (e.g. the whole job list), not a delta; for a large cluster this is sizable but rare. Decision (libxce-failover design review): accept full-state rejoin — it is simple, correct, and still cheaper than a full-history replace with no snapshot (cf. IBM LSF). Future optimization: a session-token "re-attach" hello that lets the new primary skip re-pushing already-replicated state, or a delta-only state transfer keyed on the consumer's last-known committed LSN. Delta reconciliation is non-trivial (the primary must know what each consumer already holds). Promote only if failover-rejoin latency/bandwidth is **measured** as a problem at scale. Dependencies: libxce-failover (rejoin hook), component-failover-adoption (daemon rejoin content), worker-rejoin-resync (worker job state).
- [x] job-array-single-wal-record — **IMPLEMENTED, validate-impl GO 2026-07-17** (reopened once 2026-07-16 for three user-directed residual gaps — bug-1443 bulk-insert partial-visibility, task 4.2's boot-replay fence gap, bug-1444 replay_wal array-blind tally — all closed, re-validated fresh GO). **PROMOTED to a spec 2026-06-24** (`/kiro-discovery`; brief at `.kiro/specs/job-array-single-wal-record/brief.md`; now tracked under the *Raft Apply-Ordering & Hook Decoupling* phase above, sequenced after raft-apply-decoupling). Original note retained for provenance: Enhance controller & scheduler so a job-array submission persists, replicates, and pushes to the scheduler as a **single WAL record** rather than one record per array element. Today a job array fans out to N per-job state changes, so a 10k-element array means 10k WAL appends + 10k replicated commits + 10k scheduler pushes — amplifying commit-engine load, replication bandwidth, and failover replay time linearly in array size. Scope sketch: (a) controller writes one WAL entry describing the array (base spec + index range/count + per-index overrides) committed atomically through the commit barrier; (b) replication carries the single record so standbys reconstruct the whole array from one committed LSN; (c) scheduler receives the array as one push and expands locally. Must preserve per-element identity/state addressing after expansion (status, cancel, completion still operate per task id). Dependencies: ha-commit-engine + ha-commit-barrier-rollout (single atomic commit), ha-consistency-invariants (replicated scheduling state). Spec advised before implementation; promote via `/kiro-spec-init "job-array-single-wal-record"` when ready.
- [ ] bulk job-array query/cancel — **recorded 2026-07-13, deferred out of `job-array-single-wal-record` scope by design.** A single client operation to query or cancel an entire array (not one element at a time) is explicitly out of scope for `job-array-single-wal-record` — see that spec's Boundary Context. Reason: array elements can be in heterogeneous states at request time (done/exited elements need no action; running elements need a worker kill signal; pending elements need a direct state transition to cancelled without ever running), which is a materially different bulk-operation problem from atomic array *submission* and needs its own requirements (partial-failure semantics, atomicity vs best-effort per element, etc.) rather than being folded into the submission spec. Dependencies: `job-array-single-wal-record` (per-element identity/addressing this would operate over). Promote via `/kiro-discovery` once job-array-single-wal-record ships.
- [x] ~~WAL group-commit batching~~ — **recorded 2026-06-17 as deferred; ABSORBED INTO ha-commit-durability 2026-06-18 (design-review reversal).** The `/kiro-validate-design` review surfaced that the highest-volume WAL traffic is `WAL_MODE_RETAIN` facts (job start/finish/fail/rusage) — not array-collapsible and not covered by `job-array-single-wal-record` — so a pure per-entry synchronous design would penalize the dominant write path. Decision (with user): **do group-commit now** — repurpose `fsync_worker` from a timer into a demand-driven flusher (batch one `fdatasync` across pending appends, advance `durable_lsn`, wake commit-eval) as part of ha-commit-durability rather than deferring. No longer a separate backlog item.
- [ ] primary step-down-on-quorum-loss — optional CP follow-on noted in ha-consistency-invariants brief (writes already blocked on quorum loss; step-down is an availability/clarity optimization).
- [ ] read consistency / leader leases — Raft §8 read-only optimization; status queries may currently observe stale or provisional state (documented deviation in ha-consistency-invariants).
- [ ] entity-bearing snapshots ("Task 11" format) — snapshot files are currently a 16-byte LSN sentinel (persist.c:435-437); real entity serialization unblocks snapshot-based state transfer and faster recovery. **Cheaper than it looks (verified 2026-06-11)**: the dual-zarray COW machinery it needs is already built and unit-tested but dormant — `xzarray_freeze`/`xzarray_thaw` in the vtable (zarray.c:695-757, O(1) freeze, thaw with `should_retain` GC filter, test_zarray_cow.c) with zero production callers (kvmgr.c:297 `vfreeze = NULL /* wired in P0-2 */`). Note: single-generation COW — the snapshot consumer owns freeze/thaw; do not add second concurrent consumers. Slot-level only (snapshots array structure, not object contents — serialize item state under per-object locks during the freeze window). Once landed, also strengthens ha-consistency-invariants §C eviction option (iii) and faster rebuild-on-demotion. **Downstream (recorded 2026-06-21): `config-upgrade-snapshot` HARD-depends on this** — it needs an entity-bearing snapshot to deliver an identical materialized post-upgrade state to every member (bug-857). **This is also strategy B for catch-up of a far-behind / empty-rejoin standby (cursor=0) — recorded 2026-06-25:** WAL streaming alone cannot serve a standby whose needed range was trimmed (bug-795/828/1147), and a new node always starts empty, so safe aggressive WAL trimming + new-node join *requires* InstallSnapshot (snapshot-at-boundary + tail WAL). Until this lands, trim must stay cursor-bounded (strategy-A stopgap, see Hardening) and the system cannot safely admit a standby that has fallen below the trim floor. Scope to add when promoted: the standby-side snapshot-install / apply path (request snapshot when its cursor is below the leader's earliest retained LSN, install, resume from snapshot tail).
- [x] entity-bearing snapshots ("Task 11" format) — **PROMOTED to spec `ha-entity-snapshots` (created 2026-07-01); IMPLEMENTED, validate-impl GO 2026-07-18** (21/21 tasks 1.1-8.1; 962 controller tests green including all 9 `test_persist_snapshot_entities.c` cases; live `--force-snapshot` soak: committed_divergence=0, committed_job_loss=0, confirmed real "HA: snapshot" install log line). `write_snapshot()` (`persist.c` ~2304-2372) now collects and serializes job/queue/host entity frames (`collect_job_frames`/`collect_queue_frames`/`collect_host_frames`) ahead of the header — no longer a bare 16-byte LSN sentinel. Original backlog note retained for provenance: real entity serialization unblocks snapshot-based state transfer and faster recovery. **Cheaper than it looks (verified 2026-06-11)**: the dual-zarray COW machinery it needs was already built and unit-tested but dormant — `xzarray_freeze`/`xzarray_thaw` in the vtable (zarray.c:695-757, O(1) freeze, thaw with `should_retain` GC filter, test_zarray_cow.c) with zero production callers (kvmgr.c:297 `vfreeze = NULL /* wired in P0-2 */`). Note: single-generation COW — the snapshot consumer owns freeze/thaw; do not add second concurrent consumers. Slot-level only (snapshots array structure, not object contents — serialize item state under per-object locks during the freeze window). Also strengthens ha-consistency-invariants §C eviction option (iii) and faster rebuild-on-demotion. **Downstream: `config-upgrade-snapshot`'s former HARD dependency on this is now cleared** (`blocked_on: []`) — see that item above. **Also strategy B for catch-up of a far-behind / empty-rejoin standby (cursor=0)** is now live: the standby-side snapshot-install/apply path is wired (`ha.c` ~3112-3147 wire-receive path task 6.1; `persist.c` ~4277-4285 local boot recovery task 8.1), with a decision path that requests a snapshot transfer when a standby's cursor falls below the leader's oldest retained WAL LSN (`ha.c:4413`). The bug-1147 WAL-trim cursor-bound guard (see Hardening below) is implemented in production, no longer just a stopgap.
## Hardening / Direct-Implementation Items
Smaller items that likely don't warrant a full spec; pick up opportunistically or bundle into adjacent spec work.
- [ ] **investigate: job_ctrl direct-mutate path (admin suspend/resume) — migrate to commit-then-apply?** — **recorded 2026-07-13, surfaced during job-array-single-wal-record's `persist_job_hook_fun` investigation.** `raft-apply-decoupling` deliberately scoped `job_ctrl`'s `mark_job_update`/`mark_job_fail` (admin SIGCONT/SIGSTOP) OUT-OF-BOUNDARY (task 4.1/6.1 Implementation Notes) — confirmed the ONLY remaining live call site that still mutates state directly, THEN fires the `AFTER_EVENT` hook, with `persist_job_hook_fun` doing the real WAL append + async commit from inside the hook (not through `apply_committed_entry()`). This is the same mutate-before-commit shape as the bug-795/828/851/1060 divergence family raft-apply-decoupling was built to eliminate for job submit + worker facts, narrowly scoped to admin suspend/resume. Not yet known to have caused a live incident — rare, synchronous, admin-only traffic. **Investigate before committing to a fix**: (a) actual blast radius if a commit fails/times out post-mutation (does it ever get observed/notified before commit — violates criterion 2.4-style provisional-state-export concerns?); (b) live-apply vs replay-apply asymmetry for this one WAL entry type — does replay actually diverge from live in any reachable scenario, or is it benign in practice; (c) cost of migrating vs. accepted-residual status quo. Promote to a spec (likely a small `raft-apply-decoupling` follow-up, not standalone) only if the investigation finds real risk, not proactively.
- [ ] **WAL-trim cursor-bound guard (bug-1147; surfaced 2026-06-25 by raft-drive-async design review)** — `trim_wal_segments` (`persist.c:1374`) bounds deletion ONLY by the open segment (`if (seg_start_lsn < active_seg_lsn) unlink()`) — it consults **no** standby `acked_lsn`, **no** `committed_lsn`, **no** in-flight snapshot boundary. With no working snapshot backfill (`write_snapshot` emits a 16-byte sentinel only), a standby lagging by more than ~one open segment hits a log range that exists nowhere → permanent committed-prefix gap (the bug-795/828 family). This is **strategy-A retention discipline that should exist regardless**. Stopgap fix: compute `floor = min(all standby acked_lsn, in-flight snapshot boundaries)` under `p->lock` and refuse to delete at/above `floor`. **Folded into `raft-drive-async` task 3.2** (which moves checkpoint/trim onto a concurrent lane, worsening the race) — but stands alone if that slips. Does NOT fix empty/far-behind join (cursor=0); that needs `entity-bearing snapshots` (strategy B, backlog). Related: bug-795, bug-828, bug-1060.
- [x] **WAL-trim cursor-bound guard (bug-1147; surfaced 2026-06-25 by raft-drive-async design review)** — **IMPLEMENTED** as part of `raft-drive-async` task 3.2 (`raft-drive-async` is IMPLEMENTED, validate-impl GO 2026-07-18; see above). `trim_wal_segments` (`persist.c` ~2597-2644) now computes `floor = repl_trim_lsn(&p->repl, active_seg_lsn, p->config.snap_interval_s)` — folding in active-standby `acked_lsn` and disconnected-slot `last_disconnected_lsn` — and only unlinks segments below that floor; the code comment at `persist.c:2634` explicitly labels this the "(bug-1147 guard)". Far-behind/empty join (cursor=0) is additionally covered now that `entity-bearing snapshots` (strategy B) has landed as `ha-entity-snapshots` (see above), with a live decision path (`ha.c:4413`, "< oldest_wal_lsn → requesting snapshot transfer"). Related: bug-795, bug-828, bug-1060.
- [ ] OP_heartbeat peers cross-validation — include a hash of the local `--peers` string in heartbeat requests; log ERROR on mismatch between candidates. Detects misconfigured nodes at election time instead of silently risking dual-primary split-brain. _(FUTURE_WORK.md §3.)_
- [ ] **peer-authentication-hardening** — **NEW 2026-07-06 from admin-config-tool discovery** (`/kiro-discovery`). XCE currently operates under a **trusted-LAN model** — any CA-signed SSL peer can connect to the controller and perform ANY operation. Three gaps identified: **(a) Admin→Controller**: `validate_host()` is a stub returning success for all peers (roadmap § below). `OP_upgradeConfig` has no real authorization gate today. **Same gap confirmed 2026-08-02 for `OPCode_schedAdmin`** (`scheduler-core` design, `cluster.c`'s `case OPCode_upgradeConfig` was checked as the closest precedent and has only a primary/standby routing gate, no RBAC/auth check) — `scheduler-core` ships `OPCode_schedAdmin` at parity with that existing gap (project owner decision: not a `scheduler-core` blocker), so this item now covers both opcodes; when `validate_host()` is implemented, wire it to both `OP_upgradeConfig` and `OPCode_schedAdmin` in the same pass. **(b) Worker/Scheduler→Controller**: workers and schedulers connect via `controller_connector.c` using the same TLS context as controller peers, with no role differentiation — a compromised worker could send `OP_upgradeConfig` or read full config via `OP_replConfig`. **(c) Cross-component trust**: no distinction between controller peers, admin tools, workers, and schedulers — they share the same X.509 identity pool. **(d) xceadmin login (future)**: xceadmin currently uses zero-config TLS (same as xce_test). Production deployments likely need an admin login requirement — token-based session (`xceadmin login → token → config push`) or password-per-command. X.509 CN alone proves identity but not intent; a login step provides audit trail, session expiry, and operator accountability. **Needs design**: role-based X.509 CN validation (controller/admin/worker/scheduler roles), per-role OP code allowlists (now including `OPCode_schedAdmin`), admin login/session model, audit logging for admin operations. Separate from the existing `validate_host()` hardening (below) which is the minimal gate for `OP_upgradeConfig`/`OPCode_schedAdmin` specifically. Discuss + design before implementing; likely promotes to a spec via `/kiro-discovery`.
- [ ] validate_host() real authorization — currently a stub returning success for all peers; MUST be implemented before `CONF_ENABLE_UPGRADE_CONFIG=1`. Minimum: verify peer X.509 CN against a configured allowlist (`--admin-cn` flag or `admin_cn_list` config), reject non-allowlisted `OP_upgradeConfig` **and `OPCode_schedAdmin`** (added 2026-08-02, `scheduler-core`) with clear error, WARN-log rejected attempts with CN+IP. Future: IP allowlist, role-based access, admin-specific CA. _(FUTURE_WORK.md §6; security-critical.)_ **Part of the broader `peer-authentication-hardening` item above.**
- [ ] validate_host() real authorization — currently a stub returning success for all peers (`join.c:13-16`, `return 1;` unconditionally). **`CONF_ENABLE_UPGRADE_CONFIG` is already `1` in the standard build** (`config_repl.h:27-28`, no build-system override found) — the precondition this item was originally framed to guard against has already been crossed; `OP_upgradeConfig` (and `OPCode_schedAdmin`, added 2026-08-02, `scheduler-core`) are live and unauthenticated TODAY, not a future risk to prevent. Minimum fix: verify peer X.509 CN against a configured allowlist (`--admin-cn` flag or `admin_cn_list` config), reject non-allowlisted `OP_upgradeConfig` and `OPCode_schedAdmin` with clear error, WARN-log rejected attempts with CN+IP. Future: IP allowlist, role-based access, admin-specific CA. _(FUTURE_WORK.md §6; security-critical.)_ **Part of the broader `peer-authentication-hardening` item above.**
- [ ] OP_replConfig access control hardening — currently serves the full config blob to any CA-signed SSL peer (trusted-LAN model). Consider: verify requester is a known `--peers` controller, rate-limit per peer, `minimum_role` check (controllers only). _(FUTURE_WORK.md §7.)_ **Part of the broader `peer-authentication-hardening` item above.**
- [ ] lost-and-found drain command — `xcecli lost-and-found drain`: reassign or cancel sidelined jobs, reset `lost_and_found_job_count`. Automates operator cleanup after config upgrade. _(FUTURE_WORK.md §4.)_
- [ ] OP_upgradeConfig standby redirect verification — test that a standby returns the primary's address to an admin tool and the tool retries against the primary. Note: redirect semantics change under ha-consistency-invariants Req 1 (no transitional-state redirect); verify against the new behavior. _(FUTURE_WORK.md §5.)_
- [x] steering sync — `ha-async-io.md` synchronized to the three-state model + own-term gate (transitional-state row/role removed; heartbeat re-arm PRIMARY-only; PRIMARY no-quorum fact allowlist noted). Done as part of ha-single-leader-role task 6.1.
- [ ] xce_test WAL/snapshot inspection tooling — extend the offline inspector family in `xce_test` (sibling of the shipped `waldump`, `src/controller/testsuite/waldump.{c,h}` + `cmd_waldump`). Two remaining commands: **(a) `snapdump <snap_dir|snap_file>`** — decode the `XCESNAP\0` header (8-byte LSN; `persist.c:1266` `load_snapshot`) and report whether the snapshot carries job/queue entities or is an LSN-only stub. This directly settles Open Fork #3 of the failover job-loss investigation (`.kiro/specs/ha-commit-durability/INVESTIGATION-failover-job-loss.md`): if snapshots are entity-less, any empty-rejoin/WAL-prune below committed is unrecoverable BY DESIGN. **(b) `walcompare <dirA> <dirB>`** — diff two nodes' WALs by `lsn → crc/jobid` to flag divergence/prefix-gaps between members instantly. Reuse the `waldump.c` reader/decoder; same zero-alloc capnp jobid decode + `c_capnproto_dep`/`zlib_dep` wiring already added to `xce_test_deps`. Nonzero exit on entity-less snapshot / divergence so both double as E2E assertions. _(recorded 2026-06-20; `waldump` already done.)_
- [ ] xce_test shell command support — add `!<command>` prefix to `xce_test` test scripts to execute arbitrary shell commands inline during test runs. Enables test scripts to drive environment setup/teardown (e.g., kill a node, write a file, run a helper) without calling out to a separate harness layer. Scope: parser change in the xce_test runner to detect `!`-prefixed lines, fork/exec the remainder as a shell command, fail the test on non-zero exit, capture stdout/stderr to the test log.
- [→] scheduler framework enhancement — **PROMOTED to spec 2026-07-06** (`/kiro-discovery`; brief at `.kiro/specs/scheduler-framework/brief.md`). Original backlog seed superseded by the full brief with iterator-driven allocation architecture, configurable job picker, combinatorial parallel job allocation, and session-level unsatisfiable resreq cache. Scope narrowed from the original seed: commit barrier wiring deferred (separate hardening item); GPU/affinity allocation deferred (pluggable via new allocator interface); new job selection policies deferred (framework enables them, ships separately). Next: `/kiro-spec-requirements scheduler-framework`.
- [x] scheduler framework enhancement — **PROMOTED to spec 2026-07-06, then DECOMPOSED 2026-07-27** into `scheduler-core` (**IMPLEMENTATION-COMPLETE**), `scheduler-allocation`, and `scheduler-preemption` — see **In Flight** above for current status. Scope notes from the original brief still apply: commit barrier wiring deferred (separate hardening item); GPU/affinity allocation deferred (pluggable via new allocator interface); new job selection policies deferred (framework enables them, ships separately). No longer tracked here.
- [→] **perf-tuning-extraction** — **PROMOTED to spec 2026-07-20** (`clusterconfig-schema-split`, `.kiro/specs/clusterconfig-schema-split/`). Originally recorded 2026-07-06 from admin-config-tool discovery as a documentation/audit item; the audit (2026-07-20) found the fields are load-bearing enough to need real code changes, not just a doc pass — `candidates`/`vcpus`/hash-tuning fields (`jobmgr`/`workermgr`/`qmgr`/`resmgr`/`xstrings`) are already dead weight in the `ClusterConfig` capnp blob (superseded by `--peers`/`--vcpus` CLI flags or never read into runtime state — see `src/docs/cluster-config-split-analysis.md`). **`port` is NOT dead** — a second review pass (2026-07-20) found `cluster_open_listener` (`cluster.c:1216-1258`) falls back to the blob's `port` field, and single-node mode (no `--peers` flag at all, `main.c:293-294`) depends on that fallback entirely; the spec now requires a replacement port-sourcing mechanism before the field can be removed (`clusterconfig-schema-split` Requirement 1.7), not a bare deletion. `heartbeatInterval`/`inactiveHeartbeatCount` (controller→worker liveness, NOT the HA/Raft election heartbeat) were investigated and deliberately kept IN `ClusterConfig` for operational uniformity despite passing the independence rule — see `.kiro/steering/config-design.md`. `fetchJobInterval`/`netioTimeout` left unresolved, flagged out-of-scope in the new spec for a future pass.
- [ ] **Raft/HA heartbeat interval+timeout as CLI parameters** — **NEW 2026-07-20 from clusterconfig-schema-split discovery.** The controller-to-controller HA/Raft election heartbeat (`ha->config.heartbeat_interval_ms`/`heartbeat_timeout_ms` — the one where a cross-node mismatch risks spurious failover) is 100% hardcoded today (`HA_DEFAULT_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS`/`HA_DEFAULT_HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT_MS`, `cluster.c:1131`) — there is no `ClusterConfig` field for it, and per user decision (2026-07-20) there should never be one: these values must be available to a controller BEFORE it has validated/received cluster configuration (a controller needs its own election-timing parameters to even participate in the election that delivers config in the first place — a bootstrap/chicken-egg constraint, not an independence/frequency judgment call). Target: `--heartbeat-interval-ms`/`--heartbeat-timeout-ms` CLI flags following the exact `--vcpus` pattern (`OPT_*` + `struct arguments` + `myconf_t` field, `0` sentinel = use hardcoded default). Kept hardcoded for now; this is a future item, not blocking `clusterconfig-schema-split`.