fix(raft): reject n_peers > RAFT_MAX_PEERS in raft_init
next_index[]/match_index[]/pre_vote_replies[] are fixed-size RAFT_MAX_PEERS arrays indexed by peer; without an upper-bound check a caller passing n_peers > 8 would OOB-write in the leader-progress and pre-vote loops. Add the guard (returns -EINVAL, no mutation) + canary-checked test. Latent since task 1.1; surfaced by task 2.2 review (first loop writes into the new arrays). No current caller exceeds the bound (sim caps at 8, HA <= 4).
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2 changed files with 37 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ int raft_init(raft_state_t *s, const raft_config_t *cfg)
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/* Validate required callbacks and n_peers before touching *s */
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if (cfg->n_peers < 1)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Upper bound: next_index[]/match_index[]/pre_vote_replies[] are fixed-size
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* RAFT_MAX_PEERS arrays indexed by peer in [0, n_peers). Reject oversize
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* clusters so the leader-progress and pre-vote loops can never OOB-write. */
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if (cfg->n_peers > RAFT_MAX_PEERS)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Even cluster sizes (>1) have no fault-tolerance advantage over the next
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* smaller odd size and can mislead operators into thinking split-brain is
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* impossible. Reject to prevent misconfiguration. */
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