Adds test_rcfile_integration.sh, mirroring clean_failover_preservation.sh's
shell-driven black-box pattern against the real built xce_test binary:
- a valid rc file's set masters override takes effect in both a piped run
and a genuine pty-driven interactive run, before the normal session begins
- --norc leaves the default masters value untouched with the same rc file
present
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Adds the integration call site in main(), between g_continue_on_error's
computation and the read loop: unless --norc is given, resolve the rc-file
path and load it through preprocess_and_run (the same command-execution
path used for typed/piped input). A NULL path (no XDG/HOME) or missing
file falls through silently to the read loop. A failing rc-file command
under scripted/piped abort-on-first-failure mode short-circuits straight
to the existing g_session_failed exit-code convention, never entering the
read loop -- so a piped script's own commands never run after an rc-file
failure. Verified end-to-end against the built binary, including a real
pty for the interactive path, in both the failure and success cases.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Adds struct arguments.norc, a --norc argp option, OPT_NORC (matching
main.c's OPT_PEERS/OPT_CONF_KEEP_N idiom), and its parse_opt case to
test.c. Parsing/recording only -- no wiring into main()'s control flow
or rcfile.c yet (task 2.2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Adds rcfile_load(path, runner) to rcfile.c/rcfile.h: reads lines with
getline() (no fixed-size buffer, so a long line like a multi-peer
`set masters ...` can never be silently truncated or split), strips the
trailing newline, invokes the caller-supplied runner once per line, and
stops at the first nonzero runner return, propagating that value. A missing
rc file is a silent no-op; any other open failure prints one stderr warning
and returns 0.
Found during GREEN: fopen() succeeds on a directory path on this platform,
so the EISDIR failure only surfaces on the first getline() call (ferror(f)
set) -- added a post-loop ferror() check to catch it (bug-1716).
5 new unit tests (11 total with task 1.1): ENOENT-silent, per-line-in-order
with newline stripped, stop-on-nonzero with exact propagation, non-ENOENT
open-failure warning, and a >4KB single line proving no truncation/split.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Adds rcfile_resolve_path() (rcfile.c/rcfile.h): resolves $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/xce_test/rc
when set and non-empty, else $HOME/.config/xce_test/rc, else NULL. Standalone
libc-only module mirroring the configcompare.c pattern; wired into xce_test_src
and controller_unit_test_src, registered in controller_test.c's Unity runner.
6 unit tests in test_rcfile.c cover all XDG/HOME combinations plus a dedicated
env-var save/restore isolation test, addressing the cross-test leak risk found
during design review (controller_unit_test runs 80+ test files in one process).
Adds the xce-test-rc-file spec (requirements/design/tasks/research), including
design fixes from validation: getline()-based line reading (task 1.2, avoids
truncating long rc-file lines) and the env-isolation requirement above.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Found via the mandatory live HA chaotic soak for this session's controller
audit campaign -- unrelated to any of the 9 audit fixes (bug-1684/1687/
1689/1690/1691/1692/1693/1694), all in ha.c/persist.c/job.c/cluster.c/
sched.c/worker.c; this is in myapp.c, untouched by any of them.
myapp_run()'s bootstrap "is a leader already known" check had a fallback
`c.ha.raft.term > 0` meant to detect genuine new raft activity processed
during the startup-stagger nap. But ha_restore_term() loads ha->term from
disk BEFORE this check runs, on every boot -- and Raft terms only ever
increase, never reset. So `raft.term > 0` is trivially true on every
restart for the rest of the cluster's on-disk lifetime, once it has ever
held one election, regardless of whether any leader is currently
reachable. Live-reproduced: every node, on every restart after the
cluster's first election, unconditionally skipped ha_start_election_async
forever -- no node could ever re-assert leadership through a real
election again. bug-1477's existing cluster_init_phase2 retry loop kept
firing correctly (confirmed in the reproduction logs) but could never
succeed, since the deeper cause -- no election ever runs to produce a
live primary to push config from -- was never addressed by that fix.
Fixed by snapshotting `term_at_boot` right after ha_restore_term()/
ha_init_raft() seed the term, strictly before the stagger nap, and
comparing `raft.term > term_at_boot` instead of `raft.term > 0` -- only a
term that has genuinely ADVANCED during this boot cycle (real vote/
heartbeat traffic processed) counts as evidence a leader is known. The
decision was extracted into a new, unit-testable myapp_leader_already_known()
(startup_validation.c, since controller_unit_test deliberately excludes
myapp.c/main.c). voted_for_name/vft==cur and primary_ctrl_fd>=0 checks
are unchanged.
7 new tests in test_ha_startup.c; RED/GREEN independently verified.
Rigorous A/B live-soak proof (identical 6-round --chaotic run, fixed vs
git-stashed-back-to-original): baseline showed term frozen for the whole
run and zero election activity on any non-primary node; fixed run showed
term genuinely progressing and ctrl-2 achieving a real, log-verified
CTRL_PRIMARY transition via a won PreVote round -- proof a node other
than the original primary can now take over, which was structurally
impossible before. Full controller suite: 1191 tests, 2 failures -- both
the pre-existing, unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake.
Residual, NOT independently verified yet (flagged honestly, not fixed
here): the fixed run's chaotic verdict showed committed_job_loss=6
(baseline 0) -- traced via waldump to one jobid missing from every node's
WAL, at the cold-boot window before round 1. Resembles the already-fixed
bug-1487 false-positive class (apply-pump-lag racing verify_classify's
expect-job check) but the reported mechanism doesn't perfectly match
(bug-1487's job was present-in-WAL/not-yet-visible; this one is described
as absent from every WAL entirely) -- needs independent re-verification
before being dismissed, tracked as a follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Last of the 9 confirmed findings from the /xce-audit-invariants controller
pass. checkpoint_task_fn was registered directly as a delaymgr entry and
ran its full blocking body inline: checkpoint marker pwrite+fdatasync,
write_snapshot()'s genuinely unbounded per-entity walk (scales with
cluster state size) held under apply_pump_lock, WAL trim, and snapshot
rotation/unlink -- all on the same thread that drives heartbeats/election
timeouts. Unlike every other delaymgr operation (snapshot send,
config-push, reconnect, catch-up), checkpoint had no offload mechanism
at all -- the one gap left from the raft-drive-async hardening pass.
Design: full offload via the SlowLane (slowlane_submit), default ON --
NOT the vtask pool. persist_apply_pump_run() already holds apply_pump_lock
across its own per-entry walk while running ON the vtask pool
(VTASK_LIVE_BLOCK); putting checkpoint's unbounded, lock-held
write_snapshot() on that same pool risked starving it, exactly what
ha-async-io.md's own thread-role table warns against. The SlowLane is
the actual established pattern for this I/O class (push_config_transport_only,
the snapshot-send path, catchup_lane_fn, demotion_lane_fn all dispatch
there) -- and persist_checkpoint() already runs on the slow lane in
production TODAY via ha_snapshot_do_send() -> snapshot_lane_fn, so
apply_pump_lock's acquisition from a slow-lane thread is proven-safe,
exercised daily, not new surface. Unlike catchup/demotion (which stay
flag-gated OFF for an unrelated, still-not-root-caused hang, bug-1429),
checkpoint's new flag defaults ON given this reuses an already-proven
code path. Inline-fallback + WARN only on a genuine slowlane_submit
failure (not -EAGAIN/-EEXIST, both non-failures) -- never silently drops
a scheduled checkpoint.
New test_persist_checkpoint_offload.c (3 tests). RED-phase forced the
pre-fix always-inline path: the suite never printed a single result and
had to be killed, proving the test genuinely detects the violation, not
a tautology. GREEN: all 3 pass. Full suite: 1184 tests, 2 failures --
both the pre-existing, unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake
(exact signature match). No live HA soak was run for this specific fix
in isolation (explicitly scoped out, not hidden) -- the mandatory
live-soak proof for this whole audit campaign covers it next.
This closes the last of the 9 confirmed findings from the controller
audit (bug-1684, bug-1687/1689/1690/1691/1692, bug-1693, bug-1694).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Violates this project's own recorded Decision Log entry: "No client
reply-wait timeout as a fix for a hung request -- fail loud at the real
transport/source instead of masking with a deadline backstop."
OPCode_schedAdmin (cluster.c) and on_fetchfile (job.c, the worker proxy
-- cluster.c's own comment says schedAdmin "mirrors on_fetchfile's proxy
pattern", confirming one shared design mistake, not two independent
bugs) both blocked on a multi-second pthread_cond_timedwait, replying
"timeout" on expiry. handle_scheduler_leave()/handle_worker_leave() (the
actual disconnect handlers) only nulled the endpoint pointer -- neither
ever signaled the pending waiter, so a mid-wait disconnect was invisible
until the deadline lapsed. The timeout was the ONLY failure-detection
mechanism, exactly what the decision forbids.
Both sites already had a working signal function on their success path
(schedadmin_signal(), fetchfile_signal()) -- just never wired to the
disconnect handlers. Fixed by calling them from
handle_scheduler_leave()/handle_worker_leave() with a distinguishable
-ECONNRESET outcome, so the waiter wakes immediately on disconnect
instead of only on the deadline. Timeouts kept as defensive backstops
for a genuinely wedged peer that never disconnects cleanly either --
this fix is about not relying SOLELY on the timeout, not removing it.
schedadmin_signal_disconnect() must be called BEFORE handle_scheduler_leave()
acquires c->sched.lock -- the dispatch wait holds that same lock for its
entire duration, so signaling after acquiring it would deadlock.
Found by an /xce-audit-invariants controller pass (Decision Log fidelity
dimension). New test_fetchfile_disconnect.c plus extensions to
test_sched_admin_dispatch.c/test_sched_worker_change.c; RED/GREEN
independently verified against real elapsed-time assertions (pre-fix:
5001ms full-timeout wait; post-fix: <1s immediate wake). Full controller
suite: 1181 tests, 2 failures -- both the pre-existing, unrelated
bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake, confirmed via a clean meson-driven run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Last of the five field-parity gaps from the original audit (bug-1678,
bug-1687, bug-1689, bug-1690, bug-1691). set_preason()/clear_preason()
set job.pend_reasons (host/resource-based pending-job explanations), but
persist_job_hook_fun's default: arm only ever captured {jobid, state}.
Neither apply seam restored pend_reasons after a restart.
Reuses the ALREADY-EXISTING JobPendReason/HostBasedReason/ResourceBasedReason
capnp structs -- no schema change needed, unlike bug-1690's WAL_JOB_RUSAGE.
Safety-checked against bug-1690's lesson (RTTI/makeString()-backed fields
need merge-not-replace, not free-and-replace): pend_reasons is plain
malloc/strdup-backed throughout (erase_job_preason is FREEUP()-only,
add_host_preason/add_res_preason use strdup()/calloc()), so a
straightforward free-and-replace is safe here, matching bug-1678/1687's
pattern instead.
New wrinkle beyond the four prior fixes: pend_reasons has a genuine CLEAR
operation, and "trailing bytes present or absent" can't distinguish a
legitimate clear from an old-format payload -- added an explicit presence
byte (0=cleared/adopt NULL, 1=capnp bytes follow), verified by two
dedicated "clear survives restart" tests.
11 new tests in test_wal_job_preason_fact.c; RED/GREEN independently
verified (7 genuine pre-fix failures, one test's own wrong premise about
capnp's garbage-byte behavior caught and corrected during RED/GREEN
iteration). Full controller suite: 1178 tests, 2 failures -- both the
pre-existing, unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake. No ASAN findings.
This closes the field-complete apply parity invariant class the
xce-audit-invariants controller dimension 7 was added for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Same class as bug-1678/1687/1689/1690: on_job_ckpt() sets job.ckptinfo
(a plain char*, xstring-backed via makeString()) but is purely hook-driven
-- persist_job_hook_fun's default: arm only ever captured {jobid, state}
for WAL_JOB_CKPT. Neither apply seam restored ckptinfo after a restart.
Simplest of the five field-parity fixes: ckptinfo is a bare string, so no
capnp struct is needed -- mirrors WAL_QUEUE_CTRL's existing NUL-terminated-
string-after-header wire shape instead. Adoption is unconditional (not
gated on a state transition), matching bug-1690's precedent: a checkpoint
report never changes job.state. restore_job_ckpt_state() releases the
prior value via dereference() (the correct RTTI verb for an xstring), not
free().
Found by an /xce-audit-invariants controller pass (field-complete apply
parity dimension) -- the last of five sibling gaps found together
(bug-1678, bug-1687, bug-1689, bug-1690, this one). 7 new tests in
test_wal_job_ckpt_fact.c; RED/GREEN independently verified (5 genuine
pre-fix failures, 2 backward-compat tests correctly passed unchanged).
Full controller suite: 1167 tests, 2 failures -- both the pre-existing,
unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake. No ASAN findings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Same class as bug-1678/1687/1689: the WAL fact for WAL_JOB_RUSAGE only
carried {jobid, state}, so job.run_usage (client-reported per-host
CPU/mem usage) was never restored on either apply seam after a restart.
Unlike the prior three, xce_job_runusage_t/xce_host_runusage_t had no
existing Cap'n Proto mapping -- a genuine new schema addition
(HostRunusage/JobRunusage in controller.capnp, mirroring JobPendReason's
List(NestedStruct)+$C.maplistcount style), verified against the real
struct definitions in types.h, codegen confirmed via nm on the built
binary rather than assumed.
Two deliberate deviations from the established precedent, found by
reading the real code rather than copying the pattern blindly:
1. Adoption is unconditional, not gated on a state transition -- a
rusage report almost never changes job.state (repeat reports keep
state at RUN), so gating on JOB_TRANSITION_APPLIED like START/FINISH/
DISPATCH do would make the fix dead code for the realistic case.
2. Merge, not free-and-replace. update_host_runusage() builds run_usage
with host_name sourced from makeString() -- an RTTI-managed pointer,
not malloc() -- and the primary's own live apply pump re-applies every
fact it just wrote. A naive free_JobRunusage_ptr()-then-adopt (matching
the prior three fixes exactly) would free() a non-malloc'd pointer on
the very first live rusage report for a new host -- guaranteed heap
corruption. Fixed with merge_job_runusage(): existing hosts get
scalar-only in-place updates (host_name pointer never touched), only
genuinely new hosts adopt their freshly-decoded (safe, malloc'd)
host_name. Proved via a real makeString()-backed test asserting
pointer identity survives, not just value equality. job_destroy()
(src/lib/jobj.c) was found to have this identical latent mismatch,
pre-existing and independent of this fix -- flagged, not fixed here.
Found by an /xce-audit-invariants controller pass (field-complete apply
parity dimension). 8 new tests in test_wal_job_rusage_fact.c; RED/GREEN
independently verified. Full controller suite: 1160 tests, 2 failures --
both the pre-existing, unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake. No
ASAN/heap-corruption findings. Backward compatibility confirmed for
old-format bare-payload entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Same class as bug-1678/bug-1687: record_job_finish_fact() wrote only
{jobid, state} for WAL_JOB_FINISH. Both apply seams either fabricated
finish_time via time(NULL) or touched nothing beyond state.
Worse than "lost on restart": apply_job_finish_transition() -- the only
function that ever set job.exit_info -- is dead code on the real
production apply path. The raft-apply-decoupling redesign routes actual
mutation through the leaner apply_job_update_transition() instead, so
exit_info was never populated at all, restart or not, before this fix.
job_exitinfo_t ({int exitcode;}) has no existing capnp mapping, so this
uses a small native (non-capnp) trailing payload -- wal_jobstate_t header
+ uint64_t finish_time + int32_t exit_code -- mirroring wal_jobstate_t's
own native-struct style rather than inventing a capnp wrapper for one
field. run_time is never carried on the wire, always re-derived as
finish_time - start_time at apply time. Both apply seams updated;
old-format payloads (exactly sizeof(wal_jobstate_t)) decode unchanged
(fabricated finish_time, NULL exit_info) -- full backward compatibility.
Found by an /xce-audit-invariants controller pass (field-complete apply
parity dimension). 6 new tests in test_wal_job_finish_fact.c; RED/GREEN
independently verified (4 genuine pre-fix failures with real
expected-vs-fabricated mismatches, 2 backward-compat tests correctly
passed both before and after). Full controller suite: 1152 tests, 2
failures -- both the pre-existing, unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox
flake (confirmed flaky across repeated re-runs of the same binary).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Same class as bug-1678: apply_job_start_transition() sets the real
job->job.pidinfo (worker-reported PIDs/PGIDs/exdata) and start_time, but
the WAL fact for WAL_JOB_START only carried the shared wal_jobstate_t
{jobid, state} header -- both apply seams (apply_committed_entry() for
primary boot replay, apply_wal_entry() for standby catch-up) restored
state only. pidinfo stayed permanently NULL after a restart; start_time
was fabricated with time(NULL) at replay instead of being carried,
drifting from the true value.
Mirrors bug-1678's exact fix shape: capnp_encode_pidinfo()/decode_pidinfo()
(persist.c, using the pre-existing JobPIDInfo capnp struct -- no schema
change needed) serialize job_pidinfo_t into the WAL payload, trailing a
new uint64_t start_time field appended after wal_jobstate_t.
persist_submit_job_start_fact() replaces the old state-only
persist_submit_job_fact() call for this type. Both apply seams updated;
a payload of exactly sizeof(wal_jobstate_t) (any entry written before
this fix) decodes with pidinfo left NULL and start_time fabricated via
time(NULL), exactly matching pre-fix behavior -- full backward
compatibility, verified by every pre-existing WAL_JOB_START test using
the old bare-struct shape.
Also fixed a genuine, unrelated deadlock this change's larger payload
exposed in test_commit_barrier_reply.c: cbrp_count_jobstate_entries_ex()
matched WAL entries by exact payload size (==), so once WAL_JOB_START
legitimately grew it silently undercounted to 0 and a downstream test
spun forever polling an uncounted target. Fixed the match to >= (jobid/
state always live at a fixed leading offset) -- bisected via /proc/*/wchan
futex inspection (no ptrace in this sandbox), confirmed as the actual
cause, not the teardown-ordering red herring first suspected.
Found by an /xce-audit-invariants controller pass (field-complete apply
parity dimension, added after bug-1678). 6 new tests in
test_wal_job_start_fact.c; RED/GREEN independently verified (4 tests
genuinely failed pre-fix with exact expected-vs-fabricated value
mismatches, 2 backward-compat tests correctly passed both before and
after). Full controller suite: 1146 tests, 2 failures -- both the
pre-existing, unrelated bug-1561 overlayfs sandbox flake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
User-reported live crash: xce_scheduler SIGSEGV in fcfs_cursor_enter_queue
(builtin_fcfs.c), called from builtin_fcfs_next_job <- sched_job_picker
(picker thread).
priv->cursor/priv->job_cursor (fcfs_plugin_data_t) are raw ordq_item_t*
pointers that persist across SEPARATE next_job() calls, each with its own
independent priv->lock acquisition/release. The existing mutual-exclusion
fix (task 2.4) correctly protects the cursor walk from corruption DURING
one locked call, but does nothing to stop a LATER call from dereferencing
a node a properly-locked, INTERVENING call already freed.
on_queue_update()'s re-sort (remove old ordq_item_t node, insert a fresh
one via ordq_put) is exactly such a free -- with only one queue in the
deployment, the picker's cursor is essentially always parked on it
between calls (sched_queue_is_ready/sched_job_is_ready are unconditional
true stubs today, so the cursor never advances away while jobs remain),
making a queue config update land in that window trivially reachable.
Fixed by invalidating (NULLing) whichever cursor points at a node right
before that node is freed, at all three sites that can free a node the
cursors might reference: on_queue_update's reuse-and-resort path
(priv->cursor + priv->job_cursor in lockstep), builtin_fcfs_on_job_state_change's
!JOB_IS_PEND removal, and fcfs_remove_job_everywhere's cross-queue removal
loop (both job_cursor only, via an ordq_peek-then-invalidate-then-delete
pattern). Always safe: next_job() treats a NULL cursor as "no more
candidates this round", and begin_session() resets both cursors fresh
every round regardless -- worst case is a bounded one-round delay, never
a crash or a permanently lost job.
New test_builtin_fcfs_cursor_uaf.c reproduces the bug fully single-threaded
(next_job() releases the lock between calls, so no real concurrency is
needed to hit the window). RED-phase independently confirmed a real ASAN
heap-use-after-free with the exact same call chain as the live crash
(freed by on_queue_update, read by next_job()); GREEN confirms 0 failures
and no job permanently lost across the invalidation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
User-reported live crash: xce_scheduler SIGABRT via glibc malloc_printerr
(heap corruption) inside kill_limit(), called from limit_update_config()
during a live config reload.
limit_update_config() called kill_limit(limit) in its error path after a
failed key_add(privdata->limits, ...). But privdata->limits is a kvmgr
created with .datakiller = kill_limit, so on a kvtab-level failure (e.g.
-EEXIST for a duplicate limit name -- exactly the rc=-17 captured in the
crash's own backtrace), xkvmgr_add() already rolls back via vclear() ->
xzarray_clear(), which fires kill_limit(limit) once automatically. The
caller's explicit second call was a double free.
Removed the redundant call; the kvmgr's own configured datakiller already
owns cleanup on this failure path (mirrors the ownership asymmetry
job.c's restore_job_array() already documents for the opposite case,
where its kvmgr has no datakiller configured and the caller must free
failed items itself). One accepted, documented residual gap: a vstore()-
level OOM failure (never reaching the kvtab step) would leak `limit`
instead -- vanishingly rare, and a leak is strictly better than the
guaranteed crash on the common duplicate-name case; xkvmgr_add's return
code doesn't distinguish which sub-case occurred, so there's no clean way
to free conditionally without a kvmgr API change (out of scope).
New test_limit_plugin.c (this plugin had zero test coverage before) --
RED-phase independently reproduced a genuine ASAN heap-use-after-free
matching the live crash's exact call chain; GREEN confirms 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
ha_persist_term() had a void return -- every open/write/fsync/rename
failure was silently swallowed ("best-effort; caller must not rely on
this for correctness"). Its sole vote-granting caller, raft_cb_persist(),
always returned 0 regardless, so the raft library always granted the
vote even when the term/voted_for record never reached disk -- a real
split-vote risk if the node then restarted and forgot it voted
(Election Safety requires durably-persisted votedFor).
ha_persist_term() now returns 0 on success (including the deliberate
NULL-workdir test-mode skip) or -errno on a genuine I/O failure
(fsync's previously-unchecked return is now checked too). raft_cb_persist()
propagates that failure to the raft library (denying the vote per its
own documented contract) and rolls back ha->voted_for_term/
ha->voted_for_name to their pre-call snapshot, so the adapter's
in-memory state stays consistent with the library's own "deny without
updating voted_for" behavior. ha->term is deliberately NOT rolled back:
the raft library adopts a higher observed term unconditionally at Step 2
of raft_on_vote_request, before and independent of the vote-grant/persist
outcome, so the adapter correctly mirrors that same semantics.
Also corrects a stale claim in controller/CLAUDE.md's Protocol
Verification Checklist (found by a sibling audit dimension the same
session): term+voted_for were never written "atomically under ha->lock"
-- term uses its own atomic store outside the lock.
Found by an /xce-audit-invariants controller pass (error-handling
dimension). 3 new tests in test_ha_durability.c drive the real
production path (ha_init_raft + raft_on_vote_request, the exact
function cluster.c's dispatch calls) against a forced ENOENT write
failure; RED/GREEN independently verified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
Open-ended dimension that walks .wolf/cerebrum.md's Decision Log section
fresh each audit (not a fixed list, since the log grows over sessions) --
seeded with two candidates: no-timeout-as-hang-fix, and commit-first-
then-reply ordering distinct from dimension 4's materialization-timing
check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AgYRU3zDTqNGV5Jk8aiKLg
