bug-1506 (controller): sched_worker_change pointed w->host.resvals_to_sched
at resvalist.data, then xlist_fini freed it — a concurrent reader (the
WORKER_JOIN hook encoding the worker's resvals) hit an ASAN
heap-use-after-free that crashed the controller and failed every job. Take
ownership of the resval data via MOVE_PTR (mirrors collect_resvals_workers);
the prior array is intentionally leaked (freeing it races the same readers).
bug-1507 (worker): the apiserver's bug-1500 execuser fix sent the submit
user ("admin") as execuser, but that user does not exist in the worker
host's /etc/passwd. systemd failed the worker unit with EXIT_USER (217),
so every job died immediately after submit. job_start_local_task now
checks the execuser with getpwnam() and falls back to "nobody" when the
user does not exist.
Verified with a full job lifecycle (submit -> RUN as nobody -> DONE) on
the clean build: all 4 daemons healthy, zero ASAN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
`xcecli jobs list -a` returned "no job found" even when jobs existed.
FilterRows routes every condition on a bitmask field (job_status /
host_status) to MatchesBitmaskCondition, which only implemented OpEQ/OpNE
bitmask semantics — the `-a` filter compiles to `job_status notnull`
(OpNOTNULL), which fell through to `return false` and filtered out every
job. (The default list's `notin(EXIT,DONE)` is compiled to OpEQ(mask), so
it was unaffected.)
Add OpISNULL/OpNOTNULL branches to MatchesBitmaskCondition that test the
raw field value. New query_test.go: 3 regression tests (notnull matches
all, null matches none, bitmask notin path unaffected), RED->GREEN.
Verified live: `xcecli jobs list -a` now lists all jobs including DONE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Job PEND root cause when the scheduler registered before the worker:
xcesched_push_workers only fires on scheduler join (sched.c on_scheduler_join),
so a later worker join's slots (set_host_slots from hconfig->mxj=8) is never
re-pushed to the scheduler -> allocation unsatisfied (slots total 0) -> PEND.
Operational fix (no code change): start controller -> worker -> scheduler so
the scheduler's join-time schedworkers push carries the worker's slots.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The RUSAGE_UPDATE job hook fires with (cluster_t*, xce_job_rusages_t*) as
its varargs — the apiserver and scheduler subscribers parse exactly that
contract — but persist_job_hook_fun's default case treated the second arg
as a job_t* and read j->job.state at offset 56. A xce_job_rusages_t is 56
bytes and shares only jobid@0 with xce_job_t (which is why the jobid read
coincidentally worked), so the state read landed one byte past the struct:
ASAN heap-buffer-overflow (READ of size 4) in thread T7 whenever a job runs
and the worker pushes rusage updates. This was the recurring controller
crash (term 3/4/5) blocking job-PENDING verification.
Add a dedicated HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_RUSAGE_UPDATE case that reads jobid from
the xce_job_rusages_t* and bakes the job's current state from a jobmgr
key_find on the vararg cluster_t* (race-free: the sole caller
update_job_rusages() holds that job's write lock while firing the
AFTER_EVENT hook; re-locking the job inside the hook would deadlock).
Regression test: test_job_hook_rusage_writes_wal_entry now passes a real
56-byte xce_job_rusages_t instead of a full job_t (which masked the
overflow) — ASAN stack-buffer-overflow under the old code, PASS under the
fix. Full controller unit suite: 458 tests, 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
tryConnect built the xce_client_config_t with C.CString(host/from/key), then a
defer freed all three. But xcecli_ctx_init stores the config POINTER
(ctx->conf = config), not a copy — client_failover.c dereferences
config->masters/from/key for the client's ENTIRE lifetime (e.g.
xce_failover_next_target strncpy's a master host on every write-fail/redirect).
Freeing the strings left config->masters[0] dangling → ASAN heap-use-after-free
(strncpy in the background C thread) after a few submits.
Fix: keep the three C strings for the process lifetime (tryConnect runs once at
startup, gCtx is a process-global); free them only on the init-failure path.
Verified: 6 consecutive job submits, apiserver stays up, 0 ASAN errors
(previously crashed after ~2-3 submits).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
modelJobToSubmit built the C job_startinfo_t without setting execuser, so the
controller forwarded a NULL execuser in the startjob request and the worker
ran every job as "nobody". Now the submit carries the resolved exec user: an
explicit exec_user wins, otherwise the job runs as the submitting user.
- add resolveExecUser() (plain-Go, unit-testable) + TestResolveExecUser
- set si.execuser in modelJobToSubmit, free it in freeJobSubmit
Note: deploying this exposed an ASAN heap-use-after-free in the apiserver's
submit/notification path (strncpy reading freed memory); the fix is committed
but needs the memory-lifecycle investigation before it can ship safely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
bug-1498 (re-dispatch): sched_job_is_ready() was a stub returning 1, so any
job lingering in the fcfs pendJobs queue was always elected. A dispatched job
was never marked non-PEND (the controller defers its schedStartJob notify to
the not-yet-implemented apply pump, controller/job.c), so fcfs_update_job
re-enqueued it on every job update and the election thread re-dispatched the
running job — the worker got conflicting signals and the job was SIGTERM'd.
- sched_job_is_ready: elect only PEND, non-suspended jobs
- sched_commit_decision (dispatch): mark the job JOB_STAT_RUN on dispatch so
it leaves the PEND set and is no longer re-electable
- fcfs_update_job: dedup via ordq_peek before enqueue
bug-1497 (double-free): sched_update's resval paths transferred ownership of
rv->val to sharedInst/w->resvals but left the request pointer set, so
sched_pend_update_killer double-freed it -> use-after-free in
build_host_eval_ctx. Clear rv->val = NULL on transfer.
Tests: new scheduler/testsuite/test_redispatch.c (8 cases): sched_job_is_ready
PEND gating + dispatch-commit marks the job RUN. Full scheduler meson suite
green. Live-verified: a `sleep 60` job is elected exactly once, runs the full
duration and exits 0 (`completed successfully`); before the fix it was
re-dispatched at ~11s and killed (SIGTERM 143).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
put_resvals (resource.c) used `idxs[i] <= 0` to skip "invalid" resource
indexes, but index 0 IS valid — it's the first resource in the table
(e.g. "slots"). For idx 0 the val was never allocated (xvals[i] stayed
NULL) and the write loop then SEGV'd. bug-1495.
Fix: skip only negative indexes (`idxs[i] < 0`), and NULL-guard the
write loop defensively.
Verified end-to-end: a locally-built scheduler now connects to the t1
controller and dispatches all 5 test jobs to node t1 (exec_hosts
populated, jobs run and exit). This was the final blocker for job
scheduling (bug-1494: all jobs PEND).
Also: add the t1 host definition to hosts.yaml (worker join was rejected
with -EINVAL because no matching hostconfig existed for hostname "t1").
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
worker/src/resource_sync.c init_builtin_load_indices registers 11 load
indices (r15s/r1m/r15m/ut/pg/ls/it/swp/mem/tmp/io) but resources.yaml only
defined r1m/r15s/mem/tmp. The 7 missing ones (r15m/ut/pg/ls/it/swp/io) caused
controller "update_resval: Success" ERRORs and scheduler "unknown resource in
per-worker resvals update" warnings, leaving the worker resource view
incomplete. Add the 7 definitions matching the existing r1m/r15s pattern.
Docs: log bug-1494 (all jobs PEND, scheduler never dispatches; after this
config fix jobs still PEND — remaining suspect is the scheduler→controller
join path after restart), update design doc + verification manual known-issue
tables and root CLAUDE.md cluster-verification status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The apiserver returns list rows in OrderMap columnar form —
{"Fields":["col",...],"Data":{"col":val,...}} — but the read clients
unmarshalled each row as a flat object, so every field came back empty
(counts were right, values were all zero/"").
Fix: decode rows as apiRow{Fields, Data map[string]json.RawMessage} and
pull named fields out of Data via rowStr/rowInt/rowInt64/rowFloat helpers.
ListNodes, ListQueues, and getJobs (ListJobs/GetJob) all use apiRow now.
TDD: 3 new ordermap_test.go tests built from live-captured apiserver
response shapes (red: fields empty → green: parsed). Live-verified against
t1: node name=t1 cores=8, 4 queues active, 3 jobs with real fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
30-round chaotic soak reported committed_job_loss=1 at round 25, but the
flagged job was confirmed present on every later verify and the final
sweep -- a real loss never comes back. Root-caused from ctrl-1/ctrl-2/ctrl-3
logs, no controller change needed: a newly-elected primary cannot fold a
prior-term entry into its own committed_lsn merely because it holds it
durably (Raft Figure-8 safety via ha_arm_own_term_gate) -- it needs a fresh
majority ack for its own-term WAL_NOOP first. That normally closes in
<200ms, but chaotic mode's overlapping-restart design let it stretch to
6.232s this run (the peer whose ack was needed was itself mid-catch-up from
its own recent restart). verify_classify ran its expect-job check
immediately on primary detection with no settle/retry, unlike verify_no_loss
(bug-1422) or wait_for_full_convergence, so it landed inside that window.
Added a bounded retry (5 attempts, 2s settle) around the LOSS classification
only, mirroring verify_no_loss's precedent -- a job still missing after that
still counts as a genuine loss. Verified with a fresh 30-round chaotic
re-soak: committed_divergence=0 committed_job_loss=0 result=PASS.
Verified 190 tests across 8 files cover Requirements 2.4, 3.1-3.4,
4.1, 4.4, 7.1-7.3, 7.5, 8.1-8.4. 1067 tests, 0 failures -- unchanged,
zero-diff verification task.
Task 7.2's sweep surfaced a real, pre-existing gap (bug-1421, not
this feature's fault): no test anywhere drives the real
repl_ack_decode_and_dispatch path and asserts term adoption fires for
the heartbeat-reply or WAL-NACK term-discovery vectors -- only the
config-push vector this feature added (task 2.2) is actually tested.
Logged as bug-1484; outside this spec's task list to fix.
Found during raft-adapter-conformance task 3.2; not fixed (out of that
task's boundary), avoided via the existing stub-and-reset workaround
already used by test_ha_prevote.c's LOST-path tests.
bug-1480/1481: config-push silent-drop reply gap and vote_ep_err_handler
legacy-routing gap, found during raft-adapter-conformance requirements
discovery (not yet fixed at time of logging).
bug-1482: myreq_handler_for_test's doc comment wrongly claimed the
caller owns/frees the io_packet_t after the call; xce_decode actually
consumes and frees it unconditionally. Found + corrected during task
2.2 code review remediation.
Chaotic election churn (config-upgrade-snapshot task 8.6's force_elect_node
rotation) can leave a standby log-conflicted after a rejoin. Fixing this
needed three compounding layers, each unit-green but still failing the
identical live scenario until the next layer landed:
1. ha_raft_on_repl_nack (ha.c/ha.h): routes a WAL-ACK NACK into the raft
library's nextIndex backoff and immediately repl_start_catchup's the
standby at the corrected position, instead of the 16-strike silent
eviction with no catch-up driver after it. Correct from the start, but
live soak still failed identically: nothing ever produced the NACK this
code was waiting for.
2. Standby-side NACK sending: ha_apply_term_entry_via_library's logOk-reject
path now calls a new ha_send_wal_ack_reply_ex(..., success=0) instead of
silently dropping the reject. ha_send_wal_ack_reply had hardcoded
success=1 unconditionally -- the only WalAckReply sender in the
controller -- making (1)'s NACK-routing correct but unreachable dead
code. New ha_wal_ack_send_hook (XCE_TESTING) lets a unit test observe
the NACK without a live endpoint. Live-confirmed the NACK now reaches
the primary -- but the scenario still failed for a third reason.
3. ha_compute_repl_stream_ceiling_lsn (ha.c/ha.h): ha_stream_wal_to_standby's
catch-up range was hard-bounded at committed_lsn, which can never advance
in this exact scenario because advancing it requires an ACK from the very
standby that's stuck catching up (2-of-3 alive, this standby is the only
path to a new majority) -- a self-referential deadlock. Widens the
STREAM_WAL ceiling (and the convergence check gating it) to the leader's
own log tail, matching raft.tla's real AppendEntries semantics
(leaderCommit is advisory, never a send-cap), while reusing bug-1478's
exact guard so this doesn't reopen that trap (never widen onto a trailing
local-only checkpoint's own unstreamable LSN).
Verification: controller_unit_test 1053/1053 PASS, clean twice, including
new regression tests for all three layers (test_config_repl.c,
test_term_safety_adapter.c, test_ha_role.c), each RED-confirmed against its
pre-fix behavior before the real fix was restored. Three successive live
run-ha-soak.sh --config-upgrade re-runs tracked each layer landing; the
final run passed end-to-end -- all 3 force_elect_node rounds succeeded
(ctrl-2: 3/3 jobs acked term=6; ctrl-3: 3/3 jobs acked term=7, never
previously reached), zero materialized-state divergence, zero job loss.
Unblocks config-upgrade-snapshot task 8.6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A node that takes myapp_run's skip_election passive path (bug-849 --
"leader already known after the startup stagger") makes exactly ONE
cluster_init_phase2 attempt. All 5 call sites (myapp.c's skip_election
block, raft_cb_become_leader, raft_cb_become_follower,
ha_elect_evaluate_and_signal's two branches) latched ha->phase2_done = 1
unconditionally after calling cluster_init_phase2, discarding its return
value. If that one attempt raced config availability and failed, the node
was permanently stranded: commit_engine_init never ran, so
apply_committed_entry never applied any committed WAL entry for the rest
of the process's life -- and for a skip_election node specifically,
nothing else would ever retry it, since the other 4 call sites only fire
via that node's own raft-library state transitions, which never happen
for a passive standby whose primary keeps heartbeating normally.
Extracted a shared, idempotent retry (ha_phase2_retry_fn, mirrors
upgrade_materialization_retry_fn's shape) plus a delaymgr-scheduled,
self-rescheduling trigger (ha_schedule_phase2_retry) -- self-rescheduling
because, unlike config_activate_retry/upgrade_materialization_retry which
are re-triggered externally by recurring commit-advance events, nothing
else recurs for a node stuck on the passive path. Wired into all 5 call
sites; raft_cb_become_leader additionally refuses promotion on failure
(mirroring the sibling upgrade_materialization_fenced refusal already in
that function -- a promoted primary with an unwired commit engine is far
worse than a delayed promotion).
TDD: 4 new tests, RED confirmed by temporarily reverting the rc-gating.
GREEN: full suite 1044 tests, 0 failures. Live-verified via
run-ha-soak.sh --config-upgrade (the scenario that found this bug): the
retry fires for real (4 failed attempts, then success) and the soak's
checkpoint-identity/config-identity/host-admin-status assertions -- the
things bug-1477 blocked -- all pass.
Two independent call sites duplicated target = max(committed_lsn,
last_written): ha.c's heartbeat/stateReport dispatch (repl_ack_decode_and_
dispatch) and config_repl.c's catchup_derive_target (used by the ACK-driven
catch-up continuation path). Once config-upgrade-snapshot's marker-triggered
checkpoint advances last_written one LSN past an already-committed
committed_lsn (the checkpoint's own consumed, never-replicated LSN slot),
the unconditional max() permanently wedges every standby's catch-up target
at an unreachable value -- the primary re-streams an empty range every
heartbeat forever.
Extracted the shared, pure ha_compute_repl_target_lsn(committed_lsn,
last_written) (ha.h/ha.c), which only falls back to last_written on genuine
committed_lsn==0 bootstrap, and pointed both call sites at it so they can
never disagree again.
Fixing the second call site exposed three pre-existing tests in
test_convergence_verification.c that hardcoded the old buggy formula's
output as their expected target; updated their fixture values (committed_lsn
4->9, matching appended_lsn) to decouple them from the now-fixed edge case,
which already has dedicated pure-function coverage in test_ha_role.c.
GREEN: full controller_unit_test suite = 1040 tests, 0 failures, clean
across multiple runs. Live-verified via run-ha-soak.sh
--config-upgrade-wal-trim (18 jobs, zero job loss, ctrl-1 reconverged 3-of-3
using the preserved floor segment) -- unblocks config-upgrade-snapshot
task 8.9.
bug-1472 (the prior blocker, worker-control replication) is fixed and
verified (7547a8f1). Rebuilding and re-running --config-upgrade on top of
that fix surfaced a new, unrelated defect: a node that takes the
skip_election fast path in myapp_run can permanently lose commit_engine_init
if its one cluster_init_phase2() attempt races config availability, since
none of ha.c's four retry call sites re-attempt for a node that never
contests an election. That member then never fires the marker-triggered
checkpoint (task 5), leaving it permanently unable to catch up past that
LSN (WAL_CHECKPOINT is local-only, non-replicated by design) -- a distinct,
permanent wedge from bug-1475's already-fixed transient race.
Root-caused via a dedicated debug pass (log/grep/git-blame evidence, logged
as bug-1477). Out of config-upgrade-snapshot's boundary -- same pattern as
bug-1471/1472/1474 -- so task 8.6 stays blocked until bug-1477 is fixed
upstream in HA bootstrap/election.
myconf->lock (mylock_init/fini wiring) had landed but load_primary_config()
itself was left in its RED-phase reproduction state (unguarded, decoding
directly into the shared myconf->cluster_config field), so the fix's own
regression test failed on resume: thread B raced through while thread A was
parked mid-call.
Wraps the whole free-decode-publish sequence in myconf->lock (acquired first,
released on every return path) and decodes into a local cluster_config_t*
first, publishing into myconf->cluster_config only after full decode and
validation succeed -- closing the UAF/double-free window a live 3-node ASan
soak caught (two concurrent handle_repl_config_push deliveries for the same
standby racing two load_primary_config calls).
Verified 4/4 clean full-suite runs (1036 tests, 0 failures) including the
specific race test.
Adds an explicit case WAL_CONFIG_MARKER to apply_committed_entry,
replacing its no-op treatment, that forces a checkpoint at exactly the
marker's own (term, lsn) via two new helpers:
persist_checkpoint_write_locked(p, checkpoint_lsn) -- the checkpoint
core (pin lsn, scan config ref, write_snapshot, trim, rotate) taking
an explicit LSN and never acquiring apply_pump_lock itself
persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered(p, lsn) -- shares the existing
checkpoint_in_progress CAS guard, calls the above with the marker's
own lsn
This fixes two hazards design.md's "call persist_checkpoint() directly"
text didn't account for: (1) apply_committed_entry's live-pump caller
(persist_apply_pump_run, used by both primary and standby online-apply)
already holds apply_pump_lock across the dispatch call -- a direct
persist_checkpoint() call would self-deadlock on that mutex; (2)
last_applied_lsn/replay position only advance AFTER apply_committed_entry
returns at both call sites, so pinning checkpoint_lsn from
last_applied_lsn inside the marker case would label the checkpoint with
the previous entry's LSN, not the marker's own -- fixed by threading the
marker's own lsn parameter through explicitly. A -EBUSY outcome (a
concurrent periodic checkpoint mid-flight) is logged at TRACE and treated
as expected/self-resolving, never retried. The new case has no effect on
entity interpretation/re-homing (Req 1.8).
New test_upgrade_snapshot_apply.c drives WAL_CONFIG_MARKER through the
REAL production call paths (persist_apply_pump_run and boot replay via
persist_recover), not a bare apply_committed_entry() call, so the fix is
actually proven against the lock-holding context rather than assumed.
Also fixes a genuine regression in test_config_repl.c surfaced by
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER apply having a real side effect for the first time
(bug-1466): an fsync-worker-thread race (t42_wait_applied polling helper,
mirrors test_apply_pump.c's tap_wait_applied) and one test call site
trusting an unreliable raft-derived LSN. Surfaces (but does not fix, out
of this spec's boundary) a pre-existing ha-term-safety/raft-log-replication
gap: persist_write_checkpoint_marker bypasses ha_primary_log_append,
breaking its documented current_lsn==log_len+1 invariant once a
checkpoint interleaves with primary appends -- log_len feeds real
RequestVote freshness comparisons, not advisory-only as first assumed;
severity corrected in bug-1466. Task 5 of 19.
Requirements: 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 4.4, 5.2, 5.3
Records bug-1461/1462 fixes, admin-config-tool completion, and
config-upgrade-snapshot spec work across anatomy.md, buglog.json,
cerebrum.md, memory.md, and the session/token-ledger state files.
Live-verified all three cluster_open_listener code paths not exercised by
the 3-node soak: no --peers binds hardcoded default 9990; a single
self-referencing --peers entry binds its custom port instead; --peers
given but local name absent still refuses to start with -EINVAL, unchanged.
Independently reproduced by the reviewer. This closes the actual
regression risk this spec's design was built around.
Review also found (bug-1457, logged, not fixed here) that pre-spec
single-node startup was already broken with -EINVAL before this spec
began, due to an unrelated myapp_run listener-open/config-load ordering
issue -- task 2.1's rewrite incidentally repaired it. research.md updated
to record this against the spec's original preservation premise.
buglog.json: bug-1452 marked FIXED with root cause and fix writeup.
cerebrum.md: Do-Not-Repeat entry for the commit_engine_fini/persist_stop
ordering contract, plus the flag-noted latent duplicate in
test_demotion_convergence.c.
memory.md/anatomy.md/session state: routine session bookkeeping.
raft_cb_become_leader()'s eligibility gate read
persist_apply_resource_fenced() before this process's own first
cluster_init_phase2()/persist_recover()/replay_wal() call ever ran --
so a node whose first-ever replay hit a resource-exhaustion apply
failure could still become CTRL_PRIMARY, because the fence that
replay would engage didn't exist yet when the gate checked it. Every
LATER promotion evaluation was already correctly protected; this was
a narrow gap specific to a process's single very-first election.
Fix: re-check persist_apply_resource_fenced() immediately after
cluster_init_phase2() completes on first boot, refusing promotion
(same WARN + ha_arm_promotion_fence_timer() + return pattern as the
existing refusal branch) if that first replay just engaged the fence.
Confirmed ha_elect_evaluate_and_signal (the other election path) is
dead in production for the promotion outcome -- every live call site
of handle_request_vote_reply passes vote_granted=0 since bug-828
redirected real grant recording to the record-only, non-signaling
ha_record_vote_reply -- so raft_cb_become_leader is the sole live
promotion path and this fix's scope is complete.
TDD: new test test_first_boot_promotion_evaluates_own_first_replay_fence
wires ha_phase2_hook to actually call persist_recover(), reproducing
production ordering exactly. RED-confirmed against the unfixed code
at the precise predicted assertion; GREEN-confirmed after the fix.
Full controller_unit_test regression (bundles every HA-adjacent
testsuite/test_*.c) green, 0 new failures.
Originally documented (not fixed) in job-array-single-wal-record
task 7.2's Implementation Notes; logged as bug-1445 and fixed here,
outside that spec's own task list per its persist.c-only boundary.
Root cause and reproduction path were already documented inline in
tasks.md task 7.2's Implementation Notes but never had a standalone
buglog entry. Cross-referenced from spec.json's known_limitations.
Not fixed -- suggested shape captured in the bug entry: a small,
single-call-site ha.c ordering fix (move the first promotion-gate
evaluation to run after the first replay_wal(), or have that one gate
call treat "not yet replayed" as non-promotable), not a new Kiro spec.
Both unrelated to job-array-single-wal-record's own code:
- bug-1437 (vendored rtti makeInstance leak): recurred via this
feature's own test_job_init_propagates_makeJobsub_failure, which is
simply the first test to drive job_init() through the failure path
that trips the latent characteristic. Confirmed same signature, not
a new leak, not a regression.
- bug-1438 (capnp parallel-build race): recurred on a clean build with
a different symptom (missing header vs. corrupted content) that
confirms the root cause is a missing meson dependency edge on the
controller.capnp.h custom_target, not just a non-atomic-write timing
fluke -- useful for whoever eventually fixes it, out of this spec's
scope.
A stale, long-orphaned background agent (dispatched early in this
session for task 6.1, interrupted by an API error, and only resuming
~8 hours later after task 6.0a/6.1/6.2/6.3 and the validate-impl GO
decision were already committed) independently re-discovered and
filed the exact bug commit 16747aa already fixed, before noticing the
fix was already on the branch. Its filed entry (bug-1444) accurately
describes the error/root-cause but was left marked NOT FIXED.
Corrected the fix field to reflect the actual resolution (commit
16747aa, task 6.0a) and cross-referenced it. Kept as its own entry
rather than deleting it -- task 6.0a's fix was documented in
tasks.md's Implementation Notes but had never been logged to
buglog.json, so this backfills that gap. Distinct from bug-1443
(the still-open bulk-insert partial-visibility gap in the same
feature).
No code changes; the stale agent's independently-derived
run-ha-soak.sh/soak-verdict.sh/waldump.c changes were confirmed
byte-identical to HEAD and made no git writes.
Feature-level validation ran 4 parallel dimensions: requirements
coverage (38 ACs, 33 full, 5 partial -- all tracing to the already-known
bulk-insert partial-visibility gap plus an admitted commit-barrier-count
inference), design/boundary alignment (ALIGNED, no drift), cross-task
integration (SEAMS_SOUND, wire format/arithmetic/contracts verified
consistent end to end), and mechanical checks including a live smoke
boot (fresh single-node deploy, real array submission, one WAL record,
all elements queryable) -- PASS.
The coverage pass sharpened restore_job_array()'s known bulk-insert
gap: it's a literal, code-proven violation of Requirements 2.3 and 9.4,
not just a soft nuance -- a resource-exhaustion failure during the
bulk-insert pass can permanently orphan array elements that exist and
are addressable but never get scheduled. Filed as bug-1443
(.wolf/buglog.json) for tracking. User decision: GO, ship with the
gap tracked rather than blocking on a fast-follow fix -- the trigger
condition is narrow and every other validation dimension is clean.
Closing bug-1443 needs a new kv.c/kvmgr.c primitive or a re-derive-
and-renotify path, explicitly out of this spec's approved scope.
spec.json phase -> implementation-complete.
run-ha-soak.sh: scope every pgrep/pkill to this run's --workdir, not just
binary name + --myname. An unscoped pkill -9 -x xce_controller (old
cleanup()) killed every xce_controller on the machine, including a
different concurrently-running soak's live primary — root cause of the
first bug-1436 misdiagnosis (a killed-out-from-under-it primary produced
a genuine, correctly-reported ECONNRESET that looked like a libxce bug).
.wolf/*: anatomy/cerebrum/buglog updated for bug-1435/1436, session and
token-ledger trail.
bug-1433: raft_cb_become_leader runs synchronously off peer_ctrl_dispatch_to_pool,
which hardcodes VTASK_LIVENESS for every inbound peer-control packet including
vote replies. The bug-1431 round-2 fix (flusher_flush_once force-flush in
persist_promotion_advance_committed) was reachable from that never-blocks task
class -- same bug family as bug-1198. Removed the force-flush; round-3
(durable-capped only) plus the already-shipped bug-1432 immediate-first-heartbeat
fix close the visibility-latency gap non-blockingly. TRACKED RESIDUAL:
persist_apply_pump_run_sync is still reachable on the same VTASK_LIVENESS path
and does bounded pread() -- lower risk (page-cache-hot) but strictly still
blocking I/O; not safe to remove outright (reopens bug-1043-family job loss),
needs its own follow-up (reclassify peer_ctrl_classify's winning-vote-reply case
or dispatch promotion tail onto a fresh VTASK_LIVE_BLOCK vtask).
bug-1434: persist_promotion_advance_committed and ha_standby_advance_committed_and_apply
raced on persist_t.committed_lsn via an unlocked load-then-conditional-store during
the promotion window (before ha->role flips to CTRL_PRIMARY) -- a losing racer could
regress committed_lsn. Added persist_committed_lsn_advance_atomic (CAS retry loop,
lock-free) and routed both call sites through it.
Validated: 19/19 unit test suites, 6-round chaotic soak (0 loss/divergence) + 6-round
sequential+leadership-coverage soak, both PASS. Also folds in raft-apply-decoupling
and raft-ha-core-safety validate-impl phase bumps to "implemented" and clears
config-upgrade-snapshot's now-satisfied entity-bearing-snapshots block.
buglog.json had been reset to a small auto-detected-noise-only file at some
point this session, losing the real 738-entry history (still present in git
HEAD). Restored the original list verbatim and appended bug-1421 (reusing
the ID a prior session had already reserved for this exact election
regression before the file got wiped) and bug-1422, both logged with full
root-cause/fix detail in this branch's other commits.
memory.md carries the OpenWolf session action log (auto-appended by hooks
plus this session's manual entries) for both fixes.
xce_test's cmd_jsub hardcoded idgen(&idctx, 0, 0, ...) (clusterId=apiserverId=0),
and run-ha-soak.sh's submit_jobs() spawns a fresh xce_test process per retry
attempt, resetting idgen's static sequence counter each time. Two unrelated
job submissions from separate process launches landing in the same
wall-clock second collided on an identical jobid, surfacing as a spurious
APPLY_DIVERGENT fence in chaotic soak that was initially misattributed to
bug-1419's controller-side dedup logic.
Confirmed not a production risk: apiserver's GenerateJobID holds one
process-lifetime idgen_ctx_t via sync.Once, and each deployed instance has
its own distinct apiserverId, so config.h's jobid bit layout already
partitions the production namespace. Fixed by folding getpid() into the
harness's apiserverId so cross-process collisions become structurally
impossible there too.
Also adds test_jobsubmit_resubmit_after_full_resolution_rejected_no_second_job
to test_commit_barrier_reply.c, proving the post-resolution dedup window
(retry arriving after commit+apply+reply+release) is airtight, complementing
the existing before-resolution test -- both known bug-1419 dedup windows are
now provably race-free, confirming those fixes were never the cause of this
soak failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VgT3n4vTv4ZjCuCTmzed1F
persist_checkpoint() stamped checkpoint_lsn from p->current_lsn (physical
WAL append tip) instead of p->last_applied_lsn (the true "jobmgr reflects
up through here" cursor), uncoordinated with the async apply pump
introduced by raft-apply-decoupling. write_snapshot() serializes live
jobmgr state, so a checkpoint taken while apply lags the WAL tip mislabels
the snapshot: on restart last_applied_lsn is re-seeded from checkpoint_lsn
and replay resumes strictly above it, silently skipping committed-but-not-
yet-applied entries jobmgr never received. This is the actual mechanism
behind kill-mid-apply producing a permanent APPLY_DIVERGENT fence —
apply_committed_entry() is deterministic/idempotent and write_snapshot()
is crash-atomic, so the bug was a mislabeled watermark, not a structural
divergence requiring a safety/liveness tradeoff.
Fix stamps checkpoint_lsn from last_applied_lsn and holds apply_pump_lock
across the label capture + write_snapshot() so the label and the jobmgr
state it describes are captured atomically w.r.t. the live apply pump.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VgT3n4vTv4ZjCuCTmzed1F
jobid_range_exists() only checks c->jobmgr, but task 3.1 deliberately
defers job construction until after commit -- so a submission that is
durably WAL-appended and awaiting its commit outcome is invisible to
that check. A client-side retry (XCECLI_FAILOVER_CALL resending the
same jobid after a transport error or failover mid-flight) sails past
the guard and appends a second, non-identical WAL_JOB_SUBMIT entry for
the same jobid -- confirmed via waldump on a live chaotic-soak node
(duplicate submits, same jobid, differing subtime/CRC) -- which can
trip persist_recover()'s post-replay apply-correctness check into a
genuine APPLY_DIVERGENT verdict.
Adds a process-lifetime in-flight-jobid-range registry in job.c that
handle_jobsubmit atomically check-and-claims immediately after the
existing jobid_range_exists check, releasing from
jobsubmit_async_ctx_release (the single choke point already shared by
the commit-continuation, apply-complete, and OOM early-out paths). A
resubmit for a still-in-flight jobid now gets -EEXIST with no second
WAL append.
Adds a matching XCE_TESTING reset seam (declared in cluster.h) so a
test that deliberately leaves a submission's commit continuation
unresolved through teardown doesn't leak its jobid range into a later
test reusing the same range -- commit_engine_fini frees pending
continuations without invoking their callback.
Regression test added to test_commit_barrier_reply.c (RED->GREEN
confirmed). Full 78-group controller_unit_test sweep: 782 tests, 0
failures.
This fixes only the WAL duplicate-submit mechanism (layer 1 of
bug-1419). The deeper PreVote-freshness/apply-divergence liveness
deadlock (layer 2 -- no recovery path when the only fresh-enough node
is apply-divergent-fenced) remains open and needs its own design
discussion; buglog.json updated accordingly.
Chaotic mode's run_chaotic_rounds restarts "the previously-downed node"
every round unconditionally via start_node(\$DOWN), but a round that skips
(no primary to kill) never updates \$DOWN -- so a stale node name reaches
start_node again while its own earlier restart is still alive, stacking a
second xce_controller on the same --myname/port without ever killing the
first. Six stacked ctrl-2 processes were observed by the end of a 10-round
run.
Fixed inside start_node itself with a pgrep guard, rather than reworking
run_chaotic_rounds's DOWN bookkeeping, so every call site is covered:
refuse to launch a duplicate if "xce_controller --myname \$1" is already
running.
Verified: re-ran the identical 10-round --chaotic soak that surfaced this.
The guard fired on every skip-round; exactly 3 xce_controller processes
alive throughout the entire run.
Note: the same soak run still hits a genuine, separate election-liveness
stall (a surviving node fenced non-promotable by a real apply-correctness
divergence, traced to non-identical duplicate WAL submits for the same
jobid) -- filed as bug-1419, not fixed here.
vote_reply_dispatch passed the compressed, self-excluded local votes_idx
(vctx->peer_idx, set by raft_cb_send_vote_request's absolute->local remap)
straight through to raft_on_vote_reply, which indexes vote_replies[] in
ABSOLUTE cluster space -- the same space raft_start_election's self-mark
and per-peer send loop use.
For a 3-node cluster's middle node (self_idx=1), the peer at absolute
index 2 compresses to votes_idx=1, colliding with vote_replies[self_idx=1]
-- the slot raft_start_election already marked for the self-vote. The
library's per-peer dedup guard then silently drops the genuine reply as a
duplicate, so votes_granted never reaches quorum even though the peer
granted. Peer 0 is unaffected (compressed index equals absolute), which is
why sequential elections and prior soak runs never surfaced this -- only a
middle-priority node losing its higher-priority peer and depending on its
lower peer's vote hits the collision.
Fixed by routing through ha_repl_ack_abs_peer_idx (already existed,
already unit-tested, already used for the analogous heartbeat-ACK path)
before calling raft_on_vote_reply. ha_record_vote_reply immediately above
is unchanged -- it correctly wants the compressed index for ctx->votes[].
Confirmed pre_vote_reply_dispatch needs no equivalent fix: its send path
already stores the absolute index.
New regression test drives a real 3-node election end-to-end through the
actual decode/dispatch path (not the test-hook bypass every other
real-vote test in this file uses): Expected 2 Was 1 pre-fix, GREEN
post-fix. Full 79-group suite: zero new failures. 10-round --chaotic HA
soak: zero committed divergence, zero committed job loss.
Adds --factstream HA soak mode driving real jstart/jfinish/jfail worker-fact
traffic against a live 3-node cluster, killing the primary mid-stream and
asserting zero committed-state divergence and zero phantom fact reactions.
Building this scenario surfaced bug-1416: persist_recover()'s boot-time
apply-correctness verification can race the live apply pump and the standby
live-replication apply path, both of which mutate the same last_applied_lsn/
job-table state the verification re-reads live -- producing a false
APPLY_DIVERGENT that permanently fences an otherwise-healthy node. Fixed with
a new persist_t.recovery_complete gate that defers only the in-memory apply
(never the durability write or replication ACK) while a recovery pass is in
flight, closed from the earliest safe point in myapp_run() so an election-
retry candidate can't apply live traffic before persist_recover() ever runs.
Round-2 adversarial review independently verified the ACK/durability paths
stay ungated, reproduced the myapp.c fix as load-bearing via revert-and-
reproduce, and confirmed real-divergence detection still fires. Live 3-node
factstream soak: 2/2 rounds PASS, zero APPLY_DIVERGENT across 5 recover
calls. controller_unit_test: zero new failures across 23 groups.
Reorder handle_jobsubmit() so job objects are constructed via
create_job() only after the WAL commit succeeds, not before. Adds
jobid_range_exists() for a fast-fail pre-check with no WAL work, and
persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit() (persist.c) operating on raw
xce_job_t* payloads instead of pre-existing job_t*. Commit remains
synchronous -- converting to the continuation-based commit API is
task 3.2.
Fixes bug-1408 (found during review): the post-commit array-
construction loop suppressed notification for an entire array batch
if any one sibling element failed to construct, stranding other
durably-committed and successfully-constructed jobs invisible until
the next restart's replay. Notification now fires unconditionally
for every successfully-constructed element, independent of sibling
failures; the client reply still separately reports the batch's
construction status.
Closes out task-group 1 (the commit-engine event-driven-resolve
keystone). Pure test-only: real pthreads racing the admission gate,
the sweep thread, and commit_on_ack, not sequential calls dressed as
concurrent. Adds the genuine two-real-thread ack-vs-sweep-thread race
both task-1.3 review rounds flagged as a nice-to-have (the existing
race test only proved the tie-break via single-thread white-box state
manipulation).
Also resolves the bug-1407 saga: task 1.4's "closed, 70/70" and this
task's initial "reopened, 10/10 failing" were both correct,
contradictory measurements of the identical source commit. Root cause
was a stale incremental-build artifact in the shared build/ directory
(ninja -C build rebuilt incrementally across 5 sequential tasks
without ever a fresh meson setup) -- not a source regression. Proven
by isolating each measurement in a throwaway git worktree with a
fresh build. bug-1407 is genuinely closed; the incremental-build
staleness gotcha is now documented in cerebrum.md for the remaining
task series.
commit_resolve_pending_above(ce, lsn_floor, rc) fails every registered
continuation for lsn > lsn_floor, reusing commit_resolve()'s existing
exactly-once/idempotent guarantee (no parallel bookkeeping path).
Truncation: a new on_truncate/truncate_cb_ctx callback on persist_t
(same inversion-of-control shape as the existing on_durable_advance
hook) fires from persist_truncate_wal_above after releasing p->lock,
only when entries were actually removed. This one wrapper covers all
three real truncation call sites: raft_cb_become_leader's
post-election truncate, the library's on_truncate_from
conflict-reconcile, and ha_demotion_convergence_fn's post-demotion
truncate.
Demotion: raft_cb_become_follower calls
commit_resolve_pending_above(&c->commit, 0, -XCE_ERR_STANDBY) --
lsn_floor=0 fails everything, since a demoted node can never
authoritatively confirm anything still pending (CP posture).
Without this, a demoted or truncated node would leave any pending
async command permanently unresolved -- the requester would simply
never get a reply, worse than today's bounded-timeout behavior.
Also closes bug-1407 (pre-existing test_config_repl flake, unrelated
to this feature) -- confirmed fixed as a side effect of prior tasks
in this series, 70/70 passing across 3 independent runs.
buglog.json had two broken auto-detection hook signatures polluting it:
- 207 entries "Missing error handling in X" / fix "Added try/catch block"
(nonsensical on .md/.capnp files, and C has no try/catch — never a real
applied fix)
- 452 entries with a literally-empty template ("Significant refactor of "
with no subject ever filled in) / fix "Rewrote N->M lines"
Removed both (659 total). Also merged 24 legitimate duplicate bug IDs
(re-logged/updated entries sharing an ID) into single entries — kept the
most recent content as primary, unioned tags/related_bugs, summed
occurrences — and stripped noise tags ('auto-detected', 'refactor') that
had leaked onto real entries from a since-merged junk duplicate. Net:
1406 -> 721 entries, verified zero remaining duplicate IDs and zero
remaining junk signatures.
.gitignore: added patterns for the scratch soak-run logs and codegraph.html
this session generated at repo root (already deleted from the tree), and
fixed the ucai-formatter-cache.local.json pattern to match its nested
occurrences (.claude/skills/*/.claude/, src/*/.claude/) instead of only the
repo-root one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SDWVNQLKxqTVHh42cH7rV3
