Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
27ef506058
docs(apiserver): document security defaults changed by bug-1945..1952
deployment.md: auth.yaml now holds bcrypt hashes of the (still public)
dev credentials with startup warnings; JWT secret from XCE_JWT_SECRET or a
random per-process secret; logout revocation is per process;
security.trusted_proxies for reverse proxies.
security.md steering: JWT parsing, revocation, secret resolution,
trusted proxies, middleware abort rule, bcrypt and role-change rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 08:58:20 +00:00
b64682dce9
docs: save scheduler-snapshot-job-allocation and xce-test-cli-ux spec docs, sync OpenWolf state
Adds the previously-uncommitted spec.json/requirements.md/design.md/research.md
for scheduler-snapshot-job-allocation (feature now fully implemented across
tasks 1.1-4.5) and the in-progress xce-test-cli-ux spec's requirements.md/
spec.json. Updates brief.md, a security.md note on an unrelated deferred RBAC
persistence gap found during this feature's cross-component survey, and syncs
OpenWolf's anatomy/memory/token-ledger/daemon-log bookkeeping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SSuXfK6nD1Nue5EjjdhjNZ
2026-08-28 06:30:37 +00:00
d70bf6a402 update documents 2026-08-10 17:51:51 +08:00
4ec401672b fix(xcecli): restore dangling CA-cert cleanup misses, enable https support
bug-1463: commit 94f50ce6 (bug-1453 CA-cert-plumbing removal) missed
GetJobOutput's dead tls.Config/loadRootCAs block in request.go, plus
peek.go's SetRootCAs call and serverInfo.CACert field access (the
field no longer exists on APIServerInfo) -- broke the xcecli build.

Removed all three dangling references. Also enabled NewAPIClient's
previously-commented-out InsecureSkipVerify TLS config, since no
xcecli method set any TLS config at all -- any https:// apiserver URL
would have failed cert verification, not just GetJobOutput. Matches
bug-1453's documented design (server-side TLS only, no peer
verification, mTLS deferred as P3 hardening).

Documented both the api-server (http+https) and controller
(server-side-cert-only, no client certs) TLS postures in
.kiro/steering/security.md, replacing a stale line claiming TLS is
handled at the network layer, plus a follow-up note for the planned
HAProxy TLS-termination reverse proxy once its cert type and
apiserver's own listener fate are decided.
2026-07-23 07:28:01 +00:00
9bbff7b016 claude skills 2026-05-29 15:00:06 +08:00