Extends persist_load_snapshot's public signature with an
out_entities_restored bool*, per design.md's documented contract. The
static load_snapshot function -- the real restore logic -- is completely
untouched (still today's watermark-only implementation, byte-identical
to before this task); only a thin wrapper was added that naively maps
*out_entities_restored = (rc==0), deliberately scaffolding so the 3 new
RED tests fail for genuine reasons rather than accidentally passing.
ha_handle_snapshot_chunk's sole call site gets a mechanical
declare-and-pass update -- confirmed inert, never reads the new
out-param (task 6.1's job).
Three tests against persist_load_snapshot directly (unlike prior tasks'
tests, which deliberately stayed on the raw-byte-parsing side to avoid
this exact function): restore-before-advance (fails at the job-lookup
assertion -- nothing is ever restored today), corrupted-entity-leaves-
position-unchanged (fails at rc!=0 -- today's code ignores the corrupted
section entirely, since load_snapshot never reads past the legacy
header), legacy-file-reports-position-only (fails at entities_restored==
false -- the naive wrapper claims restoration for every rc==0 case,
including legacy files).
This is the exact function/call site that caused task 2.2's rejection
(a live position-advances-before-restore-validates hazard). Independent
review verified load_snapshot's body is byte-identical to commit
d52eb94, the wrapper does nothing beyond the naive mapping, and ha.c's
change never reads the new out-param anywhere -- no repeat of that
mistake here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
rotate_snapshots now parses each candidate file's LSN and skips deletion
via a new snapshot_lsn_in_flight() check against
p->cluster->ha.snapshot_inflight_lsn[] (task 4.1) before unlinking --
protected files are retried on the next rotation pass once the transfer
completes and the LSN clears.
Checks LSN directly (nonzero + matches) rather than gating on
snapshot_inflight[]==1 first, per task 4.1's own note: the LSN clears
before the flag in every completion/failure path, so a stale flag=1 can
momentarily coexist with an already-cleared LSN=0. A checkpoint LSN is
never 0, so this is race-free without needing the flag at all.
p->cluster==NULL (standalone lib-level tests) means no HA layer exists to
protect anything.
Task 4.2's RED rotation-guard test now passes; full regression sweep
(test_persist_checkpoint, test_persist_hooks, test_commit_barrier_reply,
test_commit_durability, test_e2e_hooks, test_hooks, test_config_repl,
test_ha_liveness) all clean. Both controller_unit_test and production
xce_controller build clean; nm confirms only the real production helper
(snapshot_lsn_in_flight) appears, no test-only symbols leaked in.
Executed directly (no subagent dispatch) per the hybrid execution-mode
decision.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
A checkpoint file whose position matches an in-flight peer transfer
(task 4.1's snapshot_inflight_lsn[]) must survive rotate_snapshots even
when snap_keep_n would otherwise delete it. Genuinely fails today (file
removed, access() returns -1) since rotate_snapshots has no awareness of
in-flight transfers yet.
Executed directly (no subagent dispatch) per the hybrid execution-mode
decision -- small, single-file, isolated test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
Split remaining tasks by risk after a mid-session spend-limit hit: small/
isolated tasks (4.2, 4.3, 7.1, 8.1) execute directly with self-review;
load_snapshot restore (5.1/5.2, the exact function that caused task 2.2's
rejection) and the production wiring (6.1) keep the full implementer +
independent-reviewer subagent cycle, since that's where adversarial review
already proved its worth and where the remaining risk is concentrated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
Adds snapshot_inflight_lsn[MAX_HA_CANDIDATES] to ha_state_t, alongside the
existing snapshot_inflight[] flag it mirrors exactly: set to the
checkpoint's LSN at ha_snapshot_send_dispatch before a transfer's first
byte goes out, cleared to 0 at every completion/failure path
(snapshot_lane_fn's normal completion, and all 3 early-return failure
sites: malloc failure, slowlane dedup-refuse, slowlane submit failure).
This is the foundation task 4.3 will consult from rotate_snapshots to
avoid deleting a checkpoint file a peer is still mid-transfer reading
from -- the one genuinely new retention guard this feature needs (the
existing write_snapshot-before-trim_wal_segments sequencing already
satisfies the WAL-trim side of Requirement 3).
Proven via a new gated unit test (test_ha_liveness.c) that observes the
tracked LSN mid-flight while the send body is parked at a test gate, not
just before/after -- confirms the lifecycle ordering, not just the
endpoints.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
write_snapshot replaces the queue_count=0 placeholder with a real
collect_queue_frames helper: enumerates every queue in the live table
under nested table+per-entity RTTI_LOCK_READ (no retention filter --
table presence already implies config-provisioned existence, unlike
jobs), writes each queue's (name, status) as a plain fixed record (no
capnp -- matches restore_queue_state's exact contract). Any failure
anywhere still discards the whole checkpoint, including any
already-collected job frames, no partial file at the final path.
Entirely contained to persist.c -- load_snapshot and persist.h remain
byte-identical to before this task, honoring the boundary lesson task 2.2
established (queue restoration stays task 5.2's scope).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
Queue's (name, status) round-trip through write_snapshot's raw on-disk
bytes -- a plain fixed record (no capnp; queue definitions are
config-owned, only runtime admin status is WAL/snapshot-tracked, per
design.md's corrected queue model). Fails today (Expected 4 Was 0) since
write_snapshot still hardcodes queue_count=0 from task 2.2's placeholder.
Does not call persist_load_snapshot, following task 2.2's established
raw-byte-parsing pattern.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
write_snapshot now Cap'n-Proto-encodes every retained job under nested
table+per-entity RTTI_LOCK_READ (table lock alone does not exclude a
concurrent per-entity writer -- design.md's central correctness finding),
appends length-prefixed job frames after a new format_version marker, and
fixes a previously-unchecked fdatasync return. Any failure anywhere in the
path (encode, write, sync) discards the whole checkpoint -- no partial
file at the final path, proven by a real mid-encode-loop fault-injection
test (forces one specific job's encode to fail among N, asserts nothing
survives).
Also fixed two pre-existing bugs in task 1.1's test fixture: terminal-state
seeded jobs need a non-zero finish_time or job_should_retain's retention
window silently excludes them from any checkpoint; the fixture needs
xstring_table_init or every seeded job's submit/start_info silently
decodes as NULL.
Round 1 of this task also touched load_snapshot/persist.h to make the
round-trip tests pass end-to-end, but review caught a live hazard: it
advanced current_lsn/checkpoint_lsn BEFORE the entity-decode loop ran, so
a decode failure still left the position advanced -- reachable today
through the unmodified ha_handle_snapshot_chunk production path, not
hypothetical. Remediated by fully reverting load_snapshot/persist.h to
byte-identical pre-task-2.2 state and rewriting the round-trip tests to
parse write_snapshot's raw on-disk bytes directly (read_Job/decode_Job)
instead of round-tripping through persist_load_snapshot -- proves the
write side without depending on load_snapshot, which stays task 5.2's
scope entirely, not started here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
Three tests against the current sentinel-only write_snapshot/load_snapshot:
job content round-trip and concurrent-mutation-not-torn genuinely FAIL
(RED) since no entity content is written today; write-failure-discard
already passes (write_snapshot's open()-failure path already discards
correctly) -- flagged transparently as a GREEN-from-day-one regression
guard rather than faked RED, per real fault injection (directory removal
-> genuine ENOENT).
Carries forward two notes for task 2.2: fdatasync's return value is
currently unchecked in write_snapshot (persist.c:1505), and a mid-encode-
loop fault-injection test should be added once the per-job encode loop
exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
Adds the ha-entity-snapshots Kiro spec (requirements, design, research,
tasks) for task 5.10a / raft-ha-core-safety: making the HA checkpoint an
actually-restorable copy of committed job/queue state instead of a
position-only sentinel, closing the residual chaotic-soak divergence gap.
Task 1.1 (foundation): reusable test fixture snapent_make/snapent_teardown
in a new test_persist_snapshot_entities.c, seeding N jobs (varying state)
and M queues (varying status) into a real persist_t+cluster_t for later
write/load/rotation-guard tests to build on. Build clean; new suite 1/1;
regression spot-checks (test_persist_hooks 19/19, test_commit_barrier_reply
22/22) clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JDYFbrgyDHbvNYcxApKhrX
