Ran the live 3-node E2E (the last open task). Result:
PASS: 8 rounds, 30 jobs submitted, zero job loss; all 3 nodes led
(ctrl-1,ctrl-2,ctrl-3) (exit 0)
Live-covered: kill-primary -> promoted standby owns all confirmed jobs
(zero loss across 8 failovers, jobs 3->30, expect-job ok each round);
restart ex-primary -> converged rejoin, 3-of-3 each round, no phantom jobs;
deterministic leadership coverage (ctrl-3 forced via RequestVote-freshness
fence). The soak also served as the live regression for bug-1077 (~40
failover client round-trips, no SEGV) after rebuilding the controller (the
deployed binaries predated that fix).
Not exercised live (remain unit-covered, tasks 2/4/5): withhold-ACK barrier
single-outcome (test_demotion_convergence) and isolate/heal quorum-WARN
(test_convergence_verification). All 8 tasks now [x]; spec closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MSxwb2Xt5F84ATgiAZnH8V
ctx->reply.u is a single untagged union shared across opcodes (debugmsg /
get(dataset_t*) / jobid / clusterconf / ctrlstatus alias the same 8 bytes).
Commit 61e1391 added speculative free-guards
`if (ctx->reply.u.ctrlstatus) free_CtrlStatus_ptr(...)` (and the clusterconf
twin). A non-NULL slot does NOT imply a CtrlStatus*: a failover-aborted
reslist/joblist leaves ctx->reply.u.get == &getreply (a dead STACK pointer)
because xce_get_with_condition/xce_resval only cleared the slot on the success
path, not the xce_get_req<0 / cbuf_get<0 early returns. The next ctrlstatus
reply (worker thread) freed that foreign pointer as a CtrlStatus -> ASan
SEGV / stack-use-after-return in free_CtrlStatus (controller.capnp.c:11638).
Fix (root cause, both layers):
- Revert the unsafe free-guards in xce_handle_reply: MOVE_PTR overwrite only,
never free/deref an untagged union slot by type.
- Clear ctx->reply.u.get = NULL on ALL exit paths of xce_get_with_condition
and xce_resval via a single `goto done` cleanup (forget-proof; the bug was
one forgotten failover path). Also drops the now-unused controller.capnp.h.
- Defense-in-depth: handle_get_reply drops a reply when the slot is NULL.
Regression: expose xce_handle_reply and add
test_handle_reply_ctrlstatus_does_not_free_foreign_slot, which poisons the
shared slot with a foreign heap value and proves the ctrlstatus reply handler
does not free it (RED reproduced the exact free_CtrlStatus_ptr double-free;
GREEN after fix). xcelib_test 244/0, controller_unit_test 166/0, all binaries
build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MSxwb2Xt5F84ATgiAZnH8V
- Mark the PreVote denial log-reason nit RESOLVED in ha-prevote tasks notes (47f7338).
- File ha-elect-ctx-lifecycle spec scaffold (spec.json + brief.md) capturing the
pre-existing, bounded, UAF-sensitive election-carrier leak and the refcount/
teardown-ordered-free approach across both election and PreVote paths. Deferred
by decision — not folded into ha-prevote to avoid a risky lifetime refactor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
3 RED carriers (duplicate FINISH on DONE appends a 2nd WAL entry +
overwrites state; START on terminal clobbers it; replay non-equivalent)
+ 2 preservation pins (forward postdone PDONE-merge, fail-after-finish
PERR-merge) that 6.2 must not break. Reviewer-confirmed: the
UPDATE-clears-terminal arm is production-unreachable (pinned, not
driven). 22 tests / 3 RED; census 508 distinct triples, only those 3
fail.
configAck branch: per-push majority (acked_config_lsn >= push_tag,
1+count > n_peers/2 over r->ce->n_peers, n_peers<=1 immediate,
ce==NULL -EINVAL); legacy >0 counting and n_active==0 shortcut dead.
push_config_to_standbys returns the barrier result; upgrade failure ->
send_upgrade_error (rc forwarded), no success ACK, no restart,
committed_config_tag success-only.
Remediation r1 (two CRITICAL review findings):
- F1: wire production config-ACK ingestion — replconfigpushreplymsg
decode branch in repl_ack_decode_and_dispatch -> repl_on_config_ack
on the promoted-vote ep; + defensive cluster.c OPCode_reply case.
Closes the unlanded half of ha-config-bootstrap 8.1; without this the
barrier would brick every multi-member config upgrade. No schema change.
- F2: keep the barrier off the iomgr thread — export
push_config_transport_only (non-blocking) for the 5 ha.c + join.c
streaming sites; barrier path now vtask-only (do_upgrade_config).
Wire-path test drives real capnp ACK bytes through the production decode
branch. 30/30 rollout, 6/6 repl_majority, 46/46 config_repl; census 0
FAIL; pre-existing fixture leak only (less than baseline).
Green integration proof: 4 facts driven during total quorum loss append
RETAIN with rc 0 in <1000ms (vs 5000ms timeout — wrongly-applied WAIT
tripwire), pending with retained-depth=4 logged, present exactly once
on disk (real WAL header scan); reconnect + one covering ACK commits
the suffix with current_lsn unchanged (no redelivery). Completes the
bug-396 fix evidence (umbrella Req 2.8). Census 495/495.
7 cases: two covered short-circuits, timeout with committed_lsn
unmoved, covering-ACK release, sync_timeout_ms fallback (bounded both
directions), n_peers=1 standalone, NOT_READY passthrough via cap
saturation. Watermark resolved to current_lsn - 1 (design's literal
phrasing unsatisfiable per persist.h:71 invariant) with off-by-one
killing power both ways. 15 tests / 7 RED; suite baseline zero.
Verified table implemented (STOP/RESUME/UPDATE/FAIL RETAIN per
supersession; WORKER detail switch; CHECKPOINT LOCAL); unknown type =
ERROR + XCE_TESTING abort + production RETAIN fallback. All three
hooks route through wal_hook_append_classified (zero bare async
appends); RETAIN registers with the engine lock-free; facts propagate
local append rc only. 8/8 group tests green; full suite 465/465.
replicator_t gains ce pointer (set-once-before-traffic contract).
repl_on_ack feeds commit_on_ack after releasing r->lock (iomgr-safe);
four membership mutators feed commit_on_membership_change post-unlock,
gated on actual mutation. walAck branch delegates to commit_submit(WAIT)
when ce wired AND entry_lsn != 0 (LSN-0 interim guard until 5.3);
legacy counting kept for ce==NULL, marked DEPRECATED. commit.c linked
into production target (inert until 5.3 wiring). Tests 30-31 + all
repl_majority walAck cases green; 33/34 remain RED for 5.3; baseline
unchanged.
Tests 21-28: repl_active_standby_count contract (5 RED vs inert -1
stub) + 3 gate-level pins (n_peers<=1 always-true, zero-connected
reject, stateless re-accept) that 4.2 must preserve. Declaration in
repl.h; ha.c/ha.h untouched (4.2 boundary). 28 tests / 5 RED; suite
at the 3-failure baseline with unchanged signatures.
Tests 17-20: catch-up ACK exclusion vs pending waiter, membership-change
wake of covered waiter, removal-below-majority fails at own deadline
(no forced early-fail), non-blocking bound. Landed GREEN: task 1.2's
commit_on_membership_change already implements the full 3.2 contract,
so RED was unachievable; reviewer confirmed mutation-killing power and
zero production changes. 20/20 group tests; suite at baseline.
Replace no-send stub with real WAL entry transmission via
xce_wal_batch_req_raw. For each non-catch-up registered standby,
serialize the entry header+payload into a wal_catchup_entry_t
and enqueue. Keep the MAX_PENDING_ACKS eviction guard.
5 new tests: no-standbys, one-standby-send, skip-catch-up,
evict-overloaded, send-failure-continues. Controller suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Appended "Gap Analysis — Validation Pass (2026-06-09)" to each spec's
research.md with requirement-to-asset maps, status tags, and effort/risk.
Key outcomes:
- ha-repl-hardening: REOPENED with task series 7.1-7.7 — replication
payload data plane is missing (snapshot chunks and WAL catch-up ship
header-only; standbys converge on LSN without holding entity state)
- worker-join-refactor, resval-id-decoupling: marked implemented
(all criteria re-verified, full test suite green)
- buglog: 335/336 (scheduler dequeue, open), 337/338/339 (fixed in
previous commit); cerebrum Decision Log corrected (term-only vote
deny was recorded as intentional but was a regression)
