---
id: "bug-1948"
status: "open"
status_updated: "2026-10-10"
status_note: "newly logged"
component: "apiserver"
severity: "security"
timestamp: "2026-10-10T08:15:06Z"
last_seen: "2026-10-10T08:15:06Z"
occurrences: 1
files: ["src/frontend/apiserver/router/routers.go"]
tags: ["apiserver", "security", "whitelist"]
related: []
---

# bug-1948: apiserver trusts X-Forwarded-For from any client, so IP whitelist and JWT IP binding can be spoofed

## Description
**Observed:** (source reading, `.kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md` (P0); to be confirmed by a failing test before the fix)
The router uses `gin.Default()` (`router/routers.go:19`) and never calls `SetTrustedProxies`, so `ClientIP()` honours `X-Forwarded-For` from any peer.

**Expected:** Forwarded headers are only honoured from configured trusted proxies.
**Impact:** Security: a client can claim any IP and bypass the IP whitelist and the IP bound into its JWT.
**Found by:** review: `.kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md` (P0)
## Environment
- OS: no /etc/os-release; Docker container; NixOS kernel; kernel Linux 6.18.33 x86_64
- libc: glibc 2.42-47 (interpreter /nix/store/wb6rhpznjfczwlwx23zmdrrw74bayxw4-glibc-2.42-47/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2)
- Toolchain: gcc (GCC) 15.2.0, meson 1.9.1
- Build: asan (xce.build)
- Code: scheduler-framework @ 94472ee3-dirty
- Deployment: any (found by source reading; the failing test that confirms it is named in Verification)

## Reproduction
1. Send a request with `X-Forwarded-For: <whitelisted IP>` from a non-whitelisted host.
2. It passes the whitelist.
- Frequency: deterministic (by code reading; confirmed by the RED test of the fix)
- Evidence: the code sites quoted in Description; no logs kept.
## Root cause
TODO: required for fixed/partial

## Fix
TODO: required for fixed/partial

## Verification
- Test: TODO: name + file; RED before the fix, GREEN after
- Suites: TODO: suite results and build profile
- Live: TODO: soak/deploy run, or n/a and why

## References
- Related: none