ctrlstatus_fill now unconditionally reads ha->last_known_elected_at_ms into the reply's elected_at_ms field -- one atomic-acquire load, no role-branch, mirroring how the handler already reports raw term unconditionally. Serves both a self-stamped primary and a heartbeat-learned standby from the same field. "Unknown" display gating is deliberately left to the client command (task 7.5), not this handler. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RLSNJhNoULvVcUhXEFafQC
253 lines
12 KiB
C
253 lines
12 KiB
C
/* ctrlstatus.c — controller status query handler (controller-status spec).
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*
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* Implements the read-only `ctrlstatus` opcode (an XCE analog of LSF `lsid`):
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* snapshot the responding node's local HA/config state into a CtrlStatus reply
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* and send it. Answerable in every role (the dispatch-gate allow-listing for
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* that is task 2.2); this file only builds and sends the reply.
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*
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* Split into a pure snapshot (ctrlstatus_fill) + a thin send wrapper
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* (handle_ctrlstatus), mirroring ha_nop_reply_state_report, so the field
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* sourcing is unit-testable without an endpoint/socket.
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*
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* Requirements: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3,
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* 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 (controller-status spec, task 2.1).
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*/
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#include "config.h"
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#include <stdatomic.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include "cluster.h"
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#include "ha.h"
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#include "persist.h"
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#include "xce/cluster_def.h"
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/*
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* ctrlstatus_fill — snapshot local HA/config state into *st.
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*
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* Read-only: every field comes from an atomic load, an immutable config read,
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* or a lock-guarded copy of primary_host/port. No HA, persist, or config state
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* is modified (Req 1.2).
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*
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* Field sourcing:
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* responderName / clusterName — own peerinfo / loaded cluster config
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* responderRole / term — ha->role / ha->term atomics (Req 3.2, 6.1)
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* primaryName — derived from role + voted_for_name (NOT the
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* vestigial, never-written ha->primary_host):
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* role==CTRL_PRIMARY → responder's OWN name
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* (this node IS the primary; Req 2.1)
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* role==CTRL_STANDBY → ha->voted_for_name
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* (the elected leader it follows; Req 2.3),
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* but only if it is a real peer name —
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* empty or "self" → empty (Req 2.2)
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* else (CTRL_ELECTING/CTRL_INIT) → empty —
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* no confirmed primary (Req 2.2)
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* read under ha->lock (guards voted_for_name);
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* empty string ⇒ client renders "unknown"
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* (Req 1.3)
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* configVersion — loaded config_version_tag (Req 5.1)
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* configChecksum — lowercase-hex of myconf->config_sha256[32]
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* (64-char Text; Req 5.2 content checksum,
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* 5.3 divergence detection) — see NOTE below
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* committedConfigVersion — ha->committed_config_tag (Req 5.1)
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* committedLsn / appliedLsn — persist->committed_lsn / ha->applied_lsn (6.2)
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* fenced — in_catch_up || recovery_unrecoverable (6.3)
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* peers / peerCount — myconf->peers_cfg.candidates (Req 4.1, 4.2)
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*
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* NOTE (configChecksum): the schema field is `configChecksum @6: Text` (it was
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* originally `Data`, but `Data` maps to the project's structured `xce_data_t` —
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* a tagged union over job/worker/resource/resval table payloads, NOT a capnp
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* byte blob, so it cannot carry the raw 32-byte digest). We therefore carry the
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* full SHA-256 content checksum as a 64-char lowercase-hex `Text` string, which
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* the codec encodes/decodes like any other Text member (clusterName/primaryName)
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* and the client renders as hex anyway. This gives Req 5.2 (content checksum)
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* and Req 5.3 (same-version divergence detection — identical config bytes on two
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* nodes yield the same hex; differing bytes differ). configVersion /
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* committedConfigVersion (the 8-byte SHA-256 prefix tag) carry the version-level
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* identity for Req 5.1. The hex string is heap-allocated here and freed in
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* ctrlstatus_free_fields().
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*/
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void ctrlstatus_fill(cluster_t* c, xce_ctrlstatus_t* st)
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{
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ha_state_t* ha = &c->ha;
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myconf_t* mc = c->myconf;
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memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
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/* responder identity + cluster name */
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st->responderName = (c->myhost && c->myhost->name[0] != '\0')
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? c->myhost->name
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: (mc && mc->name) ? mc->name
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: "";
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st->clusterName = (mc && mc->cluster_config && mc->cluster_config->clustername)
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? mc->cluster_config->clustername
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: "";
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/* role / term (atomics) */
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st->responderRole = (uint8_t)atomic_load_explicit(&ha->role,
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memory_order_acquire);
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st->term = atomic_load_explicit(&ha->term, memory_order_acquire);
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/* current primary's election time (Req 12.1, 12.2, 12.5): a single
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* unconditional read of last_known_elected_at_ms -- no role-branch. Both
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* promotion roads self-stamp this field at the instant they commit to
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* CTRL_PRIMARY (task 7.2), and it is unconditionally learned off-primary
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* via heartbeat (task 7.3), so one atomic load correctly serves both the
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* primary (self-stamped) and standby (heartbeat-learned) case -- unlike
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* committedLsn/committedConfigVersion above, there is no separate
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* primary-only marker to branch on here. "Unknown" display gating (Req
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* 12.3) is a client-side print-layer decision (task 7.5), not this
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* handler's concern -- mirrors how st->term above is also read
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* unconditionally regardless of whether a primary is currently known. */
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st->elected_at_ms = atomic_load_explicit(&ha->last_known_elected_at_ms,
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memory_order_acquire);
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/* primary identity (Req 2.1/2.2/2.3). Only the PRIMARY can authoritatively
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* name the primary — itself. The controller does NOT track the current
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* primary's NAME on a standby: ha->primary_host is vestigial (never written)
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* and ha->voted_for_name is "who I last voted for" (frequently this node
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* itself), NOT the elected leader — using it makes a standby misreport
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* itself as primary and misdirects the authoritative redirect. So a non-
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* primary responder reports an empty primaryName ("unknown"); the client's
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* authoritative path (xcecli_ctrlstatus_primary) then reaches the real
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* primary by master rotation and gets the authoritative self-report. */
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if (st->responderRole == (uint8_t)CTRL_PRIMARY) {
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st->primaryName = strdup(st->responderName); /* this node IS the primary */
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} else {
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st->primaryName = strdup(""); /* unknown — not reliably known off-primary */
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}
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/* responder snapshot timestamp (Req 11.1): CLOCK_REALTIME (wall clock, NOT
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* CLOCK_MONOTONIC which is used for heartbeat liveness) at the sample
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* moment, in epoch millis, so an operator can line a captured status up
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* against this responder's log timestamps. Stamped here with the other
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* field loads to mark the snapshot instant. */
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struct timespec ctrlstatus_ts;
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clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ctrlstatus_ts);
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st->responder_time_ms = (uint64_t)ctrlstatus_ts.tv_sec * 1000u
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+ (uint64_t)ctrlstatus_ts.tv_nsec / 1000000u;
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/* loaded config version */
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st->configVersion = mc ? mc->config_version_tag : 0;
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/* configChecksum: 64-char lowercase-hex of the loaded config_sha256[32]
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* (Req 5.2 content checksum, 5.3 divergence detection — see NOTE above).
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* Heap-allocated; freed in ctrlstatus_free_fields(). */
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st->configChecksum = NULL;
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if (mc) {
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static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789abcdef";
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char* hex = (char*)malloc(2u * sizeof(mc->config_sha256) + 1u);
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if (hex) {
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for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(mc->config_sha256); i++) {
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hex[2 * i] = hexdig[(mc->config_sha256[i] >> 4) & 0x0F];
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hex[2 * i + 1] = hexdig[mc->config_sha256[i] & 0x0F];
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}
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hex[2 * sizeof(mc->config_sha256)] = '\0';
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st->configChecksum = hex;
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}
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}
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/* commit / apply progress (Req 6.2) — committed sourcing is role-branched
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* (Req 10.1/10.2): a PRIMARY's own live markers are authoritative; any
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* other role (STANDBY/ELECTING/INIT) has never served as primary, so its
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* node-local committed marker is unset (0) and the only honest "committed"
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* knowledge is what it has LEARNED from the primary's heartbeats. Reporting
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* the learned pair avoids a misleading committed=0 while the node has
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* clearly applied replicated entries, and keeps committed/applied sourced
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* consistently (no spurious applied>committed inversion, Req 10.3). Pre-
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* learn the learned values are 0 → well-defined "unknown" (Req 10.2). */
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if (st->responderRole == (uint8_t)CTRL_PRIMARY) {
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st->committedLsn = atomic_load_explicit(&c->persist.committed_lsn,
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memory_order_acquire);
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st->committedConfigVersion =
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atomic_load_explicit(&ha->committed_config_tag,
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memory_order_acquire);
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} else {
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st->committedLsn = atomic_load_explicit(&ha->last_known_committed_lsn,
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memory_order_acquire);
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/* last_known_committed_config_tag is an _Atomic uint64_t; an acquire
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* load mirrors last_known_committed_lsn above and must NOT take the
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* lock on this read path. */
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st->committedConfigVersion =
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atomic_load_explicit(&ha->last_known_committed_config_tag,
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memory_order_acquire);
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}
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st->appliedLsn = atomic_load_explicit(&ha->applied_lsn,
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memory_order_acquire);
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/* fenced: catch-up OR recovery-unrecoverable (Req 6.3) */
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int in_catch_up = atomic_load_explicit(&ha->in_catch_up,
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memory_order_acquire);
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st->fenced = (in_catch_up || persist_recovery_unrecoverable(&c->persist))
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? 1u
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: 0u;
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/* configured controllers (Req 4.1, 4.2) */
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int n = 0;
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if (mc) {
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n = mc->peers_cfg.candidates_count;
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if (n < 0)
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n = 0;
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}
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st->peerCount = (uint32_t)n;
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st->peers.count = n;
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st->peers.list = NULL;
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if (n > 0) {
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st->peers.list = (xce_ctrlpeer_t**)calloc((size_t)n,
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sizeof(xce_ctrlpeer_t*));
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for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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xce_ctrlpeer_t* p = (xce_ctrlpeer_t*)calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
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p->name = mc->peers_cfg.candidates[i].name;
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p->host = mc->peers_cfg.candidates[i].hostname;
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p->port = (uint32_t)mc->peers_cfg.candidates[i].port;
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st->peers.list[i] = p;
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* ctrlstatus_free_fields — release the heap that ctrlstatus_fill allocated.
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* Frees the per-peer structs + the pointer array and the primaryName copy.
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* The peer name/host strings are NOT owned (they point into myconf) and are
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* not freed. Safe to call once after the reply has been serialised.
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*/
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void ctrlstatus_free_fields(xce_ctrlstatus_t* st)
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{
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if (st->peers.list) {
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for (int i = 0; i < st->peers.count; i++)
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free(st->peers.list[i]);
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free(st->peers.list);
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st->peers.list = NULL;
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st->peers.count = 0;
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}
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free(st->primaryName);
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st->primaryName = NULL;
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free(st->configChecksum);
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st->configChecksum = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* handle_ctrlstatus — dispatch entry point for OPCode_ctrlstatus.
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* Builds a CtrlStatus from local state, replies, then frees. Mirrors
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* handle_clusterconf (reply.c): stack reply, init_reply_by_req, point the union
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* at the payload, xce_reply, then free what was allocated.
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*/
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int handle_ctrlstatus(cluster_t* c, endpoint_t* ep, xce_request_t* request)
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{
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xce_reply_t reply;
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xce_ctrlstatus_t status;
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ctrlstatus_fill(c, &status);
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init_reply_by_req(&reply, request);
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reply.status = 0;
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reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_ctrlstatus;
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reply.data.ctrlstatus = &status;
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xce_reply(ep, c->myhost, &reply);
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ctrlstatus_free_fields(&status);
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return 0;
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}
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