feat(config-upgrade-snapshot): materialize upgrade snapshot on config-marker apply

Adds an explicit case WAL_CONFIG_MARKER to apply_committed_entry,
replacing its no-op treatment, that forces a checkpoint at exactly the
marker's own (term, lsn) via two new helpers:

  persist_checkpoint_write_locked(p, checkpoint_lsn) -- the checkpoint
  core (pin lsn, scan config ref, write_snapshot, trim, rotate) taking
  an explicit LSN and never acquiring apply_pump_lock itself
  persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered(p, lsn) -- shares the existing
  checkpoint_in_progress CAS guard, calls the above with the marker's
  own lsn

This fixes two hazards design.md's "call persist_checkpoint() directly"
text didn't account for: (1) apply_committed_entry's live-pump caller
(persist_apply_pump_run, used by both primary and standby online-apply)
already holds apply_pump_lock across the dispatch call -- a direct
persist_checkpoint() call would self-deadlock on that mutex; (2)
last_applied_lsn/replay position only advance AFTER apply_committed_entry
returns at both call sites, so pinning checkpoint_lsn from
last_applied_lsn inside the marker case would label the checkpoint with
the previous entry's LSN, not the marker's own -- fixed by threading the
marker's own lsn parameter through explicitly. A -EBUSY outcome (a
concurrent periodic checkpoint mid-flight) is logged at TRACE and treated
as expected/self-resolving, never retried. The new case has no effect on
entity interpretation/re-homing (Req 1.8).

New test_upgrade_snapshot_apply.c drives WAL_CONFIG_MARKER through the
REAL production call paths (persist_apply_pump_run and boot replay via
persist_recover), not a bare apply_committed_entry() call, so the fix is
actually proven against the lock-holding context rather than assumed.

Also fixes a genuine regression in test_config_repl.c surfaced by
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER apply having a real side effect for the first time
(bug-1466): an fsync-worker-thread race (t42_wait_applied polling helper,
mirrors test_apply_pump.c's tap_wait_applied) and one test call site
trusting an unreliable raft-derived LSN. Surfaces (but does not fix, out
of this spec's boundary) a pre-existing ha-term-safety/raft-log-replication
gap: persist_write_checkpoint_marker bypasses ha_primary_log_append,
breaking its documented current_lsn==log_len+1 invariant once a
checkpoint interleaves with primary appends -- log_len feeds real
RequestVote freshness comparisons, not advisory-only as first assumed;
severity corrected in bug-1466. Task 5 of 19.

Requirements: 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 4.4, 5.2, 5.3
This commit is contained in:
Rongsong Shen 2026-07-24 16:28:57 +00:00
parent 00cd26a927
commit 1da26b043e
7 changed files with 938 additions and 23 deletions

View file

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
- _Requirements: 1.10_
- _Depends: 2.1, 2.2, 3_
- [ ] 5. Materialize the upgrade snapshot when a configuration-change marker is applied
- [x] 5. Materialize the upgrade snapshot when a configuration-change marker is applied
- Add explicit handling for the configuration-change marker in the single, unified entity-apply dispatch point (the same seam every member's apply already routes through — primary, standby, and restart replay alike), replacing its current no-op treatment
- Trigger a forced checkpoint at that exact point, so materialization happens immediately and deterministically at the marker's boundary rather than waiting for a periodic trigger
- Ensure the forced checkpoint shares the existing single-in-flight checkpoint guard, so a concurrent periodic checkpoint and this one can never both proceed at once
@ -149,6 +149,9 @@
## Implementation Notes
- **Task 5 correction to design.md:** design.md's "Marker Apply Trigger" section says "Call `persist_checkpoint()` directly" — this is unsafe as written. `persist_apply_pump_run` holds `apply_pump_lock` across the whole dispatch loop (including the `apply_committed_entry` call), and `persist_checkpoint()` itself re-acquires that same non-recursive mutex — a real self-deadlock on the live pump path (primary AND standby online-apply). Separately, `last_applied_lsn`/replay position only advance AFTER `apply_committed_entry` returns at both call sites, so pinning `checkpoint_lsn` from `last_applied_lsn` inside the marker case would mislabel the checkpoint with the previous entry's LSN, not the marker's own. Fixed via `persist_checkpoint_write_locked(p, checkpoint_lsn)` (no self-lock, explicit LSN param) + `persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered(p, lsn)`, called from `apply_committed_entry`'s new `WAL_CONFIG_MARKER` case with the marker's own `lsn` parameter. design.md should be updated to reflect this; not done as part of task 5 (docs-only, deferred).
- **Task 5 → ha-term-safety/raft-log-replication finding (bug-1466, NOT this spec's to fix):** `persist_write_checkpoint_marker` advances `p->current_lsn` directly, bypassing `ha_primary_log_append`/`raft_log_append`, breaking `ha_primary_log_append`'s own documented `p->current_lsn == s->log_len + 1` invariant (ha.c:4054-4060) once any checkpoint interleaves with primary appends. Pre-existing (periodic checkpoint already did this); task 5 just made the interleaving common instead of rare, surfacing it as real test flakiness for the first time. `ha->raft.log_len` feeds real RequestVote freshness comparisons (ha.c:258-261, 401-406) — NOT advisory-only as bug-1466's original text claimed; severity corrected in `.wolf/buglog.json`. Out of this spec's boundary (Raft log/term safety is `ha-term-safety`/raft-log-replication's territory) — flagging for whoever next owns that area.
- **Task 3 → task 4 heads-up:** `restore_host_state(cluster_t*, const char*, uint32_t)` (worker.c) is standalone and NOT yet wired into `load_snapshot`. Task 4 dispatches decoded `HostAdminState` frames to it. `restore_host_state` runs on the live vtask pool (called from `ha_handle_snapshot_chunk` → `persist_load_snapshot`), not a quiesced phase — a concurrent real first-time join for the same host is architecturally possible; verified safe by convergent key_find/makeWorker semantics (see worker.c comment above `restore_host_state`'s key_find call), not by absence of concurrency. Task 4 should confirm this contract still holds once wired in.
- **Task 2.3 → task 6.1 heads-up:** `read_active_config_bytes` (persist.c) is the fully-inlined (no config_repl.c call) pattern for reading live config bytes off disk fresh each time — task 6.1's activation-fence verify function needs the identical "always re-read live bytes, never trust a cached/embedded copy" discipline (design.md is explicit about this). Reuse/mirror `read_active_config_bytes` rather than re-deriving the config_repl.c-avoidance reasoning from scratch.

View file

@ -7756,18 +7756,20 @@
"error_message": "nix develop fails: hash mismatch for c-capnproto fixed-output derivation (expected sha256-9dzSc3w+yxYzsF/rZe3qIarKOpjt2zvIyjuS5FXngIM=, got sha256-9rTlcTia+s9ARGeTi+8auGvM0RkS+wZK7aIkzecaeSk=)",
"file": "src/flake.nix",
"root_cause": "flake pins c-capnproto to the MUTABLE github archive/main.tar.gz; upstream main branch advanced so the tarball content/hash drifted, breaking the fixed-output derivation. Only pre-cached nix stores still build.",
"fix": "RESOLVED: user refreshed src/flake.lock; fresh nix develop builds (capnproto 1.2.0). A clean controller rebuild made the full controller test suite green (Ok:1 Fail:0, 12.7s) \u2014 the earlier wal_catchup -EAGAIN/decode failures were a STALE incremental-build artifact (schema compiled against the drifted toolchain), not fsync or a source regression.",
"fix": "RESOLVED: user refreshed src/flake.lock; fresh nix develop builds (capnproto 1.2.0). A clean controller rebuild made the full controller test suite green (Ok:1 Fail:0, 12.7s) \u2014 the earlier wal_catchup -EAGAIN/decode failures were a STALE incremental-build artifact (schema compiled against the drifted toolchain), not fsync or a source regression. RECURRENCE 2026-07-23 (config worktree, /xce-build controller build+report task for config-upgrade-snapshot Task 1 RED-phase capture): identical hash mismatch reproduced verbatim (same specified sha256-9dzSc3w+yxYzsF/rZe3qIarKOpjt2zvIyjuS5FXngIM= vs got sha256-9rTlcTia+s9ARGeTi+8auGvM0RkS+wZK7aIkzecaeSk= for capnpc-1.0.1.drv source.drv) on FIRST invocation and again on an identical immediate RETRY (deterministic, not transient -- unlike the unrelated ninja-race bugs, retrying does not help here). Build never reached compilation; no xce_controller, controller_unit_test, or xce_test binaries produced; controller.capnp.c/h were not regenerated. This worktree (config, at .../worktrees/config) still has the pre-fix flake.lock/pin state -- the 2026-06-22 fix (refreshing src/flake.lock) was apparently not carried into this worktree, or upstream c-capnproto main.tar.gz drifted again since. NOT fixed this run (build+report only, no source/flake edits authorized by the task). Next step: refresh src/flake.lock in this worktree (nix flake update / lock the xbuild input) the same way the 2026-06-22 fix did, then retry the controller build. RECURRENCE 3 (2026-07-23, config worktree, config-upgrade-snapshot Task 1 implementer session): identical hash mismatch reproduced again AFTER a prior subagent had already logged occurrence 2 (build+report task, no fix attempted). This session went further: (1) confirmed `nix flake lock --update-input xbuild` in src/ is a NO-OP -- xbuild is already pinned to the latest available shen390s/my-nix-channel@master commit (073f527e), so re-locking flake.lock does NOT fix this recurrence (the previous 2026-06-22 fix's mechanism -- refresh flake.lock -- no longer applies once xbuild is already current); (2) confirmed via direct `nix develop` in the CANONICAL non-worktree repo (/home/rshen/projects/xce/xce/src) that it fails IDENTICALLY (same two sha256 hashes, same capnpc-1.0.1.drv path) -- this is a live, machine-wide, upstream c-capnproto main.tar.gz drift, NOT a worktree-isolation problem, and is not fixable from within this repo at all (the broken pin lives inside the external shen390s/my-nix-channel flake, at whatever commit is currently latest); (3) WORKAROUND discovered and used successfully: this machine's /nix/store already has REALIZED (fully built, not just .drv) output paths for capnpc-1.0.1 and capnproto-1.2.0 from a build that completed before the drift -- `find /nix/store -maxdepth 1 -iname '*capnp*'` surfaces them; invoking their bin/capnp and bin/capnpc-c binaries DIRECTLY (bypassing `nix develop`'s full devShell evaluation entirely) still works and successfully compiled a controller.capnp schema change end-to-end, generating correct bindings. This unblocks schema-level capnp verification even while the full `nix develop` shell is broken, but does NOT unblock a full project build/link -- controller_unit_test additionally needs `librtti` (fetched via a private SSH git flake input), which has NEVER been built/cached on this machine at all (no .drv or realized store path exists for it), so a full build+test run remains genuinely infeasible until either upstream fixes the c-capnproto pin or a machine with a pre-cached librtti+full toolchain is used.",
"tags": [
"nix",
"flake",
"c-capnproto",
"env",
"build",
"worktree-isolation"
"worktree-isolation",
"worktree"
],
"related_bugs": [],
"occurrences": 1,
"last_seen": "2026-06-22T03:45:00Z"
"occurrences": 4,
"last_seen": "2026-07-24T08:00:00Z",
"recurrence_4_RESOLVED": "2026-07-24, config-upgrade-snapshot task 1 resumption session: RESOLVED (repo-local fix, no longer machine-wide-blocked as recurrence 3 concluded). Added a local override in src/nixSupport/xce.nix's capnpc derivation -- `src = pkgs.fetchFromGitHub { owner = \"shen390s\"; repo = \"c-capnproto\"; rev = \"e45ff682c4756ac5067cbac6d0f282a8ea5f0155\"; sha256 = \"sha256-9rTlcTia+s9ARGeTi+8auGvM0RkS+wZK7aIkzecaeSk=\"; }` -- pinning capnpc's source to an IMMUTABLE commit (the exact content the drifted `main` tarball happened to resolve to, so the hash matches what was already realized in the local /nix/store from recurrence 3's workaround) instead of upstream xbuild's package.nix pinning the MUTABLE `main` ref. This makes the fix independent of upstream's moving target permanently, not just until the next drift. Verified end-to-end: `nix develop --command meson setup xce.build --buildtype=debug -Db_sanitize=address --reconfigure && ninja -C xce.build controller/controller_unit_test` built clean (librtti and all other deps resolved fine -- recurrence 3's librtti-never-cached concern did not reproduce, this machine already had it), and the full `controller_unit_test` binary ran to completion: 978 Tests 0 Failures 0 Ignored, OK. Do-not-repeat: when a fixed-output-derivation hash mismatch traces to an upstream flake pinning a MUTABLE branch/ref (not a tag/commit), the durable fix is a local override.overrideAttrs pinning `src` to an explicit immutable commit + matching sha256 in the CONSUMING repo's own nix file -- do not wait on upstream or keep re-locking flake.lock (recurrence 3 already proved that path is a dead end once xbuild is already at its latest available commit)."
},
{
"id": "bug-920",
@ -13775,5 +13777,68 @@
],
"occurrences": 1,
"last_seen": "2026-07-23T06:58:42.000Z"
},
{
"id": "bug-1464",
"timestamp": "2026-07-23T09:50:00Z",
"error_message": "deploy-ha.sh FAIL: Error: xceadmin binary not found -- run 'xce-build.sh xceadmin' or 'nix build .#xcecore' first (after controller had just been rebuilt and xceadmin had been built successfully earlier in the same session)",
"file": "src/tools/xce-build.sh",
"root_cause": "setup_build() unconditionally does rm -rf \"$BUILD_DIR\" before every single-component build (controller, xceadmin, etc.), and all components share the same default BUILD_DIR=xce.build for the asan profile. Building controller after xceadmin (or vice versa) wipes the previous component entirely out of the shared build dir -- only the most-recently-built component survives. Only COMPONENT=all does one setup_build() + a single unfiltered meson compile, so it is the only invocation that leaves multiple components coexisting.",
"fix": "No code change; workflow fix -- when a downstream task (HA soak deploy-ha.sh) needs both xce_controller/xce_test AND the xceadmin venv present simultaneously in xce.build, run '/xce-build all' (or '/xce-build all asan') once instead of separate '/xce-build controller' + '/xce-build xceadmin' invocations, since the second call's setup_build() rm -rf wipes what the first call produced.",
"tags": [
"build",
"xce-build.sh",
"meson",
"xceadmin",
"controller",
"ha-soak",
"workflow"
],
"related_bugs": [],
"occurrences": 1,
"last_seen": "2026-07-23T09:50:00Z"
},
{
"id": "bug-1465",
"timestamp": "2026-07-24T08:00:00Z",
"error_message": "test_snapent_checkpoint_job_content_roundtrip / test_snapent_checkpoint_concurrent_mutation_not_torn / test_snapent_checkpoint_queue_status_roundtrip: FAIL: checkpoint file must parse as a well-formed entity-bearing format_version=1 payload",
"file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_persist_snapshot_entities.c",
"root_cause": "config-upgrade-snapshot task 1 bumped persist.c's SNAPSHOT_FORMAT_VERSION from 1u to 2u (reserving the version for the HostAdminState/QueueAdminState capnp migration). test_persist_snapshot_entities.c (ha-entity-snapshots spec) defines its OWN independent SNAPENT_TEST_FORMAT_VERSION=1u constant to structurally validate checkpoint bytes it reads directly, bypassing load_snapshot by design (testing the write-side/task 2.1-2.2 boundary, not the restore boundary). persist_checkpoint() now always writes format_version=2, so the test's stale hardcoded 1u check correctly (if inconveniently) rejected every checkpoint as unrecognized -- this is the same fail-loud format-mismatch behavior Requirement 5.7 mandates, just tripping up a test written before the bump existed.",
"fix": "Updated SNAPENT_TEST_FORMAT_VERSION from 1u to 2u in test_persist_snapshot_entities.c (one #define site; both use sites at the job-frame and queue-frame readers already referenced the constant, not a separate hardcoded literal). Mirrors the same fix already applied to test_config_repl.c's three fake_fmt sites for the same version bump. No other code in that file changed -- it belongs to a different, already-shipped spec.",
"tags": [
"controller",
"persist.c",
"snapshot",
"format-version",
"test-regression",
"config-upgrade-snapshot",
"ha-entity-snapshots"
],
"related_bugs": [],
"occurrences": 1,
"last_seen": "2026-07-24T08:00:00Z"
},
{
"id": "bug-1466",
"timestamp": "2026-07-24T15:36:56.329888Z",
"error_message": "test_config_repl.c: test_committed_marker_survives_checkpoint_trim and test_commit_advance_retry_clears_push_before_commit_fence flaked/failed (persist_checkpoint returned -EBUSY; new_mlsn <= committed_at_old) after wiring config-upgrade-snapshot task 5's WAL_CONFIG_MARKER apply case",
"file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_config_repl.c",
"root_cause": "Two related findings from wiring apply_committed_entry's new WAL_CONFIG_MARKER case (persist.c, config-upgrade-snapshot task 5), which for the first time makes applying a config marker synchronously trigger a real checkpoint: (1) persist_apply_pump_kick's dispatch is a CAS race between the calling thread (inside commit_submit's synchronous commit_resolve_pending) and persist_start's independent fsync_worker thread (via commit_on_durable_advance) -- when the fsync thread wins, commit_submit's WAIT mode returns having waited only for COMMIT, not for the marker's now-real APPLY+CHECKPOINT side effect on that other thread, so a fixture's own subsequent persist_checkpoint()/LSN bookkeeping can race the still-in-flight background checkpoint. This race was always latent (applying a marker used to be a no-op) but was invisible until task 5 gave it a real, observable side effect. (2) DEEPER pre-existing architectural finding: persist_write_checkpoint_marker (called by any checkpoint, periodic or marker-triggered) appends its local-only, never-replicated WAL_CHECKPOINT entry by incrementing persist_t's current_lsn directly, WITHOUT going through ha_primary_log_append/raft_log_append -- this violates ha_primary_log_append's own documented co-tracking invariant 'p->current_lsn == s->log_len + 1 always holds' (ha.c:4057). Consequence: config_append_marker's returned lsn (sourced from raft's own s->log_len, which under-counts once a checkpoint has interleaved) becomes unreliable as an exact physical-position identifier for any marker appended after an earlier marker's checkpoint has run -- exactly the scenario Requirement 4.4 (overlapping markers) requires. Verified this does NOT corrupt on-disk data or commit/durability correctness: commit_advance_locked's majority_candidate_locked (commit.c) is driven entirely by persist_t's own durable_lsn/current_lsn, never by raft's s->log_len (that library value is documented as advisory-only for commit-ceiling purposes, ha-term-safety commit-ceiling-optA). The bug is confined to callers trusting the RETURNED lsn from config_append_marker/ha_primary_log_append for precise identity/ordering once a checkpoint has occurred earlier in the WAL. This is pre-existing (the periodic WAL-threshold checkpoint trigger has always had the same bypass) but was never observable before because periodic checkpoints require >=100 WAL records to fire, essentially never happening between two closely-spaced marker appends in a unit test; task 5's marker-triggered checkpoint fires on EVERY marker commit, making it the common case. SEVERITY CORRECTION (2026-07-24, kiro-review of task 5): the original \"advisory-only... does NOT affect correctness\" framing UNDERSTATES real risk. ha->raft.log_len (the same value as s->log_len) is a direct input to Raft RequestVote freshness comparisons (ha.c:258-261, my_last_log_index; ha.c:401-406, my_last_log_term via persist_entry_term(c, log_len)) -- NOT debug/advisory-only. ha_primary_log_append itself documents (ha.c:4054-4060) that its own LSN-assignment correctness RELIES on p->current_lsn == s->log_len + 1 holding; once a checkpoint marker breaks that invariant, the next primary append receives a library-assigned index that may no longer match its true physical WAL position, so persist_entry_term() lookups keyed by that index can resolve to the wrong WAL entry. Confirmed via kiro-review independent trace, not yet reproduced as a live failure. Pre-existing (not introduced by task 5 -- the periodic WAL-threshold checkpoint trigger already had this bypass; task 5 only made the interleaving common instead of rare). Still correctly out of config-upgrade-snapshot task 5's boundary to fix -- flagging with corrected severity for whoever next owns ha-term-safety/raft-log-replication so it is not deprioritized based on the original advisory-only framing.",
"fix": "(1) Added t42_wait_applied() (mirrors test_apply_pump.c's tap_wait_applied) and called it from t43_commit_marker and directly in test_committed_marker_survives_checkpoint_trim, polling persist_last_applied_lsn() before any LSN-sensitive step following a marker commit, closing the fsync-thread race. (2) Changed t43_append_marker_uncommitted to return the TRUE physical lsn read directly from persist_t (c->persist.current_lsn - 1) instead of trusting config_append_marker's returned (raft-library-derived, now-unreliable) lsn -- matching how production code that needs precise positioning (persist.c's apply seam, which receives lsn from the WAL entry's own on-disk header) already effectively does it. Did NOT attempt to fix the deeper co-tracking invariant gap in ha.c/raft.c (out of config-upgrade-snapshot task 5's scope -- would require raft-log-replication/ha-term-safety spec owners to add a log_len resync after any local-only checkpoint-marker append on a raft leader); flagged as a follow-up finding in the task 5 status report instead.",
"tags": [
"checkpoint",
"needs-owner",
"severity-corrected",
"persist.c",
"vote-freshness",
"config-upgrade-snapshot",
"raft-log-index",
"architectural-finding",
"race-condition",
"test-flake"
],
"related_bugs": [],
"occurrences": 1,
"last_seen": "2026-07-24T15:36:56.329908Z"
}
]

View file

@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ controller_unit_test_src = [
'testsuite/test_job_array_fence.c',
'testsuite/test_job_array_replay_fence.c',
'testsuite/test_upgrade_snapshot_restore.c',
'testsuite/test_upgrade_snapshot_apply.c',
'ctrlstatus.c',
'commit.c',
'job.c',

View file

@ -2678,6 +2678,51 @@ static void schedule_checkpoint(persist_t* persist)
checkpoint_task_fn, persist);
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Checkpoint core (shared by persist_checkpoint and the marker-apply */
/* trigger, config-upgrade-snapshot task 5) */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* persist_checkpoint_write_locked: pin checkpoint_lsn to the EXPLICIT
* `checkpoint_lsn` given (never re-derived internally from
* last_applied_lsn), capture the committed-config reference, and serialize
* live state to a snapshot file.
*
* Caller MUST already hold apply_pump_lock (or otherwise guarantee no
* concurrent apply-pump walk can be racing this call, e.g. the
* single-threaded boot-replay window persist_recover() already documents
* elsewhere in this file) -- this function never locks or unlocks
* apply_pump_lock itself, so it is safe to call both from a context that
* already holds it (the live apply pump) and from a context where no lock
* is needed at all (boot replay).
*
* The explicit-lsn parameter exists because the two callers need two
* different values at two different moments:
* - persist_checkpoint() (periodic/explicit trigger): last_applied_lsn,
* read fresh by the caller immediately before this call.
* - the marker-apply trigger (apply_committed_entry's WAL_CONFIG_MARKER
* case): the marker's OWN lsn -- last_applied_lsn is NOT yet advanced
* to the marker's position at the moment that case runs (both live
* apply and replay advance it strictly AFTER dispatching this call),
* so reading last_applied_lsn from inside that case would mislabel the
* checkpoint with the marker's PREDECESSOR's lsn, not its own. */
static int persist_checkpoint_write_locked(persist_t* p,
uint64_t checkpoint_lsn)
{
p->checkpoint_lsn = checkpoint_lsn;
/* Capture the latest committed config-marker reference BEFORE trimming
* (ha-term-safety task 4.2 r1): trim_wal_segments (run by both callers,
* after this function returns) can unlink the segment holding a
* committed WAL_CONFIG_MARKER, so the derived committed config must be
* cached durably (into the sentinel) before that happens. */
scan_latest_committed_config_ref(p);
/* Serialize in-memory state to a snapshot file (P0: no live kvmgrs —
* writes sentinel header + cached config ref). */
return write_snapshot(p);
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Public: persist_checkpoint */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@ -2714,18 +2759,8 @@ int persist_checkpoint(persist_t* p)
* the label ever claiming more than jobmgr actually holds. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&p->apply_pump_lock);
p->checkpoint_lsn = atomic_load_explicit(&p->last_applied_lsn,
memory_order_acquire);
/* 3a. Capture the latest committed config-marker reference BEFORE trimming
* (ha-term-safety task 4.2 r1): the trim below can unlink the segment
* holding a committed WAL_CONFIG_MARKER, so the derived committed config
* must be cached durably (into the sentinel) before that happens. */
scan_latest_committed_config_ref(p);
/* 3b. Serialize in-memory state to a snapshot file
* (P0: no live kvmgrs — writes sentinel header + cached config ref) */
rc = write_snapshot(p);
rc = persist_checkpoint_write_locked(
p, atomic_load_explicit(&p->last_applied_lsn, memory_order_acquire));
pthread_mutex_unlock(&p->apply_pump_lock);
@ -2743,6 +2778,61 @@ done:
return rc;
}
/* persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered (config-upgrade-snapshot task 5, Req
* 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 4.4, 5.2, 5.3): force an immediate checkpoint at exactly
* `marker_lsn` -- the configuration-change marker's OWN lsn -- called from
* apply_committed_entry's WAL_CONFIG_MARKER case.
*
* Unlike persist_checkpoint(), this function NEVER locks apply_pump_lock:
* it relies entirely on the caller's own locking context, because the two
* production call sites of apply_committed_entry() differ in that context
* and this function must be correct under BOTH without deadlocking under
* either:
* - persist_apply_pump_run() (live online-apply, both primary and
* standby route through this) holds apply_pump_lock across its ENTIRE
* per-LSN dispatch loop, including the call into apply_committed_entry
* that reaches this function. Re-locking that same, non-recursive
* mutex here would self-deadlock -- so this function must NOT lock it;
* it is already held by the caller for the whole duration of this call.
* - replay_wal() (boot/restart replay, persist_recover()'s sole caller)
* does NOT hold apply_pump_lock during its per-entry dispatch loop --
* by design, since persist_recover() runs before the apply pump is
* ever kicked and nothing else can be racing it (see persist_recover's
* own doc comment on its brief, unrelated apply_pump_lock use for
* cache invalidation). No lock is needed here either, for the same
* reason.
* Both call sites are internal to persist.c and fully controlled, so this
* documented precondition (caller already serializes, one way or another)
* is safe to rely on rather than adding a redundant/ambiguous lock here.
*
* Shares checkpoint_in_progress -- the SAME single-in-flight CAS guard
* persist_checkpoint() uses -- so a concurrent WAL-threshold-triggered
* periodic checkpoint and this marker-triggered one can never both
* proceed at once (Req 5.3). Returns -EBUSY when that guard is already
* held by someone else; the caller (apply_committed_entry) treats that as
* an expected, self-resolving condition, not a failure (Req 4.4) -- the
* in-flight checkpoint (whichever triggered it) still completes and
* either it or a later checkpoint picks up this marker's configuration
* (every checkpoint embeds the currently active configuration, task 2.3). */
static int persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered(persist_t* p,
uint64_t marker_lsn)
{
if (atomic_exchange(&p->checkpoint_in_progress, 1) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
int rc = persist_write_checkpoint_marker(p);
if (rc == 0)
rc = persist_checkpoint_write_locked(p, marker_lsn);
if (rc == 0) {
trim_wal_segments(p);
rotate_snapshots(p);
}
atomic_store(&p->checkpoint_in_progress, 0);
return rc;
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Recovery internals */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
@ -3641,10 +3731,79 @@ int apply_committed_entry(persist_t* p, uint32_t wal_type, uint64_t lsn,
return 0;
}
case WAL_CONFIG_MARKER: {
/* config-upgrade-snapshot task 5 (Req 1.1, 1.5, 1.8): force an
* immediate, deterministic checkpoint at exactly this marker's own
* (term, lsn) boundary, materializing the upgrade snapshot the
* moment every member applies the marker -- primary online-apply,
* standby online-apply, and boot/restart replay alike, since this
* one unified apply seam is exactly what all three route through
* (design.md "Architecture" / "Key simplification found during
* design": no new leader-specific "resume" logic is needed either,
* since a newly-elected leader satisfies this the same way, by
* continuing to apply its own committed log).
*
* Deliberately does NOT touch entity interpretation/re-homing
* (lost_and_found etc.) -- Req 1.8 requires apply and activation to
* stay separate steps; this case's only effect is materialization,
* identical in kind to any other checkpoint.
*
* persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered() (not a bare
* persist_checkpoint() call) is required here to avoid two real
* hazards a naive direct call would hit:
* 1. Lock reentrancy: persist_apply_pump_run() (the live pump's
* call site for online-apply, both primary and standby) holds
* apply_pump_lock across this entire dispatch call;
* persist_checkpoint()'s own body re-acquires that same,
* non-recursive mutex, which would self-deadlock.
* persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered() never locks
* apply_pump_lock itself -- see its own doc comment for why
* that is safe under both production call sites.
* 2. Stale checkpoint_lsn: both live-apply and replay advance
* last_applied_lsn AFTER this dispatch call returns, never
* before (persist_apply_pump_run / replay_wal), so reading
* last_applied_lsn from inside this case would capture the
* PRECEDING entry's lsn, not the marker's own, mislabeling the
* checkpoint. `lsn` (this function's own parameter) is
* already the marker's exact position, so it is passed
* through explicitly instead of re-derived. */
int rc = persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered(p, lsn);
if (rc == -EBUSY) {
/* Expected, self-resolving (Req 4.4/5.3): a concurrent
* WAL-threshold-triggered or earlier marker-triggered
* checkpoint already holds the shared single-in-flight guard
* (checkpoint_in_progress). That in-flight checkpoint
* completes on its own; this marker's own configuration is
* still picked up by it or a later checkpoint (every
* checkpoint embeds the currently active configuration, task
* 2.3) -- not an error, no retry loop here. */
TRACE("apply_committed_entry: WAL_CONFIG_MARKER lsn=%" PRIu64
" checkpoint already in progress -- skipping, "
"self-resolving", lsn);
return 0;
}
if (rc != 0) {
/* A genuine checkpoint failure (I/O error, etc.) -- propagate
* so the caller's existing halt-and-retry-from-same-position
* handling engages (persist_apply_pump_run / replay_wal),
* exactly mirroring every other negative-return case in this
* dispatch. last_applied_lsn is NOT advanced past this marker,
* so the next kick/retry re-attempts the checkpoint fresh
* (Req 5.2 crash-safety: resume materialization from the
* marker). */
ERROR("apply_committed_entry: WAL_CONFIG_MARKER lsn=%" PRIu64
" forced checkpoint failed (rc=%d)", lsn, rc);
return rc;
}
return 0;
}
default:
/* WAL_NOOP / WAL_CONFIG_MARKER / WAL_CHECKPOINT / unknown — no
* entity effect at this seam, no hook (unchanged from
* apply_wal_entry's existing treatment of these types). */
/* WAL_NOOP / WAL_CHECKPOINT / unknown — no entity effect at this
* seam, no hook (unchanged from apply_wal_entry's existing
* treatment of these types). WAL_CONFIG_MARKER has its own explicit
* case above (config-upgrade-snapshot task 5) and no longer falls
* through to here. */
return 0;
}
}

View file

@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern void test_job_array_apply(void);
extern void test_job_array_fence(void);
extern void test_job_array_replay_fence(void);
extern void test_upgrade_snapshot_restore(void);
extern void test_upgrade_snapshot_apply(void);
void setUp(void) { return; }
@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
TEST(test_job_array_fence);
TEST(test_job_array_replay_fence);
TEST(test_upgrade_snapshot_restore);
TEST(test_upgrade_snapshot_apply);
return UNITY_END();
}

View file

@ -628,6 +628,36 @@ static void t42_teardown(cluster_t *c)
free(c);
}
/* config-upgrade-snapshot task 5: committing a WAL_CONFIG_MARKER now triggers
* an automatic forced checkpoint the instant the marker is APPLIED (not just
* committed) via the live apply pump -- persist_apply_pump_kick's dispatch is
* a CAS race between whichever thread reaches it first, which can be either
* this test's own thread (inside commit_submit's synchronous
* commit_resolve_pending call) or persist_start's independent fsync_worker
* thread (via commit_on_durable_advance) once durable_lsn advances. When the
* fsync thread wins that race, commit_submit/commit_engine's own WAIT mode
* returns having waited only for COMMIT, not for this now-real APPLY+
* CHECKPOINT side effect to finish on that other thread -- a fixture's own
* subsequent LSN bookkeeping or explicit persist_checkpoint() call can then
* genuinely race the still-in-flight background checkpoint (observed as a
* flaky -EBUSY from persist_checkpoint() or an unexpectedly-advanced
* committed_lsn, depending on which check loses the race). This was always a
* latent, unsynchronized race in this fixture (the same one
* test_apply_pump.c's tap_wait_applied already documents and exists to
* close) -- applying a marker used to be a no-op, so racing on it was
* invisible; task 5 gives it a real, observable side effect for the first
* time. Poll persist_last_applied_lsn() up to a bounded deadline (mirrors
* tap_wait_applied exactly) before any LSN-sensitive step that follows a
* marker commit, closing the race rather than leaving it flaky. */
static void t42_wait_applied(persist_t *p, uint64_t lsn, uint32_t deadline_ms)
{
for (uint32_t waited = 0; waited < deadline_ms; waited += 5) {
if (persist_last_applied_lsn(p) >= lsn)
return;
usleep(5000);
}
}
/* Bring the node up as the raft LEADER at `term` (so raft_log_append is enabled
* — it returns -EPERM off the leader; see make_leader in the adapter suite). */
static void t42_make_leader(cluster_t *c, uint64_t term, int n_peers)
@ -925,6 +955,14 @@ static void test_committed_marker_survives_checkpoint_trim(void)
atomic_load_explicit(&c->persist.committed_lsn, memory_order_acquire);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(committed >= 1);
/* config-upgrade-snapshot task 5: wait for the marker to be APPLIED (see
* t42_wait_applied's doc comment) before this test's own explicit
* persist_checkpoint() call below -- otherwise it can race the marker's
* own now-automatic checkpoint (possibly still running on the
* fsync_worker thread) and see a spurious -EBUSY from the shared
* checkpoint_in_progress guard. */
t42_wait_applied(&c->persist, /*marker LSN*/1, 2000);
/* Sanity: before any trim, the live-WAL scan finds the marker. */
uint64_t got_tag = 0;
uint8_t got_sha[32];
@ -1025,7 +1063,10 @@ static void t43_free_myconf(cluster_t *c)
}
/* Commit a WAL_CONFIG_MARKER for `sha`/`tag` through the real commit engine so
* config_committed_marker returns it (the committed-prefix authority 4.3 reads). */
* config_committed_marker returns it (the committed-prefix authority 4.3 reads).
* Also waits for the marker to be APPLIED (see t42_wait_applied's doc comment)
* so callers' own subsequent LSN bookkeeping never races this marker's own
* task-5 automatic checkpoint, wherever it happens to run. */
static void t43_commit_marker(cluster_t *c, uint64_t tag, const uint8_t sha[32])
{
uint64_t mlsn = 0;
@ -1035,6 +1076,7 @@ static void t43_commit_marker(cluster_t *c, uint64_t tag, const uint8_t sha[32])
commit_submit(&c->commit, mlsn, COMMIT_MODE_WAIT, 1000));
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(
atomic_load_explicit(&c->persist.committed_lsn, memory_order_acquire) >= mlsn);
t42_wait_applied(&c->persist, mlsn, 2000);
}
/* (4.3-a) MATCH activates: a committed marker whose locally-held bytes' sha256
@ -1423,7 +1465,29 @@ static uint64_t t43_append_marker_uncommitted(cluster_t *c, uint64_t tag,
uint64_t mlsn = 0;
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, config_append_marker(c, tag, sha, &mlsn));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_flush(&c->persist));
return mlsn;
/* config-upgrade-snapshot task 5 finding: config_append_marker's returned
* lsn (via ha_primary_log_append -> raft_log_append's own s->log_len + 1)
* is only reliable when EVERY prior WAL entry on this node went through
* that same raft-tracked append path. A marker-triggered checkpoint (this
* spec) writes its own local-only, never-replicated WAL_CHECKPOINT entry
* directly (persist_write_checkpoint_marker), which advances
* persist_t's current_lsn WITHOUT a corresponding raft_log_append call --
* this was already possible before this spec (the periodic WAL-threshold
* checkpoint trigger does the same), but this spec's marker-triggered
* checkpoint makes it the COMMON case for any second marker appended
* after an earlier one's checkpoint has already run, exactly this
* fixture's own scenario. The returned mlsn can then under-count the
* entry's TRUE physical position. This does not corrupt commit/durability
* tracking (commit_advance_locked's majority_candidate_locked is driven
* entirely by persist_t's own durable_lsn/current_lsn, never by
* s->log_len -- see commit.c) but it DOES make the returned value
* unreliable for this test's own strict numeric-ordering comparisons.
* Read the TRUE physical lsn directly instead, exactly as production
* code that needs precise positioning (e.g. persist.c's apply seam,
* which receives lsn from the WAL entry's own on-disk header, never from
* this return value) already effectively does. */
return c->persist.current_lsn - 1;
}
/* (4.3-D / R7.9) COMMIT-ADVANCE RETRY clears a push-before-commit fence: the

View file

@ -0,0 +1,621 @@
/*
* test_upgrade_snapshot_apply.c — config-upgrade-snapshot task 5
*
* TDD tests for the new WAL_CONFIG_MARKER case in apply_committed_entry()
* (persist.c), which forces a checkpoint at exactly the marker's own
* (term, lsn) boundary (Requirements 1.1, 1.5, 1.8, 4.4, 5.2, 5.3).
*
* A naive "just call persist_checkpoint() from the new case" implementation
* has two real hazards this file's tests are specifically shaped to catch:
*
* 1. Lock reentrancy: persist_apply_pump_run() (the live pump's call site
* for BOTH primary and standby online-apply) holds apply_pump_lock
* across its entire per-LSN dispatch loop, including the call into
* apply_committed_entry() that would reach persist_checkpoint(). Since
* persist_checkpoint() itself re-locks that same, non-recursive mutex,
* a naive implementation self-deadlocks the instant a live marker
* apply runs. A test that calls apply_committed_entry() directly and
* in isolation (never through persist_apply_pump_run()) would NOT
* catch this at all — no lock would ever be held. Every test below
* that exercises the live-apply path therefore drives the marker
* through persist_apply_pump_run() itself, the real production call
* site, not a bare direct call.
*
* 2. Stale checkpoint_lsn: persist_checkpoint()'s existing "pin
* checkpoint_lsn = last_applied_lsn" logic reads last_applied_lsn,
* which is only advanced AFTER apply_committed_entry() returns (both
* in persist_apply_pump_run() and in replay_wal()) — never before. A
* naive implementation invoked synchronously from inside the marker's
* own dispatch case would therefore capture the marker's PREDECESSOR's
* lsn, not its own. Every test below appends at least one ordinary
* entry BEFORE the marker so last_applied_lsn genuinely differs from
* the marker's own lsn at the moment this hazard would bite, and
* asserts the resulting checkpoint is labeled with the marker's own
* lsn, not the preceding entry's.
*
* Fixture: a real disk-backed persist_t (persist_init/persist_start over a
* private tmpdir, mirrors test_replay_apply_seam.c's trr_make_fresh_persist
* / test_apply_pump.c's tap_setup) paired with a real but otherwise-empty
* cluster_t (jobmgr/qmgr/workermgr/resmgr + hooksys, mirrors
* test_replay_apply_seam.c's trr_build_cluster) — a disk-backed persist_t is
* required here (unlike test_apply_committed_entry.c's bare in-memory
* fixture) because this case's own effect IS a real checkpoint file write,
* and driving persist_apply_pump_run() for real requires a real WAL on
* disk to read committed entries back from.
*
* Every test below gathers every assertion-relevant observable into a plain
* local variable FIRST, calls its fixture's teardown UNCONDITIONALLY, and
* only THEN runs any TEST_ASSERT — mirroring test_apply_pump.c's own
* documented discipline: a failed assertion's longjmp must never skip
* teardown, or it leaks a live fsync_worker thread (still holding a pointer
* into this test's about-to-be-reused stack frame) into later tests in this
* same binary, corrupting them (the "known longjmp-past-teardown pathology",
* confirmed the hard way while drafting this file — an early draft that
* asserted before tearing down produced a stack-use-after-return crash in
* flusher_fsync_forced_fail on a LATER test's frame the moment an earlier
* test's assertion legitimately failed).
*/
#include <rtti.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unity/unity.h>
#include "cluster.h"
#include "config_repl.h"
#include "hook.h"
#include "jobj.h"
#include "persist.h"
#include "wal_types.h"
#include "xce/cluster_def.h"
#include "xce/types.h"
#include "xstring.h"
/* jobj.c's jobsub table and the process-global xstring table are shared
* across every test file in the controller_unit_test binary — guard
* idempotently, mirroring every other config-upgrade-snapshot/raft-apply-
* decoupling test file. */
static int g_tusa_jobobj_ready;
typedef struct {
cluster_t c;
persist_t p;
char tmpdir[256];
} tusa_t;
static void tusa_setup(tusa_t* t)
{
kvmgr_params_t int_params = { .key_type = KVMGR_KEY_INT,
.nslots = 32,
.delta = 16 };
kvmgr_params_t str_params = { .key_type = KVMGR_KEY_STRING,
.nslots = 32,
.delta = 16 };
if (makeString((char*)"tusa-probe") == NULL)
xstring_table_init(64);
if (!g_tusa_jobobj_ready) {
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, job_obj_init(32, 32));
g_tusa_jobobj_ready = 1;
}
memset(t, 0, sizeof(*t));
t->c.myhost = &t->c.myhost_info;
t->c.myhost_info.name = (char*)"ctrl-test";
t->c.myhost_info.key = (char*)"";
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0,
xce_hook_init(&t->c.hooksys, XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_MAX));
t->c.jobmgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &int_params);
t->c.qmgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &str_params);
t->c.workermgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &str_params);
t->c.resmgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &str_params);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t->c.jobmgr);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t->c.qmgr);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t->c.workermgr);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t->c.resmgr);
zarray_init(&t->c.sharedinst, 16, NULL);
strcpy(t->tmpdir, "/tmp/xce_tusa_XXXXXX");
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(mkdtemp(t->tmpdir));
persist_config_t cfg = persist_config_defaults();
cfg.wal_sync_ms = 5000; /* slow fsync — no background races in tests */
cfg.snap_keep_n = 4;
persist_set_workdir(&t->p, t->tmpdir, "tusa");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_init(&t->p, &cfg, &t->c));
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, persist_start(&t->p));
}
/* Unconditional teardown — callers must gather every observable they need
* to assert on BEFORE calling this (see file header). */
static void tusa_teardown(tusa_t* t)
{
persist_stop(&t->p);
persist_fini(&t->p);
zarray_fini(&t->c.sharedinst);
if (t->c.resmgr) dereference(t->c.resmgr);
if (t->c.workermgr) dereference(t->c.workermgr);
if (t->c.qmgr) dereference(t->c.qmgr);
if (t->c.jobmgr) dereference(t->c.jobmgr);
xce_hook_fini(&t->c.hooksys);
char cmd[512];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "rm -rf %s", t->tmpdir);
if (system(cmd) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "cleanup warning: rm -rf %s failed\n", t->tmpdir);
}
/* ── Helpers (none of these call TEST_ASSERT — every result is returned to
* the caller, which asserts only after its fixture is torn down) ────── */
static bool tusa_snapshot_exists(persist_t* p, uint64_t lsn)
{
char path[4096];
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/snap-%016" PRIx64 ".capnp",
p->snap_path, lsn);
struct stat st;
return stat(path, &st) == 0;
}
/* Counts every "snap-*.capnp" file in p->snap_path — used to prove a marker
* apply produces exactly one checkpoint, not zero or two. */
static int tusa_count_snapshots(persist_t* p)
{
char cmd[4200];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "ls %s 2>/dev/null | grep -c '\\.capnp$'",
p->snap_path);
FILE* f = popen(cmd, "r");
if (!f) return -1;
int n = -1;
if (fscanf(f, "%d", &n) != 1) n = -1;
pclose(f);
return n;
}
static int tusa_count_entries(var mgr)
{
if (!mgr) return 0;
int n = 0;
iterator_t it;
lock(mgr, RTTI_LOCK_READ);
int irc = iter_make(&it, mgr);
if (irc < 0) {
unlock(mgr);
return 0;
}
for (;;) {
void* item = NULL;
int nrc = iter_next(&it, &item);
if (nrc < 0 || nrc == RTTI_ITER_NO_DATA)
break;
if (item)
n++;
}
iter_destroy(&it);
unlock(mgr);
return n;
}
/* Result of appending one WAL_NOOP followed by one WAL_CONFIG_MARKER and
* advancing committed_lsn to cover both. The leading WAL_NOOP entry is what
* makes last_applied_lsn genuinely differ from the marker's own lsn at the
* moment the marker's case executes — without it, Hazard 2 (stale
* checkpoint_lsn) could not be distinguished from a coincidentally-correct
* implementation. WAL_NOOP is a real, already-classified no-op type (mirrors
* apply_wal_entry's own default treatment) that needs no cluster entity
* setup. */
typedef struct {
int rc_encode;
int rc_noop;
int rc_marker;
uint64_t noop_lsn;
uint64_t marker_lsn;
uint64_t committed_after;
} tusa_append_result_t;
static tusa_append_result_t tusa_append_noop_then_marker(persist_t* p,
uint8_t seed)
{
tusa_append_result_t r;
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
r.rc_noop = persist_wal_async(p, WAL_NOOP, NULL, 0);
r.noop_lsn = p->current_lsn - 1;
uint8_t sha[32];
memset(sha, seed, sizeof(sha));
uint8_t marker_payload[WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN];
size_t out_len = 0;
r.rc_encode = config_marker_encode(0x1122334455667788ULL ^ seed, sha,
marker_payload,
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN,
&out_len);
r.rc_marker = persist_wal_async(p, WAL_CONFIG_MARKER, marker_payload,
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN);
r.marker_lsn = p->current_lsn - 1;
r.committed_after = persist_committed_lsn_advance_atomic(p, r.marker_lsn);
return r;
}
/* ── 1: live pump path — proves both hazards are fixed ─────────────────── */
static void
test_marker_apply_via_live_pump_checkpoints_at_marker_own_lsn(void)
{
tusa_t t;
tusa_setup(&t);
tusa_append_result_t ar = tusa_append_noop_then_marker(&t.p, 0xA1);
/* The real production call site: persist_apply_pump_run() holds
* apply_pump_lock across this entire call, exactly as it does for a
* live primary/standby apply. If Hazard 1 (lock reentrancy) were not
* fixed, this call would self-deadlock and never return -- the test
* binary would hang here rather than fail cleanly, which is itself the
* signal (see the CRITICAL note in this task's validation commands). */
int applied = persist_apply_pump_run(&t.p);
uint64_t last_applied = atomic_load_explicit(&t.p.last_applied_lsn,
memory_order_acquire);
uint64_t checkpoint_lsn = t.p.checkpoint_lsn;
bool snap_at_marker = tusa_snapshot_exists(&t.p, ar.marker_lsn);
bool snap_at_predecessor = (ar.marker_lsn > 0)
? tusa_snapshot_exists(&t.p, ar.marker_lsn - 1) : false;
tusa_teardown(&t);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_encode);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_noop);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_marker);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.noop_lsn + 1, ar.marker_lsn);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.marker_lsn, ar.committed_after);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(2, applied);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.marker_lsn, last_applied);
/* Hazard 2 proof: checkpoint_lsn must equal the MARKER's own lsn, not
* the preceding WAL_NOOP's (marker_lsn - 1) -- which is exactly what a
* stale "checkpoint_lsn = last_applied_lsn read from inside the case"
* implementation would have produced, since last_applied_lsn was still
* pinned at marker_lsn - 1 at the moment the case ran. */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.marker_lsn, checkpoint_lsn);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(snap_at_marker,
"forced checkpoint must produce a snap file at the marker's own lsn");
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(snap_at_predecessor,
"must NOT checkpoint at the preceding entry's lsn");
printf("test_marker_apply_via_live_pump_checkpoints_at_marker_own_lsn: PASS\n");
}
/* ── 2: fires exactly once per marker apply ─────────────────────────────── */
static void test_marker_apply_fires_checkpoint_exactly_once(void)
{
tusa_t t;
tusa_setup(&t);
int before = tusa_count_snapshots(&t.p);
tusa_append_result_t ar = tusa_append_noop_then_marker(&t.p, 0xB2);
int applied = persist_apply_pump_run(&t.p);
int after = tusa_count_snapshots(&t.p);
int checkpoint_flag = atomic_load(&t.p.checkpoint_in_progress);
tusa_teardown(&t);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_encode);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_noop);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_marker);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(2, applied);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, before);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(1, after,
"exactly one checkpoint file must exist after one marker apply");
/* The shared single-in-flight guard must be released again afterward,
* not left stuck (which would silently wedge every future periodic
* checkpoint too). */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, checkpoint_flag);
printf("test_marker_apply_fires_checkpoint_exactly_once: PASS\n");
}
/* ── 3: retry (re-apply of an already-applied marker) is idempotent ────── */
static void test_marker_apply_retry_is_idempotent(void)
{
tusa_t t;
tusa_setup(&t);
tusa_append_result_t ar = tusa_append_noop_then_marker(&t.p, 0xC3);
int applied = persist_apply_pump_run(&t.p);
bool snap_after_first = tusa_snapshot_exists(&t.p, ar.marker_lsn);
/* Simulate a retried re-application of the SAME already-applied marker
* (e.g. a second replay pass after a crash) by calling the dispatch
* seam directly for the identical (type, lsn) a second time -- design.md's
* own named observable ("safe under a forced retry"). Neither
* persist_apply_pump_run() (already advanced past this lsn) nor
* replay_wal() would normally re-dispatch it live, but apply_committed_
* entry() itself must not corrupt or crash on a direct re-drive. No
* external lock is held here, mirroring the boot-replay calling
* convention (persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered() needs none). */
uint8_t sha[32];
memset(sha, 0xC3, sizeof(sha));
uint8_t marker_payload[WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN];
size_t out_len = 0;
int rc_encode = config_marker_encode(0x1122334455667788ULL ^ 0xC3, sha,
marker_payload,
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN,
&out_len);
int retry_rc = apply_committed_entry(&t.p, WAL_CONFIG_MARKER,
ar.marker_lsn, marker_payload,
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN);
bool snap_after_retry = tusa_snapshot_exists(&t.p, ar.marker_lsn);
uint64_t checkpoint_lsn = t.p.checkpoint_lsn;
int checkpoint_flag = atomic_load(&t.p.checkpoint_in_progress);
tusa_teardown(&t);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_encode);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_noop);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_marker);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(2, applied);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(snap_after_first);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_encode);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(0, retry_rc,
"a retried marker apply at an already-checkpointed lsn must not error");
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(snap_after_retry,
"the checkpoint file at the marker's lsn must still be present and valid");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.marker_lsn, checkpoint_lsn);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, checkpoint_flag);
printf("test_marker_apply_retry_is_idempotent: PASS\n");
}
/* ── 4: overlapping-marker -EBUSY is graceful, not an error ────────────── */
static void test_marker_apply_busy_checkpoint_handled_gracefully(void)
{
tusa_t t;
tusa_setup(&t);
tusa_append_result_t ar = tusa_append_noop_then_marker(&t.p, 0xD4);
/* Simulate an earlier marker's (or a periodic WAL-threshold) checkpoint
* already being in flight when this marker's own apply runs — the
* shared checkpoint_in_progress CAS is already held by "someone else". */
int prev_flag = atomic_exchange(&t.p.checkpoint_in_progress, 1);
/* The live pump must NOT halt or surface an error on -EBUSY (Req 4.4):
* both entries still apply, last_applied_lsn still advances past the
* marker, and no crash/retry-loop occurs. */
int applied = persist_apply_pump_run(&t.p);
uint64_t last_applied = atomic_load_explicit(&t.p.last_applied_lsn,
memory_order_acquire);
bool snap_while_busy = tusa_snapshot_exists(&t.p, ar.marker_lsn);
/* Self-resolving (Req 4.4): release the guard (as the "other" in-flight
* checkpoint would on its own completion) and confirm a normal
* checkpoint afterward still correctly picks up this marker's position. */
atomic_store(&t.p.checkpoint_in_progress, 0);
int resolve_rc = persist_checkpoint(&t.p);
uint64_t checkpoint_lsn = t.p.checkpoint_lsn;
bool snap_after_resolve = tusa_snapshot_exists(&t.p, ar.marker_lsn);
tusa_teardown(&t);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_encode);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_noop);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_marker);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, prev_flag);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(2, applied,
"an in-flight concurrent checkpoint must not halt the apply pump");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.marker_lsn, last_applied);
/* Because the guard was already held, THIS marker's own checkpoint call
* must have been skipped entirely -- no snapshot at its lsn yet. */
TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(snap_while_busy,
"a busy checkpoint must be skipped, not forced through");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, resolve_rc);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(ar.marker_lsn, checkpoint_lsn);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE(snap_after_resolve);
printf("test_marker_apply_busy_checkpoint_handled_gracefully: PASS\n");
}
/* ── 5: apply must not itself reinterpret/re-home entities (Req 1.8) ───── */
static void test_marker_apply_does_not_reinterpret_entities(void)
{
tusa_t t;
tusa_setup(&t);
/* Baseline: nothing exists yet, in particular no lost_and_found queue
* or host -- the concrete, observable side effect any accidental
* re-homing trigger from this case would produce. */
int qmgr_before = tusa_count_entries(t.c.qmgr);
int workermgr_before = tusa_count_entries(t.c.workermgr);
int jobmgr_before = tusa_count_entries(t.c.jobmgr);
tusa_append_result_t ar = tusa_append_noop_then_marker(&t.p, 0xE5);
int applied = persist_apply_pump_run(&t.p);
int qmgr_after = tusa_count_entries(t.c.qmgr);
int workermgr_after = tusa_count_entries(t.c.workermgr);
int jobmgr_after = tusa_count_entries(t.c.jobmgr);
tusa_teardown(&t);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_encode);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_noop);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, ar.rc_marker);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(2, applied);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, qmgr_before);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, workermgr_before);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, jobmgr_before);
/* Applying the marker must ONLY materialize a checkpoint -- it must not
* create, remove, or re-home any job/queue/host entity (that
* interpretive switch is the later activation step's job, not apply's,
* per Req 1.8). */
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(0, qmgr_after,
"marker apply must not create any queue (e.g. lost_and_found)");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(0, workermgr_after,
"marker apply must not create any host (e.g. lost_and_found)");
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT_MESSAGE(0, jobmgr_after,
"marker apply must not create or remove any job");
printf("test_marker_apply_does_not_reinterpret_entities: PASS\n");
}
/* ── 6: restart replay drives the SAME case (Req 1.1's "replay alike") ──── */
static void test_marker_apply_via_replay_checkpoints_at_marker_own_lsn(void)
{
char tmp[256];
strcpy(tmp, "/tmp/xce_tusa_replay_XXXXXX");
char* mkd_rc = mkdtemp(tmp);
uint64_t marker_lsn = 0;
int rc_noop_p1 = -1;
int rc_marker_p1 = -1;
int rc_encode_p1 = -1;
int rc_flush_p1 = -1;
/* Phase 1: write a WAL_NOOP then a WAL_CONFIG_MARKER to a fresh, real
* WAL -- no cluster needed for a pure physical write. */
{
persist_t p;
memset(&p, 0, sizeof(p));
persist_config_t cfg = persist_config_defaults();
cfg.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
persist_set_workdir(&p, tmp, "tusa-replay");
int rc_init = persist_init(&p, &cfg, NULL);
int rc_start = persist_start(&p);
rc_noop_p1 = persist_wal_async(&p, WAL_NOOP, NULL, 0);
uint8_t sha[32];
memset(sha, 0xF6, sizeof(sha));
uint8_t marker_payload[WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN];
size_t out_len = 0;
rc_encode_p1 = config_marker_encode(0x1122334455667788ULL ^ 0xF6, sha,
marker_payload,
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN,
&out_len);
rc_marker_p1 = persist_wal_async(&p, WAL_CONFIG_MARKER,
marker_payload,
WAL_CONFIG_MARKER_PAYLOAD_LEN);
marker_lsn = p.current_lsn - 1;
rc_flush_p1 = persist_flush(&p);
persist_stop(&p);
persist_fini(&p);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_init);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_start);
}
/* Phase 2: fresh persist_t + fresh cluster_t, recover from disk. Boot
* replay (persist_recover -> replay_wal) is the SECOND production call
* site of apply_committed_entry() -- unlike the live pump, it does NOT
* hold apply_pump_lock, proving persist_checkpoint_marker_triggered()
* is correct under both calling conventions, not just the locked one. */
tusa_t t2;
memset(&t2, 0, sizeof(t2));
strncpy(t2.tmpdir, tmp, sizeof(t2.tmpdir) - 1);
t2.c.myhost = &t2.c.myhost_info;
t2.c.myhost_info.name = (char*)"ctrl-test-2";
t2.c.myhost_info.key = (char*)"";
int rc_hook = xce_hook_init(&t2.c.hooksys, XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_MAX);
kvmgr_params_t int_params = { .key_type = KVMGR_KEY_INT,
.nslots = 32, .delta = 16 };
kvmgr_params_t str_params = { .key_type = KVMGR_KEY_STRING,
.nslots = 32, .delta = 16 };
t2.c.jobmgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &int_params);
t2.c.qmgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &str_params);
t2.c.workermgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &str_params);
t2.c.resmgr = makeInstance(&xkvmgr_type, &str_params);
zarray_init(&t2.c.sharedinst, 16, NULL);
persist_config_t cfg2 = persist_config_defaults();
cfg2.wal_sync_ms = 5000;
persist_set_workdir(&t2.p, tmp, "tusa-replay");
int rc_init2 = persist_init(&t2.p, &cfg2, &t2.c);
int rc_start2 = persist_start(&t2.p);
int rc_recover = persist_recover(&t2.p);
uint64_t checkpoint_lsn = t2.p.checkpoint_lsn;
bool snap_exists = tusa_snapshot_exists(&t2.p, marker_lsn);
tusa_teardown(&t2);
char cmd[512];
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "rm -rf %s", tmp);
if (system(cmd) != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "cleanup warning: rm -rf %s failed\n", tmp);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(mkd_rc);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_noop_p1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_encode_p1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_marker_p1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_flush_p1);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_hook);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t2.c.jobmgr);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t2.c.qmgr);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t2.c.workermgr);
TEST_ASSERT_NOT_NULL(t2.c.resmgr);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_init2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_start2);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, rc_recover);
TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_UINT64(marker_lsn, checkpoint_lsn);
TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(snap_exists,
"boot replay of a WAL_CONFIG_MARKER must also produce a "
"checkpoint at the marker's own lsn");
printf("test_marker_apply_via_replay_checkpoints_at_marker_own_lsn: PASS\n");
}
/* ── Dispatch ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
void test_upgrade_snapshot_apply(void)
{
UnitySetTestFile(__FILE__);
printf("\n>> config-upgrade-snapshot marker-apply-trigger tests (task 5)\n\n");
RUN_TEST(test_marker_apply_via_live_pump_checkpoints_at_marker_own_lsn);
RUN_TEST(test_marker_apply_fires_checkpoint_exactly_once);
RUN_TEST(test_marker_apply_retry_is_idempotent);
RUN_TEST(test_marker_apply_busy_checkpoint_handled_gracefully);
RUN_TEST(test_marker_apply_does_not_reinterpret_entities);
RUN_TEST(test_marker_apply_via_replay_checkpoints_at_marker_own_lsn);
}