From 6f1fa97fab4884657da7f5498bbe0671fe177bc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Rongsong Shen Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2026 04:44:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] feat(raft-apply-decoupling): defer job construction past the commit barrier (task 3.1) Reorder handle_jobsubmit() so job objects are constructed via create_job() only after the WAL commit succeeds, not before. Adds jobid_range_exists() for a fast-fail pre-check with no WAL work, and persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit() (persist.c) operating on raw xce_job_t* payloads instead of pre-existing job_t*. Commit remains synchronous -- converting to the continuation-based commit API is task 3.2. Fixes bug-1408 (found during review): the post-commit array- construction loop suppressed notification for an entire array batch if any one sibling element failed to construct, stranding other durably-committed and successfully-constructed jobs invisible until the next restart's replay. Notification now fires unconditionally for every successfully-constructed element, independent of sibling failures; the client reply still separately reports the batch's construction status. --- .kiro/specs/raft-apply-decoupling/tasks.md | 3 +- .wolf/buglog.json | 624 +++++++++--------- src/controller/job.c | 260 ++++++-- src/controller/persist.c | 108 ++- .../testsuite/test_commit_barrier_reply.c | 262 ++++++++ src/include/persist.h | 13 + 6 files changed, 871 insertions(+), 399 deletions(-) diff --git a/.kiro/specs/raft-apply-decoupling/tasks.md b/.kiro/specs/raft-apply-decoupling/tasks.md index 7b7b6dd..4da1a9d 100644 --- a/.kiro/specs/raft-apply-decoupling/tasks.md +++ b/.kiro/specs/raft-apply-decoupling/tasks.md @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ - _Depends: 2.2_ - [ ] 3. Command apply-after-commit ordering -- [ ] 3.1 (P) Stop constructing the in-memory job object before the commit barrier +- [x] 3.1 (P) Stop constructing the in-memory job object before the commit barrier - Change job submission to carry forward only the data needed to build the WAL entry payload, without inserting anything into the in-memory job table until the (still-synchronous, at this point) commit call returns success - Remove the now-unreachable code path that previously ran the durability step from inside the notification hook for job submission - Observable: a job submission whose commit fails or times out leaves no job object in the in-memory job table; a successful submission still replies synchronously exactly as before this task @@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ - **1.2**: implemented `commit_resolve()` + wired it into all 6 commit.c-internal paths that can advance `committed_lsn`/`writable_lsn` (the COMMITTED/majority-ack outcome). Chose `VTASK_LIVE_BLOCK` for dispatch (never admission-gated, unlike `VTASK_REQ_BLOCK` which can fast-reject — unacceptable for "exactly-once, never unresolved"). **Reviewer caught a real task-graph gap, not a defect in 1.2 itself**: converting `COMMIT_MODE_WAIT` away from a blocking wait also removes the *only* mechanism that ever detected a commit timing out (the caller's own `pthread_cond_timedwait` deadline) — nothing yet arms an equivalent timeout for async-registered continuations, and nothing yet wires demotion/log-truncation detection to call `commit_resolve(FAILED, ...)`. Without this, a pending async command during quorum loss would hang forever instead of failing — worse than today's behavior. Split out as new tasks **1.3** (timeout arming) and **1.4** (demotion/truncation wiring), inserted before the renumbered **1.5** (was 1.3, concurrency test — now exercises the real detection paths from 1.3/1.4 instead of calling `commit_resolve()` directly). Task 3.2 now also depends on 1.3/1.4, since its own "failure/timeout outcome replies" observable is meaningless without them. - **1.3**: added a dedicated per-commit-engine sweep thread (not the shared `delaymgr` — would violate boundary + delaymgr's 200ms poll granularity vs. `DEFAULT_SYNC_TIMEOUT_MS`=500ms would add timing jitter). Race rule: majority-satisfied always wins over an already-expired deadline when both are true under the same lock hold. **Round 1 REJECTED**: `commit_sweep_once()` computed the next-deadline snapshot under `ce->lock`, unlocked to dispatch, then slept on the *stale* snapshot — a `commit_submit_async()` registration/broadcast landing during that unlocked dispatch window was lost (no thread parked on the condvar to receive it), so the sweep thread could sleep on an absent/late deadline indefinitely (worst case: unbounded delay in a low-traffic quorum-loss scenario, violating the "identical failure timing" no-regression bar). **Fixed** by holding `ce->lock` continuously across scan→wait decisions (releasing only for the unlocked dispatch step) and always re-scanning under the lock immediately before ever calling `cond_wait`/`cond_timedwait` — the standard recheck-then-wait idiom. Round 2 reviewer independently reproduced the round-1 bug shape to confirm the fix actually closes it, not just narrows it. **Precedent for 1.4**: any future code that needs to interrupt the sweep thread's wait (e.g., a demotion/truncation handler resolving a pending LSN out-of-band) must go through the same lock+broadcast discipline `commit_submit_async()` uses, or it risks the identical lost-wakeup class of bug. - **1.4**: added `commit_resolve_pending_above(ce, lsn_floor, rc)` (snapshot-then-`commit_resolve()`-per-entry, no parallel bookkeeping). Truncation: a single new `on_truncate`/`truncate_cb_ctx` callback slot on `persist_t` (same inversion-of-control shape as the existing `on_durable_advance` hook) fires from `persist_truncate_wal_above` after releasing `p->lock`, only when a truncation actually removed entries — this ONE wrapper covers all three real truncation call sites (`raft_cb_become_leader`'s post-election truncate, the library's `on_truncate_from` conflict-reconcile, `ha_demotion_convergence_fn`'s post-demotion truncate), verified by the reviewer reading all three. Demotion: `raft_cb_become_follower` calls `commit_resolve_pending_above(&c->commit, 0, -XCE_ERR_STANDBY)` (lsn_floor=0 → fails everything — a demoted node can never authoritatively confirm anything pending; verified against the CP posture). **Known residual, non-blocking**: a fourth internal truncation path (`persist.c` inside `persist_wal_write_replicated`'s tip-conflict-repair branch, STANDBY replicated-apply only) calls `truncate_wal_above_locked()` directly, bypassing the new wrapper — safe today only because demotion resolves ALL pending continuations before role flips to STANDBY (so nothing can still be registered by the time that path runs), but this is an *implicit* ordering invariant, not an asserted one. Flag for whoever next touches the STANDBY replicated-apply path: add a defensive comment/assertion there, or route it through the wrapper too, before relying on it further. Also: bug-1407 was believed closed at this point (70/70 across 3 runs) — **see 1.5's note below, this was a false reading, not a real fix**. +- **3.1**: reordered `handle_jobsubmit()` (job.c) so job objects are only constructed via `create_job()` AFTER the (still-synchronous) WAL commit succeeds — extracted `jobid_range_exists()` (fast-fail pre-check, no WAL work), `build_job_submit_payloads()` (WAL-payload construction with no jobmgr insertion), and a new persist.c sibling `persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit()` (operates on raw `xce_job_t*` instead of pre-existing `job_t*`, single production call site in job.c — legitimately within `handle_jobsubmit`'s call chain, not a boundary spillover; no task-1 continuation API dependency, genuinely still synchronous). Took 3 review rounds. **Round 1 REJECTED — real defect, not documentation**: the post-commit array-construction loop suppressed the `AFTER_EVENT`/`HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW` notification for an ENTIRE array batch if even one sibling element failed to construct (e.g. a jobid collision slipping past `jobid_range_exists()`'s inherent TOCTOU window, or a plain allocation failure — no race needed) — stranding OTHER elements that were durably committed AND successfully constructed, invisible to the purely event-driven scheduler/apiserver until the next restart's replay. Logged as bug-1408. **Round 2 fixed the defect** (moved the `construct_rc < 0` early-return to AFTER the jlist-build + hook-fire block, so every successfully-constructed sibling is always notified regardless of a sibling's failure; client reply still separately reports the batch's `construct_rc`) but was REJECTED again on a narrower, documentation-only ground: bug-1408's RED-phase writeup claimed a clean assertion FAIL, but under the standard full-group `--run test_commit_barrier_reply` invocation the failing assertion actually longjmps past the test's own `cbrp_teardown()` call (Unity `TEST_ABORT` semantics) and HANGS the next test — the same longjmp-past-teardown pathology already known from task 1.3's era. **Round 3 (parent-handled directly, no code regression risk)**: corrected bug-1408's buglog.json description to accurately describe the hang mode, and hardened the new test itself — every assertion-relevant observable is now captured into a local, `cbrp_teardown()` is called unconditionally, and assertions run only after teardown, so a future regression in this exact test can no longer skip cleanup and deadlock sibling tests. No production code changed in round 3; job.c's fix from round 2 was independently verified correct by the round-2 reviewer (traced jlist-build/hook-fire at job.c:717-766 running unconditionally before the `construct_rc` check at line 775) and needed no further changes. **Known low-severity residual, not blocking, flagged for a future task**: `apiserver_push_joblist` (apiserver.c) lacks the `nfiltered > 0` guard `sched.c`'s equivalent has, so a total-batch construction failure (every array element fails, jlist ends up empty) now sends an empty/no-op jobs push to every connected apiserver — informationless, can't corrupt state, but a minor behavioral quirk introduced by firing the hook unconditionally. - **2.4**: pure test-only close-out of task-group 2 — new `test_apply_reapply_idempotency.c` (3 tests), no production changes, approved first round. Covers three distinct cases beyond 2.2's existing coverage: (1) triple-reapplication of an identical WAL_JOB_SUBMIT through `apply_committed_entry()` with hook-fire-count AND pointer-identity assertions across all 3 calls (not just final state); (2) the `JOB_TRANSITION_NOOP_DUPLICATE` guard branch (state == current state) — a genuinely untested path, distinct from 2.2's forward-once and backward-rejected cases; (3) the task's named scenario, driven entirely through the real dispatch seam (not seeded/shortcut): real SUBMIT → real FINISH → stale out-of-order START (lower LSN, arriving after), asserting the job stays in its FINISH/terminal state and no third hook fires for the rejected START. Test assertions key on hook-fire COUNT and job STATE, never a specific `HOOK_DETAIL_*` value — so these tests stay valid even if 2.2's documented generic-hook-routing deviation is later corrected. **Task-group 2 (shared apply seam) is now complete**: 2.1 (guard cores extracted) → 2.2 (dispatch function built, generic job-state-family routing is a confirmed permanent deviation from design.md, tracked) → 2.3 (replay wired to the seam, duplicate-notification-on-restart hazard confirmed inert today but must be re-verified before 4.1/6.1/6.2/6.3) → 2.4 (idempotency proven through the real dispatch path). Next: task-group 3 (command apply-after-commit ordering), which is the first consumer of both this seam and task-group 1's commit-engine continuation API. - **2.3**: rewired `replay_wal()` (persist.c) to call `apply_committed_entry()` (task 2.2's seam) instead of `apply_wal_entry()` for restart replay's per-entry apply. `apply_wal_entry`/`apply_committed_entry` are siblings, not wrapper/wrappee — `apply_wal_entry` is NOT retired, it remains ha.c's live standby catch-up/replicated-apply dispatch (untouched, different call sites, out of this task's boundary). **Confirmed hazard, investigated to resolution by the reviewer (not left open)**: `replay_wal(p, p->checkpoint_lsn, ...)` replays the FULL WAL range since the last snapshot on every restart (`last_applied_lsn` is deliberately not persisted — recomputed at replay time per design.md), not just a narrow crash-gap tail. Since `apply_committed_entry` fires `AFTER_EVENT` hooks (unlike the old `apply_wal_entry`, which never did), this means every restart re-fires notification hooks for entries already applied+notified in a prior process life — a duplicate-notification hazard in principle. **Independently traced and confirmed inert today** for both existing hook consumers: scheduler hooks aren't registered until `on_scheduler_join()` (sched.c), which happens post-boot via network JOIN handshake, strictly after `persist_recover()` runs; apiserver hooks ARE registered before `persist_recover()` (`apiserver_init()` in `cluster_init_phase2()`), but every apiserver hook body gates its actual network notify on `apiservers[i].ep != NULL`, and the apiserver-join table starts empty each process life — a no-op except via a narrow reconnect race. **MUST be re-verified before tasks 4.1/6.1/6.2/6.3** make this path unambiguously live and broad (e.g. if a future task registers apiserver connections earlier, or scheduler hooks get registered pre-replay) — at that point this either needs a replay-mode flag suppressing hook-firing, or an explicit accepted-idempotent-duplicate-notification decision recorded in design.md. A loud in-line comment cross-referencing this note now sits at the `apply_committed_entry()` call site in `replay_wal()` (persist.c). Also confirmed: job-state facts now replay through 2.1's guarded `apply_job_update_transition()` instead of the previously-unguarded `restore_job_state()` — intentional (Req 3/7 online-replay divergence fix), verified no existing test depended on the old unguarded semantics. `apply_committed_entry`'s missing oversized-payload guard (vs. `apply_wal_entry`'s `MAX_WAL_PAYLOAD_BYTES`/`-EMSGSIZE` check) confirmed inert — `persist_wal_write_replicated()` already rejects oversized payloads at write time, before anything reaches disk. - **2.2**: implemented `apply_committed_entry(persist_t*, uint32_t wal_type, uint64_t lsn, const void* payload, uint32_t len)` in persist.c/persist.h, matching design.md's signature. Routes `WAL_JOB_SUBMIT` through `restore_job()` (idempotent on duplicate jobid — no-op, Req 7.1), `WAL_QUEUE_CTRL`/`WAL_WORKER_CTRL` through their existing restore primitives, and fires each type's post-mutation hook exactly once, after mutation. **Confirmed permanent, non-cosmetic deviation from design.md's Apply Seam wording**: ALL nine job-state fact WAL types (`WAL_JOB_{START,FINISH,FAIL,STOP,RESUME,UPDATE,RUSAGE,CKPT,PREASON}`) route through the single guard-only `apply_job_update_transition()` core from 2.1 — NOT the type-specific `apply_job_{start,finish,fail}_transition` cores — and fire one generic `HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_UPDATE` hook, not the type-specific `HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_START`/`_EXIT`/`_FAIL`. Root cause, independently verified by two review rounds: the on-disk wire format for every one of these types (`wal_jobstate_t {jobid, state}`) genuinely only carries the resulting state, not the richer `job_pidinfo_t`/`xce_jobfinish_t`/`job_failinfo_t` payload the type-specific cores/hooks require — this is a pre-existing wire-format reality (`apply_wal_entry` already collapsed these the same way before this task), not a shortcut invented here. **design.md's Apply Seam section and Fact Ingestion → Event Contract section currently describe per-type hook dispatch that this wire format cannot support as written** — this is a real, standing design/reality conflict, not yet reconciled in design.md itself. No task in the current plan (2.3, 4.1, 4.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3) enriches the wire format to close this gap — confirmed by reading all of them; task 4.1 is exclusively about removing receipt-time mutation/hook-firing, not payload enrichment. **Explicit blocking-style call-out for whoever implements 4.1/6.2/6.3**: wiring this dispatch function into a live fact-apply path will permanently change every worker-reported job start/finish/fail notification to a generic UPDATE detail instead of the type-specific one, unless the wire format is enriched first or design.md is corrected to formally accept this substitution — verify this is still the accepted behavior before wiring it live, don't assume it'll be fixed by then. Took 3 review rounds to land: round 1 rejected two doc-comment defects (a citation blaming the wrong crash site, and a dangling pointer to task 4.1 as the fix location); round 2's fix corrected the crash site (real one is `sched.c`'s `sched_job_start_fun`/`_exit_fun`/`_fail_fun`, which unconditionally dereference `info->jobid` before any NULL check) but fabricated a nonexistent function name (`encode_JobPIDInfo_ptr`) as supporting evidence; round 3 replaced it with a narrower, fully source-verified claim (apiserver.c's equivalent functions store the raw pointer into a notify union without dereferencing it at that call site — real, checked line-by-line). **Lesson**: when a reviewer catches a citation error, the safest fix is the narrowest claim you can personally verify by reading the actual code, not a broader-sounding replacement — round 2's attempt to explain "why the alternative is fine" reached for an unverified downstream mechanism and got caught fabricating it. diff --git a/.wolf/buglog.json b/.wolf/buglog.json index dd9d045..9a13b4a 100644 --- a/.wolf/buglog.json +++ b/.wolf/buglog.json @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: g_tmpdir should be g_instdir", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_config_repl.c", "root_cause": "Used \"g_tmpdir\" instead of \"g_instdir\"", - "fix": "Changed g_tmpdir → g_instdir", + "fix": "Changed g_tmpdir \u2192 g_instdir", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-21T08:30:20.719Z", "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on sctx in ha_connect_to_peer", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "endpoint_fini calls FREEUP(ep->data) which frees sctx, then ha_connect_to_peer also calls free(sctx) — double-free at lines 3594-3595 and 3600-3601", + "root_cause": "endpoint_fini calls FREEUP(ep->data) which frees sctx, then ha_connect_to_peer also calls free(sctx) \u2014 double-free at lines 3594-3595 and 3600-3601", "fix": "Set ep->data = NULL before endpoint_fini so FREEUP becomes a no-op; then free(sctx) explicitly in the error paths", "tags": [ "md", @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ { "id": "bug-007", "timestamp": "2026-05-21T12:53:13.789Z", - "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in liveness_poll_fn at ha.c:3293 — reading ctx->cancelled after ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask freed the old ctx", + "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in liveness_poll_fn at ha.c:3293 \u2014 reading ctx->cancelled after ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask freed the old ctx", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask freed the old liveness_poll_ctx_t immediately after setting cancelled=1, but the delaymgr task was already in flight reading ctx->cancelled=0 and then continued to read ctx->ha after free", "fix": "ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask no longer frees old ctx; liveness_poll_fn now frees ctx when it fires with cancelled=1 (guarded by #ifndef XCE_TESTING to avoid bad-free on stack-allocated test ctxs)", @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-26T13:51:32.274Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "../../../../../claude/.claude/plans/prancy-herding-nest.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: - [ ] `test_heartbeat_carries_committed_lsn`: heartbeat payl; `committed_lsn`; standby updates `ha.last_known_committed_ls", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-26T13:52:49.044Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".kiro/specs/ha-config-bootstrap/brief.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: // Catch-up gate (Clarification 6): behind nodes must not in; if (c->ha.in_catch_up) {", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-27T03:02:34.912Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "../../../../../claude/.claude/plans/prancy-herding-nest.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: name, key, applied_lsn, and config_tag immediately after TCP; - [ ] `test_ctrl_hello_registers_standby_in_repl`: handle_ct", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: vcpus should be nres", "file": "src/include/clusterconfig.h", "root_cause": "Used \"vcpus\" instead of \"nres\"", - "fix": "Changed vcpus → nres", + "fix": "Changed vcpus \u2192 nres", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: capn_str_null should be str", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c", "root_cause": "Used \"capn_str_null\" instead of \"str\"", - "fix": "Changed capn_str_null → str", + "fix": "Changed capn_str_null \u2192 str", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: in_catch_up should be acked_config_lsn", "file": "src/controller/repl.c", "root_cause": "Used \"in_catch_up\" instead of \"acked_config_lsn\"", - "fix": "Changed in_catch_up → acked_config_lsn", + "fix": "Changed in_catch_up \u2192 acked_config_lsn", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: ha_state_t should be _Atomic", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", "root_cause": "Used \"ha_state_t\" instead of \"_Atomic\"", - "fix": "Changed ha_state_t → _Atomic", + "fix": "Changed ha_state_t \u2192 _Atomic", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: socket should be epoll", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"socket\" instead of \"epoll\"", - "fix": "Changed socket → epoll", + "fix": "Changed socket \u2192 epoll", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: XCE_ERR_STANDBY should be E_XCE_STANDBY", "file": "src/lib/request.c", "root_cause": "Used \"XCE_ERR_STANDBY\" instead of \"E_XCE_STANDBY\"", - "fix": "Changed XCE_ERR_STANDBY → E_XCE_STANDBY", + "fix": "Changed XCE_ERR_STANDBY \u2192 E_XCE_STANDBY", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: XCE_ERR_NOT_READY should be E_XCE_NOT_READY", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_libxce_retry.c", "root_cause": "Used \"XCE_ERR_NOT_READY\" instead of \"E_XCE_NOT_READY\"", - "fix": "Changed XCE_ERR_NOT_READY → E_XCE_NOT_READY", + "fix": "Changed XCE_ERR_NOT_READY \u2192 E_XCE_NOT_READY", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: data should be ctrl_hello_reply_t", "file": "src/include/typemap.h", "root_cause": "Used \"data\" instead of \"ctrl_hello_reply_t\"", - "fix": "Changed data → ctrl_hello_reply_t", + "fix": "Changed data \u2192 ctrl_hello_reply_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-29T03:54:23.205Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in struct", "file": "src/include/typemap.h", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: wal_catchup_entry_t* walcatchupentrymsg;; snapshot_transfer_t* snapshottransfermsg; | Also: /* Forward declarations for types defined later in this file; typedef struct snapshot_transfer_t snapshot_transfer_fw", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: nres should be vcpus", "file": "src/include/clusterconfig.h", "root_cause": "Used \"nres\" instead of \"vcpus\"", - "fix": "Changed nres → vcpus", + "fix": "Changed nres \u2192 vcpus", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: data should be request_vote_reply_t", "file": "src/include/typemap.h", "root_cause": "Used \"data\" instead of \"request_vote_reply_t\"", - "fix": "Changed data → request_vote_reply_t", + "fix": "Changed data \u2192 request_vote_reply_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: cluster_init_phase2 should be cluster_register_listener", "file": "src/controller/include/cluster.h", "root_cause": "Used \"cluster_init_phase2\" instead of \"cluster_register_listener\"", - "fix": "Changed cluster_init_phase2 → cluster_register_listener", + "fix": "Changed cluster_init_phase2 \u2192 cluster_register_listener", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: CTRL_PERF_NHASH should be c", "file": "src/controller/cluster.c", "root_cause": "Used \"CTRL_PERF_NHASH\" instead of \"c\"", - "fix": "Changed CTRL_PERF_NHASH → c", + "fix": "Changed CTRL_PERF_NHASH \u2192 c", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: true should be false", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-build/SKILL.md", "root_cause": "Used \"true\" instead of \"false\"", - "fix": "Changed true → false", + "fix": "Changed true \u2192 false", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: 120 should be 300", "file": "src/controller/meson.build", "root_cause": "Used \"120\" instead of \"300\"", - "fix": "Changed 120 → 300", + "fix": "Changed 120 \u2192 300", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -930,8 +930,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-30T06:38:09.325Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".kiro/specs/election-iomgr-refactor/design.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* After election determines role: */; int is_first_boot = !c->running; /* running=1 only after cl | Also: #### `ha_dispatch_gate` — CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING case; ```c | Also: ### 3-node startup — ctrl-a wins (with COMMITTING phase); participant PeerC as ctrl-c endpoint | Also: - **`ha_start_election_async()` is fully non-blocking**: Arm; - *Initial startup* (`ha->phase2_done == 0`): calls `cluster", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* After election determines role: */; int is_first_boot = !c->running; /* running=1 only after cl | Also: #### `ha_dispatch_gate` \u2014 CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING case; ```c | Also: ### 3-node startup \u2014 ctrl-a wins (with COMMITTING phase); participant PeerC as ctrl-c endpoint | Also: - **`ha_start_election_async()` is fully non-blocking**: Arm; - *Initial startup* (`ha->phase2_done == 0`): calls `cluster", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-30T11:43:44.829Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in XCE_TESTING", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Push config to standbys with lower config_tag (Req 7.1) *; #ifdef XCE_TESTING", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: third should be second", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_repl_ack.c", "root_cause": "Used \"third\" instead of \"second\"", - "fix": "Changed third → second", + "fix": "Changed third \u2192 second", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-05-31T04:11:45.534Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in struct", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-library/design.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: Caller->>RaftSM: raft_on_vote_request(state, from, term); alt term < current_term", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -1408,7 +1408,7 @@ { "id": "bug-206", "timestamp": "2026-05-31T08:40:00.000Z", - "error_message": "test_vote_reply_handler_term_fencing FAIL: Expected 10 Was 3 — ha->term must be atomically updated to peer term when peer term > ours", + "error_message": "test_vote_reply_handler_term_fencing FAIL: Expected 10 Was 3 \u2014 ha->term must be atomically updated to peer term when peer term > ours", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "vote_reply_msg_handler delegated term fencing entirely to raft_cb_become_follower (via raft_on_vote_reply). In XCE_TESTING builds, vote_reply_dispatch calls xce_vote_reply_hook and returns early, bypassing raft_on_vote_reply and thus never updating ha->term.", "fix": "Added explicit CAS loop in vote_reply_msg_handler before vote_reply_dispatch to advance ha->term when vr_term > ha->term. This applies on both the production path and the XCE_TESTING hook path.", @@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval should be test_raft_init_even_peers_returns_einval", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval\" instead of \"test_raft_init_even_peers_returns_einval\"", - "fix": "Changed test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval → test_raft_init_even_peers_returns_einval", + "fix": "Changed test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval \u2192 test_raft_init_even_peers_returns_einval", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ { "id": "bug-208", "timestamp": "2026-05-31", - "error_message": "ASAN LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks in scheduler testsuite — build exits with error code", + "error_message": "ASAN LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks in scheduler testsuite \u2014 build exits with error code", "file": "src/scheduler/testsuite/test.c", "root_cause": "sched_meet_host_selection() lazily allocates w->host_eval_ctx via build_host_eval_ctx(). Four test functions (test_meet_host_selection_always_true_passes, test_meet_host_selection_always_false_fails, test_meet_host_selection_numeric_match, test_meet_host_selection_string_match) called zarray_fini() without first calling sched_worker_release_host_ctx() to free the lazily-allocated host_eval_ctx.", "fix": "Added sched_worker_release_host_ctx(&w) calls before zarray_fini() in all four affected test functions.", @@ -1479,7 +1479,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: 2000 should be 5000", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", "root_cause": "Used \"2000\" instead of \"5000\"", - "fix": "Changed 2000 → 5000", + "fix": "Changed 2000 \u2192 5000", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: Request_body_nodata should be Request_body_nomsg", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"Request_body_nodata\" instead of \"Request_body_nomsg\"", - "fix": "Changed Request_body_nodata → Request_body_nomsg", + "fix": "Changed Request_body_nodata \u2192 Request_body_nomsg", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -1542,7 +1542,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: vote_reply_msg_handler should be vote_reply_msg_handler_for_test", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"vote_reply_msg_handler\" instead of \"vote_reply_msg_handler_for_test\"", - "fix": "Changed vote_reply_msg_handler → vote_reply_msg_handler_for_test", + "fix": "Changed vote_reply_msg_handler \u2192 vote_reply_msg_handler_for_test", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: && should be !=", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"&&\" instead of \"!=\"", - "fix": "Changed operator && → !=", + "fix": "Changed operator && \u2192 !=", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -1685,7 +1685,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_ha_connect should be test_ha_ctrlhello", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_ha_connect\" instead of \"test_ha_ctrlhello\"", - "fix": "Changed test_ha_connect → test_ha_ctrlhello", + "fix": "Changed test_ha_connect \u2192 test_ha_ctrlhello", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -1700,7 +1700,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: vcpu should be vcpus", "file": "src/tools/deploy-ha.sh", "root_cause": "Used \"vcpu\" instead of \"vcpus\"", - "fix": "Changed vcpu → vcpus", + "fix": "Changed vcpu \u2192 vcpus", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -1764,7 +1764,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: startup_validation should be testsuite_test_ha_liveness", "file": "src/xce.build/build.ninja", "root_cause": "Used \"startup_validation\" instead of \"testsuite_test_ha_liveness\"", - "fix": "Changed startup_validation → testsuite_test_ha_liveness", + "fix": "Changed startup_validation \u2192 testsuite_test_ha_liveness", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "ninja" @@ -1843,7 +1843,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_am_i_primary should be test_ha_cluster", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_am_i_primary\" instead of \"test_ha_cluster\"", - "fix": "Changed test_am_i_primary → test_ha_cluster", + "fix": "Changed test_am_i_primary \u2192 test_ha_cluster", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -1873,8 +1873,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-04T14:33:03.464Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in XCE_TESTING", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_config_repl.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* ── Task 2.1: OPCode_walCatchupEntry handler ─────────────; #ifdef XCE_TESTING | Also: /* Task 2.1: OPCode_walCatchupEntry handler */; RUN_TEST(test_wal_catchup_entry_advances_applied_lsn);", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* \u2500\u2500 Task 2.1: OPCode_walCatchupEntry handler \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500; #ifdef XCE_TESTING | Also: /* Task 2.1: OPCode_walCatchupEntry handler */; RUN_TEST(test_wal_catchup_entry_advances_applied_lsn);", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -1889,7 +1889,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-04T14:41:35.073Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in XCE_TESTING", "file": "src/controller/cluster.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: case OPCode_walCatchupEntry:; /* Task 2.1: standby applies a single WAL catch-up entry fro", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -1905,7 +1905,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-04T14:46:44.652Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: #include \"persist.h\" /* persist_t, apply_wal_entry */; #include \"typemap.h\" /* wal_catchup_entry_t */", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_evaluate_repl_action_stream_wal_from_zero should be test_evaluate_repl_action_send_snapshot_lsn_zero", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_evaluate_repl_action_stream_wal_from_zero\" instead of \"test_evaluate_repl_action_send_snapshot_lsn_zero\"", - "fix": "Changed test_evaluate_repl_action_stream_wal_from_zero → test_evaluate_repl_action_send_snapshot_lsn_zero", + "fix": "Changed test_evaluate_repl_action_stream_wal_from_zero \u2192 test_evaluate_repl_action_send_snapshot_lsn_zero", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -2097,7 +2097,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: uintptr_t should be void", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_evaluate_committing.c", "root_cause": "Used \"uintptr_t\" instead of \"void\"", - "fix": "Changed uintptr_t → void", + "fix": "Changed uintptr_t \u2192 void", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -2128,7 +2128,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: 10000 should be 60000", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", "root_cause": "Used \"10000\" instead of \"60000\"", - "fix": "Changed 10000 → 60000", + "fix": "Changed 10000 \u2192 60000", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -2144,7 +2144,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: 10000 should be HA_DEFAULT_COMMITTING_TIMEOUT_MS", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_evaluate_committing.c", "root_cause": "Used \"10000\" instead of \"HA_DEFAULT_COMMITTING_TIMEOUT_MS\"", - "fix": "Changed 10000 → HA_DEFAULT_COMMITTING_TIMEOUT_MS", + "fix": "Changed 10000 \u2192 HA_DEFAULT_COMMITTING_TIMEOUT_MS", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -2158,7 +2158,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-05T06:50:00Z", "error_message": "3-node startup: majority convergence never fires; cluster falls through to committing_timeout degraded-mode WARN", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "ha->n_peers was set to candidates_count (3, total including self) in ha_start_election_async. ha_check_majority_convergence loops i=0..n_peers-1 checking standby_converged[], but standby_converged[] is indexed by votes_idx (relative, self excluded: 0..n_other-1). With n_peers=3, it checked standby_converged[2] which is never set, so n_converged (2) < n_peers (3) always — majority convergence path could never succeed.", + "root_cause": "ha->n_peers was set to candidates_count (3, total including self) in ha_start_election_async. ha_check_majority_convergence loops i=0..n_peers-1 checking standby_converged[], but standby_converged[] is indexed by votes_idx (relative, self excluded: 0..n_other-1). With n_peers=3, it checked standby_converged[2] which is never set, so n_converged (2) < n_peers (3) always \u2014 majority convergence path could never succeed.", "fix": "Changed ha->n_peers = n_peers to ha->n_peers = n_other (= n_peers-1 = other-node count). Moved the assignment after n_other is computed. ha_repl_ack_received quorum formula (ha->n_peers+2)/2 still yields correct majority for both old and new value.", "tags": [ "ha", @@ -2177,7 +2177,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: DEBUG2 should be INFO", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"DEBUG2\" instead of \"INFO\"", - "fix": "Changed DEBUG2 → INFO", + "fix": "Changed DEBUG2 \u2192 INFO", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -2361,10 +2361,10 @@ { "id": "bug-340", "timestamp": "2026-06-10T00:23:21.918Z", - "error_message": "After kill+RESTART of a controller (ctrl-1), the restarted node loops forever: ha_on_primary_ctrl_fd_rdhup → CTRL_ELECTING → raft_cb_become_follower → CTRL_STANDBY every ~heartbeat_timeout, term climbing unbounded (473+), while ctrl-2 stays PRIMARY at term 3. On ctrl-2: every heartbeat tick logs `xce_encode op 0 (NOP)` then `WARN endpoint_update_epoll rc1=-1 < 0` (netio.c:575) — a wedged outbound standby endpoint.", + "error_message": "After kill+RESTART of a controller (ctrl-1), the restarted node loops forever: ha_on_primary_ctrl_fd_rdhup \u2192 CTRL_ELECTING \u2192 raft_cb_become_follower \u2192 CTRL_STANDBY every ~heartbeat_timeout, term climbing unbounded (473+), while ctrl-2 stays PRIMARY at term 3. On ctrl-2: every heartbeat tick logs `xce_encode op 0 (NOP)` then `WARN endpoint_update_epoll rc1=-1 < 0` (netio.c:575) \u2014 a wedged outbound standby endpoint.", "file": "src/controller/ha.c, src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_liveness.c", - "root_cause": "primary_heartbeat_fn never evicted a dead/wedged outbound standby endpoint from ha->standby_endpoints. When a peer is killed/restarted, its outbound ep on the primary wedges: handle_error (netio.c:420) runs iomgr_unmonitor (EPOLL_CTL_DEL, does NOT close the fd) and the err handler may leave the ep in standby_endpoints; epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_MOD) on the DEL'd fd then returns ENOENT (rc1=-1) on every heartbeat enqueue. xce_nop_req still returns >=0 (enqueue ok) so the heartbeat layer never detected the wedge. Critically, primary_heartbeat_fn step 2 (reconnect) treats a peer as 'found' (connected) if ANY ep for it is in standby_endpoints — so the wedged ep SUPPRESSED reconnection. ctrl-2 therefore never opened a fresh connection to the restarted ctrl-1, never sent a ctrlhello, so ctrl-1 never set primary_ctrl_fd / refreshed last_activity and its liveness watchdog re-elected every heartbeat_timeout forever. (The earlier suspected 'become_follower doesn't reset last_activity' was NOT a bug: ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask already stamps last_activity=now, so the ~11s period is exactly one full timeout — confirming the watchdog is correct and the sole cause is the broken channel.)", - "fix": "In primary_heartbeat_fn (ha.c) step 1, added liveness eviction symmetric with the standby's own liveness poll: for each standby ep, if ep->ts_last_in > 0 (was responsive at least once) AND (now_wall - ep->ts_last_in) > heartbeat_timeout_s, remove it from ha->standby_endpoints (zarray_del, under ha->lock) and collect it; after releasing ha->lock, repl_remove_standby() each evicted ep. Removal is the load-bearing action — the reconnect scan (step 2) then re-establishes a fresh ctrlhello channel to the restarted peer on this/next tick, and ctrl-1 settles via ha_discover_primary (no term gate, ha.c:3807) → become_follower → STANDBY. ts_last_in/ts_last_out are existing endpoint_t fields (wall clock, set in handle_input/handle_output), so no libnetio change. The evicted ep object itself is reclaimed by its err handler when the dead connection finally surfaces an epoll event (bounded leak, consistent with codebase). Eviction keys on ts_last_in>0 so a just-connected joiner (ts_last_in==0) gets grace. Regression tests: test_primary_hb_evicts_silent_standby (RED→GREEN), test_primary_hb_keeps_live_standby, test_primary_hb_keeps_unconfirmed_standby in test_ha_liveness.c.", + "root_cause": "primary_heartbeat_fn never evicted a dead/wedged outbound standby endpoint from ha->standby_endpoints. When a peer is killed/restarted, its outbound ep on the primary wedges: handle_error (netio.c:420) runs iomgr_unmonitor (EPOLL_CTL_DEL, does NOT close the fd) and the err handler may leave the ep in standby_endpoints; epoll_ctl(EPOLL_CTL_MOD) on the DEL'd fd then returns ENOENT (rc1=-1) on every heartbeat enqueue. xce_nop_req still returns >=0 (enqueue ok) so the heartbeat layer never detected the wedge. Critically, primary_heartbeat_fn step 2 (reconnect) treats a peer as 'found' (connected) if ANY ep for it is in standby_endpoints \u2014 so the wedged ep SUPPRESSED reconnection. ctrl-2 therefore never opened a fresh connection to the restarted ctrl-1, never sent a ctrlhello, so ctrl-1 never set primary_ctrl_fd / refreshed last_activity and its liveness watchdog re-elected every heartbeat_timeout forever. (The earlier suspected 'become_follower doesn't reset last_activity' was NOT a bug: ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask already stamps last_activity=now, so the ~11s period is exactly one full timeout \u2014 confirming the watchdog is correct and the sole cause is the broken channel.)", + "fix": "In primary_heartbeat_fn (ha.c) step 1, added liveness eviction symmetric with the standby's own liveness poll: for each standby ep, if ep->ts_last_in > 0 (was responsive at least once) AND (now_wall - ep->ts_last_in) > heartbeat_timeout_s, remove it from ha->standby_endpoints (zarray_del, under ha->lock) and collect it; after releasing ha->lock, repl_remove_standby() each evicted ep. Removal is the load-bearing action \u2014 the reconnect scan (step 2) then re-establishes a fresh ctrlhello channel to the restarted peer on this/next tick, and ctrl-1 settles via ha_discover_primary (no term gate, ha.c:3807) \u2192 become_follower \u2192 STANDBY. ts_last_in/ts_last_out are existing endpoint_t fields (wall clock, set in handle_input/handle_output), so no libnetio change. The evicted ep object itself is reclaimed by its err handler when the dead connection finally surfaces an epoll event (bounded leak, consistent with codebase). Eviction keys on ts_last_in>0 so a just-connected joiner (ts_last_in==0) gets grace. Regression tests: test_primary_hb_evicts_silent_standby (RED\u2192GREEN), test_primary_hb_keeps_live_standby, test_primary_hb_keeps_unconfirmed_standby in test_ha_liveness.c.", "tags": [ "logic-fix", "c", @@ -2388,7 +2388,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: last_heartbeat should be voted_for_term", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", "root_cause": "Used \"last_heartbeat\" instead of \"voted_for_term\"", - "fix": "Changed last_heartbeat → voted_for_term", + "fix": "Changed last_heartbeat \u2192 voted_for_term", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -2434,7 +2434,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-10T01:39:31.683Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/lib/request.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: if (req->body_which == Request_body_walcatchupentrymsg; && req->body.walcatchupentrymsg != NULL) { | Also: /* wal_entry_to_wire: fill a wire WalCatchupEntry from a C e; * fields and raw payload bytes. Sub-entry nesting is one le", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -2576,7 +2576,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-10T07:56:21.347Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in XCE_TESTING", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_repl_unit.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* =========================================================; * Task 1.1: repl_broadcast send path tests", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -2593,7 +2593,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: WAL_JOB should be WAL_JOB_SUBMIT", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_repl_unit.c", "root_cause": "Used \"WAL_JOB\" instead of \"WAL_JOB_SUBMIT\"", - "fix": "Changed WAL_JOB → WAL_JOB_SUBMIT", + "fix": "Changed WAL_JOB \u2192 WAL_JOB_SUBMIT", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -2608,7 +2608,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: DEBUG3 should be TRACE", "file": "src/controller/repl.c", "root_cause": "Used \"DEBUG3\" instead of \"TRACE\"", - "fix": "Changed DEBUG3 → TRACE", + "fix": "Changed DEBUG3 \u2192 TRACE", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -2624,7 +2624,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: request should be ep", "file": "src/controller/cluster.c", "root_cause": "Used \"request\" instead of \"ep\"", - "fix": "Changed request → ep", + "fix": "Changed request \u2192 ep", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -2639,7 +2639,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-10T08:47:48.296Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 3.3 (ha-wal-replication): dispatch gate standby-role; RUN_TEST(test_dispatch_gate_allows_wal_catchup_in_standby_ro", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -2690,7 +2690,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_catchup_full_lifecycle_integration should be test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_p2_integration.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_catchup_full_lifecycle_integration\" instead of \"test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged\"", - "fix": "Changed test_catchup_full_lifecycle_integration → test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged", + "fix": "Changed test_catchup_full_lifecycle_integration \u2192 test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -2769,7 +2769,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: signal should be stdio", "file": "src/lib/delay.c", "root_cause": "Used \"signal\" instead of \"stdio\"", - "fix": "Changed signal → stdio", + "fix": "Changed signal \u2192 stdio", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -2995,7 +2995,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-11T13:30:00Z", "error_message": "test_commit_engine fixture: Expected 0 Was 1 from repl_add_standby", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_engine.c", - "root_cause": "repl_add_standby returns the slot index (>=0) on success, not 0 — second add legitimately returns 1", + "root_cause": "repl_add_standby returns the slot index (>=0) on success, not 0 \u2014 second add legitimately returns 1", "fix": "fixture asserts TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(i, repl_add_standby(...)) per standby slot", "tags": [ "controller", @@ -3012,8 +3012,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-11T13:35:00Z", "error_message": "3 pre-existing controller testsuite failures masked by exit code 0: test_committed_lsn_does_not_advance_on_timeout (-110), test_repl_ack_after_promote_gate_allows_jobsub (-10013), test_rdhup_primary_dispatch_gate_opens (-10013)", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", - "root_cause": "each test group calls UNITY_BEGIN/UNITY_END internally, resetting Unity counters — main()'s final UNITY_END returns 0 unless the LAST group fails, so meson reported the suite green despite 3 real failures; Unity also misattributes failure FILE names to whichever file's UNITY_BEGIN ran (e.g. reports test_repl_unit.c for a test living in test_p2_integration.c)", - "fix": "not fixed (out of task 1.1 boundary) — documented; failures exist identically on baseline without ha-commit-engine changes (verified by stash/rebuild). persist_wal_sync_append returns -ETIMEDOUT while the test expects rc==0 with sync_rc==-ETIMEDOUT; the two gate tests fail ha_has_write_quorum (standby_endpoints empty with n_peers=2)", + "root_cause": "each test group calls UNITY_BEGIN/UNITY_END internally, resetting Unity counters \u2014 main()'s final UNITY_END returns 0 unless the LAST group fails, so meson reported the suite green despite 3 real failures; Unity also misattributes failure FILE names to whichever file's UNITY_BEGIN ran (e.g. reports test_repl_unit.c for a test living in test_p2_integration.c)", + "fix": "not fixed (out of task 1.1 boundary) \u2014 documented; failures exist identically on baseline without ha-commit-engine changes (verified by stash/rebuild). persist_wal_sync_append returns -ETIMEDOUT while the test expects rc==0 with sync_rc==-ETIMEDOUT; the two gate tests fail ha_has_write_quorum (standby_endpoints empty with n_peers=2)", "tags": [ "controller", "testsuite", @@ -3031,8 +3031,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-11T15:28:35.990Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_engine.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════; * Task 3.1 — membership re-evaluation (commit_on_membership_ | Also: /* Task 3.1 — membership re-evaluation */; RUN_TEST(test_catchup_standby_ack_does_not_count_toward_pend", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* \u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550; * Task 3.1 \u2014 membership re-evaluation (commit_on_membership_ | Also: /* Task 3.1 \u2014 membership re-evaluation */; RUN_TEST(test_catchup_standby_ack_does_not_count_toward_pend", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -3047,8 +3047,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-11T16:19:51.195Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_engine.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 4.2 — wired gate: registry truth at ha_dispatch_gate; RUN_TEST(test_gate_wired_registry_catchup_standby_rejects_th", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 4.2 \u2014 wired gate: registry truth at ha_dispatch_gate; RUN_TEST(test_gate_wired_registry_catchup_standby_rejects_th", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -3079,8 +3079,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-11T22:39:24.704Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_engine.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════; * Task 5.1 — integration: ACK feed and the job-submit sync-a | Also: #include \"typemap.h\" /* wal_catchup_entry_t (task 5; #include \"wal_types.h\" /* WAL_JOB_SUBMIT (task 5.1 sy", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* \u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550\u2550; * Task 5.1 \u2014 integration: ACK feed and the job-submit sync-a | Also: #include \"typemap.h\" /* wal_catchup_entry_t (task 5; #include \"wal_types.h\" /* WAL_JOB_SUBMIT (task 5.1 sy", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -3192,7 +3192,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged should be test_single_node_committed_lsn_advances", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_p2_integration.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged\" instead of \"test_single_node_committed_lsn_advances\"", - "fix": "Changed test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged → test_single_node_committed_lsn_advances", + "fix": "Changed test_single_node_committed_lsn_unchanged \u2192 test_single_node_committed_lsn_advances", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -3418,7 +3418,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-12T11:05:00-07:00", "error_message": "va_list type confusion: WAL_JOB_RUSAGE hook payload reads job_t fields from an xce_job_rusages_t*", "file": "src/controller/job.c (caller) / src/controller/persist.c (consumer)", - "root_cause": "update_job_rusages fires AFTER_EVENT HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_RUSAGE_UPDATE with (cluster_t*, xce_job_rusages_t*) at job.c:1015-1016, but persist_job_hook_fun's default arm (persist.c:1354-1359) reads the second vararg as job_t* and dereferences j->job.state at offset 56 == sizeof(xce_job_rusages_t) — an out-of-bounds read on an exactly-sized allocation; the WAL_JOB_RUSAGE payload state field is garbage (jobid at offset 0 lines up by accident)", + "root_cause": "update_job_rusages fires AFTER_EVENT HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_RUSAGE_UPDATE with (cluster_t*, xce_job_rusages_t*) at job.c:1015-1016, but persist_job_hook_fun's default arm (persist.c:1354-1359) reads the second vararg as job_t* and dereferences j->job.state at offset 56 == sizeof(xce_job_rusages_t) \u2014 an out-of-bounds read on an exactly-sized allocation; the WAL_JOB_RUSAGE payload state field is garbage (jobid at offset 0 lines up by accident)", "fix": "NOT FIXED (discovered while writing task 3.3 receipt-ACK verdict pins; production out of boundary). Test test_update_op_rusage_receipt_reply_facts_retained uses a padded union so the pin stays in-bounds under ASAN without masking the bug; fix candidates: dedicated RUSAGE arm in persist_job_hook_fun reading xce_job_rusages_t*, or fire the hook with (c, j) like the other job hooks", "tags": [ "pre-existing", @@ -3600,7 +3600,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_ha_cluster should be test_ha_role_lifecycle", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_ha_cluster\" instead of \"test_ha_role_lifecycle\"", - "fix": "Changed test_ha_cluster → test_ha_role_lifecycle", + "fix": "Changed test_ha_cluster \u2192 test_ha_role_lifecycle", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -3659,7 +3659,7 @@ }, { "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow in xce_wal_batch_req_raw <- repl_broadcast <- persist_wal_async <- ha_arm_own_term_gate <- ha_promote_to_primary, during test_promotion_registers_persist_hooks (test_ha_role_lifecycle.c case 3)", - "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role_lifecycle.c (fixture defect — OUT OF task 2.2 boundary)", + "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role_lifecycle.c (fixture defect \u2014 OUT OF task 2.2 boundary)", "root_cause": "task-2.2's ha_promote_to_primary now appends a WAL_NOOP via persist_wal_async, which broadcasts to registered standbys. The lifecycle fixture (lifecycle_cluster_setup) registers fake `int g_lc_eps[]` endpoints via repl_add_standby and NEVER installs repl_broadcast_send_hook, so repl_broadcast calls xce_wal_batch_req_raw(s->ep) and reads ep->peer (offset 36) past the 4-byte int. IDENTICAL to the prior test_p2_integration tests 8/9 bug already in buglog.", "fix": "Test-side fix (parent must apply, mirrors the documented p2_integration fix): in test_ha_role_lifecycle.c add `extern int (*repl_broadcast_send_hook)(void*, wal_catchup_entry_t**, int);` and a no-op drop hook, install it in lifecycle_cluster_setup before promotion (reset to NULL in teardown), and cast endpoints to (void*). Production ha.c is correct per design (persist_wal_async appends+broadcasts by design).", "tags": [ @@ -3679,9 +3679,9 @@ }, { "error_message": "task-2.1 lifecycle fixture off-by-one: case 5/6/7 assert writable_lsn==noop_lsn and current_lsn==noop_lsn+1, but lifecycle_cluster_setup primes current_lsn = appended_lsn + 1, so a real persist_wal_async appends the noop at appended_lsn+1 (current_lsn->appended_lsn+2), giving noop_lsn=appended_lsn+1 != asserted appended_lsn.", - "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role_lifecycle.c (fixture defect — OUT OF task 2.2 boundary)", + "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role_lifecycle.c (fixture defect \u2014 OUT OF task 2.2 boundary)", "root_cause": "persist_wal_async assigns hdr.lsn = current_lsn++ (entry takes the CURRENT value). The fixture comment assumes the next append takes current_lsn-1, which is off by one. To make the noop land at `appended_lsn`, the prime must be `current_lsn = appended_lsn`, not `appended_lsn + 1`.", - "fix": "Test-side fix (parent): set g_lc.persist.current_lsn = appended_lsn in lifecycle_cluster_setup. Production noop_lsn = current_lsn-1 (post-append) is correct per design §Promotion Rewrite / brief.", + "fix": "Test-side fix (parent): set g_lc.persist.current_lsn = appended_lsn in lifecycle_cluster_setup. Production noop_lsn = current_lsn-1 (post-append) is correct per design \u00a7Promotion Rewrite / brief.", "tags": [ "ha-single-leader-role", "task-2.2", @@ -3782,7 +3782,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING should be CTRL_PRIMARY", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING\" instead of \"CTRL_PRIMARY\"", - "fix": "Changed CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING → CTRL_PRIMARY", + "fix": "Changed CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING \u2192 CTRL_PRIMARY", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -3813,7 +3813,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING should be CTRL_PRIMARY", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_connection_reuse.c", "root_cause": "Used \"CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING\" instead of \"CTRL_PRIMARY\"", - "fix": "Changed CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING → CTRL_PRIMARY", + "fix": "Changed CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING \u2192 CTRL_PRIMARY", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -3860,7 +3860,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_committing should be test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_primary_directly", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_startup.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_committing\" instead of \"test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_primary_directly\"", - "fix": "Changed test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_committing → test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_primary_directly", + "fix": "Changed test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_committing \u2192 test_nonblocking_single_node_election_enters_primary_directly", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -3894,7 +3894,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: uint32_t should be ha_config_t", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", "root_cause": "Used \"uint32_t\" instead of \"ha_config_t\"", - "fix": "Changed uint32_t → ha_config_t", + "fix": "Changed uint32_t \u2192 ha_config_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -3908,8 +3908,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-13T14:43:54.194Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".kiro/steering/ha-async-io.md", - "root_cause": "Had `CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING → CTRL_PRIMARY`", - "fix": "Changed to 's own-term commit rule (§5.4.2): an election winn", + "root_cause": "Had `CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING \u2192 CTRL_PRIMARY`", + "fix": "Changed to 's own-term commit rule (\u00a75.4.2): an election winn", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -3924,8 +3924,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-13T14:54:21.781Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-deploy-ha/SKILL.md", - "root_cause": "Had `→ CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING`", - "fix": "Changed to `HA FSM (raft): → CTRL_PRIMARY (term=...)`", + "root_cause": "Had `\u2192 CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING`", + "fix": "Changed to `HA FSM (raft): \u2192 CTRL_PRIMARY (term=...)`", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -3940,8 +3940,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-13T15:31:21.740Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": "../../../../../claude/.claude/projects/-home-rshen-projects-xce-xce/memory/project_ha_consistency_invariants.md", - "root_cause": "Had \"XCE HA Raft+CP umbrella — sub-specs 1&2 of 4 IMPL", - "fix": "Changed to \"XCE HA Raft+CP umbrella — sub-specs 1,2,3 of 4 IM", + "root_cause": "Had \"XCE HA Raft+CP umbrella \u2014 sub-specs 1&2 of 4 IMPL", + "fix": "Changed to \"XCE HA Raft+CP umbrella \u2014 sub-specs 1,2,3 of 4 IM", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -3957,7 +3957,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: stdint should be stdbool", "file": "src/controller/include/cluster.h", "root_cause": "Used \"stdint\" instead of \"stdbool\"", - "fix": "Changed stdint → stdbool", + "fix": "Changed stdint \u2192 stdbool", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -3972,7 +3972,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: xlist_destroy should be xlist_fini", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_egress_filter.c", "root_cause": "Used \"xlist_destroy\" instead of \"xlist_fini\"", - "fix": "Changed xlist_destroy → xlist_fini", + "fix": "Changed xlist_destroy \u2192 xlist_fini", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -4099,7 +4099,7 @@ "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free in ha_rejoin_reconcile_fn (ha_convergence.c:236) during test_rejoin_second_call_no_second_restart", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_demotion_convergence.c", "root_cause": "dc_run_pending_task peeked tasks.head and ran entry(args) WITHOUT dequeuing. The once-guard correctly makes the 2nd ha_rejoin_reconcile schedule no new task, so head still pointed at the first (already-run) task whose body had freed its heap ctx (args). The 2nd dc_run_pending_task re-ran that task on the freed ctx. The convergence task bodies free their own args (production delaymgr killer frees only the delay_task_t node, never args; production execv never re-runs a one-shot).", - "fix": "Made dc_run_pending_task DEQUEUE via ordq_get(&mgr->tasks, NULL), run the body, then free(t)/free(it) — mirroring the real delaymgr worker (ordq_get -> runner_fn -> FREEUP for runcount==1). A 2nd call now returns DC_NO_TASK as production would. Production ha_rejoin_reconcile/ha_rejoin_reconcile_fn unchanged (the body-frees-ctx pattern is correct).", + "fix": "Made dc_run_pending_task DEQUEUE via ordq_get(&mgr->tasks, NULL), run the body, then free(t)/free(it) \u2014 mirroring the real delaymgr worker (ordq_get -> runner_fn -> FREEUP for runcount==1). A 2nd call now returns DC_NO_TASK as production would. Production ha_rejoin_reconcile/ha_rejoin_reconcile_fn unchanged (the body-frees-ctx pattern is correct).", "tags": [ "asan", "use-after-free", @@ -4135,7 +4135,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-14T04:57:22.178Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /*; * ha_walack_continuation_for_test: test-only entry point for", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -4167,8 +4167,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-14T06:37:35.904Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_convergence_verification.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: printf(\"\\n>> Regression pins: fan-out / snapshot fallback / ; \"re-inclusion (task 6.1 — PASS against current code)\\n\\n\"); | Also: /* ── Fan-out counting send-hook (task 6.1 (a)/(d), umbrella; * repl_broadcast routes each enqueue through repl_broadcast_", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: printf(\"\\n>> Regression pins: fan-out / snapshot fallback / ; \"re-inclusion (task 6.1 \u2014 PASS against current code)\\n\\n\"); | Also: /* \u2500\u2500 Fan-out counting send-hook (task 6.1 (a)/(d), umbrella; * repl_broadcast routes each enqueue through repl_broadcast_", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -4268,7 +4268,7 @@ "error_message": "WAL HOLE on cold-start catch-up: a fresh EMPTY standby (standby_lsn=0) catching up to a primary holding [0,1] receives ONLY lsn 1, missing lsn 0", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c", "root_cause": "ha_stream_wal_to_standby filter `if (hdr.lsn > standby_lsn)` excludes lsn 0 when standby_lsn==0 (0>0 is false). standby_lsn=0 is ambiguous: it means BOTH 'empty standby (applied nothing)' AND 'standby has applied lsn 0'. The streamer cannot distinguish, computes start_lsn=standby_lsn+1=1, and drops the genuine lsn-0 entry. Only non-cosmetic because lsn-0 entries can be REAL data (first-ever WAL entry of a fresh cluster is lsn 0 from a real write OR the promotion NOOP).", - "fix": "FIXED via reserve-lsn-0: persist_init() now sets current_lsn=1 on a fresh store (persist.c), so lsn 0 is reserved as the none/empty sentinel and the first-ever WAL entry (promotion NOOP) is lsn 1. The streamer filter hdr.lsn>standby_lsn now yields 1>0=true for an empty standby (standby_lsn=0), streaming the first entry — no hole. No streamer change needed; the reserved base makes the existing filter correct. Also fixes the uncommittable cold-start NOOP (now lsn 1, committable 0->1) and the own-term writable_lsn gate (now 1, effective). Test: test_coldstart_lsn0.c H1-H4 all green incl H4 no-hole. Base-shift fallout fixed in test_commit_engine, test_commit_barrier_rollout, test_commit_barrier_reply, test_p2_integration, test_egress_filter (removed now-redundant priming appends / wired engine).", + "fix": "FIXED via reserve-lsn-0: persist_init() now sets current_lsn=1 on a fresh store (persist.c), so lsn 0 is reserved as the none/empty sentinel and the first-ever WAL entry (promotion NOOP) is lsn 1. The streamer filter hdr.lsn>standby_lsn now yields 1>0=true for an empty standby (standby_lsn=0), streaming the first entry \u2014 no hole. No streamer change needed; the reserved base makes the existing filter correct. Also fixes the uncommittable cold-start NOOP (now lsn 1, committable 0->1) and the own-term writable_lsn gate (now 1, effective). Test: test_coldstart_lsn0.c H1-H4 all green incl H4 no-hole. Base-shift fallout fixed in test_commit_engine, test_commit_barrier_rollout, test_commit_barrier_reply, test_p2_integration, test_egress_filter (removed now-redundant priming appends / wired engine).", "tags": [ "ha", "replication", @@ -4289,7 +4289,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_pin_dispatch_gate_degraded_allowlist should be test_empty_standby_fresh_cluster_streams_not_snapshot", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_convergence_verification.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_pin_dispatch_gate_degraded_allowlist\" instead of \"test_empty_standby_fresh_cluster_streams_not_snapshot\"", - "fix": "Changed test_pin_dispatch_gate_degraded_allowlist → test_empty_standby_fresh_cluster_streams_not_snapshot", + "fix": "Changed test_pin_dispatch_gate_degraded_allowlist \u2192 test_empty_standby_fresh_cluster_streams_not_snapshot", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -4368,7 +4368,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: myconf_t should be uint32_t", "file": "src/include/myconf.h", "root_cause": "Used \"myconf_t\" instead of \"uint32_t\"", - "fix": "Changed myconf_t → uint32_t", + "fix": "Changed myconf_t \u2192 uint32_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -4423,8 +4423,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-15T09:16:53.679025Z", "error_message": "jobsub returns ok (status 0, jobid) but joblist AND jobinfo show the job absent on a stable single primary (ctrl-1); reslist works.", "file": "src/lib/request.c", - "root_cause": "SOLVED (reproduced locally via /xce-build + 3-node deploy-ha, ASAN). cluster_start() — the ONLY place that sets c->running=1 — is ORPHANED (zero callers; grep confirms). The HA startup path (myapp_run) starts iomgr/vtaskmgr/delaymgr/persist_start itself but never calls cluster_start, so c->running stays 0 (calloc default) on the primary. check_controller() (the streaming gate passed to xce_reply_get for joblist/workerlist) returns -EINVAL when !c->running; xce_reply_get then sets nc=0 (chunk count), shipping an EMPTY list to the client even though collect_jobs/key_find found the job. reslist passes checkf=NULL so it was immune. DIAG proof: 'reply_get send: table=2 pos=0 nc=0 nrows=1 checkstatus=-22' (pre-fix) -> 'nc=1 ... checkstatus=1' (post-fix). Single-node/legacy cluster_init path called cluster_start, which is why non-replicated worked.", - "fix": "Set c->running=1 at the TOP of cluster_run() (src/controller/cluster.c), symmetric with the existing c->running=0 on shutdown — the orphaned cluster_start() used to set it. c->running is a liveness/shutdown flag: check_controller() is polled PER CHUNK inside xce_reply_get()'s streaming loop so a long multi-chunk fetch (e.g. thousands of jobs) ABORTS mid-stream (nc=0) if a shutdown request arrives during it. The bug: running started 0 and was never set under HA, so the gate fired on every reply, not just during shutdown. Fix restores running=1 for the run-loop lifetime; the shutdown abort path (running=0 when cluster_run's cbuf_get loop breaks on the stop signal) is unchanged. Verified E2E on a local 3-node deploy-ha (ASAN): jobs now appear in joblist; DIAG showed checkstatus/nc flip -22/0 -> 1/1. Final fix is in cluster_run (not myapp_run — moved there so the 1<->0 lifecycle is co-located in the function that receives the shutdown signal).", + "root_cause": "SOLVED (reproduced locally via /xce-build + 3-node deploy-ha, ASAN). cluster_start() \u2014 the ONLY place that sets c->running=1 \u2014 is ORPHANED (zero callers; grep confirms). The HA startup path (myapp_run) starts iomgr/vtaskmgr/delaymgr/persist_start itself but never calls cluster_start, so c->running stays 0 (calloc default) on the primary. check_controller() (the streaming gate passed to xce_reply_get for joblist/workerlist) returns -EINVAL when !c->running; xce_reply_get then sets nc=0 (chunk count), shipping an EMPTY list to the client even though collect_jobs/key_find found the job. reslist passes checkf=NULL so it was immune. DIAG proof: 'reply_get send: table=2 pos=0 nc=0 nrows=1 checkstatus=-22' (pre-fix) -> 'nc=1 ... checkstatus=1' (post-fix). Single-node/legacy cluster_init path called cluster_start, which is why non-replicated worked.", + "fix": "Set c->running=1 at the TOP of cluster_run() (src/controller/cluster.c), symmetric with the existing c->running=0 on shutdown \u2014 the orphaned cluster_start() used to set it. c->running is a liveness/shutdown flag: check_controller() is polled PER CHUNK inside xce_reply_get()'s streaming loop so a long multi-chunk fetch (e.g. thousands of jobs) ABORTS mid-stream (nc=0) if a shutdown request arrives during it. The bug: running started 0 and was never set under HA, so the gate fired on every reply, not just during shutdown. Fix restores running=1 for the run-loop lifetime; the shutdown abort path (running=0 when cluster_run's cbuf_get loop breaks on the stop signal) is unchanged. Verified E2E on a local 3-node deploy-ha (ASAN): jobs now appear in joblist; DIAG showed checkstatus/nc flip -22/0 -> 1/1. Final fix is in cluster_run (not myapp_run \u2014 moved there so the 1<->0 lifecycle is co-located in the function that receives the shutdown signal).", "tags": [ "joblist", "workerlist", @@ -4480,7 +4480,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-16T00:10:49.295Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".kiro/specs/ha-prevote/research.md", - "root_cause": "Had 't understand PreVote (older binary) — does the ca", + "root_cause": "Had 't understand PreVote (older binary) \u2014 does the ca", "fix": "Changed to 's \"", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -4576,8 +4576,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-16T04:50:38.855Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in struct", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_vote_gate.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 3.1 — voter-side PreVote dispatch gate (stickiness +; * no mutation, reply term unchanged) */", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 3.1 \u2014 voter-side PreVote dispatch gate (stickiness +; * no mutation, reply term unchanged) */", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -4593,7 +4593,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_commit_engine should be test_ha_prevote", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_commit_engine\" instead of \"test_ha_prevote\"", - "fix": "Changed test_commit_engine → test_ha_prevote", + "fix": "Changed test_commit_engine \u2192 test_ha_prevote", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -4656,7 +4656,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_commit_engine should be test_ha_failover_prevote", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_commit_engine\" instead of \"test_ha_failover_prevote\"", - "fix": "Changed test_commit_engine → test_ha_failover_prevote", + "fix": "Changed test_commit_engine \u2192 test_ha_failover_prevote", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -4718,7 +4718,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-16T15:55:00Z", "error_message": "controller unit test TIMEOUT 300.01s killed by SIGTERM; suite exceeds 300s meson cap", "file": "src/controller/persist.c", - "root_cause": "fsync_worker slept the full wal_sync_ms in one uninterruptible nanosleep() then checked fsync_stop. persist_stop sets the flag and immediately pthread_join()s, so the join blocked until the in-progress sleep returned — up to a full wal_sync_ms per teardown. Tests set wal_sync_ms=5000 ('slow fsync, no races'), so each persist_stop cost ~5s; across ~7 suites with many fixtures the cumulative teardown time blew past the 300s controller-test cap. The 'commit: WAIT deadline expired' warnings in the log were unrelated intentional negative tests (50-300ms).", + "root_cause": "fsync_worker slept the full wal_sync_ms in one uninterruptible nanosleep() then checked fsync_stop. persist_stop sets the flag and immediately pthread_join()s, so the join blocked until the in-progress sleep returned \u2014 up to a full wal_sync_ms per teardown. Tests set wal_sync_ms=5000 ('slow fsync, no races'), so each persist_stop cost ~5s; across ~7 suites with many fixtures the cumulative teardown time blew past the 300s controller-test cap. The 'commit: WAIT deadline expired' warnings in the log were unrelated intentional negative tests (50-300ms).", "fix": "Replaced the nanosleep with pthread_cond_timedwait on a new fsync_mutex/fsync_cond (added to persist_t, init in persist_init, destroyed in persist_fini). persist_stop now sets fsync_stop and pthread_cond_signal(fsync_cond) under fsync_mutex before join, so the worker wakes immediately. fdatasync still runs under p->lock, released before re-acquiring fsync_mutex (no lock nesting). Full controller suite now completes in ~10s (was >300s); 0 failures.", "tags": [ "controller", @@ -4761,10 +4761,10 @@ { "id": "bug-606", "timestamp": "2026-06-16T17:46:00Z", - "error_message": "After killing the primary (ctrl-1), the two surviving standbys (ctrl-2,ctrl-3) livelock in synchronized elections: PreVote win → CTRL_ELECTING → become_follower (term bumped) → ~10s → repeat, term climbing unbounded (3→9→∞), no new primary ever elected. Reproduce: deploy 3-node HA, elect primary, submit 3-5 jobs, kill ctrl-1.", + "error_message": "After killing the primary (ctrl-1), the two surviving standbys (ctrl-2,ctrl-3) livelock in synchronized elections: PreVote win \u2192 CTRL_ELECTING \u2192 become_follower (term bumped) \u2192 ~10s \u2192 repeat, term climbing unbounded (3\u21929\u2192\u221e), no new primary ever elected. Reproduce: deploy 3-node HA, elect primary, submit 3-5 jobs, kill ctrl-1.", "file": "src/controller/ha.c (ha_begin_failover, ha_election_stagger_ms, ha_failover_stagger_fn); src/controller/ha.h; test: src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role.c", - "root_cause": "Dueling-candidates split-vote livelock — Raft §5.2 randomized election timeout is missing on the FAILOVER path. Both survivors lose the primary at the same instant; their liveness polls fire on the identical fixed heartbeat_timeout, so they start PreVote+real-election in perfect lock-step (ms-aligned timestamps). Both win PreVote (neither sees a primary, so each grants the other — PreVote cannot break this tie), then both campaign at the same term, each votes for itself and denies the other (quorum 2, only 2 live nodes) → split vote → election times out (fixed election_timeout_ms, raft.c:105, NO jitter) → become_follower, term+1 → repeat forever. The priority/jitter config (election_jitter_max_ms, election_priority_step_ms) is applied ONLY at startup (ha_wait_for_heartbeat_or_timeout); the failover re-election path (liveness_poll_fn → ha_on_primary_ctrl_fd_rdhup → PreVote → ha_start_election_async → raft_start_election) has no de-synchronization. raft_on_leader_lost DOES have a priority stagger (raft.c:421) but the failover loop does not go through it.", - "fix": "Added ha_election_stagger_ms() (ha.c/ha.h): per-node failover delay = my_priority*election_priority_step_ms + random[0,election_jitter_max_ms], re-randomized each call (mirrors the startup stagger). ha_begin_failover() now schedules the PreVote start via delaymgr after that stagger (production only; c==NULL/no-delaymgr stays synchronous so existing tests are unaffected). The delaymgr callback ha_failover_stagger_fn guards with role==STANDBY && ha_heartbeat_is_fresh → skips PreVote if a primary connected during the stagger. Effect: two survivors no longer campaign in lock-step; the higher-priority survivor wins and its heartbeats reset the other. TDD: test_election_stagger_desyncs_by_priority (bounds + step>jitter ordering). VERIFIED on kill-primary repro: ctrl-2 (stagger 630ms) won → PRIMARY term=1; ctrl-3 (stagger 1072ms) received ctrl-2's ctrlhello first → STANDBY, then its stagger timer hit the guard and skipped PreVote ('a primary is alive — skipping PreVote'). No term inflation, no livelock. NOTE: optional raft.c:105 give-up-watchdog randomization NOT needed — the failover-start stagger alone resolves it; left as future defense-in-depth.", + "root_cause": "Dueling-candidates split-vote livelock \u2014 Raft \u00a75.2 randomized election timeout is missing on the FAILOVER path. Both survivors lose the primary at the same instant; their liveness polls fire on the identical fixed heartbeat_timeout, so they start PreVote+real-election in perfect lock-step (ms-aligned timestamps). Both win PreVote (neither sees a primary, so each grants the other \u2014 PreVote cannot break this tie), then both campaign at the same term, each votes for itself and denies the other (quorum 2, only 2 live nodes) \u2192 split vote \u2192 election times out (fixed election_timeout_ms, raft.c:105, NO jitter) \u2192 become_follower, term+1 \u2192 repeat forever. The priority/jitter config (election_jitter_max_ms, election_priority_step_ms) is applied ONLY at startup (ha_wait_for_heartbeat_or_timeout); the failover re-election path (liveness_poll_fn \u2192 ha_on_primary_ctrl_fd_rdhup \u2192 PreVote \u2192 ha_start_election_async \u2192 raft_start_election) has no de-synchronization. raft_on_leader_lost DOES have a priority stagger (raft.c:421) but the failover loop does not go through it.", + "fix": "Added ha_election_stagger_ms() (ha.c/ha.h): per-node failover delay = my_priority*election_priority_step_ms + random[0,election_jitter_max_ms], re-randomized each call (mirrors the startup stagger). ha_begin_failover() now schedules the PreVote start via delaymgr after that stagger (production only; c==NULL/no-delaymgr stays synchronous so existing tests are unaffected). The delaymgr callback ha_failover_stagger_fn guards with role==STANDBY && ha_heartbeat_is_fresh \u2192 skips PreVote if a primary connected during the stagger. Effect: two survivors no longer campaign in lock-step; the higher-priority survivor wins and its heartbeats reset the other. TDD: test_election_stagger_desyncs_by_priority (bounds + step>jitter ordering). VERIFIED on kill-primary repro: ctrl-2 (stagger 630ms) won \u2192 PRIMARY term=1; ctrl-3 (stagger 1072ms) received ctrl-2's ctrlhello first \u2192 STANDBY, then its stagger timer hit the guard and skipped PreVote ('a primary is alive \u2014 skipping PreVote'). No term inflation, no livelock. NOTE: optional raft.c:105 give-up-watchdog randomization NOT needed \u2014 the failover-start stagger alone resolves it; left as future defense-in-depth.", "tags": [ "ha", "raft", @@ -4807,7 +4807,7 @@ { "id": "bug-609", "timestamp": "2026-06-16T10:52:01.800Z", - "error_message": "After primary killed, libxce client xce_joblist/jobsubmit returns 'Invalid argument' (-EINVAL) on every fresh call — transparent failover did not engage", + "error_message": "After primary killed, libxce client xce_joblist/jobsubmit returns 'Invalid argument' (-EINVAL) on every fresh call \u2014 transparent failover did not engage", "file": "src/lib/client_failover.c", "root_cause": "handle_disconnect leaves xce_ctx_t.state=XCE_CTX_ERR after the primary's connection drops; the per-op xceapi guard (xceapi.c:14) returns -EINVAL when state!=XCE_CTX_RUN, BEFORE the op reaches a primary. xcecli_retry_decide classified -EINVAL as TERMINAL (non-retriable), so the failover loop bailed without rotating/recovering. The ctx->state ERR->RUN recovery only ran AFTER a rotate, which a terminal classification never triggered. Surfaced by the live 3-node E2E (task 6.2); the unit tests fed status codes directly to decide() and bypassed the real guard, so they missed it.", "fix": "In xcecli_retry_decide, before classifying *rc, detect ac->ctx.state==XCE_CTX_ERR (known-dead connection) and treat it as a prompt transport-style failover cause (XCE_FO_RETRY_NOW, no backoff) regardless of *rc, so the loop rotates+recovers. On budget exhaustion surface -E_XCE_NOT_READY (cluster-not-ready), never -EINVAL. Regression: test_decide_known_dead_ctx_retries_not_terminal.", @@ -4829,10 +4829,10 @@ { "id": "bug-610", "timestamp": "2026-06-16T10:52:36.535Z", - "error_message": "ASan SEGV in endpoint_connect (netio.c:672) via xce_failover_rotate → xcecli_retry_next → xcecli_joblist during live master failover (NULL ep->iomgr deref)", + "error_message": "ASan SEGV in endpoint_connect (netio.c:672) via xce_failover_rotate \u2192 xcecli_retry_next \u2192 xcecli_joblist during live master failover (NULL ep->iomgr deref)", "file": "src/lib/client_failover.c", - "root_cause": "xce_failover_rotate reconnected via endpoint_fini + endpoint_init + endpoint_connect, but endpoint_init (do_endpoint_init) resets the endpoint struct including ep->iomgr, and the rotate never re-bound it. The client's endpoint gets ep->iomgr = &ctx->iomgr only via xce_ctx_set_endpoint (called once in xcecli_start). endpoint_connect derefs iomgr->ssl_ctx when ep->ssl==NULL (true after endpoint_fini frees the SSL) → NULL deref crash. Also the rotate never re-set owner/msg_handler/err_handler nor iomgr_monitor'd the new fd, so even without the crash the reconnected endpoint would not route replies. Pure unit tests could not exercise the live socket/iomgr path; only the live failover E2E hit it.", - "fix": "Added xce_ctx_reconnect(ctx,host,port) in xcectx.c (where static handle_msg/handle_disconnect live) that mirrors the connection-establishment of xcecli_start/xce_ctx_start without restarting iomgr/vtaskmgr or touching ctx->state: endpoint_fini → endpoint_init → endpoint_set_peer → re-bind ep->iomgr=&ctx->iomgr → endpoint_connect → re-set owner+msg/err handlers → iomgr_monitor. xce_failover_rotate now delegates the reconnect to it.", + "root_cause": "xce_failover_rotate reconnected via endpoint_fini + endpoint_init + endpoint_connect, but endpoint_init (do_endpoint_init) resets the endpoint struct including ep->iomgr, and the rotate never re-bound it. The client's endpoint gets ep->iomgr = &ctx->iomgr only via xce_ctx_set_endpoint (called once in xcecli_start). endpoint_connect derefs iomgr->ssl_ctx when ep->ssl==NULL (true after endpoint_fini frees the SSL) \u2192 NULL deref crash. Also the rotate never re-set owner/msg_handler/err_handler nor iomgr_monitor'd the new fd, so even without the crash the reconnected endpoint would not route replies. Pure unit tests could not exercise the live socket/iomgr path; only the live failover E2E hit it.", + "fix": "Added xce_ctx_reconnect(ctx,host,port) in xcectx.c (where static handle_msg/handle_disconnect live) that mirrors the connection-establishment of xcecli_start/xce_ctx_start without restarting iomgr/vtaskmgr or touching ctx->state: endpoint_fini \u2192 endpoint_init \u2192 endpoint_set_peer \u2192 re-bind ep->iomgr=&ctx->iomgr \u2192 endpoint_connect \u2192 re-set owner+msg/err handlers \u2192 iomgr_monitor. xce_failover_rotate now delegates the reconnect to it.", "tags": [ "async-fix", "md", @@ -4906,7 +4906,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: address should be hint", "file": ".kiro/specs/libxce-failover/tasks.md", "root_cause": "Used \"address\" instead of \"hint\"", - "fix": "Changed address → hint", + "fix": "Changed address \u2192 hint", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -4922,7 +4922,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: XCE_MAXHOST_LEN should be XCE_MAXHOSTNAME_LEN", "file": ".kiro/specs/libxce-failover/design.md", "root_cause": "Used \"XCE_MAXHOST_LEN\" instead of \"XCE_MAXHOSTNAME_LEN\"", - "fix": "Changed XCE_MAXHOST_LEN → XCE_MAXHOSTNAME_LEN", + "fix": "Changed XCE_MAXHOST_LEN \u2192 XCE_MAXHOSTNAME_LEN", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "md" @@ -5081,7 +5081,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_p1_integration should be test_join_redirect", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_p1_integration\" instead of \"test_join_redirect\"", - "fix": "Changed test_p1_integration → test_join_redirect", + "fix": "Changed test_p1_integration \u2192 test_join_redirect", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -5096,7 +5096,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_recover_resets_err_state_to_run should be test_decide_jitter_staggers_many_clients", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_libxce_retry.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_recover_resets_err_state_to_run\" instead of \"test_decide_jitter_staggers_many_clients\"", - "fix": "Changed test_recover_resets_err_state_to_run → test_decide_jitter_staggers_many_clients", + "fix": "Changed test_recover_resets_err_state_to_run \u2192 test_decide_jitter_staggers_many_clients", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -5155,7 +5155,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: 611 should be 646", "file": "src/lib/netio.c", "root_cause": "Used \"611\" instead of \"646\"", - "fix": "Changed 611 → 646", + "fix": "Changed 611 \u2192 646", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -5211,9 +5211,9 @@ { "id": "bug-650", "timestamp": "2026-06-17T18:30:00Z", - "error_message": "xce_test jobsub hangs in cbuf_get (xceapi.c:304) after failover even with bug-646/648 deployed. Log shows 'endpoint marked dead' (bug-646 firing) then a permanent hang; target primary (ctrl-2) is fully idle (no vtask in handle_jobsubmit) and the client fd is an unconnected TCP socket — the request was never transmitted yet the client waits for a reply forever.", + "error_message": "xce_test jobsub hangs in cbuf_get (xceapi.c:304) after failover even with bug-646/648 deployed. Log shows 'endpoint marked dead' (bug-646 firing) then a permanent hang; target primary (ctrl-2) is fully idle (no vtask in handle_jobsubmit) and the client fd is an unconnected TCP socket \u2014 the request was never transmitted yet the client waits for a reply forever.", "file": "src/lib/request.c", - "root_cause": "xce_request() and the 5 other request.c senders (xce_reply, xce_replconfigpush_req_raw, xce_wal_batch_req_raw, xce_snapshot_chunk_req_raw, xce_replconfig_reply_raw) called endpoint_enq(ep,&pkt->link) and IGNORED its return, always `return 0`. So when the transport was dead, endpoint_enq() correctly returned <0 and ran handle_error() (bug-646 fix) — but xce_request() swallowed that <0 and reported success. xce_jobsubmit() (xceapi.c:299-304) then saw rc>=0 and fell through to the BLOCKING cbuf_get(); the request was never flushed (server idle) and when err_handler was NULL after a failed reconnect, handle_disconnect never injected -ECONNRESET, so nothing woke the waiter. The bug-646 netio fix was defeated one layer up: the request layer reported success on a failed send. This was the missing link making every prior netio fix insufficient for the live hang.", + "root_cause": "xce_request() and the 5 other request.c senders (xce_reply, xce_replconfigpush_req_raw, xce_wal_batch_req_raw, xce_snapshot_chunk_req_raw, xce_replconfig_reply_raw) called endpoint_enq(ep,&pkt->link) and IGNORED its return, always `return 0`. So when the transport was dead, endpoint_enq() correctly returned <0 and ran handle_error() (bug-646 fix) \u2014 but xce_request() swallowed that <0 and reported success. xce_jobsubmit() (xceapi.c:299-304) then saw rc>=0 and fell through to the BLOCKING cbuf_get(); the request was never flushed (server idle) and when err_handler was NULL after a failed reconnect, handle_disconnect never injected -ECONNRESET, so nothing woke the waiter. The bug-646 netio fix was defeated one layer up: the request layer reported success on a failed send. This was the missing link making every prior netio fix insufficient for the live hang.", "fix": "All six request.c senders propagate the enq result: `int enq_rc = endpoint_enq(ep,&pkt->link); return (enq_rc < 0) ? enq_rc : 0;`. A failed send now returns <0 through xce_jobsubmit_req -> xce_jobsubmit, which returns before cbuf_get; the failover loop classifies the transport error and rotates instead of blocking on a reply that never arrives. TDD: test_request_send_propagation.c builds an OPCode_nop request (encodes OK) on a dead endpoint (EPOLL_CTL_MOD ENOENT) and asserts xce_request returns <0 (verified red with old `return 0`, green with fix). libxce 169/0; controller_unit_test links clean.", "tags": [ "libxce", @@ -5255,7 +5255,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_and_fires_errhandler should be test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_no_errhandler", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_netio_arm_failure.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_and_fires_errhandler\" instead of \"test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_no_errhandler\"", - "fix": "Changed test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_and_fires_errhandler → test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_no_errhandler", + "fix": "Changed test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_and_fires_errhandler \u2192 test_enq_arm_failure_is_loud_no_errhandler", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -5269,7 +5269,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-17T19:10:00Z", "error_message": "Controller (primary) self-deadlocks on ha->lock after bug-646/650 deploy: jobsub now works, but the controller freezes. gdb shows Thread 3 in primary_heartbeat_fn holding ha->lock (owner=self) and re-acquiring it via xce_nop_req -> xce_request -> endpoint_enq -> handle_error -> vote_ep_err_handler (ha.c:3478); Thread 9 (io_worker) also blocked on the same ha->lock. Whole controller frozen.", "file": "src/lib/netio.c", - "root_cause": "REGRESSION from bug-646: endpoint_enq() invoked handle_error() synchronously on the send path when the poll arm failed. handle_error() calls the endpoint's err_handler, which on a controller vote endpoint is vote_ep_err_handler() — it locks ha->lock. But endpoint_enq runs on the CALLER's thread, and the controller's primary_heartbeat_fn already holds ha->lock when it sends heartbeat NOPs. Non-recursive mutex -> self-deadlock. The err_handler is contractually an io_worker-thread callback (off an epoll error event, holding no caller locks); calling it from the synchronous send path violated that. With bug-650 now propagating the enq error up the return chain, the handle_error call in endpoint_enq was both redundant and harmful.", + "root_cause": "REGRESSION from bug-646: endpoint_enq() invoked handle_error() synchronously on the send path when the poll arm failed. handle_error() calls the endpoint's err_handler, which on a controller vote endpoint is vote_ep_err_handler() \u2014 it locks ha->lock. But endpoint_enq runs on the CALLER's thread, and the controller's primary_heartbeat_fn already holds ha->lock when it sends heartbeat NOPs. Non-recursive mutex -> self-deadlock. The err_handler is contractually an io_worker-thread callback (off an epoll error event, holding no caller locks); calling it from the synchronous send path violated that. With bug-650 now propagating the enq error up the return chain, the handle_error call in endpoint_enq was both redundant and harmful.", "fix": "endpoint_enq() no longer calls handle_error(); on arm failure it just returns a RETRIABLE -ECONNRESET. The caller propagates it (request.c senders return it -> client failover classifies ECONNRESET as RETRY_NOW and rotates; controller heartbeat path simply gets the error, no lock re-entry). The real teardown stays on the io_worker thread (handle_input/handle_output -> io_handler -> handle_error), which holds no caller locks. Updated test_netio_arm_failure.c: endpoint_enq must return <0 AND must NOT invoke the err_handler (g_err_count==0). libxce 169/0; controller_unit_test links clean.", "tags": [ "libxce", @@ -5327,8 +5327,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-17T22:00:00Z", "error_message": "Failover election takes minutes (11+ PreVote rounds) to converge. A standby keeps denying a legitimately-higher-term candidate's PreVote with reason=fresh_heartbeat for ~2.5 min AFTER its primary died (ctrl-3 killed 21:44:14, ctrl-2 logs 'PreVote DENIED ... reason=fresh_heartbeat (my_term=3)' until 21:46:58).", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "The PreVote/vote eligibility gate raft_cb_vote_eligible (ha.c:311) denied on `role==CTRL_STANDBY && ha_heartbeat_is_fresh(ha)` — checking freshness ALONE. ha_heartbeat_is_fresh derives from ha->last_activity, but ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask resets last_activity=now on EVERY watchdog (re-)arm, and ha_prevote_rearm_liveness re-arms it after every lost PreVote. So a node with NO live primary perpetually refreshes its own 'fresh heartbeat' each failover cycle and denies all other candidates (reason=fresh_heartbeat), blocking convergence until it happens to restart. The sibling gate in handle_request_vote (ha.c:2205) already required `primary_ctrl_fd >= 0 && is_fresh`; raft_cb_vote_eligible was missing the primary_ctrl_fd guard. The existing fresh-deny tests even documented the intent ('the deny gate requires a live connection AND a fresh heartbeat', set primary_ctrl_fd=999), but production didn't enforce it.", - "fix": "Added `ha->primary_ctrl_fd >= 0 &&` to the ha.c:311 eligibility gate (mirrors ha.c:2205). primary_ctrl_fd is -1 on init / after the primary RDHUPs / after the liveness watchdog fires, and a real fd only via config_repl.c:1451 (first ctrlhello from the live primary) — so a dead/absent primary no longer masquerades as fresh and the standby GRANTS, converging in ~1 round. Kept cluster.c:526 denial-reason logging in sync. TDD: test_pre_vote_dead_primary_grants_despite_fresh_activity (fresh last_activity + primary_ctrl_fd=-1 -> GRANT); verified RED (Expected 1 Was 0) without the guard, GREEN with it, and the 3 existing fresh-deny tests (fd=999) unaffected. Full controller suite + libxce 169/0, zero regressions.", + "root_cause": "The PreVote/vote eligibility gate raft_cb_vote_eligible (ha.c:311) denied on `role==CTRL_STANDBY && ha_heartbeat_is_fresh(ha)` \u2014 checking freshness ALONE. ha_heartbeat_is_fresh derives from ha->last_activity, but ha_arm_heartbeat_timeout_vtask resets last_activity=now on EVERY watchdog (re-)arm, and ha_prevote_rearm_liveness re-arms it after every lost PreVote. So a node with NO live primary perpetually refreshes its own 'fresh heartbeat' each failover cycle and denies all other candidates (reason=fresh_heartbeat), blocking convergence until it happens to restart. The sibling gate in handle_request_vote (ha.c:2205) already required `primary_ctrl_fd >= 0 && is_fresh`; raft_cb_vote_eligible was missing the primary_ctrl_fd guard. The existing fresh-deny tests even documented the intent ('the deny gate requires a live connection AND a fresh heartbeat', set primary_ctrl_fd=999), but production didn't enforce it.", + "fix": "Added `ha->primary_ctrl_fd >= 0 &&` to the ha.c:311 eligibility gate (mirrors ha.c:2205). primary_ctrl_fd is -1 on init / after the primary RDHUPs / after the liveness watchdog fires, and a real fd only via config_repl.c:1451 (first ctrlhello from the live primary) \u2014 so a dead/absent primary no longer masquerades as fresh and the standby GRANTS, converging in ~1 round. Kept cluster.c:526 denial-reason logging in sync. TDD: test_pre_vote_dead_primary_grants_despite_fresh_activity (fresh last_activity + primary_ctrl_fd=-1 -> GRANT); verified RED (Expected 1 Was 0) without the guard, GREEN with it, and the 3 existing fresh-deny tests (fd=999) unaffected. Full controller suite + libxce 169/0, zero regressions.", "tags": [ "controller", "ha", @@ -5350,7 +5350,7 @@ "error_message": "3-node failover test lost committed jobs: 7 earliest JobIds (WAL LSN<=20), majority-ACKed and survived first failover, permanently gone after a restarted node with near-empty WAL won election. joblist dropped from 10 to 3.", "file": "src/controller/persist.c, src/controller/commit.c, src/controller/repl.c", "root_cause": "'committed' does not imply 'durable'. WAL fsync is asynchronous (persist.c:173 fsync_worker, timer wal_sync_ms); persist_append and the standby WalAck path do NOT fdatasync before ACK. commit_on_ack (commit.c:303) advances committed_lsn on majority ACK = OS page cache only, durable on zero disks. On kill+restart, killed nodes lose the not-yet-fsynced tail; persist_recover hits CRC break at zeroed region (prev_crc=00000000, offset 40) and truncates replay to ~0 entries, yet the hollow node stays eligible, wins election under degraded required=1 quorum (PreVote+freshness gate cannot fence it because the committed entries were durable on nobody), self-promotes advertising committed_lsn=21 over an empty job table, and the node holding the real data converges DOWN. Violates Leader-Completeness assumption (majority-ACK != durable-on-majority) in src/controller/CLAUDE.md.", - "fix": "NOT YET FIXED. Discovery -> new spec ha-commit-durability (Path C, brief written). R1 fsync-before-ACK (standby fdatasync before WalAck, primary self-count only after local fdatasync, committed_lsn advances only on durable majority, group-commit to bound latency). R2 promotion fence (WAL CRC/replay failure => ineligible to lead until caught up, FATAL not silent truncate; never lead below known committed high-water even under degraded quorum). Live E2E reproduces via xce_test jobsub + primary kills on /xce-deploy-ha. DETERMINISTIC REPRO (task 1.3, 2026-06-18): `bash src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh --deterministic` launches the cluster with --wal-sync-ms 30000 (plumbed via deploy-ha.sh start.sh `$*` passthrough, EXTRA_CTRL_ARGS) so the primary's fsync_worker never fires in-window -> every committed entry is page-cache-only on the primary (majority_candidate_locked counts cap=highest_appended_lsn=current_lsn-1, NOT durable). It then drives rolling PRIMARY kills (each right after committing to that primary) + restart, so hollow nodes re-lead. RED CONFIRMED: 6-round run lost the 3 EARLIEST committed JobIds permanently (rounds 4 and 6 + final check), Results 5 passed/3 failed, exit=1 — matching the incident signature (earliest jobs gone). NOTE: a single double-kill does NOT repro — this codebase enforces strict majority (lone survivor will NOT self-elect: log shows 'no single-voter primary within 40s'); loss needs the ROLLING/term-accumulating path the incident used. Evidence log: dur-det-run.log in worktree.", + "fix": "NOT YET FIXED. Discovery -> new spec ha-commit-durability (Path C, brief written). R1 fsync-before-ACK (standby fdatasync before WalAck, primary self-count only after local fdatasync, committed_lsn advances only on durable majority, group-commit to bound latency). R2 promotion fence (WAL CRC/replay failure => ineligible to lead until caught up, FATAL not silent truncate; never lead below known committed high-water even under degraded quorum). Live E2E reproduces via xce_test jobsub + primary kills on /xce-deploy-ha. DETERMINISTIC REPRO (task 1.3, 2026-06-18): `bash src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh --deterministic` launches the cluster with --wal-sync-ms 30000 (plumbed via deploy-ha.sh start.sh `$*` passthrough, EXTRA_CTRL_ARGS) so the primary's fsync_worker never fires in-window -> every committed entry is page-cache-only on the primary (majority_candidate_locked counts cap=highest_appended_lsn=current_lsn-1, NOT durable). It then drives rolling PRIMARY kills (each right after committing to that primary) + restart, so hollow nodes re-lead. RED CONFIRMED: 6-round run lost the 3 EARLIEST committed JobIds permanently (rounds 4 and 6 + final check), Results 5 passed/3 failed, exit=1 \u2014 matching the incident signature (earliest jobs gone). NOTE: a single double-kill does NOT repro \u2014 this codebase enforces strict majority (lone survivor will NOT self-elect: log shows 'no single-voter primary within 40s'); loss needs the ROLLING/term-accumulating path the incident used. Evidence log: dur-det-run.log in worktree.", "tags": [ "controller", "ha", @@ -5508,7 +5508,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: myconf_t should be uint32_t", "file": "src/include/myconf.h", "root_cause": "Used \"myconf_t\" instead of \"uint32_t\"", - "fix": "Changed myconf_t → uint32_t", + "fix": "Changed myconf_t \u2192 uint32_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -5619,7 +5619,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: else should be RUN_TEST", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_durability.c", "root_cause": "Used \"else\" instead of \"RUN_TEST\"", - "fix": "Changed else → RUN_TEST", + "fix": "Changed else \u2192 RUN_TEST", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -5868,8 +5868,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T07:52:20.595Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_durability.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* task 3.2 — Boot Policy Decision Table skeletons (IGNORED,; * 3.3/4.3). Registered so each row is reported as IGNORED, n", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* task 3.2 \u2014 Boot Policy Decision Table skeletons (IGNORED,; * 3.3/4.3). Registered so each row is reported as IGNORED, n", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -5884,7 +5884,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T08:04:18.857Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in enum", "file": "src/include/persist.h", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Bounded catch-up window (ha-commit-durability task 3.3, R; * The FINITE deadline a recovery-truncated / behind member i", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -5916,7 +5916,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T08:39:54.889Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".kiro/specs/ha-commit-durability/design.md", - "root_cause": "Had `durable_floor ≤ applied_lsn`", + "root_cause": "Had `durable_floor \u2264 applied_lsn`", "fix": "Changed to `applied_lsn`", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -5964,8 +5964,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T09:08:09.215Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* ── ha-commit-durability task 4.3: pre-promotion eligibili; * Refuse promotion BEFORE the node becomes authoritative CTR", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* \u2500\u2500 ha-commit-durability task 4.3: pre-promotion eligibili; * Refuse promotion BEFORE the node becomes authoritative CTR", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -5980,7 +5980,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T09:09:28.348Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_durability.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Empty first-boot WAL: durable=0, HWM=0 -> ELIGIBLE. A fr; * member is not behind anything and must be promotable (no f", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -6044,7 +6044,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T09:49:58.840Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_durability.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Test-injectable send hook (defined in repl.c under XCE_TE; * repl_broadcast from dereferencing the dummy endpoints as r", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -6060,7 +6060,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T10:25:02.673Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/ha.h", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* ha_cancel_promotion_fence_timer: cancel a pending bounded; * (idempotent; no-op when none is armed). Called when the m", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -6077,7 +6077,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: != should be ==", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Used \"!=\" instead of \"==\"", - "fix": "Changed operator != → ==", + "fix": "Changed operator != \u2192 ==", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -6092,8 +6092,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-18T10:30:18.073Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_durability.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* task 4.4 — bounded-window catch-up before FATAL (no synch; * deferred-timer FATAL only after a real bounded failure; fe", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* task 4.4 \u2014 bounded-window catch-up before FATAL (no synch; * deferred-timer FATAL only after a real bounded failure; fe", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -6138,10 +6138,10 @@ { "id": "bug-760", "timestamp": "2026-06-18T13:00:00Z", - "error_message": "test_commit_barrier_rollout.c:446 test_fact_hook_append_is_retained_and_nonblocking FAIL: Expected 1 Was 0 — a covering ACK must advance committed_lsn over the retained fact (6/6 deterministic)", + "error_message": "test_commit_barrier_rollout.c:446 test_fact_hook_append_is_retained_and_nonblocking FAIL: Expected 1 Was 0 \u2014 a covering ACK must advance committed_lsn over the retained fact (6/6 deterministic)", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_barrier_rollout.c", "root_cause": "ha-commit-durability task 2.2 capped the primary commit self-contribution at durable_lsn (advanced asynchronously by the demand-driven group-commit flusher) and wired a durable-advance commit-wake callback. This adjacent-spec (ha-commit-barrier-rollout) test uses a REAL persist+flusher and checks committed_lsn SYNCHRONOUSLY the instant after repl_on_ack(fact_lsn); the flusher has not yet fdatasync'd LSN1, so durable_lsn==0, self-cap==0, majority candidate==0, committed_lsn stays 0. Pre-spec the test passed (self counted the appended tip immediately). Task 2.2 primed durable_lsn in the in-memory stub fixtures (barrier_setup_vcpus) but did NOT update this real-flusher test. The implementation-note claim that this is a pre-existing /tmp-overlay fdatasync-EIO artifact is FALSE in this env: fdatasync returns rc=0 on /tmp here, and the test passed pre-spec.", - "fix": "FIXED — test_commit_barrier_rollout.c:445: insert persist_flush(g_fp) + assert persist_durable_lsn>=fact_lsn BEFORE repl_on_ack, so the covering ACK (commit_on_ack runs synchronously inside repl_on_ack) deterministically completes the durable majority. Mirrors task 2.2's durable_lsn priming of the in-memory barrier_setup_vcpus stubs. Verified: was 6/6 deterministic FAIL, now fact_hook PASS across 4 runs + meson controller suite Ok:1 Fail:0, all groups 0 Failures. Production was never affected (RETAIN facts have no waiter; WAIT-mode replies block on commit barrier commit.c:334).", + "fix": "FIXED \u2014 test_commit_barrier_rollout.c:445: insert persist_flush(g_fp) + assert persist_durable_lsn>=fact_lsn BEFORE repl_on_ack, so the covering ACK (commit_on_ack runs synchronously inside repl_on_ack) deterministically completes the durable majority. Mirrors task 2.2's durable_lsn priming of the in-memory barrier_setup_vcpus stubs. Verified: was 6/6 deterministic FAIL, now fact_hook PASS across 4 runs + meson controller suite Ok:1 Fail:0, all groups 0 Failures. Production was never affected (RETAIN facts have no waiter; WAIT-mode replies block on commit barrier commit.c:334).", "tags": [ "ha-commit-durability", "commit-barrier-rollout", @@ -6210,10 +6210,10 @@ { "id": "bug-765", "timestamp": "2026-06-18T14:30:00Z", - "error_message": "scheduler-controller-msg-gap marked 36/36 [x] but NOT truly implemented: schedUpdateJob notify path hits the bulk CREATE path (sched_update_existing_job is dead code) → corrupts/duplicates live job state, no -ENOENT; Req 3 broken at dequeue, Req 6 stores nothing (rusage never stored).", - "file": "src/scheduler/ (sched_update_existing_job dead; schedUpdateJob → CREATE path)", + "error_message": "scheduler-controller-msg-gap marked 36/36 [x] but NOT truly implemented: schedUpdateJob notify path hits the bulk CREATE path (sched_update_existing_job is dead code) \u2192 corrupts/duplicates live job state, no -ENOENT; Req 3 broken at dequeue, Req 6 stores nothing (rusage never stored).", + "file": "src/scheduler/ (sched_update_existing_job dead; schedUpdateJob \u2192 CREATE path)", "root_cause": "Tasks were checked [x] without the dequeue/update path and rusage storage actually being wired; gap surfaced only by cross-task re-audit (per-task review missed it).", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-18 (commits 5c1f715,93124c5,080ff78,276e26c): G-8/G-4 (route notify job-update to in-place sched_update_existing_job, all mutable fields, -ENOENT no-create); G-5 (store rusage on xce_sched_job_t via sched_apply_job_rusage + free_JobRusages_ptr); G-3 (free all 5 killer op payloads with generated deep-freers); G-7 (doc reconciliation — sched_op_name stays static in scheduler.c, lib must not depend on scheduler headers); G-6 (real white-box tests: test_handlers.c 6/6 for 9.2/9.3, test_job_update.c 10/10 for 9.4/9.5/9.7, registered as meson tests). Scheduler suite 31/31 GREEN, ASAN-clean, boundary-clean. validate-impl GO. RESIDUAL (documented, non-blocking): 9.6 dequeue worker-resvals APPLY unit test (dormant path R-3 — enqueue tested), 9.8 documented compile-time absence, 9.9 log-capture gated, 9.2 -ENOMEM fault-injection.", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-18 (commits 5c1f715,93124c5,080ff78,276e26c): G-8/G-4 (route notify job-update to in-place sched_update_existing_job, all mutable fields, -ENOENT no-create); G-5 (store rusage on xce_sched_job_t via sched_apply_job_rusage + free_JobRusages_ptr); G-3 (free all 5 killer op payloads with generated deep-freers); G-7 (doc reconciliation \u2014 sched_op_name stays static in scheduler.c, lib must not depend on scheduler headers); G-6 (real white-box tests: test_handlers.c 6/6 for 9.2/9.3, test_job_update.c 10/10 for 9.4/9.5/9.7, registered as meson tests). Scheduler suite 31/31 GREEN, ASAN-clean, boundary-clean. validate-impl GO. RESIDUAL (documented, non-blocking): 9.6 dequeue worker-resvals APPLY unit test (dormant path R-3 \u2014 enqueue tested), 9.8 documented compile-time absence, 9.9 log-capture gated, 9.2 -ENOMEM fault-injection.", "tags": [ "scheduler", "controller", @@ -6265,7 +6265,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: xce_sched_op_name should be sched_op_name", "file": ".kiro/specs/scheduler-controller-msg-gap/design.md", "root_cause": "Used \"xce_sched_op_name\" instead of \"sched_op_name\"", - "fix": "Changed xce_sched_op_name → sched_op_name", + "fix": "Changed xce_sched_op_name \u2192 sched_op_name", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "md" @@ -6311,8 +6311,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-19T13:00:00Z", "error_message": "3-node rolling-SIGKILL soak round 3: 'no new primary elected within 40s'; soak reports 'DATA LOSS 5/5 jobs vanished'. Both surviving nodes recovered RECOVER_TRUNCATED after SIGKILL (torn WAL tail) and stay permanently fenced/non-promotable even though durable_floor==cluster_hwm (they hold ALL committed data).", "file": "src/controller/ha.c (raft_cb_become_leader promotion fence release) + persist.c (recovery_truncated verdict stickiness); design ha-commit-durability Req 2.2/2.6 + Boot Policy Decision Table", - "root_cause": "A SIGKILL tears the WAL tail; on restart replay_wal hits a CRC-break/short-read at the tail -> RECOVER_TRUNCATED (sticky flag). The promotion-fence release condition requires `!recovery_truncated`, but the truncated flag is NEVER cleared by catch-up — so a node whose intact durable prefix (durable_floor) already reaches/exceeds the cluster committed high-water (durable_floor>=hwm, i.e. holds ALL committed entries; the torn tail is entirely UNCOMMITTED) stays permanently non-promotable. The design assumed 'TRUNCATED => provably below HWM', which is FALSE for a torn TAIL above the committed prefix. When all survivors are in this state (after multiple rolling failovers), none can promote => election/availability WEDGE. Observed: ctrl-1 recovery_truncated=1 durable_floor=13 cluster_hwm=13, PreVote-DENY peers reason=catch_up, indefinitely.", - "fix": "DATA-LOSS dimension RESOLVED by the bug-778 fix (commit 64ab210): the cold-restart loss was the CRC-chain clobber; with the chain intact, cold restart recovers all committed jobs (soak 5/5, joblist 6/6 after cold restart). The AVAILABILITY-WEDGE dimension was a CONSEQUENCE of the spurious RECOVER_TRUNCATED from the broken chain — no longer triggered (nodes now recover CLEAN; round-3 re-elects normally). RESIDUAL HARDENING (latent, not currently triggered): the promotion fence keeps recovery_truncated sticky even when durable_floor>=HWM, so a GENUINE torn-tail that leaves a node RECOVER_TRUNCATED while holding all committed data could still over-fence. Optional follow-up: clear the truncated fence when durable_floor>=cluster_hwm (the torn tail is provably uncommitted). Not blocking — the systematic trigger is gone.", + "root_cause": "A SIGKILL tears the WAL tail; on restart replay_wal hits a CRC-break/short-read at the tail -> RECOVER_TRUNCATED (sticky flag). The promotion-fence release condition requires `!recovery_truncated`, but the truncated flag is NEVER cleared by catch-up \u2014 so a node whose intact durable prefix (durable_floor) already reaches/exceeds the cluster committed high-water (durable_floor>=hwm, i.e. holds ALL committed entries; the torn tail is entirely UNCOMMITTED) stays permanently non-promotable. The design assumed 'TRUNCATED => provably below HWM', which is FALSE for a torn TAIL above the committed prefix. When all survivors are in this state (after multiple rolling failovers), none can promote => election/availability WEDGE. Observed: ctrl-1 recovery_truncated=1 durable_floor=13 cluster_hwm=13, PreVote-DENY peers reason=catch_up, indefinitely.", + "fix": "DATA-LOSS dimension RESOLVED by the bug-778 fix (commit 64ab210): the cold-restart loss was the CRC-chain clobber; with the chain intact, cold restart recovers all committed jobs (soak 5/5, joblist 6/6 after cold restart). The AVAILABILITY-WEDGE dimension was a CONSEQUENCE of the spurious RECOVER_TRUNCATED from the broken chain \u2014 no longer triggered (nodes now recover CLEAN; round-3 re-elects normally). RESIDUAL HARDENING (latent, not currently triggered): the promotion fence keeps recovery_truncated sticky even when durable_floor>=HWM, so a GENUINE torn-tail that leaves a node RECOVER_TRUNCATED while holding all committed data could still over-fence. Optional follow-up: clear the truncated fence when durable_floor>=cluster_hwm (the torn tail is provably uncommitted). Not blocking \u2014 the systematic trigger is gone.", "tags": [ "ha", "convergence", @@ -6368,7 +6368,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: hdr should be payload_len", "file": "src/controller/persist.c", "root_cause": "Used \"hdr\" instead of \"payload_len\"", - "fix": "Changed hdr → payload_len", + "fix": "Changed hdr \u2192 payload_len", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -6383,7 +6383,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: NULL should be type", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_role_lifecycle.c", "root_cause": "Used \"NULL\" instead of \"type\"", - "fix": "Changed NULL → type", + "fix": "Changed NULL \u2192 type", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -6399,7 +6399,7 @@ "error_message": "xce_test jobsub prints 'jobsubmit ok: JobId: 63-15--1-1015808' (uninitialized/garbage jobid) on repeated/mid-failover submits; controller then logs 'handle_jobsubmit fail to lock job 63-15--1-...'. Client claims success with a malformed id it never got a clean ack for.", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test.c (cmd_jobsub)", "root_cause": "On the 2nd+ submit (and during failover windows) the jobsub reply/jobid is not cleanly populated, leaving an uninitialized jobid struct; cmd_jobsub still prints 'jobsubmit ok' with the garbage id instead of verifying the controller reply status and failing. Forces E2E scripts (test-commit-durability.sh) to strict-regex-filter the 4-field id to avoid chasing phantom jobs.", - "fix": "PENDING — jobsub must report success ONLY on a clean ack with a valid jobid; otherwise print a typed error (REDIRECT/NOMASTER/NOT_READY/TIMEOUT) and set non-zero status. Part of the xce-test-e2e-primitives work (exit-code-as-verdict + $jobid auto-var). | STRENGTHENED 2026-06-19 (commit 8609976): `jobid != 0` gate was insufficient — a stale non-zero reply id (63-15--1-1015808) from a non-jobid reply during failover slipped through. New gate requires the echoed jobid == the locally idgen-generated jobsubmit.jobid (controller commits/echoes exactly that id, job.c:616). Surfaced by the live durability soak (task 7.2).", + "fix": "PENDING \u2014 jobsub must report success ONLY on a clean ack with a valid jobid; otherwise print a typed error (REDIRECT/NOMASTER/NOT_READY/TIMEOUT) and set non-zero status. Part of the xce-test-e2e-primitives work (exit-code-as-verdict + $jobid auto-var). | STRENGTHENED 2026-06-19 (commit 8609976): `jobid != 0` gate was insufficient \u2014 a stale non-zero reply id (63-15--1-1015808) from a non-jobid reply during failover slipped through. New gate requires the echoed jobid == the locally idgen-generated jobsubmit.jobid (controller commits/echoes exactly that id, job.c:616). Surfaced by the live durability soak (task 7.2).", "tags": [ "xce_test", "jobsub", @@ -6451,9 +6451,9 @@ "id": "bug-795", "timestamp": "2026-06-19", "error_message": "Cold-restart-all (kill ALL 3 controllers + restart) non-deterministically loses a committed job: a job that returned 'jobsubmit ok' and survived every rolling single-node failover round vanishes after a full-cluster restart (expect-jobs expected N, actual N-2; expect-job not found). Recovery logs show WAL truncate.", - "file": "src/controller/{persist.c recovery/truncate, commit.c commit-gate, ha.c promotion-fence/election} — UPSTREAM ha-commit-durability Phase 6.2", - "root_cause": "Commit-durability race under TOTAL-cluster-outage recovery. Acked (committed) entry not durable on a fault-tolerant majority before all nodes die, OR recovery truncates committed entries on cold restart. Non-deterministic (passed 1 run, failed next). Surfaced on overlayfs sandbox (NOT a real fsync-able fs) — must be reconfirmed on real hardware. UPDATE: with the hardened (trustworthy) soak, the loss ALSO reproduces in ROLLING single-node failover with the cluster confirmed serving (~1/3 runs) — broader than cold-restart-all; bug-661 not fully closed for rolling failover. Separate finding: >60s post-kill election (liveness) every run, always recovers. CORRECTION: NOT an overlay-fdatasync artifact — reproduces OUTSIDE the container (user's real host) AND on an in-sandbox real ext2/3 fs with ZERO fdatasync EIO. Real controller durability bug + a coupled liveness stall (>60s / stuck election after killing ctrl-1). Phase 6.1 answered (REAL); now at 6.2 root-cause.", - "fix": "NOT FIXED HERE — out of boundary for xce-test-e2e-primitives (this spec changes no controller/replication code). Routed to spec ha-commit-durability owner. The converted durability soak (src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh, new run_cold_restart_recovery phase) correctly detects it via the exit-code verdict.", + "file": "src/controller/{persist.c recovery/truncate, commit.c commit-gate, ha.c promotion-fence/election} \u2014 UPSTREAM ha-commit-durability Phase 6.2", + "root_cause": "Commit-durability race under TOTAL-cluster-outage recovery. Acked (committed) entry not durable on a fault-tolerant majority before all nodes die, OR recovery truncates committed entries on cold restart. Non-deterministic (passed 1 run, failed next). Surfaced on overlayfs sandbox (NOT a real fsync-able fs) \u2014 must be reconfirmed on real hardware. UPDATE: with the hardened (trustworthy) soak, the loss ALSO reproduces in ROLLING single-node failover with the cluster confirmed serving (~1/3 runs) \u2014 broader than cold-restart-all; bug-661 not fully closed for rolling failover. Separate finding: >60s post-kill election (liveness) every run, always recovers. CORRECTION: NOT an overlay-fdatasync artifact \u2014 reproduces OUTSIDE the container (user's real host) AND on an in-sandbox real ext2/3 fs with ZERO fdatasync EIO. Real controller durability bug + a coupled liveness stall (>60s / stuck election after killing ctrl-1). Phase 6.1 answered (REAL); now at 6.2 root-cause.", + "fix": "NOT FIXED HERE \u2014 out of boundary for xce-test-e2e-primitives (this spec changes no controller/replication code). Routed to spec ha-commit-durability owner. The converted durability soak (src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh, new run_cold_restart_recovery phase) correctly detects it via the exit-code verdict.", "tags": [ "ha-commit-durability", "commit-durability", @@ -6496,8 +6496,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-20T01:05:25.091Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": "src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh", - "root_cause": "Had \"$label: DATA LOSS — a committed job vanished (bug", - "fix": "Changed to \"$label: DATA LOSS — a committed job vanished from", + "root_cause": "Had \"$label: DATA LOSS \u2014 a committed job vanished (bug", + "fix": "Changed to \"$label: DATA LOSS \u2014 a committed job vanished from", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -6577,7 +6577,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: Data should be Text", "file": "src/schema/controller.capnp", "root_cause": "Used \"Data\" instead of \"Text\"", - "fix": "Changed Data → Text", + "fix": "Changed Data \u2192 Text", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -6593,7 +6593,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: xce_data_t should be char", "file": "src/include/typemap.h", "root_cause": "Used \"xce_data_t\" instead of \"char\"", - "fix": "Changed xce_data_t → char", + "fix": "Changed xce_data_t \u2192 char", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -6624,7 +6624,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: >= should be ==", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test.c", "root_cause": "Used \">=\" instead of \"==\"", - "fix": "Changed operator >= → ==", + "fix": "Changed operator >= \u2192 ==", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -6638,7 +6638,7 @@ "id": "bug-817", "timestamp": "2026-06-19", "error_message": "client op (joblist, ctrlstatus, wait-primary) returns EINVAL / 'Invalid argument' and fails to reach the live primary when a DEAD controller is FIRST in the masters list; with a live-only masters list the same op succeeds in ~46ms.", - "file": "src/lib/client_failover.c / client.c failover-rotation (libxce) — UPSTREAM, not controller-status", + "file": "src/lib/client_failover.c / client.c failover-rotation (libxce) \u2014 UPSTREAM, not controller-status", "root_cause": "libxce client failover does not cleanly advance past a dead FIRST master to the live nodes; surfaces a typed EINVAL instead of rotating. Pre-existing (controller-status consumes failover unchanged). Surfaced by controller-status task 5.1 E2E (authoritative wait-primary timed out after a primary kill while a dead node led the masters list, even though a new primary was serving).", "fix": "NOT fixed in controller-status (out of boundary). Route to libxce-failover. Confirmed affects plain joblist identically. Workaround: ensure the masters list does not lead with a known-dead node, or restart killed nodes (as the durability soak does).", "tags": [ @@ -6764,7 +6764,7 @@ "error_message": "Clean single failover under-computes safe_committed_lsn: new leader logs 'safe_committed_lsn=1 ... (from 1 granted voters)' (self only) and truncates committed entries down to its own boot floor. Post-election safe-commit-from-votes plumbing was DEAD in production.", "file": "src/controller/ha.c (vote_reply_dispatch), src/controller/persist.c (persist_wal_write_replicated)", "root_cause": "vote_reply_decode_and_dispatch decoded the granting voter's advertised peerLastLogLsn (vr_lsn at ha.c ~4254) but vote_reply_dispatch DISCARDED it ('(void)peer_lsn; raft_on_vote_reply(...)'). raft_on_vote_reply only bumps s->votes_granted; it never records the peer LSN. The only writer of ctx->votes[idx].vote_granted/peer_lsn (handle_request_vote_reply) was, in production, called ONLY from the connect/error failure paths with (granted=0, lsn=0); the real-grant caller was gated behind a test-only hook (xce_vote_reply_hook, never set in production). So ctx->votes[*] stayed calloc'd zero -> ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn saw n_granted=1 (self) -> safe_committed_lsn = self_lsn. A standby promoting with its own durable_floor=1 then persist_truncate_wal_above(1) destroyed committed LSN 2..5.", - "fix": "PRIMARY: in vote_reply_dispatch production branch, route the decoded reply into the election context via a NEW record-only seam ha_record_vote_reply(ha,ctx,idx,term,granted,tag,lsn) BEFORE raft_on_vote_reply. Factored ha_record_vote_reply_locked out of handle_request_vote_reply: it records ctx->votes[idx] under ctx->lock with the idempotency guard but does NOT call ha_elect_evaluate_and_signal -> no second/racing legacy promotion path (raft_on_vote_reply remains the SOLE production promotion driver; the two quorum tallies (raft s->votes_granted / legacy ctx->votes_granted) and their guards (s->election_decided / ctx->done_posted) stay independent and idempotent). idx == vctx->peer_idx == the local ctx->votes[] index (absolute->local map done in raft_cb_send_vote_request), exactly the index ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn + the test hook use. SECONDARY: persist_wal_write_replicated now advances durable_lsn to the synced tip immediately after the inline fdatasync (mirror persist_flush; monotonic max; fail-loud rc-gated) so a standby advertises its own synced durable floor without waiting for the 10ms cadence flusher. VERIFIED: unit test_safe_commit_reflects_granting_voter_lsn RED (safe=1 'from 1 granted voters') -> GREEN (safe=5 'from 3 granted voters'); 177/177 controller_unit_test pass. NOTE: the LIVE clean_failover_preservation harness still FAILS, but the failure is PRE-EXISTING on baseline 14c41cb (verified by stash+rerun: baseline runs also diverge / lose jobs) — it is the SEPARATE bug-795/828 replication+catch-up gap (standbys' WALs physically contain only LSN 1..2, durable_floor=1; committed entries 2..5 never reach the standby WAL; primary advanced committed_lsn to 5 without a standby durable at 5). The fix DID change the live fingerprint from 'from 1 granted voters' to 'from 2 granted voters', proving the plumbing is now alive. safe-commit-from-votes is correct; the residual live job loss is out of scope (needs the catch-up/snapshot-backfill fix tracked under ha-commit-durability).", + "fix": "PRIMARY: in vote_reply_dispatch production branch, route the decoded reply into the election context via a NEW record-only seam ha_record_vote_reply(ha,ctx,idx,term,granted,tag,lsn) BEFORE raft_on_vote_reply. Factored ha_record_vote_reply_locked out of handle_request_vote_reply: it records ctx->votes[idx] under ctx->lock with the idempotency guard but does NOT call ha_elect_evaluate_and_signal -> no second/racing legacy promotion path (raft_on_vote_reply remains the SOLE production promotion driver; the two quorum tallies (raft s->votes_granted / legacy ctx->votes_granted) and their guards (s->election_decided / ctx->done_posted) stay independent and idempotent). idx == vctx->peer_idx == the local ctx->votes[] index (absolute->local map done in raft_cb_send_vote_request), exactly the index ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn + the test hook use. SECONDARY: persist_wal_write_replicated now advances durable_lsn to the synced tip immediately after the inline fdatasync (mirror persist_flush; monotonic max; fail-loud rc-gated) so a standby advertises its own synced durable floor without waiting for the 10ms cadence flusher. VERIFIED: unit test_safe_commit_reflects_granting_voter_lsn RED (safe=1 'from 1 granted voters') -> GREEN (safe=5 'from 3 granted voters'); 177/177 controller_unit_test pass. NOTE: the LIVE clean_failover_preservation harness still FAILS, but the failure is PRE-EXISTING on baseline 14c41cb (verified by stash+rerun: baseline runs also diverge / lose jobs) \u2014 it is the SEPARATE bug-795/828 replication+catch-up gap (standbys' WALs physically contain only LSN 1..2, durable_floor=1; committed entries 2..5 never reach the standby WAL; primary advanced committed_lsn to 5 without a standby durable at 5). The fix DID change the live fingerprint from 'from 1 granted voters' to 'from 2 granted voters', proving the plumbing is now alive. safe-commit-from-votes is correct; the residual live job loss is out of scope (needs the catch-up/snapshot-backfill fix tracked under ha-commit-durability).", "tags": [ "async-fix", "md", @@ -6974,8 +6974,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-20T14:30:00.000Z", "error_message": "Every committed job appears as TWO consecutive WAL_JOB_SUBMIT entries with the SAME jobid (e.g. ctrl-1 LSN 2,3 = jobid 1868520205844480). Surfaced by waldump on /tmp/xce-ha-deploy.", "file": "src/lib/hook.c (xce_add_hook idempotency); root path src/controller/{persist.c persist_start, ha.c ha_register_persist_hooks}", - "root_cause": "NOT array expansion — job_submit() assigns array members DISTINCT ids (base_id+i, job.c) and the Job capnp schema has a single jobid field, so identical-jobid pairs cannot be two array tasks. A single client submit is producing two WAL_JOB_SUBMIT appends of the same job. EXACTLY 2 entries per job (never 1 or 3), always at ADJACENT LSNs, for every job on every node. CONFIRMED via enhanced waldump (payload-CRC + subtime columns): each pair is BYTE-IDENTICAL (same PCRC, e.g. LSN 2,3 both 6d79074e; same subtime 1781959730) — proving a literal double-append of the SAME encoded job_t in one submit flow; a failover retry would re-stamp subtime=time(NULL) and differ, so retry is DEFINITIVELY ruled out. Remaining candidates: AFTER_EVENT jlist contains the job twice, or the JOB_NEW hook/handler persists twice per submit. So 'ctrl-1 has 12 submits' is really 6 jobs (halve when reconciling failover-test job totals). Doubles LSN consumption; consistent across nodes here (F@14,15 on both ctrl-1 and ctrl-3) so not itself divergence, but a latent cross-node LSN-divergence risk if the duplicate count ever varies by primary.", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-23 (src/lib/hook.c). Root cause: persist_job_hook_fun was registered on XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_JOB by TWO owners — persist_start() (unconditional, boot) AND ha_register_persist_hooks() (on PRIMARY promotion) — with the SAME persist_t closure. xce_add_hook did not dedup, xce_run_hooks fires ALL slots, so a promoted primary had 2 active slots => persist_job_hook_fun ran twice per submit => 2 byte-identical adjacent WAL_JOB_SUBMIT appends. Fix: made xce_add_hook idempotent on exact (fn,data) — re-registering an active (fn,data) is a no-op; same fn with DISTINCT data still registers (legitimate multi-closure). Preserves the persist_start test contract many unit tests rely on. Verified: WAL now single-entry per job (waldump); 5/5 hook unit tests; controller suite 343 tests 0 new failures; 3/3 post-fix HA soaks zero job loss. NOTE: an earlier post-fix soak hit the KNOWN intermittent failover durability race (bug-795/828 class, LSN-10 cross-node divergence) — confirmed pre-existing (baseline passes/fails on timing too), NOT caused by this dedup.", + "root_cause": "NOT array expansion \u2014 job_submit() assigns array members DISTINCT ids (base_id+i, job.c) and the Job capnp schema has a single jobid field, so identical-jobid pairs cannot be two array tasks. A single client submit is producing two WAL_JOB_SUBMIT appends of the same job. EXACTLY 2 entries per job (never 1 or 3), always at ADJACENT LSNs, for every job on every node. CONFIRMED via enhanced waldump (payload-CRC + subtime columns): each pair is BYTE-IDENTICAL (same PCRC, e.g. LSN 2,3 both 6d79074e; same subtime 1781959730) \u2014 proving a literal double-append of the SAME encoded job_t in one submit flow; a failover retry would re-stamp subtime=time(NULL) and differ, so retry is DEFINITIVELY ruled out. Remaining candidates: AFTER_EVENT jlist contains the job twice, or the JOB_NEW hook/handler persists twice per submit. So 'ctrl-1 has 12 submits' is really 6 jobs (halve when reconciling failover-test job totals). Doubles LSN consumption; consistent across nodes here (F@14,15 on both ctrl-1 and ctrl-3) so not itself divergence, but a latent cross-node LSN-divergence risk if the duplicate count ever varies by primary.", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-23 (src/lib/hook.c). Root cause: persist_job_hook_fun was registered on XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_JOB by TWO owners \u2014 persist_start() (unconditional, boot) AND ha_register_persist_hooks() (on PRIMARY promotion) \u2014 with the SAME persist_t closure. xce_add_hook did not dedup, xce_run_hooks fires ALL slots, so a promoted primary had 2 active slots => persist_job_hook_fun ran twice per submit => 2 byte-identical adjacent WAL_JOB_SUBMIT appends. Fix: made xce_add_hook idempotent on exact (fn,data) \u2014 re-registering an active (fn,data) is a no-op; same fn with DISTINCT data still registers (legitimate multi-closure). Preserves the persist_start test contract many unit tests rely on. Verified: WAL now single-entry per job (waldump); 5/5 hook unit tests; controller suite 343 tests 0 new failures; 3/3 post-fix HA soaks zero job loss. NOTE: an earlier post-fix soak hit the KNOWN intermittent failover durability race (bug-795/828 class, LSN-10 cross-node divergence) \u2014 confirmed pre-existing (baseline passes/fails on timing too), NOT caused by this dedup.", "tags": [ "double-register", "duplicate", @@ -6999,9 +6999,9 @@ "id": "bug-847", "timestamp": "2026-06-20T14:37:08.863Z", "error_message": "Catch-up WAL streaming silently DROPS entry payloads at scale: a rejoining controller (ctrl-1 restarted) received [1..14] with correct LSN/type/CRC but PLEN=0 / empty job blobs (waldump PCRC=00000000, jobid=?). Structurally-intact but content-empty WAL = silent data corruption. THE committed-job-loss mechanism.", - "file": "src/lib/request.c (xce_wal_batch_encode_raw / wal_entry_to_wire / xce_decode extract loop) — capnp multi-segment Data pointers", - "root_cause": "Multi-segment capnp bug. xce_wal_batch_encode_raw builds a WalCatchupEntry struct-list where each element's payload is a capnp Data (List(UInt8)) allocated via capn_new_list8(cs=root_seg,...). When the message outgrows its first segment (large batch), the per-element payload Data pointer is lost across the segment boundary — on decode extract_data_bytes(we.payload) reads CAPN_NULL and returns len 0. write_WalCatchupEntry uses capn_setp (far-pointer-capable) so the fault is in the overflow/segment handling as used here. REPRODUCED deterministically: src/lib/testsuite/test_wal_wire.c test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads (14 entries x 872B) FAILS 'Expected 872 Was 0'; the 2-entry test_wal_batch_roundtrip_payload_bytes PASSES. Threshold is size, not count. Live replication (repl_broadcast) carries payloads fine — ONLY the catch-up/rejoin path corrupts, which is why loss only appears after a node restarts and catches up.", - "fix": "FIXED — CONFIRMED via un-ignoring its own purpose-built RED reproducer (strongest possible evidence). Removed the TEST_IGNORE_MESSAGE guard from test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads (src/lib/testsuite/test_wal_wire.c); rebuilt and ran it 2x under ASAN with leak detection ON — clean PASS both times, all 14 entries' 872-byte payloads byte-exact, zero leaks (285/285 lib tests, 0 failures, 0 ignored). Root-cause investigation traced the encode path (xce_wal_batch_encode_raw / wal_entry_to_wire in src/lib/request.c) and the underlying c-capnproto far-pointer machinery (write_ptr/capn_setp in capn.c) — the cross-segment struct->Data far-pointer path is correct by construction (new_object relocates and re-tags .seg on segment overflow; write_ptr emits a proper far/double-far pointer when segments differ). capn-malloc.c's create() confirms genuine multi-segment allocation occurs at this test's scale (4096-byte segments, 12.2KB of payload), so the test IS exercising the real segment-boundary path, not a false negative from staying single-segment. No production code changed — whatever regressed this (library version bump via the documented nix flake repin, or an incidental request.c change) already fixed it; the TEST_IGNORE was simply never removed. This is the 6th bug in this sweep found to be already-fixed-but-untracked (846/855/1096/1147/1198/847) — buglog.json has significant staleness debt from fixes landing without their originating bug entries being closed.", + "file": "src/lib/request.c (xce_wal_batch_encode_raw / wal_entry_to_wire / xce_decode extract loop) \u2014 capnp multi-segment Data pointers", + "root_cause": "Multi-segment capnp bug. xce_wal_batch_encode_raw builds a WalCatchupEntry struct-list where each element's payload is a capnp Data (List(UInt8)) allocated via capn_new_list8(cs=root_seg,...). When the message outgrows its first segment (large batch), the per-element payload Data pointer is lost across the segment boundary \u2014 on decode extract_data_bytes(we.payload) reads CAPN_NULL and returns len 0. write_WalCatchupEntry uses capn_setp (far-pointer-capable) so the fault is in the overflow/segment handling as used here. REPRODUCED deterministically: src/lib/testsuite/test_wal_wire.c test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads (14 entries x 872B) FAILS 'Expected 872 Was 0'; the 2-entry test_wal_batch_roundtrip_payload_bytes PASSES. Threshold is size, not count. Live replication (repl_broadcast) carries payloads fine \u2014 ONLY the catch-up/rejoin path corrupts, which is why loss only appears after a node restarts and catches up.", + "fix": "FIXED \u2014 CONFIRMED via un-ignoring its own purpose-built RED reproducer (strongest possible evidence). Removed the TEST_IGNORE_MESSAGE guard from test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads (src/lib/testsuite/test_wal_wire.c); rebuilt and ran it 2x under ASAN with leak detection ON \u2014 clean PASS both times, all 14 entries' 872-byte payloads byte-exact, zero leaks (285/285 lib tests, 0 failures, 0 ignored). Root-cause investigation traced the encode path (xce_wal_batch_encode_raw / wal_entry_to_wire in src/lib/request.c) and the underlying c-capnproto far-pointer machinery (write_ptr/capn_setp in capn.c) \u2014 the cross-segment struct->Data far-pointer path is correct by construction (new_object relocates and re-tags .seg on segment overflow; write_ptr emits a proper far/double-far pointer when segments differ). capn-malloc.c's create() confirms genuine multi-segment allocation occurs at this test's scale (4096-byte segments, 12.2KB of payload), so the test IS exercising the real segment-boundary path, not a false negative from staying single-segment. No production code changed \u2014 whatever regressed this (library version bump via the documented nix flake repin, or an incidental request.c change) already fixed it; the TEST_IGNORE was simply never removed. This is the 6th bug in this sweep found to be already-fixed-but-untracked (846/855/1096/1147/1198/847) \u2014 buglog.json has significant staleness debt from fixes landing without their originating bug entries being closed.", "tags": [ "c", "reproducer-unignored", @@ -7029,7 +7029,7 @@ { "id": "bug-848", "timestamp": "2026-06-20T14:40:02.211Z", - "error_message": "On a PRESERVED-DATA restart (no wipe — user confirmed), a controller recovers its WAL [1..7] from disk but rejoins advertising applied_lsn=0, so the primary re-streams the WHOLE log [1..committed] and O_TRUNC-overwrites the node's already-correct WAL. Logs: 'HA: learned committed_lsn=10 ... (was 0)'. THE root trigger that forces the full re-stream (then bug-847 empties it).", + "error_message": "On a PRESERVED-DATA restart (no wipe \u2014 user confirmed), a controller recovers its WAL [1..7] from disk but rejoins advertising applied_lsn=0, so the primary re-streams the WHOLE log [1..committed] and O_TRUNC-overwrites the node's already-correct WAL. Logs: 'HA: learned committed_lsn=10 ... (was 0)'. THE root trigger that forces the full re-stream (then bug-847 empties it).", "file": "src/controller/cluster.c (cluster_init_phase2, after persist_recover) + src/controller/ha.c (ha_init applied_lsn=0; state report sr->applied_lsn)", "root_cause": "ha->applied_lsn is NEVER reconstructed from the recovered WAL on boot. ha_init zeros it (ha.c:1367); persist_recover (cluster.c:1352) replays the WAL and advances persist->current_lsn/durable_lsn, but nothing copies that recovered position into ha->applied_lsn (persist_t and ha_state_t are separate; the only setter besides ha_init is the SNAPSHOT receive path ha.c:1771 = checkpoint_lsn). So the standby state report advertises sr->applied_lsn = ha->applied_lsn = 0 (ha.c:1787) and the primary's ha_evaluate_repl_action streams [0+1 .. committed]. ASYMMETRY proving it's a bug: ELECTION advertise uses ha_candidate_advertise_lsn = persist_durable_floor (the RECOVERED position, correct), but CATCH-UP advertise uses the un-recovered applied_lsn=0. The system knows its durable tip for voting but not for catch-up. Defeats Raft incremental catch-up for every restarted node; also the upstream cause of the earlier missing-prefix cases (full re-stream from a trimmed primary -> prefix gap).", "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-20 (HA-layer). Added ha_sync_applied_lsn_from_recovery(ha,p) (ha.c/ha.h) = monotonic store of persist_durable_floor(p) into ha->applied_lsn; wired into cluster_init_phase2 right after persist_recover, plus a diagnostic INFO log of recovered durable_floor/current_lsn/applied_lsn. TDD: test_recovered_member_advertises_real_applied_lsn (test_persist_recovery.c) write->recover->sync asserts applied_lsn==durable_floor>0 and monotonic. controller_unit_test 6/6 + adjacent HA 8/8, daemon builds. CAVEAT: live ctrl-1 also showed current_lsn=1 (seg O_TRUNC'd from LSN 1) implying persist_recover may not have loaded the WAL on that restart at all; if so this HA-layer fix is necessary but not sufficient. The new INFO log reveals on the next live restart whether persist_recover is effective (durable_floor>0) or not (bug-849 candidate: recovery not running/loading on the rejoin path).", @@ -7055,10 +7055,10 @@ { "id": "bug-849", "timestamp": "2026-06-20T14:42:09.400Z", - "error_message": "After bug-848 fix, restart still loses the committed prefix: restarted ctrl-1 ended with WAL [15..16] only — missing [1..14] (waldump 'GAP: missing prefix LSN 1..14'). Payloads now full (bug-848 era), but the prefix is gone. Loss mode changed (empty-payload -> missing-prefix), loss remains.", + "error_message": "After bug-848 fix, restart still loses the committed prefix: restarted ctrl-1 ended with WAL [15..16] only \u2014 missing [1..14] (waldump 'GAP: missing prefix LSN 1..14'). Payloads now full (bug-848 era), but the prefix is gone. Loss mode changed (empty-payload -> missing-prefix), loss remains.", "file": "src/controller/myapp.c (standby-rejoin path ~317-320) + src/controller/cluster.c cluster_init_phase2 (holds persist_recover)", - "root_cause": "CONFIRMED from live logs (/tmp/xce-ha-deploy/logs/ctrl-1.log). persist_recover (and the bug-848 applied_lsn sync, and catch-up) run ONLY inside cluster_init_phase2, which is ELECTION-GATED — its real callers are all ha.c election/promotion paths (ha.c:1021,1166,2943,3022) + cluster_init. First boot ran it (ctrl-1 won an election; logged 'persist_recover done — durable_floor=0 current_lsn=1'). The 11:07:20 RESTART came up as a follower ('myapp_run: CTRL_STANDBY — waiting for primary to connect and push config') with NO election → cluster_init_phase2 NEVER ran → NO 'persist_recover done' line for pid 304897. So the rejoining follower never recovered its on-disk [1..7], operated with current_lsn=1/applied_lsn=0, then received LIVE replication of the new job [15..16] (repl_broadcast), O_TRUNC'd seg-001 and wrote [15..16] there. [1..7] never recovered + [1..14] never caught up = permanent prefix gap. Ordering corollary: live replication advances applied past the gap so the primary's catch-up never backfills it.", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-21 (design B — boot-path-universal recovery). Refined root cause: phase2 is invoked ONLY from the election-result path; a rejoining follower that SKIPS its election (goto skip_election in myapp_run because a primary already exists) never reaches it. Fix: in myapp.c the skip-election standby branch now calls cluster_init_phase2(&c) (build resources + persist_recover + bug-848 ha_sync_applied_lsn) when !ha.phase2_done, BEFORE cluster_run starts serving — so every boot path recovers its own WAL and advertises its real applied_lsn before accepting replication. Idempotent via phase2_done (same once-per-process contract as the election callers); recovery decoupled from the primary config push (a restart already loaded config from disk pre-election). Daemon builds; controller suite incl. test_persist_recovery/test_ha_startup/test_repl_catchup/test_ha_failover 8/8 green. LIVE VALIDATION PENDING: redeploy + kill/restart ctrl-1; expect a 'HA: persist_recover done — durable_floor=7 current_lsn=8' line for the restarted pid and ctrl-1 keeping [1..7] + catching up only the suffix.", + "root_cause": "CONFIRMED from live logs (/tmp/xce-ha-deploy/logs/ctrl-1.log). persist_recover (and the bug-848 applied_lsn sync, and catch-up) run ONLY inside cluster_init_phase2, which is ELECTION-GATED \u2014 its real callers are all ha.c election/promotion paths (ha.c:1021,1166,2943,3022) + cluster_init. First boot ran it (ctrl-1 won an election; logged 'persist_recover done \u2014 durable_floor=0 current_lsn=1'). The 11:07:20 RESTART came up as a follower ('myapp_run: CTRL_STANDBY \u2014 waiting for primary to connect and push config') with NO election \u2192 cluster_init_phase2 NEVER ran \u2192 NO 'persist_recover done' line for pid 304897. So the rejoining follower never recovered its on-disk [1..7], operated with current_lsn=1/applied_lsn=0, then received LIVE replication of the new job [15..16] (repl_broadcast), O_TRUNC'd seg-001 and wrote [15..16] there. [1..7] never recovered + [1..14] never caught up = permanent prefix gap. Ordering corollary: live replication advances applied past the gap so the primary's catch-up never backfills it.", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-21 (design B \u2014 boot-path-universal recovery). Refined root cause: phase2 is invoked ONLY from the election-result path; a rejoining follower that SKIPS its election (goto skip_election in myapp_run because a primary already exists) never reaches it. Fix: in myapp.c the skip-election standby branch now calls cluster_init_phase2(&c) (build resources + persist_recover + bug-848 ha_sync_applied_lsn) when !ha.phase2_done, BEFORE cluster_run starts serving \u2014 so every boot path recovers its own WAL and advertises its real applied_lsn before accepting replication. Idempotent via phase2_done (same once-per-process contract as the election callers); recovery decoupled from the primary config push (a restart already loaded config from disk pre-election). Daemon builds; controller suite incl. test_persist_recovery/test_ha_startup/test_repl_catchup/test_ha_failover 8/8 green. LIVE VALIDATION PENDING: redeploy + kill/restart ctrl-1; expect a 'HA: persist_recover done \u2014 durable_floor=7 current_lsn=8' line for the restarted pid and ctrl-1 keeping [1..7] + catching up only the suffix.", "tags": [ "wrong-value", "md", @@ -7086,7 +7086,7 @@ "error_message": "A rejoining standby receives LIVE replication of new entries before its historical catch-up, advancing current_lsn past the gap so the idempotency guard skips the catch-up of the prefix. Explains ctrl-1 ending with [15..16] only (gap [1..14]). Distinct from bug-849; persists even after recovery.", "file": "src/controller/repl.c repl_add_standby (line ~119) + repl_broadcast in_catch_up gate", "root_cause": "repl_add_standby initializes a freshly-registered standby with in_catch_up=0, so it is IMMEDIATELY eligible for repl_broadcast (which correctly skips in_catch_up standbys at repl.c:27). Mechanism (confirmed from ctrl-1.log 11:07:21): ctrl-1 reconnects -> registered in_catch_up=0 -> the new job [15..16] is live-broadcast to it (not gated) -> persist_wal_write_replicated writes them, current_lsn jumps to 17 -> THEN the catch-up stream of [1..14] arrives but persist_wal_write_replicated's idempotency guard (lsn+1 <= current_lsn) skips ALL of them (1+1<=17 ... 14+1<=17) -> permanent prefix gap [1..14]. Independent of bug-849: even with recovery (current_lsn=8), a live [15..16] arriving first jumps current_lsn to 17 and the catch-up of [8..14] is skipped (gap [8..14]). Root architectural cause: catch-up streaming and live broadcast are SEPARATE unordered paths (unlike Raft AppendEntries which is one ordered per-follower stream).", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-21 via a CONTIGUITY GUARD at the persist layer (Raft log-matching), NOT in_catch_up. First tried defaulting in_catch_up=1 in repl_add_standby — REVERTED: it broke the whole controller suite (commit-WAIT tests TIMEOUT 300s because a fresh standby no longer counts toward write quorum until convergence, and the unit tests don't run the heartbeat dispatch that would clear it). Correct fix: persist_wal_write_replicated now REJECTS a forward gap (lsn > current_lsn) with -EAGAIN instead of writing it — so a live broadcast that arrives ahead of the in-order catch-up is DROPPED (no write, no ack, no current_lsn jump), and the ACK-driven catch-up continuation re-streams from current_lsn so the log fills in order. ha_apply_single_entry + ha_apply_wal_catchup_entry treat -EAGAIN as a quiet skip (TRACE, no ack, no ERROR spam). Combined with bug-848 (advertise durable_floor == current_lsn-1) the catch-up always starts AT current_lsn so it is never spuriously rejected; only genuine forward gaps are. Files: src/controller/persist.c (guard), src/controller/ha.c (quiet -EAGAIN). TDD: test_repl_write_rejects_forward_gap (test_repl_apply.c) — contiguous write ok, forward-gap lsn 5 @ current_lsn 2 -> -EAGAIN + current_lsn unchanged, fill 2..4 then 5 ok, recovery clean. FULL controller suite green (129/0/0, no timeout); daemon builds. LIVE VALIDATION PENDING with bug-848+849+850 together.", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-21 via a CONTIGUITY GUARD at the persist layer (Raft log-matching), NOT in_catch_up. First tried defaulting in_catch_up=1 in repl_add_standby \u2014 REVERTED: it broke the whole controller suite (commit-WAIT tests TIMEOUT 300s because a fresh standby no longer counts toward write quorum until convergence, and the unit tests don't run the heartbeat dispatch that would clear it). Correct fix: persist_wal_write_replicated now REJECTS a forward gap (lsn > current_lsn) with -EAGAIN instead of writing it \u2014 so a live broadcast that arrives ahead of the in-order catch-up is DROPPED (no write, no ack, no current_lsn jump), and the ACK-driven catch-up continuation re-streams from current_lsn so the log fills in order. ha_apply_single_entry + ha_apply_wal_catchup_entry treat -EAGAIN as a quiet skip (TRACE, no ack, no ERROR spam). Combined with bug-848 (advertise durable_floor == current_lsn-1) the catch-up always starts AT current_lsn so it is never spuriously rejected; only genuine forward gaps are. Files: src/controller/persist.c (guard), src/controller/ha.c (quiet -EAGAIN). TDD: test_repl_write_rejects_forward_gap (test_repl_apply.c) \u2014 contiguous write ok, forward-gap lsn 5 @ current_lsn 2 -> -EAGAIN + current_lsn unchanged, fill 2..4 then 5 ok, recovery clean. FULL controller suite green (129/0/0, no timeout); daemon builds. LIVE VALIDATION PENDING with bug-848+849+850 together.", "tags": [ "wrong-value", "c", @@ -7115,8 +7115,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-20T15:20:00.000Z", "error_message": "After the primary dies, xce_test client ops (ctrlstatus/joblist/jobsub) fail PERSISTENTLY with 'Invalid argument' (EINVAL) and wait-primary times out, even though a new primary was elected (ctrl-2 term 3). Blocks failover testing from the client.", "file": "src/lib/xceapi.c (per-op state guard) + src/lib/client_failover.c (xce_failover_classify / xcecli_retry_decide)", - "root_cause": "Client-side, NOT server. ha_dispatch_gate ALLOWS OPCode_ctrlstatus in every role and rejects client writes with the RETRYABLE -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY (never EINVAL), so a reachable controller would answer. The EINVAL is the xceapi per-op guard: `if (ctx->state != XCE_CTX_RUN) return -EINVAL`. The failover loop only AUTO-RECOVERS ctx.state==XCE_CTX_ERR (xcecli_retry_decide rotates+recovers); xce_failover_classify maps EINVAL -> XCE_FO_TERMINAL ('everything else -> terminal'), so a bare EINVAL is surfaced and the sticky master cursor never advances to the live new primary. So once the ctx lands in a non-ERR non-RUN state (INIT/DOWN) — or yields a bare EINVAL while RUN — failover gives up permanently. Exact stuck state needs a live repro to confirm.", - "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02, no direct code trail to when — landed under libxce-failover). src/lib/client_failover.c xcecli_retry_decide() now checks `ac->ctx.state == XCE_CTX_ERR` BEFORE classifying rc, bypassing the -EINVAL misclassification entirely (comment there literally reads 'the reported bug'). xcecli_ctx_recover() resets ERR->RUN post-reconnect. This is exactly recommendation (B) from this bug's own original fix note.", + "root_cause": "Client-side, NOT server. ha_dispatch_gate ALLOWS OPCode_ctrlstatus in every role and rejects client writes with the RETRYABLE -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY (never EINVAL), so a reachable controller would answer. The EINVAL is the xceapi per-op guard: `if (ctx->state != XCE_CTX_RUN) return -EINVAL`. The failover loop only AUTO-RECOVERS ctx.state==XCE_CTX_ERR (xcecli_retry_decide rotates+recovers); xce_failover_classify maps EINVAL -> XCE_FO_TERMINAL ('everything else -> terminal'), so a bare EINVAL is surfaced and the sticky master cursor never advances to the live new primary. So once the ctx lands in a non-ERR non-RUN state (INIT/DOWN) \u2014 or yields a bare EINVAL while RUN \u2014 failover gives up permanently. Exact stuck state needs a live repro to confirm.", + "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02, no direct code trail to when \u2014 landed under libxce-failover). src/lib/client_failover.c xcecli_retry_decide() now checks `ac->ctx.state == XCE_CTX_ERR` BEFORE classifying rc, bypassing the -EINVAL misclassification entirely (comment there literally reads 'the reported bug'). xcecli_ctx_recover() resets ERR->RUN post-reconnect. This is exactly recommendation (B) from this bug's own original fix note.", "tags": [ "client", "stale-report", @@ -7139,7 +7139,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_wal_batch_entry_without_payload should be test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_wal_wire.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_wal_batch_entry_without_payload\" instead of \"test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads\"", - "fix": "Changed test_wal_batch_entry_without_payload → test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads", + "fix": "Changed test_wal_batch_entry_without_payload \u2192 test_wal_batch_roundtrip_large_payloads", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -7186,7 +7186,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_repl_write_rejects_checkpoint should be test_repl_write_rejects_forward_gap", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_repl_apply.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_repl_write_rejects_checkpoint\" instead of \"test_repl_write_rejects_forward_gap\"", - "fix": "Changed test_repl_write_rejects_checkpoint → test_repl_write_rejects_forward_gap", + "fix": "Changed test_repl_write_rejects_checkpoint \u2192 test_repl_write_rejects_forward_gap", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -7200,7 +7200,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-21T13:30:00.000Z", "error_message": "CHAOTIC leadership churn (3x kill-the-primary) causes SILENT committed-prefix DIVERGENCE: all 3 nodes report committedLsn=54 with lsn range 1..54 / 0 gaps / CRC intact, but WAL CONTENT diverges at LSN 45-54 (ctrl-1/ctrl-2/ctrl-3 each hold DIFFERENT jobs at the same LSNs; fps bfeb26ad/216af434/865304ec). Violates Raft committed-prefix invariant (a committed entry must be byte-identical on every member). Originally seen as a liveness 'commit stall'; the deeper defect is divergence + acked-job loss under churn.", "file": "src/controller/persist.c:588/726/1040 (hdr.term=p->term, p->term never set) + src/controller/ha.c (election term = local+1, PreVote no-persist; two leaders per term) + src/controller/ha_convergence.c (reconcile cannot (term,lsn) log-match)", - "root_cause": "ROOT-CAUSED 2026-06-21 (owned-cluster repro, see .kiro/specs/ha-commit-durability/repro-851/). THREE compounding defects: (1) Election term not monotonic across cluster: term = locally-persisted+1, PreVote does NOT persist/propagate ('PreVote round ... no persist'); under chaotic kills a leader wins term N, appends own-term noop+jobs, and is killed BEFORE term N propagates to a majority; a restarted node recovers a STALE term and elects at the SAME N+1 => TWO leaders share a term (logs: term3 led by ctrl-3@08:40 AND ctrl-1@08:47:39; term4 led by ctrl-2@08:47:52 AND ctrl-3@08:48:04), each appending its own-term noop at the SAME lsn 45. (2) WAL entry term field is DEAD (always 0): wal_entry_hdr_t.term exists (wal_types.h:30) but writer does hdr.term=p->term (persist.c:588/726/1040) and p->term is NEVER assigned from ha->term anywhere in the controller (zero matches) => every entry persists term=0; waldump confirms term=0 cluster-wide. (3) No (term,lsn) reconcile: with no usable per-entry term, ha_convergence.c reconcile cannot Raft-log-match, so a divergent same-lsn suffix (45@term3 vs 45@term4) looks already-present and is never truncated; ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn then advances committed 'from 1 granted voter' over content other members never received. NOTE: a CLEAN single failover fully converges (all WALs identical 1..22, 848/849/850 validated) — only CHAOTIC churn triggers it.", + "root_cause": "ROOT-CAUSED 2026-06-21 (owned-cluster repro, see .kiro/specs/ha-commit-durability/repro-851/). THREE compounding defects: (1) Election term not monotonic across cluster: term = locally-persisted+1, PreVote does NOT persist/propagate ('PreVote round ... no persist'); under chaotic kills a leader wins term N, appends own-term noop+jobs, and is killed BEFORE term N propagates to a majority; a restarted node recovers a STALE term and elects at the SAME N+1 => TWO leaders share a term (logs: term3 led by ctrl-3@08:40 AND ctrl-1@08:47:39; term4 led by ctrl-2@08:47:52 AND ctrl-3@08:48:04), each appending its own-term noop at the SAME lsn 45. (2) WAL entry term field is DEAD (always 0): wal_entry_hdr_t.term exists (wal_types.h:30) but writer does hdr.term=p->term (persist.c:588/726/1040) and p->term is NEVER assigned from ha->term anywhere in the controller (zero matches) => every entry persists term=0; waldump confirms term=0 cluster-wide. (3) No (term,lsn) reconcile: with no usable per-entry term, ha_convergence.c reconcile cannot Raft-log-match, so a divergent same-lsn suffix (45@term3 vs 45@term4) looks already-present and is never truncated; ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn then advances committed 'from 1 granted voter' over content other members never received. NOTE: a CLEAN single failover fully converges (all WALs identical 1..22, 848/849/850 validated) \u2014 only CHAOTIC churn triggers it.", "fix": "NOT FIXED (HA-core + persistence => full spec workflow per CLAUDE.md, not a quick patch). Keystone lever: stamp hdr.term from live ha->term on the primary append path + carry term through the repl envelope + persist it, THEN make ha_convergence reconcile truncate any local suffix whose (term,lsn) != leader's (standard Raft log-matching). MUST pair with durably-establishing the election term before a new leader acts (no two leaders per term: persist/propagate the won term to a majority before appending the own-term noop, or bump term beyond any (term,lsn) a voter advertises). Route to ha-consistency-invariants / ha-convergence-recovery as a new sub-spec.", "tags": [ "ha", @@ -7229,8 +7229,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-21T09:10:00.000Z", "error_message": "Client primary-discovery is POSITIONAL, not failover-correct: with masters=[m0,m1,...] the client only finds the primary if m0 IS the primary. wait-primary: 9993(primary-first)=ok 45ms; 9992,9993(standby-first)=no primary; 9991,9993(dead-first)=no primary; 9993,9991=ok.", "file": "src/lib/client.c:403 xcecli_ctrlstatus_primary + src/controller/ctrlstatus.c:104 (standby primaryName=\"\")", - "root_cause": "Two compounding defects in libxce: (1) XCECLI_FAILOVER_CALL classifies a standby's status-0 ctrlstatus reply as SUCCESS and never rotates the endpoint (ctrlstatus is answerable in every role, so ANY reachable standby answers 0 — the inner call never rotates off it). (2) xcecli_ctrlstatus_primary captures a redirect hint from the non-authoritative reply but does not force rotation to consume it — it re-queries the same standby until the retry budget exhausts, never traversing the master ring. No server-side primaryName source existed on a standby (voted_for_name is not the leader, and primary_host is vestigial/never-written). Verified: baseline (no fix) with standby-first masters does NOT find the primary (pins to standby).", - "fix": "FIXED (2026-06-23). xcecli_ctrlstatus_primary: force xce_failover_rotate(ctx) + xcecli_ctx_recover(ctx) under failover.lock on every non-authoritative reply (hint-first then next-master rotation). Loop floor raised to max(max_retries, nmasters+1). Verified: wait-primary 'ctrl-3' serving after 92 ms with standby-first masters list; end-to-end clean-failover discover pass. Deliberately NOT adding server-side primaryName source — it is only a latency optimization; the client rotation fix alone resolves the hang.", + "root_cause": "Two compounding defects in libxce: (1) XCECLI_FAILOVER_CALL classifies a standby's status-0 ctrlstatus reply as SUCCESS and never rotates the endpoint (ctrlstatus is answerable in every role, so ANY reachable standby answers 0 \u2014 the inner call never rotates off it). (2) xcecli_ctrlstatus_primary captures a redirect hint from the non-authoritative reply but does not force rotation to consume it \u2014 it re-queries the same standby until the retry budget exhausts, never traversing the master ring. No server-side primaryName source existed on a standby (voted_for_name is not the leader, and primary_host is vestigial/never-written). Verified: baseline (no fix) with standby-first masters does NOT find the primary (pins to standby).", + "fix": "FIXED (2026-06-23). xcecli_ctrlstatus_primary: force xce_failover_rotate(ctx) + xcecli_ctx_recover(ctx) under failover.lock on every non-authoritative reply (hint-first then next-master rotation). Loop floor raised to max(max_retries, nmasters+1). Verified: wait-primary 'ctrl-3' serving after 92 ms with standby-first masters list; end-to-end clean-failover discover pass. Deliberately NOT adding server-side primaryName source \u2014 it is only a latency optimization; the client rotation fix alone resolves the hang.", "tags": [ "libxce", "client", @@ -7413,7 +7413,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval should be test_raft_init_oversize_peers_returns_einval", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval\" instead of \"test_raft_init_oversize_peers_returns_einval\"", - "fix": "Changed test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval → test_raft_init_oversize_peers_returns_einval", + "fix": "Changed test_raft_init_zero_peers_returns_einval \u2192 test_raft_init_oversize_peers_returns_einval", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -7508,7 +7508,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: g_te_spy should be g_pe_spy", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"g_te_spy\" instead of \"g_pe_spy\"", - "fix": "Changed g_te_spy → g_pe_spy", + "fix": "Changed g_te_spy \u2192 g_pe_spy", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -7570,7 +7570,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-21T16:51:25.960Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: RUN_TEST(test_sim_9_1_replication_and_partition_catch_up);; RUN_TEST(test_sim_9_2_divergent_suffix_truncation);", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -7587,7 +7587,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: <= should be >=", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"<=\" instead of \">=\"", - "fix": "Changed operator <= → >=", + "fix": "Changed operator <= \u2192 >=", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -7699,7 +7699,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_INT should be TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_INT\" instead of \"TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL\"", - "fix": "Changed TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_INT → TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL", + "fix": "Changed TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL_INT \u2192 TEST_ASSERT_NOT_EQUAL", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -7730,7 +7730,7 @@ "error_message": "controller_unit_test: 6 test_wal_catchup_* tests FAIL (Expected ... Was -11/-EAGAIN or wrong applied_lsn) on the raft_tla checkpoint branch", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_config_repl.c (tests) / src/controller/persist.c:705 (guard)", "root_cause": "PRE-EXISTING on checkpoint 20e59d0, NOT caused by ha-term-safety 1.1/1.2. The bug-850 contiguity guard (persist.c:705 rejects lsn>current_lsn with -EAGAIN) is committed at HEAD, but the test_wal_catchup_* tests feed forward-gap LSNs (30, 42) into a FRESH persist (current_lsn~=1) and still expect them to apply -> guard returns -EAGAIN -> applied_lsn does not advance. ha-term-safety changes touch only vote/schema/typemap/stubs; git diff --stat shows ZERO changes to persist.c/config_repl.c/test_config_repl.c. Also a separate run TIMED OUT 300s (the bug-850 DNR /tmp fsync-EIO + commit-WAIT signature; environment artifact on overlayfs).", - "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02): ran controller_unit_test directly — all test_wal_catchup_* tests (append_term_fields_round_trip, entry_advances_applied_lsn, entry_error_skipped_no_crash, entry_null_entry_no_crash, batch_advances_applied_lsn, partial_batch, batch_error_entry_skipped, batch_zero_entries_fallback, batch_256_entries) PASS. Landed as part of ha-term-safety's WAL term-index work (owner this bug deferred to).", + "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02): ran controller_unit_test directly \u2014 all test_wal_catchup_* tests (append_term_fields_round_trip, entry_advances_applied_lsn, entry_error_skipped_no_crash, entry_null_entry_no_crash, batch_advances_applied_lsn, partial_batch, batch_error_entry_skipped, batch_zero_entries_fallback, batch_256_entries) PASS. Landed as part of ha-term-safety's WAL term-index work (owner this bug deferred to).", "tags": [ "controller-test", "stale-report", @@ -7756,7 +7756,7 @@ "error_message": "nix develop fails: hash mismatch for c-capnproto fixed-output derivation (expected sha256-9dzSc3w+yxYzsF/rZe3qIarKOpjt2zvIyjuS5FXngIM=, got sha256-9rTlcTia+s9ARGeTi+8auGvM0RkS+wZK7aIkzecaeSk=)", "file": "src/flake.nix", "root_cause": "flake pins c-capnproto to the MUTABLE github archive/main.tar.gz; upstream main branch advanced so the tarball content/hash drifted, breaking the fixed-output derivation. Only pre-cached nix stores still build.", - "fix": "RESOLVED: user refreshed src/flake.lock; fresh nix develop builds (capnproto 1.2.0). A clean controller rebuild made the full controller test suite green (Ok:1 Fail:0, 12.7s) — the earlier wal_catchup -EAGAIN/decode failures were a STALE incremental-build artifact (schema compiled against the drifted toolchain), not fsync or a source regression.", + "fix": "RESOLVED: user refreshed src/flake.lock; fresh nix develop builds (capnproto 1.2.0). A clean controller rebuild made the full controller test suite green (Ok:1 Fail:0, 12.7s) \u2014 the earlier wal_catchup -EAGAIN/decode failures were a STALE incremental-build artifact (schema compiled against the drifted toolchain), not fsync or a source regression.", "tags": [ "nix", "flake", @@ -7791,7 +7791,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_waldump should be test_term_safety_adapter", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_waldump\" instead of \"test_term_safety_adapter\"", - "fix": "Changed test_waldump → test_term_safety_adapter", + "fix": "Changed test_waldump \u2192 test_term_safety_adapter", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8034,7 +8034,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: ha_arm_own_term_gate should be ha_arm_own_term_gate_for_test", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_term_safety_adapter.c", "root_cause": "Used \"ha_arm_own_term_gate\" instead of \"ha_arm_own_term_gate_for_test\"", - "fix": "Changed ha_arm_own_term_gate → ha_arm_own_term_gate_for_test", + "fix": "Changed ha_arm_own_term_gate \u2192 ha_arm_own_term_gate_for_test", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8064,7 +8064,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-22T08:21:57.062Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* ha-term-safety task 3.2 (R2.6 / G5): route the heartbeat ; * library as a 0-entry AppendEntries so the LIBRARY performs", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -8219,7 +8219,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: persist_roll_segment should be persist_test_force_new_segment", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_config_repl.c", "root_cause": "Used \"persist_roll_segment\" instead of \"persist_test_force_new_segment\"", - "fix": "Changed persist_roll_segment → persist_test_force_new_segment", + "fix": "Changed persist_roll_segment \u2192 persist_test_force_new_segment", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8231,7 +8231,7 @@ { "id": "bug-970", "timestamp": "2026-06-22T10:24:35.905518Z", - "error_message": "ha-term-safety task 4.2 rejected (review r1): live config-change path (do_upgrade_config_with_bytes) never appended WAL_CONFIG_MARKER — config_committed_marker had ZERO production callers (dead primitive); and checkpoint/compaction could trim a committed marker segment, regressing the derive to -ENOENT.", + "error_message": "ha-term-safety task 4.2 rejected (review r1): live config-change path (do_upgrade_config_with_bytes) never appended WAL_CONFIG_MARKER \u2014 config_committed_marker had ZERO production callers (dead primitive); and checkpoint/compaction could trim a committed marker segment, regressing the derive to -ENOENT.", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c, src/controller/persist.c", "root_cause": "Finding1: do_upgrade_config_with_bytes still drove the term-blind committed_config_tag push/ack/advance and never called config_append_marker, so the derive primitive was dead code. Finding2: persist_checkpoint->trim_wal_segments unlinks older segments and the snapshot sentinel carried no config reference, so a committed marker in a trimmed segment vanished and config_committed_marker regressed/returned -ENOENT.", "fix": "Added config_commit_change() wired into do_upgrade_config_with_bytes step 7: appends WAL_CONFIG_MARKER as the consensus record (config_append_marker), then delegates byte delivery + the existing majority barrier to push_config_to_standbys (mechanism unchanged); committed_config_tag is now only a cache, config_committed_marker (committed-prefix derive) is authoritative. Compaction safety: persist_checkpoint scans the committed prefix for the latest marker {version_tag,sha256} (scan_latest_committed_config_ref) BEFORE trim and stamps it into the snapshot sentinel (41-byte optional tail); load_snapshot reads it back into persist.cfgref_*; config_committed_marker falls back to it when no marker survives the live WAL. Added integration test (drives config_commit_change) + checkpoint-trim test + persist_test_force_new_segment seam. cb5 upgrade pins made persist-backed so the marker append succeeds. RED confirmed (Expected 1 Was 0; Expected 0 Was -110); GREEN 0 failures direct-run.", @@ -8305,7 +8305,7 @@ "error_message": "ha-term-safety task 4.3 REJECTED r1: verify-before-activate BYPASSED on push path (handle_repl_config_push pre-activated via load_primary_config before the hash gate); recovery-activate had NO production call site (boot loaded blindly); serve-fence had NO production reader (a fenced member still served)", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c, src/controller/ha.c, src/controller/myapp.c", "root_cause": "config_activate_committed (verify-before-activate + fence) was unit-correct but not integrated: (A) handle_repl_config_push called load_primary_config UNCONDITIONALLY before config_activate_committed, so mismatched bytes went live before the gate; (B) myapp.c boot step 7 + on_commit_advanced never called the consumer, so a recovering member loaded config blind against the committed marker; (C) ha_dispatch_gate / pre-promotion gate never read config_serve_fence, so a fenced member still served + could promote", - "fix": "(A) handle_repl_config_push now SAVES bytes (conf_save_config) then calls config_activate_committed ONLY — removed premature load_primary_config; activate is the sole activation point (hash-verify gate). (B) config_activate_committed -ENOENT branch falls back to load_primary_config (absent marker != mismatch, no false fence); myapp.c step 7 calls config_activate_committed (latest committed marker, verified). on_commit_advanced documents why activation is deferred off the iomgr thread (async-I/O invariant: scan/load do disk I/O). (C) ha_dispatch_gate CTRL_PRIMARY now refuses config-dependent state-changing ops when config_serve_fenced (replication/read-only pass), pre-promotion gate in raft_cb_become_leader refuses promotion when fenced via new ha_config_promotion_fenced; member stays ALIVE, never self-terminates; fence clears on correct bytes re-verify", + "fix": "(A) handle_repl_config_push now SAVES bytes (conf_save_config) then calls config_activate_committed ONLY \u2014 removed premature load_primary_config; activate is the sole activation point (hash-verify gate). (B) config_activate_committed -ENOENT branch falls back to load_primary_config (absent marker != mismatch, no false fence); myapp.c step 7 calls config_activate_committed (latest committed marker, verified). on_commit_advanced documents why activation is deferred off the iomgr thread (async-I/O invariant: scan/load do disk I/O). (C) ha_dispatch_gate CTRL_PRIMARY now refuses config-dependent state-changing ops when config_serve_fenced (replication/read-only pass), pre-promotion gate in raft_cb_become_leader refuses promotion when fenced via new ha_config_promotion_fenced; member stays ALIVE, never self-terminates; fence clears on correct bytes re-verify", "tags": [ "ha-term-safety", "config-replication", @@ -8346,7 +8346,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: ClusterConfig should be cluster_config_t", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_config_repl.c", "root_cause": "Used \"ClusterConfig\" instead of \"cluster_config_t\"", - "fix": "Changed ClusterConfig → cluster_config_t", + "fix": "Changed ClusterConfig \u2192 cluster_config_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8530,7 +8530,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_repl_ack_currentterm_quorum_advances_commit should be test_live_broadcast_receive_persists_leader_term", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_term_safety_adapter.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_repl_ack_currentterm_quorum_advances_commit\" instead of \"test_live_broadcast_receive_persists_leader_term\"", - "fix": "Changed test_repl_ack_currentterm_quorum_advances_commit → test_live_broadcast_receive_persists_leader_term", + "fix": "Changed test_repl_ack_currentterm_quorum_advances_commit \u2192 test_live_broadcast_receive_persists_leader_term", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8562,7 +8562,7 @@ ], "occurrences": 1, "last_seen": "2026-06-22T16:00:00.000000", - "validation": "Unit RED->GREEN: test_broadcast_carries_leader_term_and_prev_tuple (repl: neuter term -> Expected 7 Was 0) + test_live_broadcast_receive_persists_leader_term (adapter: neuter receive route -> Expected 7 Was 3, i.e. standby persisted its LOCAL term). Full controller suite 175 Tests 0 Failures (clean /tmp direct binary) + meson Ok:1 Fail:0. Live STRICT_TERM gate (clean_failover_preservation.sh) NOT runnable in this overlayfs sandbox: baseline-confirmed no failover completes (split-vote no-promotion within 20s + fdatasync errno=5) — bug-924 env limitation, requires real-fs. The 7 test_wal_catchup_* (test_config_repl.c) + occasional durability FAILs on the direct binary are the SAME pre-existing bug-924 overlayfs fdatasync artifact (identical on baseline)." + "validation": "Unit RED->GREEN: test_broadcast_carries_leader_term_and_prev_tuple (repl: neuter term -> Expected 7 Was 0) + test_live_broadcast_receive_persists_leader_term (adapter: neuter receive route -> Expected 7 Was 3, i.e. standby persisted its LOCAL term). Full controller suite 175 Tests 0 Failures (clean /tmp direct binary) + meson Ok:1 Fail:0. Live STRICT_TERM gate (clean_failover_preservation.sh) NOT runnable in this overlayfs sandbox: baseline-confirmed no failover completes (split-vote no-promotion within 20s + fdatasync errno=5) \u2014 bug-924 env limitation, requires real-fs. The 7 test_wal_catchup_* (test_config_repl.c) + occasional durability FAILs on the direct binary are the SAME pre-existing bug-924 overlayfs fdatasync artifact (identical on baseline)." }, { "id": "bug-1000", @@ -8585,8 +8585,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-22T15:44:54.113Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in errno", "file": ".kiro/specs/ha-term-safety/tasks.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: - _Blocked (live portion only — build+unit gate CONFIRMED GR", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: - _Blocked (live portion only \u2014 build+unit gate CONFIRMED GR", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -8633,7 +8633,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-22T22:31:03.315Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_term_safety_adapter.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: RUN_TEST(test_catchup_applied_lsn_is_last_held_no_skip);", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -8649,8 +8649,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-22T22:32:53.722Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Advance applied_lsn to last_good_lsn after the full batch; * last contiguously-held LSN, NOT last_good_lsn + 1 — see th", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Advance applied_lsn to last_good_lsn after the full batch; * last contiguously-held LSN, NOT last_good_lsn + 1 \u2014 see th", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -8679,7 +8679,7 @@ { "id": "bug-1013", "timestamp": "2026-06-22T00:00:00Z", - "error_message": "Stable HA cluster: committed_lsn pinned at 1 (< 5) while all 5 entries are durable on all 3 nodes — STRICT_TERM live failover gate fails 'committed_lsn>=5'", + "error_message": "Stable HA cluster: committed_lsn pinned at 1 (< 5) while all 5 entries are durable on all 3 nodes \u2014 STRICT_TERM live failover gate fails 'committed_lsn>=5'", "file": "src/controller/commit.c", "root_cause": "ha-term-safety task 2.4 added a min(durable-majority, raft_commit_index) ceiling in majority_candidate_locked. raft_commit_index is fed only via the library ACK path (ha_raft_on_repl_ack -> raft_advance_commit -> on_commit_advanced), which advances from match_index[] driven by the asynchronous catch-up streamer and routinely LAGS the durable majority. When delivery goes via catch-up, raft_commit_index stays low and PINS committed_lsn below the safe durable watermark (a redundant, starvation-prone gate). The durable-majority barrier was already current-term-safe under single-writer + the own-term NOOP writable gate, making the ceiling redundant.", "fix": "Option A: removed the raft_commit_index fold from majority_candidate_locked (commit.c). The durable-majority barrier + own-term writable_lsn gate are now authoritative for commit-advance. commit_set_raft_commit_index / ce->raft_commit_index made INERT-ADVISORY (recorded for observability/conformance-oracle only; still fed by on_commit_advanced so the library half keeps a sink). Kept durable self-cap (persist_durable_lsn), persist-before-ACK, and assert(cand<=persist_durable_lsn). Verified live: commit advances 4->5 via durable barrier (commit.c:184); walcompare OK committed prefix byte-identical across 3 nodes up to LSN 5.", @@ -8707,8 +8707,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-23T03:05:00.000Z", "error_message": "Clean failover still truncates committed jobs: new primary logs 'safe_committed_lsn=1 (from 2 granted voters)' and walcompare reports committed-prefix DIVERGENCE at LSN 2; jobs at LSN 2..5 lost.", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_vote_gate.c (test added); ha.c/persist.c advertise path investigated (no change needed)", - "root_cause": "INVESTIGATED, NOT an advertisement-staleness bug. The advertise path already reflects the live durable tip: ha_candidate_advertise_lsn -> persist_durable_floor, and the voter floor = max(persist_durable_floor, learned_committed); persist_durable_floor == persist_durable_lsn (both read p->durable_lsn, the fsync watermark), and part-1's secondary fix advances durable_lsn after the standby's inline fdatasync in persist_wal_write_replicated. LIVE evidence (fix828c_r1..r3, STRICT_TERM clean failover x3) proves the surviving voters advertise 1 because they are GENUINELY durable only at LSN 1: their WAL physically holds 1..2 (LSN2 = their own term-3 NOOP), recovered tip=2, durable_floor=1. The original primary ctrl-1 (down at election time, WAL 1..5 tip=5) advanced committed_lsn 1->2->3->4->5 in ~250ms while standbys had only converged applied_lsn=1 and catch-up streaming was still in flight. So committed advanced past what the surviving majority durably held — the UPSTREAM replication / commit-barrier durability gap (bug-795/661), not the vote advertisement. safe_committed_lsn=1 is the CORRECT, SAFE Raft answer given the real durable state; advertising the true durable tip cannot conjure data never replicated.", - "fix": "No production code change required for part-2 — the durable-tip advertisement is already correct & safe after part-1. Added unit test test_live_durable_tip_advertised_over_lagging_learned (test_ha_vote_gate.c): a standby durable at LSN5 (real persist, flush -> durable_lsn=5) with learned_committed lagging at 1 must advertise 5 as BOTH candidate self-LSN (ha_candidate_advertise_lsn) and voter floor (ha_vote_self_freshness over persist_durable_floor, dominating learned=1), and ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn from two such granting voters must return 5 — locking in the in-scope contract. Explicitly did NOT fold learned_committed into the CANDIDATE advertise (the requested max(...,learned_committed)) because that re-opens the truncated-candidate-over-advertises-and-wins hole ha-commit-durability task 4.2 deliberately closed (candidate must advertise only a DURABLE position; learned_committed is volatile/not necessarily durable on this node). The residual live job loss is bug-795/661, out of scope.", + "root_cause": "INVESTIGATED, NOT an advertisement-staleness bug. The advertise path already reflects the live durable tip: ha_candidate_advertise_lsn -> persist_durable_floor, and the voter floor = max(persist_durable_floor, learned_committed); persist_durable_floor == persist_durable_lsn (both read p->durable_lsn, the fsync watermark), and part-1's secondary fix advances durable_lsn after the standby's inline fdatasync in persist_wal_write_replicated. LIVE evidence (fix828c_r1..r3, STRICT_TERM clean failover x3) proves the surviving voters advertise 1 because they are GENUINELY durable only at LSN 1: their WAL physically holds 1..2 (LSN2 = their own term-3 NOOP), recovered tip=2, durable_floor=1. The original primary ctrl-1 (down at election time, WAL 1..5 tip=5) advanced committed_lsn 1->2->3->4->5 in ~250ms while standbys had only converged applied_lsn=1 and catch-up streaming was still in flight. So committed advanced past what the surviving majority durably held \u2014 the UPSTREAM replication / commit-barrier durability gap (bug-795/661), not the vote advertisement. safe_committed_lsn=1 is the CORRECT, SAFE Raft answer given the real durable state; advertising the true durable tip cannot conjure data never replicated.", + "fix": "No production code change required for part-2 \u2014 the durable-tip advertisement is already correct & safe after part-1. Added unit test test_live_durable_tip_advertised_over_lagging_learned (test_ha_vote_gate.c): a standby durable at LSN5 (real persist, flush -> durable_lsn=5) with learned_committed lagging at 1 must advertise 5 as BOTH candidate self-LSN (ha_candidate_advertise_lsn) and voter floor (ha_vote_self_freshness over persist_durable_floor, dominating learned=1), and ha_compute_safe_committed_lsn from two such granting voters must return 5 \u2014 locking in the in-scope contract. Explicitly did NOT fold learned_committed into the CANDIDATE advertise (the requested max(...,learned_committed)) because that re-opens the truncated-candidate-over-advertises-and-wins hole ha-commit-durability task 4.2 deliberately closed (candidate must advertise only a DURABLE position; learned_committed is volatile/not necessarily durable on this node). The residual live job loss is bug-795/661, out of scope.", "tags": [ "safety", "failover", @@ -8737,8 +8737,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-23T03:45:00Z", "error_message": "Clean single failover (STRICT_TERM) loses committed jobs: safe_committed_lsn=1 from votes despite a standby being genuinely durable at LSN 5; walcompare reports committed-prefix divergence at LSN 2 (jobs gone on the new leader).", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "ha_enter_real_election() PRE-TRUNCATED the candidate's WAL above ha->last_known_committed_lsn BEFORE the vote. last_known_committed_lsn is the LOCALLY-LEARNED commit watermark, which LAGS the true cluster commit point (the primary commits an entry on a durable majority, then dies before a heartbeat carries that committed LSN to the standby). persist_truncate_wal_above clamps durable_lsn down to the cutoff (clamp_durable_lsn_locked). So a standby durably holding committed entries [committed+1..tip] discarded them, then advertised the stale-low cutoff as its durable floor (ha_candidate_advertise_lsn / ha_vote_self_freshness both read persist_durable_floor). Every voter doing the same collapsed safe-committed-from-votes to the stale watermark; the AUTHORITATIVE post-election truncate (raft_cb_become_leader -> persist_truncate_wal_above(safe_committed_lsn)) then kept only that stale prefix, losing committed jobs. Live trace (DBG828) PROVED the standbys wrote+fdatasync'd LSN 2-5 (durable_lsn=5) and only LOST them at the pre-election truncate clamp — NOT a durability/ack-before-fsync violation. Final bug-828/795 slice.", - "fix": "Removed the pre-election persist_truncate_wal_above(last_known_committed_lsn) in ha_enter_real_election (src/controller/ha.c). Raft model: a candidate does NOT truncate its log before campaigning — it keeps its full durable log and advertises its real durable tip so voters holding more committed entries deny a colder candidate and the winner has every committed entry (Leader Completeness). Divergent UNCOMMITTED tails are removed only by the authoritative post-election safe-commit truncate (above the majority-held point) and by the library's per-entry (term,lsn) reconcile (on_truncate_from) during AppendEntries. RED: live STRICT_TERM harness safe=1 + walcompare divergence at LSN 2. GREEN: every run now logs safe_committed_lsn=5 (from 2 granted voters) and walcompare 'committed prefixes identical'. Unit: new test_repl_catchup_durable_floor_survives_failover (test_repl_apply.c) + 177/177 unit GREEN. NOTE: live EXIT still 1 due to a PRE-EXISTING libxce client-failover bug (bug: 'client op fails to reach live primary when a DEAD controller is FIRST in the masters list') surfacing now that the durability bug no longer masks the post-walcompare expect-job/wait-primary step — committed jobs are physically present on disk (walcompare proves it).", + "root_cause": "ha_enter_real_election() PRE-TRUNCATED the candidate's WAL above ha->last_known_committed_lsn BEFORE the vote. last_known_committed_lsn is the LOCALLY-LEARNED commit watermark, which LAGS the true cluster commit point (the primary commits an entry on a durable majority, then dies before a heartbeat carries that committed LSN to the standby). persist_truncate_wal_above clamps durable_lsn down to the cutoff (clamp_durable_lsn_locked). So a standby durably holding committed entries [committed+1..tip] discarded them, then advertised the stale-low cutoff as its durable floor (ha_candidate_advertise_lsn / ha_vote_self_freshness both read persist_durable_floor). Every voter doing the same collapsed safe-committed-from-votes to the stale watermark; the AUTHORITATIVE post-election truncate (raft_cb_become_leader -> persist_truncate_wal_above(safe_committed_lsn)) then kept only that stale prefix, losing committed jobs. Live trace (DBG828) PROVED the standbys wrote+fdatasync'd LSN 2-5 (durable_lsn=5) and only LOST them at the pre-election truncate clamp \u2014 NOT a durability/ack-before-fsync violation. Final bug-828/795 slice.", + "fix": "Removed the pre-election persist_truncate_wal_above(last_known_committed_lsn) in ha_enter_real_election (src/controller/ha.c). Raft model: a candidate does NOT truncate its log before campaigning \u2014 it keeps its full durable log and advertises its real durable tip so voters holding more committed entries deny a colder candidate and the winner has every committed entry (Leader Completeness). Divergent UNCOMMITTED tails are removed only by the authoritative post-election safe-commit truncate (above the majority-held point) and by the library's per-entry (term,lsn) reconcile (on_truncate_from) during AppendEntries. RED: live STRICT_TERM harness safe=1 + walcompare divergence at LSN 2. GREEN: every run now logs safe_committed_lsn=5 (from 2 granted voters) and walcompare 'committed prefixes identical'. Unit: new test_repl_catchup_durable_floor_survives_failover (test_repl_apply.c) + 177/177 unit GREEN. NOTE: live EXIT still 1 due to a PRE-EXISTING libxce client-failover bug (bug: 'client op fails to reach live primary when a DEAD controller is FIRST in the masters list') surfacing now that the durability bug no longer masks the post-walcompare expect-job/wait-primary step \u2014 committed jobs are physically present on disk (walcompare proves it).", "tags": [ "ha", "raft", @@ -8768,7 +8768,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: $MASTERS should be $MASTERS_LIVE", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/clean_failover_preservation.sh", "root_cause": "Used \"$MASTERS\" instead of \"$MASTERS_LIVE\"", - "fix": "Changed $MASTERS → $MASTERS_LIVE", + "fix": "Changed $MASTERS \u2192 $MASTERS_LIVE", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "sh" @@ -8782,8 +8782,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-23", "error_message": "Post-failover AVAILABILITY: after a clean failover the new primary never becomes available to serve clients (wait-primary times out). New primary logs 'ha_dispatch_repl_action_for_standby: standby[0] lsn=5 < committed_lsn=6 -> stream WAL batches' every ~3s indefinitely; the lagging standby never advances to the new primary's own-term tip, and the client cannot reach a serving primary. Surfaced only AFTER bug-828 was fixed (the committed-job-loss previously masked this by failing the harness earlier at walcompare).", "file": "src/controller/ha.c (ha_dispatch_repl_action_for_standby / catch-up streamer on the NEW term), config_repl.c (ha_stream_wal_to_standby), persist.c (standby apply) -- NOT data loss; committed prefix is byte-identical on disk (walcompare OK).", - "root_cause": "ha_stream_wal_to_standby (config_repl.c) stamped each streamed entry's term and the AppendEntries prev_log_term from raw on-disk hdr.term (the WAL header), but the standby's logOk (raft_on_append_entries_request) and the library's own send path both source terms from persist_entry_term (the authoritative in-memory per-LSN term index), which maps a legacy-0 entry to WAL_LEGACY_TERM(1). So for a legacy-0 predecessor entry (raw hdr.term==0), the streamer sent prev_log_term=0 while the standby computed its own term as 1 → logOk mismatch → the new-term NOOP (the post-promotion first entry) is perpetually rejected → no WalAck → applied_lsn stuck at pre-promotion value → the heartbeat state report advertises the stale lsn → the primary re-streams [lsn+1..committed] every heartbeat cycle. The committed prefix stays byte-identical because only term metadata diverges, not data. CONFIRMED: baseline walcompare shows committed-prefix DIVERGENCE (term mismatch → CRC-chain breaks on some members); with the fix the committed prefix is IDENTICAL.", - "fix": "FIXED (2026-06-23). ha_stream_wal_to_standby gained a const persist_t* p parameter (decl in config_repl.h). All three hdr.term source sites in the streamer body (entry->term, prev_streamed_term on the main path, prev_streamed_term on the OOM-skip path) replaced with p ? persist_entry_term(p, hdr.lsn) : hdr.term (NULL-p path for count-only unit tests). Callers (ha_dispatch_repl_action_for_standby in ha.c, catchup_stream_range in config_repl.c) pass &c->persist. Unit test (test_wal_stream_term_from_index_not_raw_hdr) legacy-appends LSN 1 at term 0 + LSN 2 at term 3; streams standby_lsn=1,committed=2; asserts streamed entry term==3 and prev_log_term==WAL_LEGACY_TERM(1). RED→GREEN proven (Expected 1 Was 0 → PASS). Live: standby converge + committed prefix identical.", + "root_cause": "ha_stream_wal_to_standby (config_repl.c) stamped each streamed entry's term and the AppendEntries prev_log_term from raw on-disk hdr.term (the WAL header), but the standby's logOk (raft_on_append_entries_request) and the library's own send path both source terms from persist_entry_term (the authoritative in-memory per-LSN term index), which maps a legacy-0 entry to WAL_LEGACY_TERM(1). So for a legacy-0 predecessor entry (raw hdr.term==0), the streamer sent prev_log_term=0 while the standby computed its own term as 1 \u2192 logOk mismatch \u2192 the new-term NOOP (the post-promotion first entry) is perpetually rejected \u2192 no WalAck \u2192 applied_lsn stuck at pre-promotion value \u2192 the heartbeat state report advertises the stale lsn \u2192 the primary re-streams [lsn+1..committed] every heartbeat cycle. The committed prefix stays byte-identical because only term metadata diverges, not data. CONFIRMED: baseline walcompare shows committed-prefix DIVERGENCE (term mismatch \u2192 CRC-chain breaks on some members); with the fix the committed prefix is IDENTICAL.", + "fix": "FIXED (2026-06-23). ha_stream_wal_to_standby gained a const persist_t* p parameter (decl in config_repl.h). All three hdr.term source sites in the streamer body (entry->term, prev_streamed_term on the main path, prev_streamed_term on the OOM-skip path) replaced with p ? persist_entry_term(p, hdr.lsn) : hdr.term (NULL-p path for count-only unit tests). Callers (ha_dispatch_repl_action_for_standby in ha.c, catchup_stream_range in config_repl.c) pass &c->persist. Unit test (test_wal_stream_term_from_index_not_raw_hdr) legacy-appends LSN 1 at term 0 + LSN 2 at term 3; streams standby_lsn=1,committed=2; asserts streamed entry term==3 and prev_log_term==WAL_LEGACY_TERM(1). RED\u2192GREEN proven (Expected 1 Was 0 \u2192 PASS). Live: standby converge + committed prefix identical.", "tags": [ "failover", "availability", @@ -8846,7 +8846,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: handle_ssl_handshake should be endpoint_ssl_handshake", "file": "src/lib/netio.c", "root_cause": "Used \"handle_ssl_handshake\" instead of \"endpoint_ssl_handshake\"", - "fix": "Changed handle_ssl_handshake → endpoint_ssl_handshake", + "fix": "Changed handle_ssl_handshake \u2192 endpoint_ssl_handshake", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8861,7 +8861,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: handle_ssl_handshake should be endpoint_ssl_handshake", "file": "src/controller/cluster.c", "root_cause": "Used \"handle_ssl_handshake\" instead of \"endpoint_ssl_handshake\"", - "fix": "Changed handle_ssl_handshake → endpoint_ssl_handshake", + "fix": "Changed handle_ssl_handshake \u2192 endpoint_ssl_handshake", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8876,7 +8876,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: endpoint_ssl_handshake should be handle_ssl_handshake", "file": "src/lib/netio.c", "root_cause": "Used \"endpoint_ssl_handshake\" instead of \"handle_ssl_handshake\"", - "fix": "Changed endpoint_ssl_handshake → handle_ssl_handshake", + "fix": "Changed endpoint_ssl_handshake \u2192 handle_ssl_handshake", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -8890,8 +8890,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-23T14:08:05.466Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-test-ha/run-ha-soak.sh", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: # ── Steps 7–10 looped: kill primary, verify, submit, restar; #", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: # \u2500\u2500 Steps 7\u201310 looped: kill primary, verify, submit, restar; #", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -8923,7 +8923,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: >= should be ==", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-test-ha/run-ha-soak.sh", "root_cause": "Used \">=\" instead of \"==\"", - "fix": "Changed operator >= → ==", + "fix": "Changed operator >= \u2192 ==", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -8954,8 +8954,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-24T12:05:00.000Z", "error_message": "After soak test coverage maneuver, ctrl-1 and ctrl-2 enter permanent prevote deadlock: ctrl-1 denies ctrl-2 (freshness: LSN=45 < floor=47), ctrl-2 denies ctrl-1 (log_stale: cand_llt=12 < local_last_log_term=13). Neither can ever win.", "file": "src/controller/ha.c (raft_cb_become_leader / safe_committed_lsn), src/controller/cluster.c (OPCode_preVoteRequest)", - "root_cause": "ctrl-3 computed safe_committed_lsn=44 from voter peerLastLogLsn (ctrl-3=47, ctrl-2=44 → majority at 44) and truncated committed entries 45-47 (term=12, acked by ctrl-3 itself as standby under ctrl-1). ctrl-3 then wrote leadership NOP at LSN=45 (term=13) and replicated it to ctrl-2. Result: ctrl-1 has LSN=45=JOB_SUBMIT/term=12, ctrl-2 has LSN=45=NOOP/term=13 — divergent WALs. The safe_committed_lsn formula ignores the candidate's own durable knowledge of committed entries, violating Leader Completeness: the new leader must never truncate entries it has that were committed by a prior leader.", - "fix": "IMPLEMENTED (2026-06-24): added pure helper ha_promotion_truncate_floor(safe_lsn, durable_tip)=max(safe_lsn,durable_tip) in ha.c/ha.h; raft_cb_become_leader now truncates at max(safe_committed_lsn, persist_durable_floor(&c->persist)) instead of bare safe_committed_lsn. Since the cutoff is never below the leader's own durable tip, persist_truncate_wal_above is a no-op on the leader's durable log — the new leader NEVER truncates entries it holds (Raft §5.4 Leader Completeness). safe_committed_lsn is still the commit lower-bound and promotion-gate HWM (NOT clamped — clamping it would defeat the behind-node fence). The leadership NOP now appends at the true tip (current_lsn) so replication converges peers to the leader's WAL with zero job loss. Unit test test_promotion_never_truncates_own_committed_entries in test_ha_election.c (GREEN). Steering src/controller/CLAUDE.md updated (Leader Completeness section + Post-Election Safe Commit Point + verification checklist). Recovery of an already-diverged cluster still requires restarting the over-truncated node (loses the cut jobs); this fix prevents the divergence.", + "root_cause": "ctrl-3 computed safe_committed_lsn=44 from voter peerLastLogLsn (ctrl-3=47, ctrl-2=44 \u2192 majority at 44) and truncated committed entries 45-47 (term=12, acked by ctrl-3 itself as standby under ctrl-1). ctrl-3 then wrote leadership NOP at LSN=45 (term=13) and replicated it to ctrl-2. Result: ctrl-1 has LSN=45=JOB_SUBMIT/term=12, ctrl-2 has LSN=45=NOOP/term=13 \u2014 divergent WALs. The safe_committed_lsn formula ignores the candidate's own durable knowledge of committed entries, violating Leader Completeness: the new leader must never truncate entries it has that were committed by a prior leader.", + "fix": "IMPLEMENTED (2026-06-24): added pure helper ha_promotion_truncate_floor(safe_lsn, durable_tip)=max(safe_lsn,durable_tip) in ha.c/ha.h; raft_cb_become_leader now truncates at max(safe_committed_lsn, persist_durable_floor(&c->persist)) instead of bare safe_committed_lsn. Since the cutoff is never below the leader's own durable tip, persist_truncate_wal_above is a no-op on the leader's durable log \u2014 the new leader NEVER truncates entries it holds (Raft \u00a75.4 Leader Completeness). safe_committed_lsn is still the commit lower-bound and promotion-gate HWM (NOT clamped \u2014 clamping it would defeat the behind-node fence). The leadership NOP now appends at the true tip (current_lsn) so replication converges peers to the leader's WAL with zero job loss. Unit test test_promotion_never_truncates_own_committed_entries in test_ha_election.c (GREEN). Steering src/controller/CLAUDE.md updated (Leader Completeness section + Post-Election Safe Commit Point + verification checklist). Recovery of an already-diverged cluster still requires restarting the over-truncated node (loses the cut jobs); this fix prevents the divergence.", "tags": [ "prevote", "deadlock", @@ -8994,8 +8994,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z", "error_message": "Cross-term WAL catch-up permanently stalls: ctrl-2 stuck at lsn=8, all walCatchupEntry rejected (ae_reject_stale + ae_reject_logmismatch)", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c, src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "AE term conflation: entry->term is the WAL entry's stored term (e.g. 4 for entries written by ctrl-1 at term=4), but ha_consume_append_entries uses it as the AE header ae_term. For live appends this is correct (leader appends at current term), but for catch-up streaming of historical entries from prior terms, ae_term = entry_term < leader.current_term. The Raft AE stale-term check (if term < s->term → ae_reject_stale) correctly rejects, but it should never fire — the AE header term must always be the leader's current term. There is no separate leader_term field in wal_catchup_entry_t. Consequence: historical entries at entry_term < raft.term are permanently rejected; standby_reported_lsn never advances; streamer retransmits forever.", - "fix": "IMPLEMENTED (2026-06-24): separated the AppendEntries HEADER term (leader's CURRENT term) from the per-entry STORED term. Added wire field WalCatchupEntry.leaderCurrentTerm @8 (controller.capnp) + C field wal_catchup_entry_t.leader_current_term (typemap.h, hand-defined struct — capnp generates encode/decode against it). Encoder (request.c wal_entry_to_wire + top container) writes it; decode auto-populates (generated, scalar mapname field). The catch-up streamer ha_stream_wal_to_standby gained a leader_term param (callers pass atomic_load(&c->ha.term)) and stamps entry->leader_current_term=leader_term on every streamed entry. Receiver ha_consume_append_entries now uses ae_term = e->leader_current_term ? e->leader_current_term : entry_term (single-entry branch) — the leader term rides on the sub-entry e by reference through ha_apply_term_entry_via_library, so no extra threading needed. entry->term (@4) remains the per-entry stored term for logOk/on_persist_entry. 0 = unset (legacy/live sender) → falls back to stored term (live appends have entry_term==leader_term, so unchanged). repl.c live paths UNTOUCHED. Tests (test_term_safety_adapter.c): test_intake_crossterm_catchup_uses_leader_current_term (historical entry@term4 streamed by leader@term5 to follower@term5 is ACCEPTED, not stale-rejected) + test_intake_stale_leader_term_still_rejected (leader_current_term=3 < follower term 5 still REJECTED — safety preserved). GREEN: 185 PASS term-safety+config-repl, 6 PASS wal_wire wire round-trip, 80 PASS failover/repl/durability, 0 failures.", + "root_cause": "AE term conflation: entry->term is the WAL entry's stored term (e.g. 4 for entries written by ctrl-1 at term=4), but ha_consume_append_entries uses it as the AE header ae_term. For live appends this is correct (leader appends at current term), but for catch-up streaming of historical entries from prior terms, ae_term = entry_term < leader.current_term. The Raft AE stale-term check (if term < s->term \u2192 ae_reject_stale) correctly rejects, but it should never fire \u2014 the AE header term must always be the leader's current term. There is no separate leader_term field in wal_catchup_entry_t. Consequence: historical entries at entry_term < raft.term are permanently rejected; standby_reported_lsn never advances; streamer retransmits forever.", + "fix": "IMPLEMENTED (2026-06-24): separated the AppendEntries HEADER term (leader's CURRENT term) from the per-entry STORED term. Added wire field WalCatchupEntry.leaderCurrentTerm @8 (controller.capnp) + C field wal_catchup_entry_t.leader_current_term (typemap.h, hand-defined struct \u2014 capnp generates encode/decode against it). Encoder (request.c wal_entry_to_wire + top container) writes it; decode auto-populates (generated, scalar mapname field). The catch-up streamer ha_stream_wal_to_standby gained a leader_term param (callers pass atomic_load(&c->ha.term)) and stamps entry->leader_current_term=leader_term on every streamed entry. Receiver ha_consume_append_entries now uses ae_term = e->leader_current_term ? e->leader_current_term : entry_term (single-entry branch) \u2014 the leader term rides on the sub-entry e by reference through ha_apply_term_entry_via_library, so no extra threading needed. entry->term (@4) remains the per-entry stored term for logOk/on_persist_entry. 0 = unset (legacy/live sender) \u2192 falls back to stored term (live appends have entry_term==leader_term, so unchanged). repl.c live paths UNTOUCHED. Tests (test_term_safety_adapter.c): test_intake_crossterm_catchup_uses_leader_current_term (historical entry@term4 streamed by leader@term5 to follower@term5 is ACCEPTED, not stale-rejected) + test_intake_stale_leader_term_still_rejected (leader_current_term=3 < follower term 5 still REJECTED \u2014 safety preserved). GREEN: 185 PASS term-safety+config-repl, 6 PASS wal_wire wire round-trip, 80 PASS failover/repl/durability, 0 failures.", "tags": [ "catch-up", "replication", @@ -9018,7 +9018,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-24T08:18:27.510Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: if (c && c->persist.wal_path[0]) {; /* bug-1067: pass the leader's CURRENT term so historical ca", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -9035,7 +9035,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: standby_lsn should be leader_term", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_coldstart_lsn0.c", "root_cause": "Used \"standby_lsn\" instead of \"leader_term\"", - "fix": "Changed standby_lsn → leader_term", + "fix": "Changed standby_lsn \u2192 leader_term", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -9050,7 +9050,7 @@ "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: SEGV / stack-use-after-return in free_CtrlStatus (lib/controller.capnp.c:11638) via handle_reply -> free_CtrlStatus_ptr (lib/xcectx.c:91) on `ctrlstatus` after failover; READ derefs the dead-stack `getreply` of xce_get_with_condition (xceapi.c)", "file": "src/lib/xcectx.c", "root_cause": "ctx->reply.u is an UNTAGGED union shared across opcodes (debugmsg/get/jobid/clusterconf/ctrlstatus alias the same 8 bytes). Commit 61e1391 ('fix bug-1060 bug-1067', unrelated Raft work) added speculative free-guards `if (ctx->reply.u.ctrlstatus) free_CtrlStatus_ptr(&ctx->reply.u.ctrlstatus)` (and the clusterconf twin). A non-NULL slot does NOT imply a CtrlStatus*: a failover-aborted reslist/joblist leaves ctx->reply.u.get == &getreply (a dead STACK pointer) because xce_get_with_condition/xce_resval only NULL the slot on the success path, not the xce_get_req<0 / cbuf_get<0 early-returns. The next ctrlstatus reply (worker thread) sees the foreign non-NULL slot and free_CtrlStatus walks it -> stack-use-after-return SEGV.", - "fix": "1) Revert the two unsafe free-guards in handle_reply (untagged union slot can never be safely freed by type) — restores prior MOVE_PTR-overwrite behavior. 2) Clear ctx->reply.u.get = NULL on ALL early-return paths of xce_get_with_condition and xce_resval (kill the dangling-stack-pointer leak at its source; also prevents a late OPCode_get reply writing through the dead stack via handle_get_reply). 3) Defense-in-depth: handle_get_reply drops a reply when ctx->reply.u.get is NULL. Regression test: test_handle_reply_ctrlstatus_does_not_free_foreign_slot (exposes xce_handle_reply, proves a foreign heap value in the shared union is not freed). VERIFIED 2026-06-24 (Opus): re-confirmed 3-layer fix present in working tree; RED proven by re-injecting the ctrlstatus free-guard -> ASan double-free at test_ctrlstatus.c:384 (free_CtrlStatus_ptr at controller.capnp.c:11892), then restored -> GREEN. Full libxce suite 291 Tests / 0 Failures / 0 ASan errors under ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0.", + "fix": "1) Revert the two unsafe free-guards in handle_reply (untagged union slot can never be safely freed by type) \u2014 restores prior MOVE_PTR-overwrite behavior. 2) Clear ctx->reply.u.get = NULL on ALL early-return paths of xce_get_with_condition and xce_resval (kill the dangling-stack-pointer leak at its source; also prevents a late OPCode_get reply writing through the dead stack via handle_get_reply). 3) Defense-in-depth: handle_get_reply drops a reply when ctx->reply.u.get is NULL. Regression test: test_handle_reply_ctrlstatus_does_not_free_foreign_slot (exposes xce_handle_reply, proves a foreign heap value in the shared union is not freed). VERIFIED 2026-06-24 (Opus): re-confirmed 3-layer fix present in working tree; RED proven by re-injecting the ctrlstatus free-guard -> ASan double-free at test_ctrlstatus.c:384 (free_CtrlStatus_ptr at controller.capnp.c:11892), then restored -> GREEN. Full libxce suite 291 Tests / 0 Failures / 0 ASan errors under ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0.", "tags": [ "asan", "use-after-return", @@ -9077,7 +9077,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: handle_reply should be xce_handle_reply", "file": "src/lib/xcectx.c", "root_cause": "Used \"handle_reply\" instead of \"xce_handle_reply\"", - "fix": "Changed handle_reply → xce_handle_reply", + "fix": "Changed handle_reply \u2192 xce_handle_reply", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -9092,7 +9092,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: libxce_failover_client_hang should be project_libxce_failover_hang", "file": "../../../../../claude/.claude/projects/-home-rshen-projects-xce-xce/memory/project_bug1077_reply_union_type_confusion.md", "root_cause": "Used \"libxce_failover_client_hang\" instead of \"project_libxce_failover_hang\"", - "fix": "Changed libxce_failover_client_hang → project_libxce_failover_hang", + "fix": "Changed libxce_failover_client_hang \u2192 project_libxce_failover_hang", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "md" @@ -9123,7 +9123,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: apply should be advanced", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-sim-conformance/design.md", "root_cause": "Used \"apply\" instead of \"advanced\"", - "fix": "Changed apply → advanced", + "fix": "Changed apply \u2192 advanced", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "md" @@ -9218,7 +9218,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_sim_check_election_safety_fail_on_two_leaders should be test_sim_3_2_log_matching_shared_idx_term_requires_identical_prefix", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_sim_check_election_safety_fail_on_two_leaders\" instead of \"test_sim_3_2_log_matching_shared_idx_term_requires_identical_prefix\"", - "fix": "Changed test_sim_check_election_safety_fail_on_two_leaders → test_sim_3_2_log_matching_shared_idx_term_requires_identical_prefix", + "fix": "Changed test_sim_check_election_safety_fail_on_two_leaders \u2192 test_sim_3_2_log_matching_shared_idx_term_requires_identical_prefix", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -9322,7 +9322,7 @@ "error_message": "raft_on_vote_reply counts a stale-term vote-reply (term < currentTerm) toward the current election instead of dropping it", "file": "src/lib/raft/raft.c", "root_cause": "No DropStaleResponse: a reply with term < s->term fell through to replies_received++/votes_granted++, corrupting quorum accounting (raft.tla DropStaleResponse discards mterm < currentTerm).", - "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02): src/lib/raft/raft.c:832 has `if (reply_term != s->term)` guard before tallying, with an on_trace(\"vote_reply_stale_drop\", ...) at raft.c:455 — exactly the fix this bug's own second entry described. Landed under raft-sim-conformance / raft-commit-safety (both implemented, 18/18 + 23/23 tasks).", + "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02): src/lib/raft/raft.c:832 has `if (reply_term != s->term)` guard before tallying, with an on_trace(\"vote_reply_stale_drop\", ...) at raft.c:455 \u2014 exactly the fix this bug's own second entry described. Landed under raft-sim-conformance / raft-commit-safety (both implemented, 18/18 + 23/23 tasks).", "tags": [ "raft", "vote-reply", @@ -9426,7 +9426,7 @@ { "id": "bug-1112", "timestamp": "2026-06-24T15:15:03.882281Z", - "error_message": "ld: undefined reference to 'raft_sim_scenario_drop_dup_reorder' at test_raft.c:8288 — lib test binary fails to link", + "error_message": "ld: undefined reference to 'raft_sim_scenario_drop_dup_reorder' at test_raft.c:8288 \u2014 lib test binary fails to link", "file": "src/lib/raft/raft_sim.c", "root_cause": "Commit e445404 (task 5.3 drop/dup/reorder) added the raft.h declaration + the test_sim_5_3 test but FORGOT to add the raft_sim_scenario_drop_dup_reorder implementation to raft_sim.c. Symbol is declared+referenced but never defined, breaking the link for the whole xcelib_test binary.", "fix": "Pre-existing, outside task 5.4 boundary. Surfaced while validating task 5.4 (figure8). Needs task 5.3 implementation added to raft_sim.c. NOT fixed by 5.4.", @@ -9446,8 +9446,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-24T15:16:52.683Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/lib/raft/raft_sim.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /*; * sim_scen_catch_up_commit: drive bounded AppendEntries-to-a | Also: * on a CONNECTED quorum, yet raft_advance_commit must NOT co; * count alone — the current-term Figure-8 rule (raft.c G4) f", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /*; * sim_scen_catch_up_commit: drive bounded AppendEntries-to-a | Also: * on a CONNECTED quorum, yet raft_advance_commit must NOT co; * count alone \u2014 the current-term Figure-8 rule (raft.c G4) f", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -9463,7 +9463,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: != should be ==", "file": "src/lib/raft/raft_sim.c", "root_cause": "Used \"!=\" instead of \"==\"", - "fix": "Changed operator != → ==", + "fix": "Changed operator != \u2192 ==", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -9511,7 +9511,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep should be test_sim_7_1_fault_switch_mechanism", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep\" instead of \"test_sim_7_1_fault_switch_mechanism\"", - "fix": "Changed test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep → test_sim_7_1_fault_switch_mechanism", + "fix": "Changed test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep \u2192 test_sim_7_1_fault_switch_mechanism", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -9526,7 +9526,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep should be test_sim_7_2_negative_both_directions", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep\" instead of \"test_sim_7_2_negative_both_directions\"", - "fix": "Changed test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep → test_sim_7_2_negative_both_directions", + "fix": "Changed test_sim_6_1_seed_sweep \u2192 test_sim_7_2_negative_both_directions", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -9541,7 +9541,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_sim_4_2_step_liveness_and_coverage should be test_sim_8_1_export_trace_named_and_gated", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_raft.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_sim_4_2_step_liveness_and_coverage\" instead of \"test_sim_8_1_export_trace_named_and_gated\"", - "fix": "Changed test_sim_4_2_step_liveness_and_coverage → test_sim_8_1_export_trace_named_and_gated", + "fix": "Changed test_sim_4_2_step_liveness_and_coverage \u2192 test_sim_8_1_export_trace_named_and_gated", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -9587,7 +9587,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-25T03:20:00.000Z", "error_message": "test_demotion_replay_yields_committed_only flakes ~16% on overlayfs: boot recovery over surviving WAL must yield the committed prefix ONLY", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_demotion_convergence.c", - "root_cause": "TWO compounding non-determinism sources, both fixture artifacts not product bugs: (1) overlayfs metadata incoherence — a freshly-opened persist_t fd over a just-ftruncate'd WAL intermittently reads the STALE pre-truncate size, so the cross-context fresh recovery replays the already-removed suffix; (2) DEEPER, fs-independent: the fixture wires a LIVE commit engine and on a single node (n_peers=1) the persist durable-advance callback (fsync worker -> on_durable_advance) commits the whole durable log, so persist_flush asynchronously raced committed_lsn UP from the test-set committed_boundary (5) to the appended tip (8) AFTER the test pinned it; the demotion seam reads committed_lsn at task time -> truncated to 8 not 5 -> current_lsn=9 > committed_boundary+1. DIAG proof: committed_boundary=5 live_committed=8 live_tip=9 on failing runs.", + "root_cause": "TWO compounding non-determinism sources, both fixture artifacts not product bugs: (1) overlayfs metadata incoherence \u2014 a freshly-opened persist_t fd over a just-ftruncate'd WAL intermittently reads the STALE pre-truncate size, so the cross-context fresh recovery replays the already-removed suffix; (2) DEEPER, fs-independent: the fixture wires a LIVE commit engine and on a single node (n_peers=1) the persist durable-advance callback (fsync worker -> on_durable_advance) commits the whole durable log, so persist_flush asynchronously raced committed_lsn UP from the test-set committed_boundary (5) to the appended tip (8) AFTER the test pinned it; the demotion seam reads committed_lsn at task time -> truncated to 8 not 5 -> current_lsn=9 > committed_boundary+1. DIAG proof: committed_boundary=5 live_committed=8 live_tip=9 on failing runs.", "fix": "Test-only, two parts. (a) Detach the durable-advance commit wake (g_dc.persist.on_durable_advance = NULL) and re-pin committed_lsn = committed_boundary right before driving the demotion task, killing the commit-engine race deterministically (helps BOTH fs paths). (b) Hybrid gate by fs type via static dc_path_is_overlayfs() (statfs f_type == OVERLAYFS_SUPER_MAGIC 0x794c7630, defaults to real-fs path on statfs error): on a real fs keep the strong cross-context fresh boot-recovery assertion (fresh->current_lsn <= committed_boundary+1); on overlayfs skip that fd-incoherent step and assert the LIVE-context truncate effect (g_dc.persist.current_lsn <= committed_boundary+1, coherent under p->lock). Both branches prove the same property. Production persist.c truncate (ftruncate+fdatasync) untouched.", "fix_validation": "Full controller suite 20/20 runs: 0 demotion_replay failures, 0 total failures. Group-only 60/60: 0 failures. Baseline (pre-fix) was 4/20. /tmp confirmed overlayfs (statfs magic 0x794c7630), so the overlayfs branch is the one exercised here.", "tags": [ @@ -9747,7 +9747,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-25T23:37:38.579Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-drive-async/design.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: - Commit-advance under pool load (R4.5): with the vtask pool; - Snapshot/checkpoint concurrency (R1.1/1.3/1.5): concurrent", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -9793,10 +9793,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1147", "timestamp": "2026-06-26T03:46:38.904419+00:00", - "error_message": "WAL trim_wal_segments deletes any closed segment regardless of standby catch-up cursor → lagging/empty-rejoin standby loses its needed log range with no snapshot backfill (permanent committed-prefix gap)", + "error_message": "WAL trim_wal_segments deletes any closed segment regardless of standby catch-up cursor \u2192 lagging/empty-rejoin standby loses its needed log range with no snapshot backfill (permanent committed-prefix gap)", "file": "src/controller/persist.c:1374 (trim_wal_segments)", - "root_cause": "trim_wal_segments bounds deletion ONLY by active_seg_lsn (the currently-open segment): `if (seg_start_lsn < active_seg_lsn) unlink()`. It consults no standby acked_lsn, no committed_lsn, no in-flight snapshot boundary. Strategy-A (cursor-bounded retention) discipline is absent. Strategy-B (entity-bearing snapshot install) is also not live — write_snapshot (persist.c:1247) writes only a 16-byte P0 sentinel, not materialized state. So a standby that lags by more than ~one open segment (down across segment rolls, slow link, >64MB lag, or empty rejoin from cursor=0) hits a log range that exists nowhere and cannot catch up.", - "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02): src/controller/persist.c trim_wal_segments() computes `floor = repl_trim_lsn(&p->repl, active_seg_lsn, p->config.snap_interval_s)` (min of active segment, all standby acked_lsn, disconnected-slot guards) and only unlinks segments below that floor — comment inline explicitly cites 'bug-1147 guard'. Landed under raft-drive-async task 3.2 (all leaf tasks complete).", + "root_cause": "trim_wal_segments bounds deletion ONLY by active_seg_lsn (the currently-open segment): `if (seg_start_lsn < active_seg_lsn) unlink()`. It consults no standby acked_lsn, no committed_lsn, no in-flight snapshot boundary. Strategy-A (cursor-bounded retention) discipline is absent. Strategy-B (entity-bearing snapshot install) is also not live \u2014 write_snapshot (persist.c:1247) writes only a 16-byte P0 sentinel, not materialized state. So a standby that lags by more than ~one open segment (down across segment rolls, slow link, >64MB lag, or empty rejoin from cursor=0) hits a log range that exists nowhere and cannot catch up.", + "fix": "FIXED (verified 2026-07-02): src/controller/persist.c trim_wal_segments() computes `floor = repl_trim_lsn(&p->repl, active_seg_lsn, p->config.snap_interval_s)` (min of active segment, all standby acked_lsn, disconnected-slot guards) and only unlinks segments below that floor \u2014 comment inline explicitly cites 'bug-1147 guard'. Landed under raft-drive-async task 3.2 (all leaf tasks complete).", "tags": [ "durability", "permanent-gap", @@ -9873,7 +9873,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: PeerCtrlDispatch should be LivenessAdmission", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-drive-async/design.md", "root_cause": "Used \"PeerCtrlDispatch\" instead of \"LivenessAdmission\"", - "fix": "Changed PeerCtrlDispatch → LivenessAdmission", + "fix": "Changed PeerCtrlDispatch \u2192 LivenessAdmission", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "md" @@ -9904,7 +9904,7 @@ "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-drive-async/tasks.md", "root_cause": "Had `VTASK_LIVENESS_RESERVED`", - "fix": "Changed to `R = clamp(n_peers − 1, 1, n_vcpus − 1)`", + "fix": "Changed to `R = clamp(n_peers \u2212 1, 1, n_vcpus \u2212 1)`", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -10080,7 +10080,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_request_send_propagation should be test_netio_bounded_connect", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_request_send_propagation\" instead of \"test_netio_bounded_connect\"", - "fix": "Changed test_request_send_propagation → test_netio_bounded_connect", + "fix": "Changed test_request_send_propagation \u2192 test_netio_bounded_connect", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -10191,7 +10191,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: >= should be !=", "file": "src/controller/commit.c", "root_cause": "Used \">=\" instead of \"!=\"", - "fix": "Changed operator >= → !=", + "fix": "Changed operator >= \u2192 !=", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -10492,10 +10492,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1197", "timestamp": "2026-06-26T00:00:00.000Z", - "error_message": "raft-drive-async finding-1 (FLAG-ON ONLY, dormant): enabling peerctrl_dispatch creates an endpoint UAF — raft_cb_become_follower runs on a pool worker and endpoint_fini()s all peer vote-eps (frees ep->data) while the single io_worker can concurrently read ep_j->data in peer_ctrl_msg_handler_inline for a same-batch queued event", + "error_message": "raft-drive-async finding-1 (FLAG-ON ONLY, dormant): enabling peerctrl_dispatch creates an endpoint UAF \u2014 raft_cb_become_follower runs on a pool worker and endpoint_fini()s all peer vote-eps (frees ep->data) while the single io_worker can concurrently read ep_j->data in peer_ctrl_msg_handler_inline for a same-batch queued event", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "Moving peer-control off the sequential io_worker onto the pool co-locates teardown (frees ep->data) and inbound delivery (reads ep->data) on different threads with no unmonitor-before-free ordering. Safe today only because g_drive_async_peerctrl_dispatch_enabled defaults OFF.", - "fix": "SUPERSEDED 2026-06-30 by bug-1298 endpoint reference counting (commit 6e05dc1). The pool-reachable teardown-frees-peer-ep UAF class is now governed generally by endpoint_ref/endpoint_unref (refcnt + heap_alloc gate) acquired per ep-bound VTASK_IO in vtask_enq and released in run_task/taskq_item_killer — a queued vtask holds a ref so the io_worker cannot free the ep out from under the dispatcher. Re-validate when raft-drive-async flips g_drive_async_peerctrl_dispatch ON.", + "fix": "SUPERSEDED 2026-06-30 by bug-1298 endpoint reference counting (commit 6e05dc1). The pool-reachable teardown-frees-peer-ep UAF class is now governed generally by endpoint_ref/endpoint_unref (refcnt + heap_alloc gate) acquired per ep-bound VTASK_IO in vtask_enq and released in run_task/taskq_item_killer \u2014 a queued vtask holds a ref so the io_worker cannot free the ep out from under the dispatcher. Re-validate when raft-drive-async flips g_drive_async_peerctrl_dispatch ON.", "tags": [ "endpoint-quiescence", "fixed", @@ -10522,7 +10522,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-26T00:00:00.000Z", "error_message": "raft-drive-async task 3.1: peer-control vtask enqueued-but-not-executed at vtaskmgr_fini leaks its io_packet_t (only the executed entry transfers ownership via iod->pkt=NULL)", "file": "src/lib/vtaskmgr.c", - "root_cause": "taskq_item_killer called vtask_fini (frees task->data wrapper only), never the carried io_packet_t. The generic killer could not free the pkt unconditionally because the libxce client path (xcectx.c vtask_handle_msg) does NOT clear ep->fsm_in.pkt — its pkt lifetime is the endpoint's, so an unconditional free would double-free.", + "root_cause": "taskq_item_killer called vtask_fini (frees task->data wrapper only), never the carried io_packet_t. The generic killer could not free the pkt unconditionally because the libxce client path (xcectx.c vtask_handle_msg) does NOT clear ep->fsm_in.pkt \u2014 its pkt lifetime is the endpoint's, so an unconditional free would double-free.", "fix": "Added int owns_io_pkt to vtask_t (default 0 in vtask_init). taskq_item_killer frees the pkt ONLY when owns_io_pkt && vtype==VTASK_IO && pkt!=NULL. Controller peer_ctrl_dispatch_to_pool sets owns_io_pkt=1. libxce path keeps owns_io_pkt=0 -> unchanged, no double-free. Verified: leak count 808 unchanged vs baseline, 0 double-free under ASan.", "tags": [ "raft-drive-async", @@ -10541,10 +10541,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1198", "timestamp": "2026-06-26T00:00:00.000Z", - "error_message": "raft-drive-async finding-2 (FLAG-ON ONLY, dormant): peer_ctrl_classify tags all peer-control work VTASK_LIVENESS, but the CTRL_PRIMARY repl-ack path can reach HA_REPL_SEND_SNAPSHOT->persist_checkpoint (blocking fdatasync) inline — a blocking op under the never-gated liveness reservation breaks deadlock-freedom", + "error_message": "raft-drive-async finding-2 (FLAG-ON ONLY, dormant): peer_ctrl_classify tags all peer-control work VTASK_LIVENESS, but the CTRL_PRIMARY repl-ack path can reach HA_REPL_SEND_SNAPSHOT->persist_checkpoint (blocking fdatasync) inline \u2014 a blocking op under the never-gated liveness reservation breaks deadlock-freedom", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", "root_cause": "repl_ack_decode_and_dispatch -> ha_dispatch_repl_action_for_standby can run the snapshot send inline. LIVENESS is only correct once that long op is offloaded off the pool.", - "fix": "FIXED/CLOSED (verified 2026-07-02): src/controller/ha.c:5647 carries an explicit in-code 'CLOSED' banner comment — the bug-1197 endpoint_ref/endpoint_unref bracket around the lane dispatch means the repl-ack path's snapshot send is ALWAYS offloaded before peer_ctrl_classify can tag it VTASK_LIVENESS, so bug-1198 cannot recur. Both flags (peerctrl dispatch + snapshot offload) default ON since bug-1376 was fixed.", + "fix": "FIXED/CLOSED (verified 2026-07-02): src/controller/ha.c:5647 carries an explicit in-code 'CLOSED' banner comment \u2014 the bug-1197 endpoint_ref/endpoint_unref bracket around the lane dispatch means the repl-ack path's snapshot send is ALWAYS offloaded before peer_ctrl_classify can tag it VTASK_LIVENESS, so bug-1198 cannot recur. Both flags (peerctrl dispatch + snapshot offload) default ON since bug-1376 was fixed.", "tags": [ "task-3.1", "review-finding", @@ -10567,7 +10567,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-26T11:33:28.328Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in task", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_e2e_checkpoint.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Helper: check if a file exists in a directory ; static int file_exists_in(const char* dir, const char* name)", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -10584,7 +10584,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: file_exists_for_trim_test should be seg_file_exists", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_e2e_checkpoint.c", "root_cause": "Used \"file_exists_for_trim_test\" instead of \"seg_file_exists\"", - "fix": "Changed file_exists_for_trim_test → seg_file_exists", + "fix": "Changed file_exists_for_trim_test \u2192 seg_file_exists", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -10737,7 +10737,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: ssl_handshake_done should be tearing_down", "file": "src/include/netio.h", "root_cause": "Used \"ssl_handshake_done\" instead of \"tearing_down\"", - "fix": "Changed ssl_handshake_done → tearing_down", + "fix": "Changed ssl_handshake_done \u2192 tearing_down", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -10752,7 +10752,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: ssl_handshake_done should be tearing_down", "file": "src/lib/netio.c", "root_cause": "Used \"ssl_handshake_done\" instead of \"tearing_down\"", - "fix": "Changed ssl_handshake_done → tearing_down", + "fix": "Changed ssl_handshake_done \u2192 tearing_down", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -10796,9 +10796,9 @@ { "id": "bug-1224", "timestamp": "2026-06-26", - "error_message": "raft-drive-async 3.4b integration tests (test_ha_dispatch_integration.c) hang intermittently — controller_unit_test never completes (timeout-killed)", + "error_message": "raft-drive-async 3.4b integration tests (test_ha_dispatch_integration.c) hang intermittently \u2014 controller_unit_test never completes (timeout-killed)", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_dispatch_integration.c", - "root_cause": "Test teardown race: P1/P2/P3 released a parked vtask body (gate_open) then immediately called vtaskmgr_fini, which tears down workers via pthread_cancel. The tests polled a run-counter incremented MID-body, so fini raced the just-released body still unwinding (esp. P2 REQ_BLOCK bodies in vtaskmgr_blocking_release racing blk_lock teardown) → flaky deadlock. slowlane_fini is graceful (join) so the lane side was safe; vtaskmgr_fini (cancel) was the hazard.", + "root_cause": "Test teardown race: P1/P2/P3 released a parked vtask body (gate_open) then immediately called vtaskmgr_fini, which tears down workers via pthread_cancel. The tests polled a run-counter incremented MID-body, so fini raced the just-released body still unwinding (esp. P2 REQ_BLOCK bodies in vtaskmgr_blocking_release racing blk_lock teardown) \u2192 flaky deadlock. slowlane_fini is graceful (join) so the lane side was safe; vtaskmgr_fini (cancel) was the hazard.", "fix": "Add end-of-body completion counters (g_pc_completed on both pc_probe paths incl. the park path; g_block_done at the end of block_task_entry) and poll them to the full expected count AFTER gate_open and BEFORE vtaskmgr_fini, so every pool body has fully returned (worker idle in cbuf_get) before the cancel-based fini. Verified deterministic 5/5 isolated runs + full suite EXIT=0, ASan-clean.", "tags": [ "raft-drive-async", @@ -10895,8 +10895,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-27T04:59:57.805Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-test-ha/run-ha-soak.sh", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: # ── Chaotic-mode primitives (count outcomes into the verdic; # Run `walcompare --report` across all three members and ADD | Also: # ── Chaotic mode: overlapping-kill rounds → isolated verdic; # Opt-in (--chaotic / XCE_HA_MODE=chaotic). Kills land insid", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: # \u2500\u2500 Chaotic-mode primitives (count outcomes into the verdic; # Run `walcompare --report` across all three members and ADD | Also: # \u2500\u2500 Chaotic mode: overlapping-kill rounds \u2192 isolated verdic; # Opt-in (--chaotic / XCE_HA_MODE=chaotic). Kills land insid", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -10943,7 +10943,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-27T09:28:07.944Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-ha-core-safety/design.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: - **Technical debt addressed:** the silent empty-payload shi | Also: - `.claude/skills/xce-test-ha/run-ha-soak.sh` (and `SKILL.md; - `src/controller/` log init (only if the client-probe appro | Also: | Catch-up Payload Integrity | Adapter | Stream a non-empty ; | Persist Conflict Guard | Persist | `(term,lsn,payload-crc) | Also: - The live-repro gate (task 1.3) has **already run and refut; - A green synthetic unit test over a still-red soak is not a", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -10960,7 +10960,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong operator: == should be <<", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-test-ha/run-ha-soak.sh", "root_cause": "Used \"==\" instead of \"<<\"", - "fix": "Changed operator == → <<", + "fix": "Changed operator == \u2192 <<", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "operator-fix", @@ -11023,8 +11023,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-27T10:45:00.686Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/persist.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* (a) non-empty incoming whose payload differs at an existi; * — a genuine payload conflict. Branch on tip vs below-tip.", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* (a) non-empty incoming whose payload differs at an existi; * \u2014 a genuine payload conflict. Branch on tip vs below-tip.", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -11071,8 +11071,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-27T11:14:27.133Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_core_safety.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: * TASK 2.3 — cross-term catch-up streamer payload integrity ; * | Also: /* Task 2.3 cross-term catch-up streamer payload integrity:; * CORE RED — the streamer must never ship a non-empty cro", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: * TASK 2.3 \u2014 cross-term catch-up streamer payload integrity ; * | Also: /* Task 2.3 cross-term catch-up streamer payload integrity:; * CORE RED \u2014 the streamer must never ship a non-empty cro", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -11135,7 +11135,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-30T01:47:07.635Z", "error_message": "Missing await", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "Async call without await — returned Promise instead of value", + "root_cause": "Async call without await \u2014 returned Promise instead of value", "fix": "Added await to async call", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -11151,7 +11151,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-30T02:25:32.055Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-ha-core-safety/tasks.md", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: - _Depends: 1.5, 6.2, 5.2, 5.3_; - _Blocked: first soak run (HEAD 01419e1, Phase-2+5 fixes) i", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -11168,7 +11168,7 @@ "error_message": "raft-ha-core-safety 7.2 chaotic soak: round-4 'NO new primary within window (possible election stall)' after 3 overlapping kills", "file": "src/controller/ha.c (election/PreVote path)", "root_cause": "After 3 overlapping kills the only fully-up-to-date node is killed; the two survivors are both restarted-and-lagging (tips 15 and 11; leader was 19). Both hold the full committed prefix [1..11] (safe candidates) but their PreVote rounds repeatedly time out with no grant quorum (prospective terms frozen, never bumped). Distinct from the 5.2 spurious-failover flap (that is fixed and confirmed). Contributors: freshness mutual-denial between lagging survivors, in_catch_up-denies-all-votes (Req 2.5) with no live primary to catch up from, and/or peer vote connection not established between two nodes that only held a control channel to the dead primary.", - "fix": "FIXED at unit level by task 5.3 (commit bf88681): gate the in_catch_up PreVote deny in raft_cb_vote_eligible on a LIVE primary (primary_ctrl_fd>=0 && ha_heartbeat_is_fresh), so a catching-up survivor with a dead primary can grant/win a fresh PreVote (logOk preserves Leader Completeness). CORRECTION: this in_catch_up deadlock is a real latent defect (unit RED→GREEN) but is NOT the soak's round-4 blocker. The soak stall is bug-924 (WAL fdatasync→EINVAL wedges a survivor so it stops answering PreVotes; presents as an election stall). 7.2 live acceptance is blocked on that env defect (out of scope; owned by ha-commit-durability), not on consensus.", + "fix": "FIXED at unit level by task 5.3 (commit bf88681): gate the in_catch_up PreVote deny in raft_cb_vote_eligible on a LIVE primary (primary_ctrl_fd>=0 && ha_heartbeat_is_fresh), so a catching-up survivor with a dead primary can grant/win a fresh PreVote (logOk preserves Leader Completeness). CORRECTION: this in_catch_up deadlock is a real latent defect (unit RED\u2192GREEN) but is NOT the soak's round-4 blocker. The soak stall is bug-924 (WAL fdatasync\u2192EINVAL wedges a survivor so it stops answering PreVotes; presents as an election stall). 7.2 live acceptance is blocked on that env defect (out of scope; owned by ha-commit-durability), not on consensus.", "tags": [ "prevote", "ha", @@ -11198,8 +11198,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-30T02:41:41.017Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in unknown", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_core_safety.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", - "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 5.3 lagging-but-safe survivor electability under ove; * CORE RED — a catching-up survivor with NO live primary m", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 5.3 lagging-but-safe survivor electability under ove; * CORE RED \u2014 a catching-up survivor with NO live primary m", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "error-handling", @@ -11245,7 +11245,7 @@ "id": "bug-1281", "timestamp": "2026-06-30T03:25:00Z", "error_message": "Restart-stability bug: a restarted xce_controller becomes unable to participate at chaotic round 4. Release build SIGSEGVs ('Segmentation fault (core dumped) --myname ctrl-3'); under gdb the SAME corruption manifests as a WEDGED inbound-accept/iomgr path (last accept 03:42:03 while the election timer keeps firing) so two restarted survivors can't exchange PreVotes -> permanent round-N election stall.", - "file": "src/controller (restart/recovery/election path — exact site unknown, no backtrace)", + "file": "src/controller (restart/recovery/election path \u2014 exact site unknown, no backtrace)", "root_cause": "ROOT-CAUSED via gdb SIGQUIT all-thread bt: an ABBA lock-order deadlock in src/lib async dispatch. io_worker (netio.c:672) holds ep->lock then blocks on q->lock (dataq_enq); vdispatcher dataq_deq (dataq.c:65) holds q->lock then blocks on ep->lock via the vtask_eligible->endpoint_is_task_blocked (netio.c:1001) match callback. io_worker dies -> node stops accepting/answering PreVotes -> round-4 stall. In release the same ep/q race corrupts -> SIGSEGV. See bug-1282 (the actual dispatch defect).", "fix": "The crash/hang IS bug-1282 (UPSTREAM raft-drive-async dispatch deadlock). raft-ha-core-safety 7.2 stays blocked until bug-1282 is fixed upstream, then re-run the gate. No raft-ha-core-safety code change.", "tags": [ @@ -11293,7 +11293,7 @@ "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-ha-core-safety/tasks.md", "root_cause": "Had \"Task 7.2 on ~/tmp\"", - "fix": "Changed to \"Task 7.2/5.4 — UNIFIED root cause\"", + "fix": "Changed to \"Task 7.2/5.4 \u2014 UNIFIED root cause\"", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -11308,7 +11308,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-30T04:17:08.329Z", "error_message": "ABBA lock-order deadlock under chaotic churn: io_worker (ep->lock then dataq_enq wants q->lock) vs vdispatcher dataq_deq (q->lock then vtask_eligible->endpoint_is_task_blocked wants ep->lock). Wedges io_worker -> controller stops accepting connections; in release the race corrupts -> SIGSEGV.", "file": "src/lib/dataq.c:65 (dataq_deq holds q->lock across match cb) + src/lib/vtaskmgr.c:255 (vtask_eligible) + src/lib/netio.c:1001 (endpoint_is_task_blocked takes ep->lock) + src/lib/netio.c:672 (io_worker holds ep->lock across vtask_enq->dataq_enq)", - "root_cause": "dataq_deq runs its match callback while holding q->lock, and the callback (vtask_eligible->endpoint_is_task_blocked) acquires ep->lock — inverting the ep->lock->q->lock order io_worker uses. Two-thread ABBA deadlock, deterministic under round-4 chaotic churn. Confirmed via gdb all-thread backtrace on two independently-wedged nodes.", + "root_cause": "dataq_deq runs its match callback while holding q->lock, and the callback (vtask_eligible->endpoint_is_task_blocked) acquires ep->lock \u2014 inverting the ep->lock->q->lock order io_worker uses. Two-thread ABBA deadlock, deterministic under round-4 chaotic churn. Confirmed via gdb all-thread backtrace on two independently-wedged nodes.", "fix": "FIXED (commit 25e741d): promoted endpoint_t.busy from a 1-bit bitfield to _Atomic int; endpoint_block_tasks/endpoint_unblock_tasks/endpoint_is_task_blocked now lockless (release/acquire), removing the ep->lock acquire from the vtask-eligibility path that ran under q->lock. Verified: post-fix gdb soak has ZERO __lll_lock_wait threads + no endpoint_is_task_blocked in any lock path; controller_unit_test all green. Mirrors dispatch_inflight (bug-1197). NOTE: a SEPARATE release-only restart segfault (bug-1283) remains and still blocks 7.2.", "tags": [ "deadlock", @@ -11366,10 +11366,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1286", "timestamp": "2026-06-30T05:30:00Z", - "error_message": "xce_controller SIGSEGV in ha_dispatch_gate during chaotic round-4 restart — Thread received SIGSEGV at ha.c:3194 (atomic_load &ha->role) with ha=0x3ff0 (garbage). The release-only crash that blocks raft-ha-core-safety 7.2; DISTINCT from the bug-1282 deadlock (which is fixed).", + "error_message": "xce_controller SIGSEGV in ha_dispatch_gate during chaotic round-4 restart \u2014 Thread received SIGSEGV at ha.c:3194 (atomic_load &ha->role) with ha=0x3ff0 (garbage). The release-only crash that blocks raft-ha-core-safety 7.2; DISTINCT from the bug-1282 deadlock (which is fixed).", "file": "src/controller/cluster.c:251 (myreq_handler) + src/controller/ha.c:3194 (ha_dispatch_gate)", - "root_cause": "NULL ep->owner. myreq_handler does `cluster_t* c = (cluster_t*)ep->owner;` then `ha_dispatch_gate(&c->ha, opcode)`. On a chaotic restart an inbound endpoint dispatches a walCatchupEntry (op 37) vtask while ep->owner==NULL, so c=NULL and &c->ha = NULL+offsetof(cluster_t,ha) = 0x3ff0 — a garbage pointer ha_dispatch_gate dereferences (atomic_load &ha->role, ha.c:3194) -> SIGSEGV. Backtrace (debug -O0 -g3 under gdb): ha_dispatch_gate(ha=0x3ff0,opcode=37) <- myreq_handler cluster.c:251 <- vtask_entry cluster.c:693 <- run_task/vcpu_entry. ep->owner is NULL because the accept/dispatch path runs a request before owner is wired (or owner cleared mid-flight during teardown).", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-30 (commit 5db734a). NULL-guard `c = ep->owner` in myreq_handler (cluster.c): a chaotic-restart walCatchupEntry (op 37) vtask ran with ep->owner==NULL → &c->ha==0x3ff0 deref crash at ha.c:3194. Guard returns early when owner unset. Verified: round-4 restart SIGSEGV gone; controller_unit_test green.", + "root_cause": "NULL ep->owner. myreq_handler does `cluster_t* c = (cluster_t*)ep->owner;` then `ha_dispatch_gate(&c->ha, opcode)`. On a chaotic restart an inbound endpoint dispatches a walCatchupEntry (op 37) vtask while ep->owner==NULL, so c=NULL and &c->ha = NULL+offsetof(cluster_t,ha) = 0x3ff0 \u2014 a garbage pointer ha_dispatch_gate dereferences (atomic_load &ha->role, ha.c:3194) -> SIGSEGV. Backtrace (debug -O0 -g3 under gdb): ha_dispatch_gate(ha=0x3ff0,opcode=37) <- myreq_handler cluster.c:251 <- vtask_entry cluster.c:693 <- run_task/vcpu_entry. ep->owner is NULL because the accept/dispatch path runs a request before owner is wired (or owner cleared mid-flight during teardown).", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-30 (commit 5db734a). NULL-guard `c = ep->owner` in myreq_handler (cluster.c): a chaotic-restart walCatchupEntry (op 37) vtask ran with ep->owner==NULL \u2192 &c->ha==0x3ff0 deref crash at ha.c:3194. Guard returns early when owner unset. Verified: round-4 restart SIGSEGV gone; controller_unit_test green.", "tags": [ "segfault", "null-deref", @@ -11394,8 +11394,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-06-30T09:15:12.861Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".kiro/specs/raft-ha-core-safety/tasks.md", - "root_cause": "Had 't crash) — STILL blocks the gate; likely an endpo", - "fix": "Changed to 't crash) — is now **ROOT-CAUSED** (via the new `", + "root_cause": "Had 't crash) \u2014 STILL blocks the gate; likely an endpo", + "fix": "Changed to 't crash) \u2014 is now **ROOT-CAUSED** (via the new `", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -11440,9 +11440,9 @@ { "id": "bug-1296", "timestamp": "2026-06-30T13:21:00.000Z", - "error_message": "10-round chaotic soak FAIL at round 7: all 3 nodes in RDHUP→PreVote→timeout→repeat livelock — zero pre_vote_reply_in events (not denials, silence). ctrl-3 sent 20+ PreVote rounds with NO reply received; ctrl-1 and ctrl-2 same loop. Rounds 1-6 PASS clean (all elections + job-verification succeeded); round 7 kills ctrl-2 (term=9 primary), restarts ctrl-3 (no convergence wait — chaotic). 2 surviving nodes (ctrl-1, ctrl-3) both start PreVote; neither processes the other's request → mutual timeout → RDHUP fires again → repeat forever.", + "error_message": "10-round chaotic soak FAIL at round 7: all 3 nodes in RDHUP\u2192PreVote\u2192timeout\u2192repeat livelock \u2014 zero pre_vote_reply_in events (not denials, silence). ctrl-3 sent 20+ PreVote rounds with NO reply received; ctrl-1 and ctrl-2 same loop. Rounds 1-6 PASS clean (all elections + job-verification succeeded); round 7 kills ctrl-2 (term=9 primary), restarts ctrl-3 (no convergence wait \u2014 chaotic). 2 surviving nodes (ctrl-1, ctrl-3) both start PreVote; neither processes the other's request \u2192 mutual timeout \u2192 RDHUP fires again \u2192 repeat forever.", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "TASK 5.6 dueling-candidate PreVote cross-denial — DISTINCT from the earlier PreVote-WINS + real-election split-vote (which had both nodes winning PreVote then deadlocking in RequestVote). Here PreVote itself starves: each node's PreVote handler likely drops/ignores inbound PreVote requests while in its own PreVote round (no reply sent, not even denial). The task 5.6 RDHUP guard (commit 25e741d+) only prevents restarting failover while in CTRL_ELECTING — it does NOT fix the core problem where two nodes enter simultaneous PreVote rounds and each starves the other's reply. The priority stagger (bug-606) helps when 3 nodes are alive (one grants to break symmetry), but with only 2 survivors (the third restarting without convergence in chaotic mode), both deny each other and the stagger is insufficient.", + "root_cause": "TASK 5.6 dueling-candidate PreVote cross-denial \u2014 DISTINCT from the earlier PreVote-WINS + real-election split-vote (which had both nodes winning PreVote then deadlocking in RequestVote). Here PreVote itself starves: each node's PreVote handler likely drops/ignores inbound PreVote requests while in its own PreVote round (no reply sent, not even denial). The task 5.6 RDHUP guard (commit 25e741d+) only prevents restarting failover while in CTRL_ELECTING \u2014 it does NOT fix the core problem where two nodes enter simultaneous PreVote rounds and each starves the other's reply. The priority stagger (bug-606) helps when 3 nodes are alive (one grants to break symmetry), but with only 2 survivors (the third restarting without convergence in chaotic mode), both deny each other and the stagger is insufficient.", "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-30 (subsumed by tasks 5.6 commit 81cb09a + 5.7 commit 74784b2). The RDHUP->PreVote->timeout liveloc was the same fixed-watchdog resonance as bug covered by 5.7: per-campaign election watchdog re-randomized to [T,2T] (Ongaro 3.4) + don't-preempt-in-flight-election (5.6). CONFIRMED by a 10-round chaotic soak: 10/10 rounds elect a new primary in a single term increment (4->13), zero term escalation, round 7+ (the old liveloc point) all clean.", "tags": [ "raft-ha-core-safety", @@ -11481,9 +11481,9 @@ { "id": "bug-1298", "timestamp": "2026-06-30T13:36:00-07:00", - "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free READ size 4 at endpoint_is_task_blocked netio.c:1008 (vtask dispatcher T3) — endpoint freed by endpoint_killer cluster.c:813 (io_worker T2); ctrl-3 ABORTs mid-chaotic-soak round 3→4, dropping the cluster to 1/3 (no quorum) so round 4 'NO new primary within window'", + "error_message": "AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free READ size 4 at endpoint_is_task_blocked netio.c:1008 (vtask dispatcher T3) \u2014 endpoint freed by endpoint_killer cluster.c:813 (io_worker T2); ctrl-3 ABORTs mid-chaotic-soak round 3\u21924, dropping the cluster to 1/3 (no quorum) so round 4 'NO new primary within window'", "file": "src/lib/netio.c / src/lib/vtaskmgr.c / src/controller/cluster.c", - "root_cause": "Teardown-vs-dispatch race: io_worker (T2) tears down a connection on error — handle_endpoint_error → zarray_del → endpoint_killer free()s the endpoint_t — while the vtask dispatcher (T3) is concurrently scanning the dataq (dataq_deq_first_match → vtask_eligible → endpoint_is_task_blocked) and reads ep->busy on that just-freed endpoint. The endpoint is freed while still referenced by a pending vtask in the dataq; nothing drains/guards the ep's queued vtasks before the free, and no refcount keeps it alive across the dispatcher read. Same netio surface as bug-1282 (ABBA, ep->busy made lockless) and the bug-1197 dispatch_inflight precedent; the bug-1282 lockless read removed the (incidental) lock contention so the dispatcher reaches the read faster, exposing the latent UAF.", + "root_cause": "Teardown-vs-dispatch race: io_worker (T2) tears down a connection on error \u2014 handle_endpoint_error \u2192 zarray_del \u2192 endpoint_killer free()s the endpoint_t \u2014 while the vtask dispatcher (T3) is concurrently scanning the dataq (dataq_deq_first_match \u2192 vtask_eligible \u2192 endpoint_is_task_blocked) and reads ep->busy on that just-freed endpoint. The endpoint is freed while still referenced by a pending vtask in the dataq; nothing drains/guards the ep's queued vtasks before the free, and no refcount keeps it alive across the dispatcher read. Same netio surface as bug-1282 (ABBA, ep->busy made lockless) and the bug-1197 dispatch_inflight precedent; the bug-1282 lockless read removed the (incidental) lock contention so the dispatcher reaches the read faster, exposing the latent UAF.", "fix": "FIXED (commit 6e05dc1): added endpoint_t reference count (refcnt _Atomic + heap_alloc flag). endpoint_get starts refcnt=1 (owner); vtask_enq takes a per-vtask ref before publishing the task to the dispatcher, run_task/taskq_item_killer release it; every heap-ep teardown site drops its owner ref via endpoint_unref (last unref fini+frees). The dispatcher can now read ep->busy on a queued vtask without the io_worker freeing it underneath. Embedded eps (heap_alloc=0) never freed by unref. Validated: 182 unit tests/0 fail; 6-round ASAN chaotic soak ZERO ASan reports, ctrl-3 survives round 4, all rounds elect.", "tags": [ "netio", @@ -11544,7 +11544,7 @@ "error_message": "6-round chaotic-failover soak FAIL: committed_job_loss=4 committed_divergence=7 (rounds 4-6). Committed job 0-0-1782829181-1 permanently absent on reachable primary from round 4 on, across 3 elected primaries; rounds 1-3 clean.", "file": "src/lib/hook.c (xce_run_hooks); job.c:603 gate is correct", "root_cause": "SHARPENED 2026-06-30 (waldump+log bisect of the 10-round soak): NOT the catch-up prefix-gap/entity-snapshot mechanism. xce_run_hooks (src/lib/hook.c:134-157) returns only the LAST-registered hook's rc (rc overwritten each loop iter; break is BEFORE_EVENT-only). The durable-majority gate works: a term-9 leader's job at LSN 30 timed out commit (peers mid-restart, repl_wait_majority_ack -> commit_submit -> -ETIMEDOUT), persist_job_hook_fun returned -ETIMEDOUT, but a later-registered JOB AFTER_EVENT hook (sched/apiserver) returned 0 and CLOBBERED it -> handle_jobsubmit saw hook_rc==0 -> replied 'jobsubmit ok' for an uncommitted entry -> term-10 leader legally overwrote LSN 30 (term-10 NOOP) -> committed-job-loss. Violates the Commit Durability invariant (reply-success => majority-durable). Evidence: all 3 WALs gapless/CRC-intact/full payloads; lost job only on ctrl-1@LSN30 term9 vs term10 NOOP on majority; ctrl-1 log has the WAIT-deadline-expired WARNs and NO 'rejecting job' line.", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-30 (raft-apply-decoupling item #1 down payment). Extracted the WAL append + majority-commit barrier out of persist_job_hook_fun's WAIT branch into an explicit persist_submit_wal_and_commit(p, jlist); handle_jobsubmit now calls it directly and reads the commit rc DIRECTLY (rejects on <0 before notifying), so the -ETIMEDOUT can no longer be clobbered by a later notify hook's 0 in xce_run_hooks. The JOB_NEW AFTER hook is now notification-only. PROVEN: 10-round chaotic soak committed_job_loss 5 -> 0 (same election code, A/B isolates the durability fix). Unit: +test_job_hook_new_is_notify_only; persist_hooks 19/0, e2e_hooks 3/0, commit_barrier_reply 22/0, commit_durability 38/0. Remaining soak FAIL is committed_divergence (transient catch-up lag, present=2) + a separate round-4 election escalation tail (5.7 class) — neither is job loss.", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-06-30 (raft-apply-decoupling item #1 down payment). Extracted the WAL append + majority-commit barrier out of persist_job_hook_fun's WAIT branch into an explicit persist_submit_wal_and_commit(p, jlist); handle_jobsubmit now calls it directly and reads the commit rc DIRECTLY (rejects on <0 before notifying), so the -ETIMEDOUT can no longer be clobbered by a later notify hook's 0 in xce_run_hooks. The JOB_NEW AFTER hook is now notification-only. PROVEN: 10-round chaotic soak committed_job_loss 5 -> 0 (same election code, A/B isolates the durability fix). Unit: +test_job_hook_new_is_notify_only; persist_hooks 19/0, e2e_hooks 3/0, commit_barrier_reply 22/0, commit_durability 38/0. Remaining soak FAIL is committed_divergence (transient catch-up lag, present=2) + a separate round-4 election escalation tail (5.7 class) \u2014 neither is job loss.", "tags": [ "ha-commit-durability", "pre-existing", @@ -11572,10 +11572,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1307", "timestamp": "2026-06-30T15:05:00.000Z", - "error_message": "Task 5.7 election-resonance jitter (74784b2) introduced data-safety REGRESSION: 6-round chaotic soak shows 7 committed divergences (LSNs 8,12,16,19) + 4 committed job losses (job 0-0-1782831451-1). Previous run (pre-5.7, commit 81cb09a) had ZERO divergences and ZERO job losses through 6 rounds. LSN 19 divergence is present=3 (ALL 3 members have different content at same LSN — silent divergence, textbook bug-851). Election liveness improved (all 6 rounds complete vs stalled at round 7), but the jitter defeats the election-safety balance: faster-starting node wins before catching up on committed prefix → Leader Completeness violation.", + "error_message": "Task 5.7 election-resonance jitter (74784b2) introduced data-safety REGRESSION: 6-round chaotic soak shows 7 committed divergences (LSNs 8,12,16,19) + 4 committed job losses (job 0-0-1782831451-1). Previous run (pre-5.7, commit 81cb09a) had ZERO divergences and ZERO job losses through 6 rounds. LSN 19 divergence is present=3 (ALL 3 members have different content at same LSN \u2014 silent divergence, textbook bug-851). Election liveness improved (all 6 rounds complete vs stalled at round 7), but the jitter defeats the election-safety balance: faster-starting node wins before catching up on committed prefix \u2192 Leader Completeness violation.", "file": "src/controller/ha.c", - "root_cause": "Task 5.7 jittered watchdog ([T,2T] randomized) lets a less-complete node start and win an election before catching up on the full committed prefix from the dead primary. With the original fixed watchdog, both survivors fired RDHUP simultaneously → cross-denied → the library's priority stagger resolved the tie safely (the fresher node won after deterministic desynchronization). With jitter, one node can fire much earlier (near T) and the other much later (near 2T) → the early node campaigns with an incomplete log → voters grant based on stale view → winner truncates committed entries it never held. The 5.3 in_catch_up release (which drops the vote-deny when the primary is dead) opens a window where a still-catching-up candidate can win — with the new jitter timings this window is hit frequently.", - "fix": "CONFIRMED FIXED via live re-soak (2026-07-03): ran the exact reproducing scenario — 6-round chaotic soak (overlapping kill-the-primary, real ext4 at ~/tmp, ASAN controller binary) — that originally showed 7 committed divergences + 4 job losses. This run: 21 jobs submitted, 0 committed_divergence, 0 committed_job_loss, PASS across all 6 rounds (terms 3->9, all 3 nodes rotated through primary). Matches the earlier circumstantial evidence (raft-ha-core-safety Phase 5 fully complete + prior soak-clean sessions) with a fresh, direct confirmation run — no residual doubt.", + "root_cause": "Task 5.7 jittered watchdog ([T,2T] randomized) lets a less-complete node start and win an election before catching up on the full committed prefix from the dead primary. With the original fixed watchdog, both survivors fired RDHUP simultaneously \u2192 cross-denied \u2192 the library's priority stagger resolved the tie safely (the fresher node won after deterministic desynchronization). With jitter, one node can fire much earlier (near T) and the other much later (near 2T) \u2192 the early node campaigns with an incomplete log \u2192 voters grant based on stale view \u2192 winner truncates committed entries it never held. The 5.3 in_catch_up release (which drops the vote-deny when the primary is dead) opens a window where a still-catching-up candidate can win \u2014 with the new jitter timings this window is hit frequently.", + "fix": "CONFIRMED FIXED via live re-soak (2026-07-03): ran the exact reproducing scenario \u2014 6-round chaotic soak (overlapping kill-the-primary, real ext4 at ~/tmp, ASAN controller binary) \u2014 that originally showed 7 committed divergences + 4 job losses. This run: 21 jobs submitted, 0 committed_divergence, 0 committed_job_loss, PASS across all 6 rounds (terms 3->9, all 3 nodes rotated through primary). Matches the earlier circumstantial evidence (raft-ha-core-safety Phase 5 fully complete + prior soak-clean sessions) with a fresh, direct confirmation run \u2014 no residual doubt.", "tags": [ "data-safety-regression", "task-5.7", @@ -11645,7 +11645,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_job_hook_start_writes_wal_entry should be test_job_hook_new_is_notify_only", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_persist_hooks.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_job_hook_start_writes_wal_entry\" instead of \"test_job_hook_new_is_notify_only\"", - "fix": "Changed test_job_hook_start_writes_wal_entry → test_job_hook_new_is_notify_only", + "fix": "Changed test_job_hook_start_writes_wal_entry \u2192 test_job_hook_new_is_notify_only", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -11676,7 +11676,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: unistd should be time", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_rdhup_integration.c", "root_cause": "Used \"unistd\" instead of \"time\"", - "fix": "Changed unistd → time", + "fix": "Changed unistd \u2192 time", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -11708,7 +11708,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_ha_partition should be test_persist_snapshot_entities", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/controller_test.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_ha_partition\" instead of \"test_persist_snapshot_entities\"", - "fix": "Changed test_ha_partition → test_persist_snapshot_entities", + "fix": "Changed test_ha_partition \u2192 test_persist_snapshot_entities", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -11739,7 +11739,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: pthread should be fcntl", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_persist_snapshot_entities.c", "root_cause": "Used \"pthread\" instead of \"fcntl\"", - "fix": "Changed pthread → fcntl", + "fix": "Changed pthread \u2192 fcntl", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-reference", @@ -11818,7 +11818,7 @@ "timestamp": "2026-07-01T13:27:42.519Z", "error_message": "Missing error handling in every", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_core_safety.c", - "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling — exceptions would propagate uncaught", + "root_cause": "Code path had no error handling \u2014 exceptions would propagate uncaught", "fix": "Added try/catch block | Also: /* Task 6.1 integration: leader->standby replication carries; * payload) faithfully end-to-end across BOTH live in-term re", "tags": [ "auto-detected", @@ -11835,7 +11835,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_pre_vote_catch_up_denies should be test_pre_vote_catch_up_grants_when_primary_unreachable", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test_ha_vote_gate.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_pre_vote_catch_up_denies\" instead of \"test_pre_vote_catch_up_grants_when_primary_unreachable\"", - "fix": "Changed test_pre_vote_catch_up_denies → test_pre_vote_catch_up_grants_when_primary_unreachable", + "fix": "Changed test_pre_vote_catch_up_denies \u2192 test_pre_vote_catch_up_grants_when_primary_unreachable", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -11866,7 +11866,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: myconf_t should be uint32_t", "file": "src/include/myconf.h", "root_cause": "Used \"myconf_t\" instead of \"uint32_t\"", - "fix": "Changed myconf_t → uint32_t", + "fix": "Changed myconf_t \u2192 uint32_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -11897,7 +11897,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: persist_config_t should be uint32_t", "file": "src/include/persist.h", "root_cause": "Used \"persist_config_t\" instead of \"uint32_t\"", - "fix": "Changed persist_config_t → uint32_t", + "fix": "Changed persist_config_t \u2192 uint32_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -11912,7 +11912,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: WAL_SEGMENT_SIZE_BYTES should be p", "file": "src/controller/persist.c", "root_cause": "Used \"WAL_SEGMENT_SIZE_BYTES\" instead of \"p\"", - "fix": "Changed WAL_SEGMENT_SIZE_BYTES → p", + "fix": "Changed WAL_SEGMENT_SIZE_BYTES \u2192 p", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -11927,7 +11927,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: myconf_t should be uint32_t", "file": "src/include/myconf.h", "root_cause": "Used \"myconf_t\" instead of \"uint32_t\"", - "fix": "Changed myconf_t → uint32_t", + "fix": "Changed myconf_t \u2192 uint32_t", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "h" @@ -11941,8 +11941,8 @@ "timestamp": "2026-07-02T03:57:52.302Z", "error_message": "Incorrect value in code", "file": ".claude/skills/xce-test-ha/run-ha-soak.sh", - "root_cause": "Had \"MODE=force-snapshot — forcing one full-checkpoint", - "fix": "Changed to \"MODE=force-snapshot — forcing one full-checkpoint", + "root_cause": "Had \"MODE=force-snapshot \u2014 forcing one full-checkpoint", + "fix": "Changed to \"MODE=force-snapshot \u2014 forcing one full-checkpoint", "tags": [ "auto-detected", "wrong-value", @@ -12098,7 +12098,7 @@ "error_message": "/xce-test-ha --force-snapshot round: after a wiped ctrl-2 rejoins empty and the primary sends a full-checkpoint snapshot, ctrl-2 sometimes never logs a completed install (\"HA: snapshot loaded/legacy\" line absent) though the cluster still reconverges to 3-of-3 -- OR the cluster fails to reconverge to 3-of-3 at all. Reproduced with g_drive_async_configpush_offload BOTH ON (0/3 pass) and OFF (1/2 pass) on the same freshly-built xce.build binary, so it is independent of that flag -- discovered while validating the bug-1381 configpush flip.", "file": "src/controller/config_repl.c", "root_cause": "ha_send_snapshot_to_standby (config_repl.c, ~line 2596) loops over up to 12 65536-byte chunks calling xce_snapshot_chunk_req_raw(ep, &chunk, buf, chunk_len) WITHOUT checking or propagating its return value. xce_snapshot_chunk_req_raw -> endpoint_enq can return -ECONNRESET (e.g. if the standby endpoint is mid-teardown or reconnecting during the empty-rejoin window) but the loop keeps incrementing offset/chunk_index regardless, and the function still logs \"transfer complete\" and returns rc=0 at the end. Confirmed via ctrl-2 log evidence: primary logs start+complete for a 735546-byte (12-chunk) snapshot within ~2ms, but ctrl-2 only ever receives a handful of leading chunks (2 in one run, 5 in another) before the stream silently stops -- no ERROR on either side.", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-07-02 (config_repl.c): ha_send_snapshot_to_standby's chunk loop now captures the return value of xce_snapshot_chunk_req_raw (production path) and xce_snapshot_chunk_hook (XCE_TESTING path) into send_rc, breaks the loop on send_rc != 0, and propagates it as the function's rc instead of silently continuing. The 'transfer complete' INFO log is now strictly gated on rc==0; a failure path now logs a WARN with checkpoint_lsn/total_size/sent-offset/chunk_index/rc for observability. No receive-side timeout/re-request mechanism was added (out of scope, no existing seam) — the existing per-peer snapshot_inflight[] flag already clears unconditionally on send-thread exit (snapshot_lane_fn, ha.c) and the next heartbeat's SEND_SNAPSHOT decision naturally re-triggers a fresh transfer to a peer whose applied_lsn never advanced, so the existing retry cadence recovers once the endpoint is healthy again. New RED->GREEN unit test test_snapshot_transfer_stops_and_propagates_send_failure (test_config_repl.c) injects a mid-loop -ECONNRESET via the existing xce_snapshot_chunk_hook seam (new snaptest_fail_after_hook) and asserts rc == -ECONNRESET and exactly 2 chunks attempted (not the false-'complete' 3). RED confirmed via temporary revert ('Expected -104 Was 0'); GREEN restored, full controller_unit_test suite clean (0 failures across all groups).", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-07-02 (config_repl.c): ha_send_snapshot_to_standby's chunk loop now captures the return value of xce_snapshot_chunk_req_raw (production path) and xce_snapshot_chunk_hook (XCE_TESTING path) into send_rc, breaks the loop on send_rc != 0, and propagates it as the function's rc instead of silently continuing. The 'transfer complete' INFO log is now strictly gated on rc==0; a failure path now logs a WARN with checkpoint_lsn/total_size/sent-offset/chunk_index/rc for observability. No receive-side timeout/re-request mechanism was added (out of scope, no existing seam) \u2014 the existing per-peer snapshot_inflight[] flag already clears unconditionally on send-thread exit (snapshot_lane_fn, ha.c) and the next heartbeat's SEND_SNAPSHOT decision naturally re-triggers a fresh transfer to a peer whose applied_lsn never advanced, so the existing retry cadence recovers once the endpoint is healthy again. New RED->GREEN unit test test_snapshot_transfer_stops_and_propagates_send_failure (test_config_repl.c) injects a mid-loop -ECONNRESET via the existing xce_snapshot_chunk_hook seam (new snaptest_fail_after_hook) and asserts rc == -ECONNRESET and exactly 2 chunks attempted (not the false-'complete' 3). RED confirmed via temporary revert ('Expected -104 Was 0'); GREEN restored, full controller_unit_test suite clean (0 failures across all groups).", "tags": [ "raft-drive-async", "snapshot-transfer", @@ -12133,10 +12133,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1389", "timestamp": "2026-07-02T09:05:00.000Z", - "error_message": "/xce-test-ha --force-snapshot: after bug-1386's fix (sender now correctly reports success only on true completion), the force-snapshot soak still FAILs. ctrl-2's log shows all 12 chunks of a 735546-byte snapshot received, then `ha_handle_snapshot_chunk: persist_load_snapshot failed rc=-5` / `handle_snapshot_transfer: chunk 11 rc=-5` (rc=-5=-EIO). ctrl-1 (sender) correctly logs 'transfer complete' both times — the send genuinely succeeded, full byte count. This is NOT bug-1386 (that was a chunk DROP producing a truncated/short transfer). Byte-comparing the primary's source checkpoint file against the exact bytes ctrl-2 assembled into snap.part -> snap-{lsn}.bin (same run, two separate checkpoint LSNs 0x75 and 0x76, both reproduced) shows: identical total size (735546==735546) but DIFFERENT CONTENT — the received file diverges from the sender's file starting exactly at a SNAPSHOT_CHUNK_SIZE (65536-byte) chunk boundary, then the content is a byte-SHIFTED copy of the correct data (same repeating job-frame strings, same occurrence count, just offset) that re-synchronizes with the source at a later offset. The shift direction/magnitude differs between the two independent attempts (-912 bytes resyncing at 262144 vs +4684 bytes resyncing at ~458752) — nondeterministic, not a fixed structural bug.", + "error_message": "/xce-test-ha --force-snapshot: after bug-1386's fix (sender now correctly reports success only on true completion), the force-snapshot soak still FAILs. ctrl-2's log shows all 12 chunks of a 735546-byte snapshot received, then `ha_handle_snapshot_chunk: persist_load_snapshot failed rc=-5` / `handle_snapshot_transfer: chunk 11 rc=-5` (rc=-5=-EIO). ctrl-1 (sender) correctly logs 'transfer complete' both times \u2014 the send genuinely succeeded, full byte count. This is NOT bug-1386 (that was a chunk DROP producing a truncated/short transfer). Byte-comparing the primary's source checkpoint file against the exact bytes ctrl-2 assembled into snap.part -> snap-{lsn}.bin (same run, two separate checkpoint LSNs 0x75 and 0x76, both reproduced) shows: identical total size (735546==735546) but DIFFERENT CONTENT \u2014 the received file diverges from the sender's file starting exactly at a SNAPSHOT_CHUNK_SIZE (65536-byte) chunk boundary, then the content is a byte-SHIFTED copy of the correct data (same repeating job-frame strings, same occurrence count, just offset) that re-synchronizes with the source at a later offset. The shift direction/magnitude differs between the two independent attempts (-912 bytes resyncing at 262144 vs +4684 bytes resyncing at ~458752) \u2014 nondeterministic, not a fixed structural bug.", "file": "src/lib/request.c (suspected: xce_snapshot_chunk_encode_raw capnp Data encode) or src/controller/ha.c (ha_handle_snapshot_chunk per-chunk append)", - "root_cause": "NOT YET PINNED to an exact line — root cause is a chunk-CONTENT-corruption bug in the OPCode_snapshotTransfer chunk pipeline, most likely in the capnp raw-Data encode/decode path for the 64KB `payload :Data` field (xce_snapshot_chunk_encode_raw, request.c:630-671, uses the same capn_new_list8/capn_setv8 pattern as bug-847 — 'WAL Catch-Up Streaming Silently Corrupts Payloads at capnp Segment Boundary' — a proven prior case of this exact capnp pattern corrupting raw-byte payloads at a segment boundary). Ruled out as NOT the cause: (1) receiver-side concurrent chunk processing — vtaskmgr's per-endpoint FIFO (endpoint_block_tasks/endpoint_unblock_tasks) guarantees chunk N+1 cannot dispatch until chunk N's ha_handle_snapshot_chunk (including its fopen/fwrite/fclose) fully returns; (2) sender buf-reuse race — xce_snapshot_chunk_encode_raw copies bytes into the capnp segment synchronously before ha_send_snapshot_to_standby's loop re-fread()s the shared buf; (3) fixed-size packet-pool truncation — alloc_packet (netio.c:416-432) mallocs fresh per packet, sized to capn_size(&c), no shared buffer to overflow into. persist_load_snapshot (persist.c:2440 -> load_snapshot at 2325 -> load_snapshot_entities at 2222) is NOT the bug — it correctly rejects the corrupted file via one of its length-sanity -EIO guards (most likely persist.c:2240-2241, the job-frame payload_len-vs-file_size guard); format_version/job_count field-order misparse was considered and ruled out (load_snapshot consumes and validates format_version at persist.c:2399-2413 before ever calling load_snapshot_entities).", - "fix": "FIXED 2026-07-02 (ha.c, ha.h). Root cause pinned via live crc32 instrumentation (TRACE logs at both ha_send_snapshot_to_standby's send point and ha_handle_snapshot_chunk's receive point, correlated by snapshot_lsn+chunk_index): every chunk's CONTENT crossed the wire byte-for-byte intact (crc32 matched exactly for all 12 chunks) — the corruption was never in capnp encode/decode/transport at all. The real bug: OPCode_snapshotTransfer chunks of one transfer are dispatched across the vtask pool and are NOT guaranteed to arrive/execute in chunk_index order (live soak log showed arrival order 0,1,3,4,2,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 across cpu#0-3 workers), but ha_handle_snapshot_chunk appended every chunk's bytes to snap.part in ARRIVAL order (fopen \"ab\"/fwrite) instead of at the chunk's own chunk_offset (a field already carried on the wire but never used for anything). Reordered chunks landed at the wrong file position: same total byte count, wrong content from the first reordered chunk's offset onward — exactly the observed 'byte-shifted, resyncing later, nondeterministic magnitude' signature. Fix: (1) write each chunk via pwrite(fd, payload, len, chunk->chunk_offset) instead of append — order-independent and safe for concurrent writers (positioned writes to disjoint byte ranges of the same fd don't race). (2) Track completion via a new ha_state_t.snapshot_recv_count/snapshot_recv_total pair (guarded by the existing ha->lock) instead of finalizing on 'this call happens to carry is_last' — under out-of-order arrival, is_last can be processed before an earlier chunk; finalize now fires only once every chunk 0..N-1 has actually been written, and snapshot_recv_total is claimed (reset to 0) by whichever thread crosses the completion threshold so a late straggler chunk can never double-finalize. chunk_index==0 still resets both the stale-file unlink and the new counters (Req 4.4 unchanged). New RED->GREEN unit test test_snapshot_recv_out_of_order_chunks_assemble_correctly (test_config_repl.c) replays the exact non-sequential delivery order and asserts byte-identical assembly; RED confirmed via temporary revert (Expected 0 Was -22, job_count field corrupted by the misordered chunk boundary); GREEN restored, full controller suite clean (0 failures). Also added 2 new deterministic full-size (65536-byte) capnp encode/decode round-trip tests (test_wal_wire.c) that definitively cleared the capnp/transport layer before the real cause was found — permanent regression coverage, the prior test only covered a 300-byte payload. New xce_test snapverify/snapdiff subcommands (built as part of this investigation) were instrumental in diagnosing this live. Live-validated: 3/3 --force-snapshot rounds PASS (genuine 'HA: snapshot loaded ... full job/queue entity restoration' installs confirmed, zero divergence/loss) + 6-round --chaotic PASS.", + "root_cause": "NOT YET PINNED to an exact line \u2014 root cause is a chunk-CONTENT-corruption bug in the OPCode_snapshotTransfer chunk pipeline, most likely in the capnp raw-Data encode/decode path for the 64KB `payload :Data` field (xce_snapshot_chunk_encode_raw, request.c:630-671, uses the same capn_new_list8/capn_setv8 pattern as bug-847 \u2014 'WAL Catch-Up Streaming Silently Corrupts Payloads at capnp Segment Boundary' \u2014 a proven prior case of this exact capnp pattern corrupting raw-byte payloads at a segment boundary). Ruled out as NOT the cause: (1) receiver-side concurrent chunk processing \u2014 vtaskmgr's per-endpoint FIFO (endpoint_block_tasks/endpoint_unblock_tasks) guarantees chunk N+1 cannot dispatch until chunk N's ha_handle_snapshot_chunk (including its fopen/fwrite/fclose) fully returns; (2) sender buf-reuse race \u2014 xce_snapshot_chunk_encode_raw copies bytes into the capnp segment synchronously before ha_send_snapshot_to_standby's loop re-fread()s the shared buf; (3) fixed-size packet-pool truncation \u2014 alloc_packet (netio.c:416-432) mallocs fresh per packet, sized to capn_size(&c), no shared buffer to overflow into. persist_load_snapshot (persist.c:2440 -> load_snapshot at 2325 -> load_snapshot_entities at 2222) is NOT the bug \u2014 it correctly rejects the corrupted file via one of its length-sanity -EIO guards (most likely persist.c:2240-2241, the job-frame payload_len-vs-file_size guard); format_version/job_count field-order misparse was considered and ruled out (load_snapshot consumes and validates format_version at persist.c:2399-2413 before ever calling load_snapshot_entities).", + "fix": "FIXED 2026-07-02 (ha.c, ha.h). Root cause pinned via live crc32 instrumentation (TRACE logs at both ha_send_snapshot_to_standby's send point and ha_handle_snapshot_chunk's receive point, correlated by snapshot_lsn+chunk_index): every chunk's CONTENT crossed the wire byte-for-byte intact (crc32 matched exactly for all 12 chunks) \u2014 the corruption was never in capnp encode/decode/transport at all. The real bug: OPCode_snapshotTransfer chunks of one transfer are dispatched across the vtask pool and are NOT guaranteed to arrive/execute in chunk_index order (live soak log showed arrival order 0,1,3,4,2,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 across cpu#0-3 workers), but ha_handle_snapshot_chunk appended every chunk's bytes to snap.part in ARRIVAL order (fopen \"ab\"/fwrite) instead of at the chunk's own chunk_offset (a field already carried on the wire but never used for anything). Reordered chunks landed at the wrong file position: same total byte count, wrong content from the first reordered chunk's offset onward \u2014 exactly the observed 'byte-shifted, resyncing later, nondeterministic magnitude' signature. Fix: (1) write each chunk via pwrite(fd, payload, len, chunk->chunk_offset) instead of append \u2014 order-independent and safe for concurrent writers (positioned writes to disjoint byte ranges of the same fd don't race). (2) Track completion via a new ha_state_t.snapshot_recv_count/snapshot_recv_total pair (guarded by the existing ha->lock) instead of finalizing on 'this call happens to carry is_last' \u2014 under out-of-order arrival, is_last can be processed before an earlier chunk; finalize now fires only once every chunk 0..N-1 has actually been written, and snapshot_recv_total is claimed (reset to 0) by whichever thread crosses the completion threshold so a late straggler chunk can never double-finalize. chunk_index==0 still resets both the stale-file unlink and the new counters (Req 4.4 unchanged). New RED->GREEN unit test test_snapshot_recv_out_of_order_chunks_assemble_correctly (test_config_repl.c) replays the exact non-sequential delivery order and asserts byte-identical assembly; RED confirmed via temporary revert (Expected 0 Was -22, job_count field corrupted by the misordered chunk boundary); GREEN restored, full controller suite clean (0 failures). Also added 2 new deterministic full-size (65536-byte) capnp encode/decode round-trip tests (test_wal_wire.c) that definitively cleared the capnp/transport layer before the real cause was found \u2014 permanent regression coverage, the prior test only covered a 300-byte payload. New xce_test snapverify/snapdiff subcommands (built as part of this investigation) were instrumental in diagnosing this live. Live-validated: 3/3 --force-snapshot rounds PASS (genuine 'HA: snapshot loaded ... full job/queue entity restoration' installs confirmed, zero divergence/loss) + 6-round --chaotic PASS.", "tags": [ "raft-drive-async", "snapshot-transfer", @@ -12188,9 +12188,9 @@ { "id": "bug-1396", "timestamp": "2026-07-02T14:00:00.000Z", - "error_message": "ha-commit-durability task 6.1 (cold-restart-all real-fs reproduction, src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh on a genuine ext4 deploy dir, ~/tmp not overlay): run 5 of 5 reported `expect-jobs: expected 19, actual 20` after a full cold-stop-all + cold-start-all cycle — the cluster had ONE MORE committed job than the harness's own ACKED_FILE (deduplicated via `sort -u`) tracked. All 19 tracked job IDs individually verified present (`expect-job` loop all `ok`); the 20th job's identity was not captured (cluster had already been torn down by the script's EXIT trap by the time this was investigated). This is the OPPOSITE of bug-661/795's symptom (loss) — an unexplained EXTRA job, not a missing one. 4 of the other 5 runs (and every prior round within run 5 itself, rounds 1-8) showed correct exact-count durability with zero anomalies.", + "error_message": "ha-commit-durability task 6.1 (cold-restart-all real-fs reproduction, src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh on a genuine ext4 deploy dir, ~/tmp not overlay): run 5 of 5 reported `expect-jobs: expected 19, actual 20` after a full cold-stop-all + cold-start-all cycle \u2014 the cluster had ONE MORE committed job than the harness's own ACKED_FILE (deduplicated via `sort -u`) tracked. All 19 tracked job IDs individually verified present (`expect-job` loop all `ok`); the 20th job's identity was not captured (cluster had already been torn down by the script's EXIT trap by the time this was investigated). This is the OPPOSITE of bug-661/795's symptom (loss) \u2014 an unexplained EXTRA job, not a missing one. 4 of the other 5 runs (and every prior round within run 5 itself, rounds 1-8) showed correct exact-count durability with zero anomalies.", "file": "src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh (harness) or controller job-recovery path (unconfirmed which)", - "root_cause": "NOT INVESTIGATED — deprioritized because it doesn't match the loss scenario task 6.1 was probing for, and reproducing it requires re-running with a 'joblist' capture at the exact expect-jobs failure point (the script doesn't dump the full list on a count mismatch, only the count). Two live hypotheses, unconfirmed: (a) harness-side race — ACKED_FILE's write (submit_n) and run_cold_restart_recovery's read (`committed=$(sort -u ACKED_FILE | grep -c .)`) are not synchronized against a submission whose ack arrives asynchronously after the harness moves on, so a genuinely-committed job simply never got recorded in ACKED_FILE — a test-harness bookkeeping gap, not a controller bug; (b) a genuine job-duplication bug on the controller's recovery/replay path creating an extra job entry with a fresh ID. Also observed in this run's ctrl-1.log: repeated unrelated `handle_jobsubmit fail to lock job 63-15--1-1015808[32751]` errors and one `job not durable (rc=-110) — rejecting submission` for a DIFFERENTLY-FORMATTED job ID (not this harness's `0-0--0` convention) — almost certainly a stray unrelated process hitting the same cluster ports in the shared sandbox, not this test's own traffic, but flagged here in case it's connected.", + "root_cause": "NOT INVESTIGATED \u2014 deprioritized because it doesn't match the loss scenario task 6.1 was probing for, and reproducing it requires re-running with a 'joblist' capture at the exact expect-jobs failure point (the script doesn't dump the full list on a count mismatch, only the count). Two live hypotheses, unconfirmed: (a) harness-side race \u2014 ACKED_FILE's write (submit_n) and run_cold_restart_recovery's read (`committed=$(sort -u ACKED_FILE | grep -c .)`) are not synchronized against a submission whose ack arrives asynchronously after the harness moves on, so a genuinely-committed job simply never got recorded in ACKED_FILE \u2014 a test-harness bookkeeping gap, not a controller bug; (b) a genuine job-duplication bug on the controller's recovery/replay path creating an extra job entry with a fresh ID. Also observed in this run's ctrl-1.log: repeated unrelated `handle_jobsubmit fail to lock job 63-15--1-1015808[32751]` errors and one `job not durable (rc=-110) \u2014 rejecting submission` for a DIFFERENTLY-FORMATTED job ID (not this harness's `0-0--0` convention) \u2014 almost certainly a stray unrelated process hitting the same cluster ports in the shared sandbox, not this test's own traffic, but flagged here in case it's connected.", "fix": "NOT YET ROOT-CAUSED (still needs a live re-run to capture the actual extra job's identity). Made the harness able to diagnose it next time it fires: src/tools/test-commit-durability.sh's assert_job_count() now dumps the live `joblist` output AND the ACKED_FILE ledger (sorted, deduplicated) on any count mismatch, instead of only printing the count as before. This was the bug's own recorded 'next step'. Bash syntax-checked (bash -n); not yet re-run against a live cluster in this session (that requires reproducing the original 5-round real-fs soak, which is long-running).", "tags": [ "ha-commit-durability", @@ -12257,10 +12257,10 @@ { "id": "bug-1400", "timestamp": "2026-07-02T14:20:00.000Z", - "error_message": "xce_test cmd_jobsub SEGVs (ASAN) on `jobsub sleep 1` — positional args instead of required getopt flags (-u/-q/-c). getopt silently ignores unrecognized positional args, leaving submit.command/queue etc. NULL, and something downstream derefs a NULL field.", + "error_message": "xce_test cmd_jobsub SEGVs (ASAN) on `jobsub sleep 1` \u2014 positional args instead of required getopt flags (-u/-q/-c). getopt silently ignores unrecognized positional args, leaving submit.command/queue etc. NULL, and something downstream derefs a NULL field.", "file": "src/controller/testsuite/test.c (cmd_jobsub, ~line 1748)", - "root_cause": "CONFIRMED STALE for the reported SEGV: git blame shows NULLSTR guards for submit.user/submit.queue/submit.start_info->cmdline were added 2025-11-05 (commit 41f56fa6), long before this bug was logged 2026-07-02 — 'jobsub sleep 1' getopt-returns -1 immediately on the non-option 'sleep' token, then hits the -EINVAL guard at test.c:1838 before any NULL deref. No SEGV path exists in current code; the buglog entry was stale (fix landed under a different/untracked change, buglog never updated). A REAL, separate defect was found in the same function: submit.start_info (calloc'd test.c:1767) was never freed on any of the 4 early-return validation paths (getopt default case + the 3 NULLSTR checks) — a ~128-byte leak per malformed jobsub invocation.", - "fix": "SEGV claim: not applicable, already fixed pre-existing. Leak: refactored cmd_jobsub (test.c) to `goto cleanup` on all 4 early-return validation failures instead of a bare `return -EINVAL`, reusing the existing FREEUP(submit.user/queue/resreq/start_info->cmdline/exdata/start_info) block via a new `cleanup:` label — mirrors the `goto clean` idiom already used in queue_ctrl() (queue.c). Verified: controller ASAN build + full controller_unit_test suite green (0 failures) after the change.", + "root_cause": "CONFIRMED STALE for the reported SEGV: git blame shows NULLSTR guards for submit.user/submit.queue/submit.start_info->cmdline were added 2025-11-05 (commit 41f56fa6), long before this bug was logged 2026-07-02 \u2014 'jobsub sleep 1' getopt-returns -1 immediately on the non-option 'sleep' token, then hits the -EINVAL guard at test.c:1838 before any NULL deref. No SEGV path exists in current code; the buglog entry was stale (fix landed under a different/untracked change, buglog never updated). A REAL, separate defect was found in the same function: submit.start_info (calloc'd test.c:1767) was never freed on any of the 4 early-return validation paths (getopt default case + the 3 NULLSTR checks) \u2014 a ~128-byte leak per malformed jobsub invocation.", + "fix": "SEGV claim: not applicable, already fixed pre-existing. Leak: refactored cmd_jobsub (test.c) to `goto cleanup` on all 4 early-return validation failures instead of a bare `return -EINVAL`, reusing the existing FREEUP(submit.user/queue/resreq/start_info->cmdline/exdata/start_info) block via a new `cleanup:` label \u2014 mirrors the `goto clean` idiom already used in queue_ctrl() (queue.c). Verified: controller ASAN build + full controller_unit_test suite green (0 failures) after the change.", "tags": [ "stale-report", "low-priority", @@ -12278,9 +12278,9 @@ { "id": "bug-1401", "timestamp": "2026-07-02T14:25:00.000Z", - "error_message": "ASAN LeakSanitizer: every ctrlstatus reply leaks memory in decode_CtrlStatus_ptr (lib/controller.capnp.c:11873) — observed during ha-heartbeat-committed-propagation task 4.1 live validation: 120 bytes/1 alloc after a single ctrlstatus call, 12360 bytes/103 allocs after ~a dozen calls (roughly proportional to call count).", + "error_message": "ASAN LeakSanitizer: every ctrlstatus reply leaks memory in decode_CtrlStatus_ptr (lib/controller.capnp.c:11873) \u2014 observed during ha-heartbeat-committed-propagation task 4.1 live validation: 120 bytes/1 alloc after a single ctrlstatus call, 12360 bytes/103 allocs after ~a dozen calls (roughly proportional to call count).", "file": "src/lib/controller.capnp.c (decode_CtrlStatus_ptr, generated codec) or its caller in request.c/xcecli", - "root_cause": "CONFIRMED via codegraph + generated codec trace: src/include/client.h:119 defined `xce_free_ctrlstatus(s)` as `free_CtrlStatus(s)` — the generated free_CtrlStatus() only frees the FIELDS INSIDE the xce_ctrlstatus_t (clusterName/primaryName/responderName/configChecksum/peers list), matching decode_CtrlStatus(). But the real client reply path (xce_handle_reply -> MOVE_PTR from the decoded RequestReply -> xce_ctrlstatus) populates the struct via decode_CtrlStatus_PTR(), which calloc's the xce_ctrlstatus_t itself (controller.capnp.c:11873) before calling decode_CtrlStatus() to fill it. Only free_CtrlStatus_ptr() (which calls free_CtrlStatus() THEN free()s the struct and nulls the caller's pointer) matches that allocation. free_RequestReply/free_Request/MOVE_PTR were all confirmed symmetric and correct — the bug was isolated to this one macro definition. Existing unit tests never caught it because they call free_CtrlStatus(&out) directly on a stack struct, never exercising the xce_free_ctrlstatus() macro used by real client code.", + "root_cause": "CONFIRMED via codegraph + generated codec trace: src/include/client.h:119 defined `xce_free_ctrlstatus(s)` as `free_CtrlStatus(s)` \u2014 the generated free_CtrlStatus() only frees the FIELDS INSIDE the xce_ctrlstatus_t (clusterName/primaryName/responderName/configChecksum/peers list), matching decode_CtrlStatus(). But the real client reply path (xce_handle_reply -> MOVE_PTR from the decoded RequestReply -> xce_ctrlstatus) populates the struct via decode_CtrlStatus_PTR(), which calloc's the xce_ctrlstatus_t itself (controller.capnp.c:11873) before calling decode_CtrlStatus() to fill it. Only free_CtrlStatus_ptr() (which calls free_CtrlStatus() THEN free()s the struct and nulls the caller's pointer) matches that allocation. free_RequestReply/free_Request/MOVE_PTR were all confirmed symmetric and correct \u2014 the bug was isolated to this one macro definition. Existing unit tests never caught it because they call free_CtrlStatus(&out) directly on a stack struct, never exercising the xce_free_ctrlstatus() macro used by real client code.", "fix": "src/include/client.h:119 changed to `#define xce_free_ctrlstatus(s) free_CtrlStatus_ptr(&(s))`. Added regression test test_xce_free_ctrlstatus_frees_the_struct_itself (src/lib/testsuite/test_ctrlstatus.c), which decodes via decode_CtrlStatus_ptr (the real allocation path, not the stack-struct helper the other roundtrip tests use) and frees via the xce_free_ctrlstatus macro. RED confirmed: reverting the fix reproduces the exact reported leak signature (LeakSanitizer: 120 bytes in 1 object, decode_CtrlStatus_ptr calloc). GREEN after fix: 285 lib tests / 0 failures / 0 leaks. Controller ASAN build + controller_unit_test also green post-fix (client.h is shared).", "tags": [ "asan", @@ -12316,7 +12316,7 @@ "error_message": "Wrong reference: test_xcecli_ctrlstatus_null_ctx_typed_failure should be test_xce_free_ctrlstatus_frees_the_struct_itself", "file": "src/lib/testsuite/test_ctrlstatus.c", "root_cause": "Used \"test_xcecli_ctrlstatus_null_ctx_typed_failure\" instead of \"test_xce_free_ctrlstatus_frees_the_struct_itself\"", - "fix": "Changed test_xcecli_ctrlstatus_null_ctx_typed_failure → test_xce_free_ctrlstatus_frees_the_struct_itself", + "fix": "Changed test_xcecli_ctrlstatus_null_ctx_typed_failure \u2192 test_xce_free_ctrlstatus_frees_the_struct_itself", "tags": [ "wrong-reference", "c" @@ -12361,8 +12361,32 @@ "raft-apply-decoupling", "closed" ], - "related_bugs": ["bug-924"], + "related_bugs": [ + "bug-924" + ], "occurrences": 5, "last_seen": "2026-07-03T13:00:00.000Z" + }, + { + "id": "bug-1408", + "timestamp": "2026-07-03T21:00:00.000Z", + "error_message": "raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 round-1 handle_jobsubmit(): when an array job submission has >1 element and ONE element fails post-commit construction (create_job()/makeJob_() returns NULL, e.g. a jobid collision that slipped past jobid_range_exists() pre-check TOCTOU, or a plain calloc failure), the function returned the construction error IMMEDIATELY after the per-element construct loop, before ever building the AFTER_EVENT notify jlist or firing HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW -- even for SIBLING array elements that constructed successfully and are already durably committed on a majority.", + "file": "src/controller/job.c", + "root_cause": "handle_jobsubmit()'s post-commit construction loop set construct_rc<0 on any failed create_job() call but used continue (not break) to keep constructing remaining siblings correctly -- however, immediately AFTER the loop, \"if (construct_rc < 0) { reply error; return; }\" fired BEFORE the jlist-build + xce_run_hooks(HOOK_AFTER_EVENT, HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW) block, so a single failed element suppressed notification for every successfully constructed sibling in the same array submission. Both the scheduler and apiserver are purely event-driven off this hook with no periodic reconciliation, so the stranded siblings (real, durable, present in c->jobmgr) were invisible until the next controller restart replayed the WAL.", + "fix": "Moved the construct_rc<0 early-return in handle_jobsubmit() (src/controller/job.c) to AFTER the jlist-build + xce_run_hooks(HOOK_AFTER_EVENT, HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW, ...) block instead of before it. The jlist-build loop already only finds jobs that key_find() locates in c->jobmgr, so a failed-to-construct element is naturally and silently absent from jlist with no extra bookkeeping -- the hook now fires unconditionally for every successfully constructed element regardless of a sibling's construct_rc, and the client-facing reply still reports the construct_rc error afterward. Added regression test test_jobsubmit_array_partial_construct_failure_notifies_survivors in src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_barrier_reply.c: drives handle_jobsubmit with a 2-element array on a worker pthread, ACKs element 0's WAL entry, then deterministically reproduces the TOCTOU outcome by inserting a stand-in job directly into c->jobmgr for element 1's jobid (via the existing cbrp_make_job helper) strictly after jobid_range_exists() has already run and strictly before the construction loop can run (element 1's commit is still pending on a withheld ACK) -- makeJob_()'s own key_find() then legitimately returns EEXIST for element 1. A new test hook capture (cbrp_jobnew_capture_fn, registered via xce_add_hook) records every jobid delivered through HOOK_AFTER_EVENT/HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW so the test can assert element 0 was both constructed AND notified despite element 1 failing. RED-phase confirmed against the pre-fix code (job 9201 construction failed with errno=17/EEXIST as designed, and the notification assertion for job 9200 failed as predicted). CORRECTION (round-2 review): under the standard verification invocation (--run test_commit_barrier_reply, the full 25-test group), the failing TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE at test_commit_barrier_reply.c longjmps past this test's own inline cbrp_teardown() call (Unity TEST_ABORT semantics) -- the SAME longjmp-past-teardown pathology already documented for round 1's withheld-commit test, not a clean assertion FAIL. It leaks live persist/commit-engine background threads into the next test's setup, producing a deterministic HANG under the full-group command (reproduced 3/3 times, both threads blocked in futex_do_wait). A clean, fast FAIL was only observed when this test was isolated from the other 24 tests in the group -- that isolated form is what the original write-up described. GREEN after the fix (reordering removes the failure entirely, so this hang mode never triggers in the fixed code): both pre-existing single-element jobsubmit tests and the full 25-test test_commit_barrier_reply group plus the full controller_unit_test binary pass (0 failures) via the standard --run invocation. Hardened afterward: the test now captures its assertion-relevant booleans (cbrp_job_exists/cbrp_jobnew_notified) into locals and calls cbrp_teardown() unconditionally before asserting on the captured locals, so a future regression in this exact test can no longer skip cleanup and hang sibling tests.", + "tags": [ + "raft-apply-decoupling", + "task-3.1", + "handle_jobsubmit", + "array-job-submit", + "notification", + "commit-barrier", + "toctou", + "round-2-remediation", + "test-longjmp-past-teardown" + ], + "related_bugs": [], + "occurrences": 1, + "last_seen": "2026-07-03T21:00:00.000Z" } ] diff --git a/src/controller/job.c b/src/controller/job.c index 2c8e7dc..4c58486 100644 --- a/src/controller/job.c +++ b/src/controller/job.c @@ -50,36 +50,76 @@ static job_t* create_job(cluster_t* c, xce_job_t* j) return job; } -uint64_t job_submit(void* c, xce_job_submit_t* submit) +/* True if any jobid in [base_jobid, base_jobid + array_size) already exists + * in c->jobmgr (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1). Checked BEFORE any WAL work + * so a colliding submission is still rejected immediately with no side + * effect, matching the fast-fail behavior create_job()'s own key_find + * guard used to provide when job construction ran before the commit + * barrier — now that construction is deferred to after commit, a collision + * detected only post-commit could no longer be cleanly reported as "never + * happened". */ +static bool jobid_range_exists(cluster_t* c, uint64_t base_jobid, + uint64_t array_size) { - job_t* job = NULL; - uint64_t base_id = submit->jobid; - xce_job_t j = { .submit = submit->submit }; - time_t now = time(NULL); - int i; + for (uint64_t i = 0; i < array_size; i++) { + job_t* existing = NULL; + int found; - j.sub_time = now; - j.queue_time = now; - j.start_time = 0; - j.finish_time = 0; - j.pidinfo = NULL; - j.state = JOB_STAT_PEND; - j.allocs = NULL; - j.run_time = 0; - j.run_usage = NULL; - j.exit_info = NULL; - j.ckptinfo = NULL; - j.pending_ctrl = 0; + lock(c->jobmgr, RTTI_LOCK_READ); + found = key_find(c->jobmgr, (void*)(base_jobid + i), + (void**)&existing); + unlock(c->jobmgr); - for (i = 0; i < submit->array_size; i++) { - j.jobid = base_id + i; - job = create_job(c, &j); - if (job == NULL) { - return -errno; + if (found > 0 && existing != NULL) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* Build one xce_job_t submission payload per array element, WITHOUT + * constructing or registering any job object (raft-apply-decoupling task + * 3.1 / Req 2.1, 2.3) — these are plain heap structs carrying only the data + * needed to build each entry's WAL payload; `free_job_submit_payloads` frees + * them. `submit->submit` is borrowed (owned by the caller's request), never + * duplicated or freed here. Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on allocation + * failure (payloads already stored are left for the caller to free). */ +static int build_job_submit_payloads(uint64_t base_jobid, + xce_job_submit_t* submit, xlist_t* plist) +{ + time_t now = time(NULL); + + xlist_init(plist, submit->array_size); + + for (uint64_t i = 0; i < submit->array_size; i++) { + xce_job_t* jp = calloc(1, sizeof(*jp)); + if (jp == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + if (xlist_store(plist, jp) < 0) { + free(jp); + return -ENOMEM; } + + jp->submit = submit->submit; + jp->jobid = base_jobid + i; + jp->sub_time = now; + jp->queue_time = now; + jp->state = JOB_STAT_PEND; } - return base_id; + return 0; +} + +static int xlist_free_job_payload_(xce_job_t* j, void* arg) +{ + (void)arg; + free(j); + return 0; +} + +static void free_job_submit_payloads(xlist_t* plist) +{ + xlist_iter(plist, (xlist_iter_fn_t)xlist_free_job_payload_, NULL); + xlist_fini(plist); } int load_jobs(void* c) @@ -562,8 +602,10 @@ int handle_jobsubmit(cluster_t* c, endpoint_t* ep, xce_request_t* request) uint64_t jobid; xce_job_submit_t* submit; xce_reply_t reply; - xlist_t jlist; - job_t* j = NULL; + xlist_t plist; /* xce_job_t* WAL payloads, pre-commit */ + xlist_t jlist; /* job_t* for the post-commit notify hook */ + uint64_t* lsns = NULL; + job_t* j = NULL; int i; int rc; @@ -574,15 +616,7 @@ int handle_jobsubmit(cluster_t* c, endpoint_t* ep, xce_request_t* request) if (NULLSTR(submit->submit->user) || NULLSTR(submit->submit->queue) || (submit->submit->start_info == NULL) || NULLSTR(submit->submit->start_info->cmdline)) { - jobid = 0; errno = EINVAL; - } else { - xce_run_hooks(&(c->hooksys), XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_JOB, HOOK_BEFORE_EVENT, - HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW, c, submit); - - jobid = job_submit(c, submit); - } - if (jobid == 0) { reply.status = -errno; reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_nodata; @@ -590,9 +624,114 @@ int handle_jobsubmit(cluster_t* c, endpoint_t* ep, xce_request_t* request) return -errno; } - /* Build job list for the AFTER_EVENT hook BEFORE replying to client. - * The AFTER_EVENT hook writes WAL and waits for majority replication — - * the client must not be acknowledged until the job is durable. */ + xce_run_hooks(&(c->hooksys), XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_JOB, HOOK_BEFORE_EVENT, + HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW, c, submit); + + jobid = submit->jobid; + + if (jobid_range_exists(c, jobid, submit->array_size)) { + errno = EEXIST; + reply.status = -errno; + reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_nodata; + + xce_reply(ep, c->myhost, &reply); + return -errno; + } + + /* Build only the WAL payload data for each array element — no job + * object is constructed or inserted into c->jobmgr until the commit + * below succeeds (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 / Req 2.1, 2.3): a + * commit that fails or times out must leave the job table untouched, + * and the only way to guarantee that structurally is to never + * construct anything until commit has already returned success. */ + rc = build_job_submit_payloads(jobid, submit, &plist); + if (rc == 0) { + lsns = calloc((size_t)plist.count, sizeof(*lsns)); + if (lsns == NULL) + rc = -ENOMEM; + } + if (rc < 0) { + free_job_submit_payloads(&plist); + + reply.status = rc; + reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_nodata; + + xce_reply(ep, c->myhost, &reply); + return rc; + } + + /* Explicit raft step (raft-apply-decoupling item #1 / bug-1306; task + * 3.1): WAL-append + majority-commit barrier for every payload, reading + * the commit verdict DIRECTLY. This used to run inside the AFTER_EVENT + * hook (persist_job_hook_fun), but xce_run_hooks returns only the LAST + * hook's rc, so a later notify subscriber (sched/apiserver) returning 0 + * CLOBBERED the -ETIMEDOUT — the client was acked for an entry that + * never reached majority, which a new-term leader then legally + * discarded (committed-job-loss). The client must not be acknowledged, + * and no job object may exist, until the submission is durable on a + * majority. */ + int commit_rc = persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit(&c->persist, + &plist, lsns); + if (commit_rc < 0) { + WARN("handle_jobsubmit: job not durable (rc=%d) — rejecting submission", + commit_rc); + free_job_submit_payloads(&plist); + free(lsns); + + reply.status = commit_rc; + reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_nodata; + + xce_reply(ep, c->myhost, &reply); + return commit_rc; + } + + /* Committed on a majority — NOW construct and register each job object + * (moved here from before the commit barrier; raft-apply-decoupling + * task 3.1 / Req 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). A construction failure at this point + * cannot be rolled back (the entry is already durably committed); it is + * a genuine apply-time failure, not a retryable one (design.md Error + * Strategy) — logged loud, and the submission is NOT reported as a + * success. */ + int construct_rc = 0; + for (i = 0; i < plist.count; i++) { + xce_job_t* jp = (xce_job_t*)xlist_get(&plist, i); + job_t* job = create_job(c, jp); + + if (job == NULL) { + int saved_errno = errno; + + ERROR("handle_jobsubmit: job %lu committed at lsn %lu but " + "could not be constructed (errno=%d)", + (unsigned long)jp->jobid, (unsigned long)lsns[i], + saved_errno); + if (construct_rc == 0) + construct_rc = -saved_errno; + continue; + } + job->submit_lsn = lsns[i]; + } + + free_job_submit_payloads(&plist); + free(lsns); + + /* Build the job list for the AFTER_EVENT hook — the same lookup used + * before this task, just run after construction (which now itself runs + * after commit) instead of before either. + * + * IMPORTANT (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 remediation): this lookup + * and the hook it feeds run UNCONDITIONALLY here, even when + * construct_rc < 0 for one or more array elements. Every element whose + * create_job() succeeded above is already durably committed AND already + * inserted into c->jobmgr — key_find below naturally finds only those + * (a failed element was never inserted, so it is silently absent from + * jlist with no extra bookkeeping needed). Both the scheduler and the + * apiserver are purely event-driven off this hook with no periodic + * reconciliation, so returning early here (as a previous version of + * this function did whenever ANY sibling failed to construct) would + * strand the successfully constructed siblings — real, durable jobs — + * invisible until the next controller restart replays the WAL. A + * whole-batch construction failure must never suppress notification for + * the elements that individually succeeded. */ xlist_init(&jlist, submit->array_size); for (i = 0; i < submit->array_size; i++) { @@ -615,31 +754,13 @@ int handle_jobsubmit(cluster_t* c, endpoint_t* ep, xce_request_t* request) } } - /* Explicit raft step (raft-apply-decoupling item #1 / bug-1306): WAL-append - * + majority-commit barrier, reading the commit verdict DIRECTLY. This used - * to run inside the AFTER_EVENT hook (persist_job_hook_fun), but xce_run_hooks - * returns only the LAST hook's rc, so a later notify subscriber (sched/ - * apiserver) returning 0 CLOBBERED the -ETIMEDOUT — the client was acked for - * an entry that never reached majority, which a new-term leader then legally - * discarded (committed-job-loss). The client must not be acknowledged until - * the job is durable on a majority. */ - int commit_rc = persist_submit_wal_and_commit(&c->persist, &jlist); - if (commit_rc < 0) { - WARN("handle_jobsubmit: job not durable (rc=%d) — rejecting submission", - commit_rc); - xlist_iter(&jlist, (xlist_iter_fn_t)xlist_deref_job_item_, NULL); - xlist_fini(&jlist); - reply.status = commit_rc; - reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_nodata; - - xce_reply(ep, c->myhost, &reply); - return commit_rc; - } - - /* Committed on a majority — fire the AFTER_EVENT hook as NOTIFICATION only - * (scheduler push, apiserver SSE), observing already-committed state. Its - * return no longer gates durability: a notify-hook failure cannot un-commit - * an already-durable job, so it is logged but never fails the client reply. */ + /* Committed + constructed — fire the AFTER_EVENT hook as NOTIFICATION + * only (scheduler push, apiserver SSE), observing already-committed, + * already-applied state. Its return no longer gates durability: a + * notify-hook failure cannot un-commit an already-durable job, so it is + * logged but never fails the client reply. Fired for every + * successfully constructed element regardless of construct_rc (see the + * comment above jlist's construction). */ int notify_rc = xce_run_hooks(&(c->hooksys), XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_JOB, HOOK_AFTER_EVENT, HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW, c, &jlist); @@ -651,7 +772,20 @@ int handle_jobsubmit(cluster_t* c, endpoint_t* ep, xce_request_t* request) xlist_fini(&jlist); - /* Reply success only AFTER WAL write + majority commit succeeded. */ + if (construct_rc < 0) { + /* At least one array element durably committed but could not be + * constructed (see the ERROR logged at the point of failure above). + * The client learns the submission did not fully succeed; the + * siblings that DID construct successfully were already notified + * above and must never have that notification gated on this. */ + reply.status = construct_rc; + reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_nodata; + + xce_reply(ep, c->myhost, &reply); + return construct_rc; + } + + /* Reply success only AFTER WAL write + majority commit + construction. */ reply.status = 0; reply.data_which = RequestReply_data_jobid; reply.data.jobid = jobid; diff --git a/src/controller/persist.c b/src/controller/persist.c index aa8b54a..6a5e854 100644 --- a/src/controller/persist.c +++ b/src/controller/persist.c @@ -3610,6 +3610,44 @@ static int wal_hook_append_classified(persist_t* p, uint32_t wal_type, return rc; /* local append rc only — facts have no commit timeout */ } +/* Shared step for a single WAL_JOB_SUBMIT entry (raft-apply-decoupling task + * 3.1): encode `job`, append, and block on the majority-commit barrier. + * Returns 0 when the entry committed on a majority; a negative rc otherwise + * (-ETIMEDOUT: no majority within the deadline; -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY: admission + * cap; -ENOMEM: encode failure; or a local-write error). Whenever the LOCAL + * WAL write succeeded (rc == 0, -ETIMEDOUT, or -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY — the entry + * was appended locally and the LSN advanced even though replication is + * degraded), *out_lsn is set to the entry's assigned LSN so a caller can tag + * it for egress-watermark purposes even on a rejected submission. */ +static int submit_job_wal_entry_and_commit(persist_t* p, const xce_job_t* job, + uint64_t* out_lsn) +{ + uint8_t* buf = NULL; + size_t sz = 0; + int rc; + + if (capnp_encode_job(job, &buf, &sz) != 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* ha-convergence-recovery (3.3): snapshot the LSN this submit entry + * will receive BEFORE the append. persist_wal_async assigns + * hdr.lsn = current_lsn then increments, so the pre-append current_lsn + * is exactly the written entry's LSN. */ + pthread_mutex_lock(&p->lock); + uint64_t submit_lsn = p->current_lsn; + pthread_mutex_unlock(&p->lock); + + int sync_rc = 0; + rc = persist_wal_sync_append(p, WAL_JOB_SUBMIT, buf, (uint32_t)sz, + &sync_rc); + free(buf); + + if (rc == 0 || rc == -ETIMEDOUT || rc == -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY) + *out_lsn = submit_lsn; + + return rc; +} + /* Explicit controller-side raft step for a job submission (raft-apply-decoupling * item #1 / bug-1306): WAL-append each job in `jlist` and block on the * majority-commit barrier, returning the commit verdict DIRECTLY to the caller @@ -3633,32 +3671,36 @@ int persist_submit_wal_and_commit(persist_t* p, xlist_t* jlist) for (int i = 0; i < jlist->count && rc == 0; i++) { job_t* j = (job_t*)xlist_get(jlist, i); - uint8_t* buf = NULL; - size_t sz = 0; - if (capnp_encode_job(&j->job, &buf, &sz) != 0) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - break; - } - /* ha-convergence-recovery (3.3): snapshot the LSN this submit entry - * will receive BEFORE the append. persist_wal_async assigns - * hdr.lsn = current_lsn then increments, so the pre-append current_lsn - * is exactly the written entry's LSN. */ - pthread_mutex_lock(&p->lock); - uint64_t submit_lsn = p->current_lsn; - pthread_mutex_unlock(&p->lock); + uint64_t lsn = 0; - int sync_rc = 0; - rc = persist_wal_sync_append(p, WAL_JOB_SUBMIT, buf, (uint32_t)sz, - &sync_rc); - free(buf); - - /* Tag the job with its submit entry's LSN whenever the LOCAL WAL write - * succeeded. persist_wal_sync_append returns the persist_wal_async - * error only on local-write failure; on a replication-degraded outcome - * (0 / -ETIMEDOUT / -ENODEV / -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY) the entry was appended - * locally and the LSN advanced, so the egress tag is set. */ + rc = submit_job_wal_entry_and_commit(p, &j->job, &lsn); if (rc == 0 || rc == -ETIMEDOUT || rc == -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY) - j->submit_lsn = submit_lsn; + j->submit_lsn = lsn; + } + + return rc; +} + +/* Sibling of persist_submit_wal_and_commit for a job submission whose job + * object(s) do not exist yet (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 / Req 2.1, 2.3): + * `payloads` is an xlist_t of xce_job_t* that have never been registered in + * any job table. On full success (return 0), out_lsns[i] holds payloads[i]'s + * committed LSN — the caller constructs and tags the job object AFTER this + * call returns, so a failed/timed-out commit never leaves a job object + * behind (there is nothing to construct until this succeeds). Returns the + * first negative rc on failure. */ +int persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit(persist_t* p, xlist_t* payloads, + uint64_t* out_lsns) +{ + int rc = 0; + + if (p == NULL || payloads == NULL || out_lsns == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + for (int i = 0; i < payloads->count && rc == 0; i++) { + xce_job_t* j = (xce_job_t*)xlist_get(payloads, i); + + rc = submit_job_wal_entry_and_commit(p, j, &out_lsns[i]); } return rc; @@ -3685,17 +3727,13 @@ int persist_job_hook_fun(int type, int situation, int detail, mode = wal_classify(wal_type, detail); if (mode == WAL_MODE_WAIT) { - /* WAL_JOB_SUBMIT durability (WAL append + majority-commit barrier) was - * MOVED OUT of this hook into the explicit raft step - * persist_submit_wal_and_commit(), called directly by handle_jobsubmit - * (raft-apply-decoupling item #1 / bug-1306). Rationale: xce_run_hooks - * returns only the LAST-registered hook's rc, so a later JOB AFTER_EVENT - * subscriber (sched/apiserver, returning 0) CLOBBERED this branch's - * -ETIMEDOUT — handle_jobsubmit then replied `jobsubmit ok` for an - * entry that never reached majority, and a new-term leader legally - * discarded it (committed-job-loss). The commit verdict must be read - * from the protocol step directly, never as a hook return. This branch - * is now a no-op; the AFTER_EVENT hook chain is notification-only. */ + /* WAL_JOB_SUBMIT durability (WAL append + majority-commit barrier) is + * an explicit step invoked directly by handle_jobsubmit — + * persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit(), called strictly before + * any job object is constructed (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 / + * bug-1306) — never from this hook. This hook fires only after that + * commit has already succeeded, purely as a notification, so there + * is nothing left for it to do here. */ return 0; } diff --git a/src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_barrier_reply.c b/src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_barrier_reply.c index a3d8c5c..694a130 100644 --- a/src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_barrier_reply.c +++ b/src/controller/testsuite/test_commit_barrier_reply.c @@ -834,6 +834,264 @@ static void test_worker_join_no_hostconfig_error_reply_immediate(void) printf("test_worker_join_no_hostconfig_error_reply_immediate: PASS\n"); } +/* ── handle_jobsubmit (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1: apply-after-commit) ── + * + * Req 2.1/2.3: a job submission whose commit fails or times out must leave + * NO job object in c->jobmgr — construction is deferred until after the + * commit barrier succeeds. Req 2.2: a successful submission still replies + * synchronously with the jobid, and by the time that reply is observable the + * job is already visible in c->jobmgr. */ + +static job_startinfo_t g_jobsub_startinfo; +static job_submit_data_t g_jobsub_data; +static xce_job_submit_t g_jobsub_msg; +static xce_request_t g_jobsub_req; +static xce_peerinfo_t g_jobsub_from; + +static void cbrp_arrange_jobsubmit(uint64_t jobid, uint64_t array_size) +{ + memset(&g_jobsub_startinfo, 0, sizeof(g_jobsub_startinfo)); + g_jobsub_startinfo.cmdline = (char *)"/bin/true"; + + memset(&g_jobsub_data, 0, sizeof(g_jobsub_data)); + g_jobsub_data.queue = (char *)"normal"; + g_jobsub_data.user = (char *)"tester"; + g_jobsub_data.start_info = &g_jobsub_startinfo; + + memset(&g_jobsub_msg, 0, sizeof(g_jobsub_msg)); + g_jobsub_msg.jobid = jobid; + g_jobsub_msg.array_size = array_size; + g_jobsub_msg.submit = &g_jobsub_data; + + g_jobsub_from.name = (char *)"requester"; + g_jobsub_from.key = (char *)""; + + memset(&g_jobsub_req, 0, sizeof(g_jobsub_req)); + g_jobsub_req.opcode = OPCode_jobsub; + g_jobsub_req.seq = 15; + g_jobsub_req.from = &g_jobsub_from; + g_jobsub_req.body_which = Request_body_jobsubmsg; + g_jobsub_req.body.jobsubmsg = &g_jobsub_msg; +} + +/* Direct c->jobmgr lookup — the task 3.1 observable is about the in-memory + * job TABLE, not the wire reply, so it is checked independently of + * cbrp_scan_replies/cbrp_reply_obs_t (which do not carry a jobid). */ +static bool cbrp_job_exists(uint64_t jobid) +{ + job_t *j = NULL; + int rc; + + lock(g_hc.jobmgr, RTTI_LOCK_READ); + rc = key_find(g_hc.jobmgr, (void *)jobid, (void **)&j); + unlock(g_hc.jobmgr); + + return (rc > 0 && j != NULL); +} + +static void test_jobsubmit_withheld_acks_no_phantom_job(void) +{ + cbrp_setup(300); + cbrp_arrange_jobsubmit(9100, 1); + cbrp_drive_withheld(handle_jobsubmit, &g_jobsub_req, 300); + TEST_ASSERT_FALSE_MESSAGE(cbrp_job_exists(9100), + "a job submission whose commit times out must leave no job object " + "in the in-memory job table (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1, " + "Req 2.1/2.3)"); + cbrp_teardown(); + printf("test_jobsubmit_withheld_acks_no_phantom_job: PASS\n"); +} + +static void test_jobsubmit_success_reply_and_job_visible_after_commit(void) +{ + cbrp_setup(1500); + cbrp_arrange_jobsubmit(9101, 1); + cbrp_drive_acked(handle_jobsubmit, &g_jobsub_req); + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(cbrp_job_exists(9101), + "a successful job submission must construct the job object once " + "its commit succeeds, and still reply synchronously with the " + "jobid (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1, Req 2.2)"); + cbrp_teardown(); + printf("test_jobsubmit_success_reply_and_job_visible_after_commit: PASS\n"); +} + +/* Captures every jobid delivered via the AFTER_EVENT/HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW + * notification hook (job.c's post-commit notify list). Needed by the + * array-partial-construction-failure remediation test below to observe + * that a durably committed AND successfully constructed sibling is still + * notified even when another array element in the same submission fails to + * construct (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 remediation). xce_run_hooks + * also fires this same hook TYPE for HOOK_BEFORE_EVENT with a different + * vararg shape (xce_job_submit_t*, not xlist_t*) — filtered out below + * before touching ap. */ +#define CBRP_MAX_JOBNEW_NOTIFY 8 +static int g_jobnew_notify_count; +static uint64_t g_jobnew_notify_jobids[CBRP_MAX_JOBNEW_NOTIFY]; + +static void cbrp_jobnew_capture_reset(void) +{ + g_jobnew_notify_count = 0; + memset(g_jobnew_notify_jobids, 0, sizeof(g_jobnew_notify_jobids)); +} + +static int cbrp_jobnew_capture_fn(int type, int situation, int detail, + void *data, va_list ap) +{ + (void)type; (void)data; + + if (detail != HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_NEW || situation != HOOK_AFTER_EVENT) + return 0; + + { + xlist_t *jlist; + int i; + + (void)va_arg(ap, cluster_t *); + jlist = va_arg(ap, xlist_t *); + + if (jlist == NULL) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < jlist->count + && g_jobnew_notify_count < CBRP_MAX_JOBNEW_NOTIFY; i++) { + job_t *j = (job_t *)xlist_get(jlist, i); + if (j != NULL) + g_jobnew_notify_jobids[g_jobnew_notify_count++] = j->job.jobid; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static bool cbrp_jobnew_notified(uint64_t jobid) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < g_jobnew_notify_count; i++) { + if (g_jobnew_notify_jobids[i] == jobid) + return true; + } + return false; +} + +/* Array-partial-construction-failure remediation (round-2 fix, task 3.1): + * when ONE array element's post-commit create_job() fails (a jobid + * collision that slipped past jobid_range_exists()'s pre-check, or any + * other construct-time failure), the OTHER array elements that constructed + * successfully — and are already durably committed — must still fire the + * AFTER_EVENT/JOB_NEW notification hook. Both scheduler and apiserver are + * purely event-driven off this hook with no periodic reconciliation, so a + * withheld notification strands an otherwise-healthy, already-durable job + * until the next controller restart replays the WAL. + * + * The colliding element's failure is reproduced deterministically (no real + * race) by exploiting the actual TOCTOU window between + * jobid_range_exists()'s pre-check (a READ-locked snapshot taken BEFORE any + * WAL work) and makeJob_'s own key_find (a WRITE-locked check made fresh at + * construction time, AFTER the commit barrier): a stand-in job for the + * second array element's jobid is inserted directly into c->jobmgr from the + * test thread strictly after the pre-check has already run (its own WAL + * entry is visible, which cannot happen until after the pre-check passes) + * and strictly before the construction loop can run (its commit is still + * pending on a withheld ACK). */ +static void test_jobsubmit_array_partial_construct_failure_notifies_survivors(void) +{ + cbrp_reply_obs_t obs = { 0 }; + uint64_t lsn_before, wm0, wm1; + job_submit_data_t collide_submit; + bool elem0_wal_appeared, elem1_wal_appeared; + bool elem0_exists, elem0_notified; + + /* Every TEST_ASSERT_* below is deferred until after cbrp_teardown(). + * A failing Unity assertion longjmps out of this function (TEST_ABORT), + * which would otherwise skip cbrp_teardown() and leak live + * persist/commit-engine background threads into the NEXT test's setup, + * deadlocking the whole group (see bug-1408's round-2 correction: this + * exact failure mode was originally reproduced as a hang, not a clean + * FAIL, under the standard --run test_commit_barrier_reply invocation). + * Capture every observable into a local first, teardown unconditionally, + * then assert on the captured locals. */ + + cbrp_setup(2000); + cbrp_jobnew_capture_reset(); + TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, xce_add_hook(&g_hc.hooksys, XCE_CONTROLLER_HOOK_JOB, + cbrp_jobnew_capture_fn, NULL)); + cbrp_arrange_jobsubmit(9200, 2); /* 9200 survives, 9201 collides */ + + pthread_mutex_lock(&g_hc.persist.lock); + lsn_before = g_hc.persist.current_lsn; + pthread_mutex_unlock(&g_hc.persist.lock); + + g_op_arg.fn = handle_jobsubmit; + g_op_arg.req = &g_jobsub_req; + g_op_arg.rc = -9999; + TEST_ASSERT_EQUAL_INT(0, pthread_create(&g_op_tid, NULL, + cbrp_op_thread_fn, &g_op_arg)); + + /* Element 0's (jobid 9200) WAL entry appears first; ACK it so the + * sequential payload loop advances to element 1. The settling sleep + * before each ACK mirrors cbrp_drive_acked's proven pattern — it gives + * the handler thread time to actually register its commit wait for the + * just-appended LSN before the ACK is delivered. */ + wm0 = cbrp_poll_append(&g_hc.persist, lsn_before, 2000); + elem0_wal_appeared = (wm0 > 0); + cbrp_sleep_ms(150); + if (elem0_wal_appeared) + repl_on_ack(&g_hc.persist.repl, &g_hep_a, wm0); + + /* Element 1's (jobid 9201) WAL entry appears once element 0 commits. + * Its own ACK is deliberately withheld until the collision stand-in + * below is in place. cbrp_poll_append's lsn_before is a current_lsn + * SNAPSHOT (see its first use above, seeded from persist.current_lsn), + * not an entry's assigned LSN — element 0 already advanced current_lsn + * to wm0 + 1, so that (not wm0 itself) is the correct baseline to wait + * past for element 1's append. */ + wm1 = cbrp_poll_append(&g_hc.persist, wm0 + 1, 2000); + elem1_wal_appeared = (wm1 > wm0); + cbrp_sleep_ms(150); + + /* Deterministic TOCTOU-outcome injection (see block comment above). */ + memset(&collide_submit, 0, sizeof(collide_submit)); + cbrp_make_job(9201, &collide_submit); + + if (elem1_wal_appeared) + repl_on_ack(&g_hc.persist.repl, &g_hep_a, wm1); + + cbrp_poll_reply(&g_req_ep, 2000, &obs); + pthread_join(g_op_tid, NULL); + + elem0_exists = cbrp_job_exists(9200); + elem0_notified = cbrp_jobnew_notified(9200); + + cbrp_teardown(); + + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(elem0_wal_appeared, + "array element 0's WAL entry must appear"); + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(elem1_wal_appeared, + "array element 1's WAL entry must appear"); + + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(obs.n_replies > 0, + "the requester must still receive a reply when one array element " + "fails post-commit construction"); + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(obs.last_status < 0, + "a partially-failed array submission must report the construction " + "failure to the client"); + + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(elem0_exists, + "the non-colliding array element must still be constructed and " + "present in c->jobmgr despite its sibling failing to construct"); + TEST_ASSERT_TRUE_MESSAGE(elem0_notified, + "the successfully constructed sibling must fire the AFTER_EVENT/" + "JOB_NEW notification hook even though array element 9201 failed " + "to construct post-commit (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 " + "remediation) — otherwise it is durably committed and constructed " + "but invisible to the purely event-driven scheduler/apiserver " + "until the next controller restart replays the WAL"); + + printf("test_jobsubmit_array_partial_construct_failure_notifies_survivors:" + " PASS\n"); +} + /* ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ * Receipt-ACK verdict pins (ha-commit-barrier-rollout task 3.3, Req 2.3) * @@ -1873,6 +2131,10 @@ void test_commit_barrier_reply(void) RUN_TEST(test_worker_join_withheld_acks_replies_error); RUN_TEST(test_worker_join_success_reply_only_after_commit); RUN_TEST(test_worker_join_no_hostconfig_error_reply_immediate); + /* handle_jobsubmit (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1, Req 2.1/2.2/2.3) */ + RUN_TEST(test_jobsubmit_withheld_acks_no_phantom_job); + RUN_TEST(test_jobsubmit_success_reply_and_job_visible_after_commit); + RUN_TEST(test_jobsubmit_array_partial_construct_failure_notifies_survivors); /* Receipt-ACK verdict pins (task 3.3, Req 2.3) — green on landing */ RUN_TEST(test_jobdispatch_receipt_ack_no_wal_append); RUN_TEST(test_set_preason_receipt_reply_fact_retained); diff --git a/src/include/persist.h b/src/include/persist.h index fdb6336..b64b82c 100644 --- a/src/include/persist.h +++ b/src/include/persist.h @@ -719,6 +719,19 @@ void persist_log_entry_metadata(const wal_entry_hdr_t* hdr); * a negative rc MUST reject the submission (never reply success). */ int persist_submit_wal_and_commit(persist_t* p, xlist_t* jlist); +/* Sibling of persist_submit_wal_and_commit for callers that must not + * construct any job object before the commit barrier succeeds + * (raft-apply-decoupling task 3.1 / Req 2.1, 2.3): `payloads` is an xlist_t + * of xce_job_t* — raw submission data that has never been registered in any + * job table. WAL-appends + majority-commits each entry in order; on full + * success (return 0), out_lsns[i] holds payloads[i]'s committed LSN, for the + * caller to construct and tag the corresponding job object AFTER this call + * returns — there is nothing to roll back on failure because nothing was + * ever constructed. Returns the first negative rc on failure; out_lsns is + * only valid up to (not including) the failed index. */ +int persist_submit_job_payloads_and_commit(persist_t* p, xlist_t* payloads, + uint64_t* out_lsns); + int persist_job_hook_fun(int type, int situation, int detail, void* cls, va_list ap); int persist_queue_hook_fun(int type, int situation, int detail,