Commit graph

347 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
b028d25dbd test(raft-ha-core-safety): machine-checkable walcompare report (task 1.1)
Per-member (lsn,term,pcrc,present) report + committed-vs-uncommitted
divergence classification via walcompare_report()/--report. Soak signal
(OK/exit-code) preserved. 4 new unit tests, all GREEN.
2026-06-27 04:53:32 +00:00
227f592250 docs(raft-ha-core-safety): finalize spec (requirements, design, research, tasks)
Reframed as residual-defect + convergence/liveness + live-verification spec
(machinery present at baseline 21e26a1). Root cause: term-blind catch-up
bypass of the single reconcile seam. 8 requirements, 7-phase task plan,
all review gates passed.
2026-06-27 04:37:07 +00:00
3609f468c5 chore(raft-ha-core-safety): init spec scaffold (HA-core failover-safety gate)
New spec for the pre-existing HA-core consistency/convergence failures the
xce-test-ha soak reproduces under chaotic failover — committed-prefix
divergence (bug-851, bug-795/828), standby-rejoin/reconverge failure
(bug-1042), and round-N election stall — all baseline-confirmed at commit
21e26a1 (independent of raft-drive-async). This spec is the gate that must
close before raft-drive-async flips its dispatch flags ON in production.

Scaffold only (spec.json + requirements.md project description); requirements
generation is the next phase.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6fDCtXkkEgupu7rUah1y2
2026-06-27 03:16:17 +00:00
294b9ce8eb chore(raft-drive-async): task 4.2 regression sweep — no new regression (baseline-confirmed)
Verdict: raft-drive-async introduces NO new regression.

- Unit: controller_unit_test EXIT=0, xcelib_test 282/0 (all HA suites green;
  dispatch/snapshot/configpush flags default OFF, inert).
- Live kill-based failover soak on a real fs (~/tmp), release + ASAN builds:
  zero committed-JOB loss every completed round (jobs 3->12 monotonic).
- The 6-round CHAOTIC soak does not run clean to round 6 (fails ~round 4), but a
  baseline comparison against pre-Phase-3 binaries (commit 21e26a1) fails round 4
  IDENTICALLY (election stall / reconverge). The round-4 committed-prefix
  divergence at LSN 9 is the documented pre-existing bug-851/795 family
  (chaotic-failover silent divergence), present before Phase 3 and out of scope
  for this spec. Logged as bug-1225 (baseline-confirmed).

Also: make the xce-test-ha soak driver's controller/xce_test paths
env-overridable (XCE_HA_BIN / XCE_HA_XT, backward-compatible defaults) — used to
run the baseline binaries through the same driver for the regression comparison.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6fDCtXkkEgupu7rUah1y2
2026-06-27 03:04:23 +00:00
d2830ce514 test(raft-drive-async): receiver-side dispatch liveness integration tests (task 3.4b)
With the dispatch flags flipped ON in-test, prove the three receiver-side
liveness properties (production defaults stay OFF):

- P1: while a snapshot (and config-push) transfer is parked in flight on the
  slow lane, another endpoint's peer-control message is still processed
  promptly on the vtask pool (different thread), with the transfer still
  parked — the offloaded transfer does not block the drive path.
- P2: a peer-control ack (classified VTASK_LIVENESS) runs promptly even while
  the pool is saturated to the LivenessAdmission reservation boundary with
  REQ_BLOCK tasks (one more REQ_BLOCK fast-rejects with -E_XCE_NOT_READY,
  proving real saturation). Narrowed to the liveness-dispatch-under-saturation
  assertion; commit-advance itself is covered by the commit-engine tests.
- P3: while one endpoint's peer-control body is parked (holding a worker + that
  ep busy), another endpoint's body runs concurrently on a different worker —
  per-endpoint FIFO does not serialize across endpoints.

All deterministic (cond-var gates, bounded polls). Fixed a flaky teardown-race
hang (bug-1224): the tests released a parked vtask body then immediately called
the cancel-based vtaskmgr_fini while the just-released body was still unwinding
(P2's REQ_BLOCK bodies racing blk_lock teardown the worst). Fix adds end-of-body
completion counters polled to the full expected count before fini, so every
pool body has fully returned (worker idle) before the cancel. slowlane_fini is
graceful (join) so the lane side was already safe.

Verified: 5/5 deterministic isolated runs; full controller suite EXIT=0;
ASan-clean. Completes task 3.4 (3.4a UAF fix + 3.4b tests); the production
flag-flip remains deferred to after the 4.1 partition soak + 4.2 regression
sweep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6fDCtXkkEgupu7rUah1y2
2026-06-27 00:36:22 +00:00
6d510d8cf4 fix(raft-drive-async): endpoint-quiescence for bug-1197 vote-ep teardown (task 3.4a)
When the (still-default-OFF) peer-control dispatch flag is ON,
raft_cb_become_follower runs as a vtask pool worker and frees every peer
vote-ep while other pool workers may still hold those eps' data — a UAF
(bug-1197). This makes that path quiescence-safe so the flag can later be
flipped ON (deferred to the 4.x prod-flip gate; production stays OFF here).

Mechanism (no libxce-wide endpoint refcount; reuses the existing per-ep FIFO +
busy serialization):

- Deferred teardown-as-vtask: the loser loop, when dispatch is ON and the pool
  is wired, does per vote-ep endpoint_mark_tearing_down -> iomgr_unmonitor ->
  enqueue a VTASK_IO/VTASK_LIVENESS teardown vtask bound to that ep. Per-ep busy
  FIFO makes it run strictly after any in-flight/queued same-ep peer-control
  vtask; the body NULLs iod->ep before endpoint_fini+free(ep) to disarm
  run_task's post-body endpoint_unblock_tasks (which would touch the freed
  ep->lock). OFF / pool-unwired path is byte-for-byte the legacy endpoint_fini.

- RCU-like drain closes the dispatch/teardown TOCTOU window: new _Atomic int
  endpoint_t.dispatch_inflight (+ tearing_down:1 bit). The ON dispatch brackets
  its flag-check+enqueue with fetch_add/fetch_sub (seq_cst);
  endpoint_mark_tearing_down sets the flag under ep->lock, releases, then spins
  until dispatch_inflight drains to 0. So every dispatch that read the flag
  false finishes its enqueue before mark returns (FIFO-before the teardown
  vtask); any later dispatch reads the flag set and drops the packet. ep->lock
  is deliberately NOT held across the enqueue (it inverts with the taskq lock in
  vtask_eligible); the counter is the lock-free handshake. Drain is bounded: the
  held window is just a calloc + non-blocking enqueue on the single io_worker.

Still open before the production flag flip (4.x): the borrowed-ep race in
snapshot_lane_fn/configpush_lane_fn is distinct (slowlane thread vs io_worker
RDHUP teardown, not the vtask-pool FIFO) and needs its own per-standby-ep
discipline.

Tests: test_ha_vep_teardown.c — 5 ASan tests (ordering, late-event drop, run_task
unblock disarm, OFF-path unchanged, deterministic mark-drains-inflight-dispatch).
xcelib_test 282/0; controller_unit_test EXIT=0; ASan-clean. Adversarial
cpp-review: no CRITICAL/HIGH; handshake formally sound, flag-ON path race-free.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6fDCtXkkEgupu7rUah1y2
2026-06-26 17:37:26 +00:00
bd02064ebc feat(raft-drive-async): offload requester-less config-push to slow lane (task 3.3)
push_config_transport_only spawns one thread per standby then joins them with a
CONF_PUSH_TIMEOUT_MS bounded wait — blocking the caller. On the requester-less
drive-thread paths (promotion + heartbeat convergence) that wait stalls the
io_worker. Route those through ha_config_push_offloadable, gated by
g_drive_async_configpush_offload (default OFF → inline, byte-for-byte legacy;
ON → slow lane, non-blocking).

Flag ON deep-copies the config bytes + sha into a lane ctx (caller keeps owning
and freeing its own buffer); a single cluster-wide single-flight guard
(ha_state_t.configpush_inflight scalar CAS + lane key=1) bounds it to one
config-push fan-out in flight; the in-flight flag is cleared on every terminal
path (two alloc failures, -EEXIST, hard submit error, lane completion). Send
body factored into ha_config_push_do_send.

Three requester-less drive-thread call sites converted: raft_cb_become_leader
(promotion), the HA_REPL_PUSH_CONFIG heartbeat case, and the direct-CTRL_PRIMARY
FSM promotion branch. The admin-upgrade barrier (push_config_to_standbys, has a
waiting requester) and join.c are untouched.

Lands DORMANT like tasks 3.1/3.2: the lane reads c->ha.standby_endpoints and
writes those borrowed standby endpoints, racing io_worker RDHUP teardown if run
off-thread (bug-1197 family). Flag OFF keeps push+teardown serialized on the
io_worker. Task 3.4 flips this ON together with the snapshot and peerctrl flags
after establishing endpoint-lifetime discipline.

Tests (controller suite EXIT=0): test_configpush_offload_runs_on_lane,
test_configpush_inline_when_flag_off, test_configpush_offload_dedups.
Adversarial cpp-review: no CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM findings.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6fDCtXkkEgupu7rUah1y2
2026-06-26 16:05:54 +00:00
6c0523b69b feat(raft-drive-async): snapshot SlowLane offload + WAL-trim cursor guard (task 3.2)
Part B (LIVE, default-ON): trim_wal_segments now bounds WAL-segment deletion
by repl_trim_lsn(&p->repl, active_seg_lsn) = min(active segment LSN, every
active standby acked_lsn, every valid disconnected-slot last_disconnected_lsn),
after repl_expire_disconnect_slots ages out stale slot guards. floor <=
active_seg_lsn structurally, so the guard can only preserve more segments,
never delete one a live standby still needs — closes the bug-795/828
trim-vs-cursor race for connected/recently-disconnected standbys (bug-1147
stopgap; empty/cursor=0 join still needs entity-bearing snapshots).

Part A (DORMANT, g_drive_async_snapshot_offload default OFF): ha_snapshot_send_
dispatch routes HA_REPL_SEND_SNAPSHOT inline (flag OFF — byte-for-byte legacy,
on io_worker) or to slowlane_submit+snapshot_lane_fn (flag ON). Send body
factored into ha_snapshot_do_send. Per-peer single-flight via
ha_state_t.snapshot_inflight[] CAS + slowlane key; in-flight flag cleared on
all four terminal paths, mirroring the reconnect offload (task 2.1).

Lands dormant like task 3.1: snapshot_lane_fn borrows a standby endpoint it
does not own, so flag-ON would race io_worker RDHUP teardown (cross-thread UAF,
bug-1197 family). Flag OFF keeps send+teardown serialized on the io_worker.
Task 3.4 is the single gate that flips both this and the peerctrl flag ON after
establishing endpoint-lifetime discipline; bug-1198 stays open by design until
then. The offload flag was initially authored default-ON (would ship the UAF)
and corrected to OFF in ha.c and the ha.h accessor doc (bug-1210).

Tests (controller 196/0, 0 new leaks): test_snapshot_offload_runs_on_lane,
test_snapshot_inline_when_flag_off, test_snapshot_offload_dedups_per_peer,
test_trim_guard_preserves_standby_segments,
test_trim_without_standbys_proceeds_normally. Adversarial cpp-review: GO.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S6fDCtXkkEgupu7rUah1y2
2026-06-26 15:43:24 +00:00
e07667ff9b feat(raft-drive-async): offload delaymgr peer reconnect to slow lane (task 2.1)
Heartbeat timer detects a disconnected peer, CAS-acquires a per-peer
single-flight flag, slowlane_submits the bounded connect, and returns — the
delaymgr never blocks on connect. Lane worker (reconnect_lane_fn) does the
bounded endpoint_connect + lock-guarded iomgr_monitor; flag cleared on all
terminal paths (incl. -EEXIST race fix). Default-ON kill-switch retains the
inline path for TDD-RED/fallback. Never self-terminates on failure. 2.2 adds
the inbound/outbound race + failure hardening (documented seam). 196/0 green.
2026-06-26 08:08:31 +00:00
a36234a103 feat(raft-drive-async): LivenessAdmission pool reservation + commit fold (tasks 1.6/1.7)
vtaskmgr gains vtask_class_t (LIVENESS/LIVE_BLOCK/REQ_BLOCK) + a pool-level
blocking reservation: REQ_BLOCK fast-rejects -XCE_ERR_NOT_READY past
n_vcpus-R; LIVENESS never gated (deadlock-freedom). commit_submit folds its
inflight_waits onto the pool via commit_set_pool; production wired in
cluster.c phase2 (vtaskmgr_set_liveness_reserved(R) + commit_set_pool).
Lock order p->lock->ce->lock->blk_lock. Dormant until 3.1. Commit suites
38/30/22/38 green; lib 282/0, controller 196/0, ASAN clean. Phase 1 done.
2026-06-26 07:43:19 +00:00
0781c6c027 feat(raft-drive-async): bound peer connect (O_NONBLOCK+poll), close tasks 1.3/1.4/1.5
socket_connect sets O_NONBLOCK before connect and bounds the attempt with
poll(timeout); new connect_timeout_ms param (0=DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS);
all 5 callers updated (ha.c x3, client.c, xcectx.c). Revalidation Trigger:
shared netio helper signature changed. Broad build links all components;
xcelib_test 278/0, controller_unit_test 194/0. 1.4/1.5 unit tests satisfied
by the TDD output of 1.2/1.3 (test_slowlane.c, test_netio_bounded_connect.c).
2026-06-26 07:10:53 +00:00
5650acd375 feat(raft-drive-async): SlowLane bounded executor for long blocking I/O (task 1.2)
Dedicated-pthread pool isolated from the vtask pool; non-blocking slowlane_submit
(0 enqueued / -EEXIST deduped / -EAGAIN cap-full-deferred), admission cap on
running tasks, per-key in-flight dedup, run-exactly-once, drain+join fini. Wired
into controller lifecycle (dormant; consumers land in 2.x/3.x). 7 unit tests,
mutation-verified cap+dedup; full suite 194/0 green, 15x ASAN.
2026-06-26 05:24:00 +00:00
729055a37f feat(raft-drive-async): add drive-async config constants + liveness-reservation helper (task 1.1)
drive_async_liveness_reserved = max(1, min(n_peers-1, n_vcpus-1)) — single
source of truth for VTASK_LIVENESS_RESERVED (deadlock-freedom floor applied
last). New DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS / DEFAULT_SLOWLANE_* constants. Resolved
reservation logged at init; under-provisioned (n_vcpus<n_peers) clamp WARNs
loudly, never self-terminates. 8 unit cases, mutation-verified.
2026-06-26 04:58:07 +00:00
13c43c23a4 test(ha-term-safety): controller Election-Safety regression for bug-1095/1096 + absorb into spec
Adds two controller-level regression tests driving the production raft_on_vote_reply
via ha->raft (test_ha_election.c): a duplicated vote-grant from one peer must not
double-count toward quorum (bug-1095) and a stale-term reply must be dropped
(bug-1096) — both asserted on role/promotion (no two leaders per term). Formally
absorbs bug-1095/1096 into the ha-term-safety spec (Implementation Note) mapping to
its Requirement 1 / Objective; the raft.c fix (b5b7e01) is owned there with
protocol-suite regression at both the libxce (test_vote_reply_*) and controller
(test_ha_election) levels. No production source changed.
2026-06-25 02:44:29 +00:00
95629797f8 feat(raft-sim-conformance): optional TLC-consumable trace export, default-off (task 8.1) 2026-06-24 16:49:36 +00:00
ffeb7c2cf5 docs(raft-sim-conformance): reflect runtime fault-injection flag (vs compile-time macro) in design 2026-06-24 16:36:54 +00:00
90197f8595 test(raft-sim-conformance): negative test proving oracle teeth, both directions (task 7.2) 2026-06-24 16:30:20 +00:00
62523892d9 feat(raft-sim-conformance): runtime fault-injection switch (G1 term-stamp, G3 truncate) (task 7.1) 2026-06-24 16:15:13 +00:00
7087dc19d9 docs(raft-sim-conformance): mark task 6.2 done — conformance batch ASAN/UBSAN-clean 2026-06-24 16:04:29 +00:00
47f68032b7 test(raft-sim-conformance): randomized M-seed sweep + all scenarios, zero violations (task 6.1) 2026-06-24 15:59:22 +00:00
a2933c274d feat(raft-sim-conformance): stale-rejoin scenario, bug-851 G5 term adoption via AE (task 5.5) 2026-06-24 15:50:13 +00:00
b1f289d2cb feat(raft-sim-conformance): Figure-8 commit-safety scenario + restore dropped 5.3 impl (task 5.4)
Adds raft_sim_scenario_figure8: a previous-term entry on a quorum under a
new-term leader is NOT committed until a current-term entry commits (library-
gated by raft_advance_commit; verified by a mutation test). Also restores the
raft_sim_scenario_drop_dup_reorder implementation that commit e445404 (task 5.3)
silently dropped from raft_sim.c (a stray git checkout reverted the uncommitted
impl), which had left the lib build broken with an undefined reference.

Build green: test_sim_5_3_drop_dup_reorder + test_sim_5_4_figure8 both PASS.
2026-06-24 15:38:01 +00:00
e445404439 feat(raft-sim-conformance): drop/duplicate/reorder adversarial scenario (task 5.3) 2026-06-24 15:09:31 +00:00
6976392d77 feat(raft-sim-conformance): restart-churn adversarial scenario (task 5.2) 2026-06-24 14:47:25 +00:00
7d0964dd16 feat(raft-sim-conformance): partition/heal adversarial scenario (task 5.1) 2026-06-24 14:34:22 +00:00
b844e75f3b feat(raft-sim-conformance): raft_sim_run + deterministic replay (task 4.4) 2026-06-24 14:14:15 +00:00
5f67be4fa3 test(raft-sim-conformance): conformance Restart persistence test (task 4.3) 2026-06-24 14:05:19 +00:00
e15bbf8190 feat(raft-sim-conformance): seeded scheduler raft_sim_step + per-step invariant check (task 4.2)
Harness surfaced a real upstream raft.c split-brain bug (bug-1095/1096,
bug-851 family) in raft_on_vote_reply: counter-based vote tally double-counts
a duplicated vote-response and no stale-term drop -> two leaders same term.
Out of this spec's boundary (raft.c protocol); recorded as Implementation Note.
2026-06-24 13:37:03 +00:00
90e7e9c999 feat(raft-sim-conformance): action trace recorder + raft_sim_dump_trace (task 4.1) 2026-06-24 13:10:31 +00:00
f0be46fb32 feat(raft-sim-conformance): raft_sim_check_all first-failure composition (task 3.5) 2026-06-24 13:00:10 +00:00
a38d9a7271 feat(raft-sim-conformance): State Machine Safety invariant checker (task 3.4) 2026-06-24 12:51:58 +00:00
63a9740c85 feat(raft-sim-conformance): Leader Completeness invariant checker (task 3.3) 2026-06-24 12:44:18 +00:00
d9b5fd51e0 test(raft-sim-conformance): focused Log Matching checker test for R3.2 (task 3.2) 2026-06-24 12:35:36 +00:00
25b14a6dca feat(raft-sim-conformance): Election Safety invariant checker (task 3.1) 2026-06-24 12:28:16 +00:00
b450e60d13 feat(raft-sim-conformance): bag-only Drop/Duplicate/Reorder ops (task 2.2) 2026-06-24 12:19:15 +00:00
ae4495104a feat(raft-sim-conformance): bag push/deliver routes vote+AE RPCs through library handlers (task 2.1) 2026-06-24 12:10:11 +00:00
631854303c feat(raft-sim-conformance): seeded PRNG + in-memory adapter callbacks + conformance init (task 1.2) 2026-06-24 11:55:11 +00:00
35c012ddc2 feat(raft-sim-conformance): add conformance-harness data types to raft.h (task 1.1) 2026-06-24 11:40:38 +00:00
2b15dfb67a docs(raft-sim-conformance): fix mermaid pipe + semicolon syntax in design diagrams
Mermaid parse errors in design.md's diagrams:
- Literal `|` in flowchart node labels is read as an edge-label delimiter:
  system-flow `term | 0` -> `term &#124; 0`; checker `|{i:...}|` ->
  `&#124;{i:...}&#124;` (entity renders as a literal `|`, meaning preserved).
- `;` is a mermaid statement separator and truncated the text it appeared in:
  sequence msgs `commit_index += ; apply()` -> `commit_index advanced, apply()`
  and `(R5); halt` -> `(R5), then halt`; flowchart label `responses;<br/>` ->
  `responses,<br/>`.

Valid edge-label pipes (-->|violation|) and all `;` in prose/tables outside the
mermaid fences are unchanged. All three diagrams now render.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MSxwb2Xt5F84ATgiAZnH8V
2026-06-24 10:43:48 +00:00
af099dca3e test(ha-convergence-recovery): close Task 8 — live /xce-test-ha 8-round PASS
Ran the live 3-node E2E (the last open task). Result:
  PASS: 8 rounds, 30 jobs submitted, zero job loss; all 3 nodes led
  (ctrl-1,ctrl-2,ctrl-3)  (exit 0)

Live-covered: kill-primary -> promoted standby owns all confirmed jobs
(zero loss across 8 failovers, jobs 3->30, expect-job ok each round);
restart ex-primary -> converged rejoin, 3-of-3 each round, no phantom jobs;
deterministic leadership coverage (ctrl-3 forced via RequestVote-freshness
fence). The soak also served as the live regression for bug-1077 (~40
failover client round-trips, no SEGV) after rebuilding the controller (the
deployed binaries predated that fix).

Not exercised live (remain unit-covered, tasks 2/4/5): withhold-ACK barrier
single-outcome (test_demotion_convergence) and isolate/heal quorum-WARN
(test_convergence_verification). All 8 tasks now [x]; spec closed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MSxwb2Xt5F84ATgiAZnH8V
2026-06-24 10:17:11 +00:00
05febbc9a7 docs(specs): gap re-validation 2026-06-24 (5 HA/raft specs)
/kiro-validate-gap gap-focused sweep. Per-spec gap analysis written to each
spec's research.md (3 new, 2 appended), grounded in file:line evidence:

- config-upgrade-snapshot (new): real open gap — transport + (term,lsn) marker
  + COW substrate exist, but the entity-bearing snapshot PAYLOAD does not
  (16-byte LSN sentinel). HARD-blocked on entity-bearing-snapshots. Closes
  bug-857. Effort L (XL incl. blocker) / Risk High.
- raft-commit-safety (new): CLOSED — G4 Figure-8 commit (raft.c:733) + G6 vote
  freshness (raft.c:157) done, full sim coverage; the "(0,0) stopgap / broken
  build" concern is stale (build green, real vote tuple at cluster.c:435).
- raft-sim-conformance (new): mostly open — raft.tla is reference-only; only
  1 of 4 invariants (Log Matching) checked in code. Missing PRNG/replay,
  message-fault bag, scheduler, 3 invariant checkers, fault switches,
  scenarios. Effort L / Risk Medium.
- ha-repl-hardening (append): RESCOPE/superseded — 31/33 EARS closed; Req 2.3
  + Req 6 obsolete (CTRL_PRIMARY_COMMITTING removed). Residual: docs only.
- ha-convergence-recovery (append): done bar Task 8 (live E2E); bug-1028
  post-failover availability resolved 2026-06-23.

Skipped ha-elect-ctx-lifecycle (no requirements.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01MSxwb2Xt5F84ATgiAZnH8V
2026-06-24 10:04:06 +00:00
4338a97d0e docs(steering): sync HA protocol with ha-term-safety — per-entry term, (term,lsn) reconcile, commit-source ownership, bug-828 truncate rule 2026-06-23 04:48:06 +00:00
51d8a4c981 docs(ha-term-safety): record bug-828 FIXED (premature pre-election truncate) + bug-854 residual 2026-06-23 04:08:18 +00:00
ff869e4fc0 docs(ha-term-safety): characterize remaining bug-828 slice (election watermark tangle) 2026-06-23 03:15:23 +00:00
14c41cb298 docs(ha-term-safety): record Option A resolution + newly-exposed bug-828 failover job-loss 2026-06-23 00:29:06 +00:00
df4bc4f86a test(ha-term-safety): live-harness fixes + record bug-991 (commit stall via catch-up + 2.4 ceiling)
Ran clean_failover_preservation.sh on a real fs ($HOME/tmp/xce-ha-deploy, ext4).
PAYLOAD run CONFIRMED bug-990 fixed live: standbys persist the leader's real
term (2) for the committed prefix; walcompare OK.

Harness fixes: robust failover detection (any post-kill CTRL_PRIMARY promotion,
45s settle) + a wait-for-commit-before-kill gate (jobsub returns on accept not
commit, so the prior harness raced replication vs kill).

That commit-wait gate exposed bug-991: on a STABLE cluster, jobs replicate to
all members (durable LSN 5) but committed_lsn pins at 1. Catch-up-delivered
entries don't advance the library commit_index, so task-2.4's ceiling
min(durable-majority, raft_commit_index) starves commit below the durable
majority. A real regression from the commit-source switch (2.4+3.3), invisible
to the steady-state-only unit tests.
2026-06-22 21:10:48 +00:00
5fa394f598 docs(ha-term-safety): record final verification state — build+unit gate green (175/0); 5.2/5.4/5.5 live runs env-blocked 2026-06-22 15:48:53 +00:00
efe621c124 feat(ha-term-safety): retire term-0 repl_broadcast live send; carry leader term on replication (task 3.4)
Closes bug-990: the live replicator repl_broadcast wire-encoded term=0
(entry.term was never set), so standbys persisted hdr.term=0 and took the
legacy direct-apply path instead of the library (term,lsn) intake. Now the
live broadcast and catch-up streamer carry the leader's real term + AE prev
tuple; ha_apply_wal_catchup_entry routes every term-carrying entry through
raft_on_append_entries_request -> on_persist_entry (leader term stamped),
retiring the term-0 direct-apply. Standbys now persist the leader's real term
and reconcile by (term,lsn); the live commit chain is end-to-end.

848/849/850 + persist-before-ACK + commit-barrier + bug-960 preserved.
Proven at integration level; the definitive live STRICT_TERM failover run is
env-blocked here (bug-924 overlayfs) and recommended on a real fs.
2026-06-22 15:45:14 +00:00
87242aa8e9 spec(ha-term-safety): add task 3.4 — retire term-0 repl_broadcast, drive live library send (closes bug-990) 2026-06-22 15:02:21 +00:00
fda15336d5 test(ha-term-safety): clean-failover live harness; mark 5.2/5.4/5.5 blocked on bug-990 (live-send retirement)
Task 5.2 harness deploys a real 3-node localhost cluster, kills the primary,
promotes a standby, restarts the old primary, and asserts convergence via
walcompare --committed + per-job expect-job. Runs GREEN in PAYLOAD mode
(guards 848/849/850 + no committed-job loss).

The term-identity half of R5.1 is BLOCKED (bug-990): live replication still
uses term-0 repl_broadcast; the library send loop (on_send_append_entries) has
no live caller, so standbys persist hdr.term=0. The live-send retirement was
deferred across tasks 3.2/3.3 into verification tasks 5.2/5.4 that cannot
contain the production cutover. Needs a dedicated implementation task.
2026-06-22 13:27:21 +00:00