myxce/.kiro/steering/error-handling.md
2026-08-10 17:51:51 +08:00

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# Error Handling Standards
## Philosophy
Fail fast with a consistent, machine-readable response. Handle errors at the controller boundary; let business logic return typed errors. Never silently swallow errors.
## Go API Response Pattern
All HTTP responses go through two helpers in `controllers/response.go` (a small number of legacy handlers, e.g. `FilesController` list/dir endpoints in `controllers/files.go`, still call `ctx.JSON()` directly — treat those as bugs to fix opportunistically, not as sanctioned exceptions):
```go
// Success (always HTTP 200)
ReturnSuccess(ctx, common.SUCCESS_CODE, common.SUCCESS_MSG, data)
// Error (HTTP status == code parameter)
ReturnError(ctx, common.ERROR_AUTH_CODE, common.ERROR_ACCESS_FORBIDDEN_MSG, nil)
ctx.Abort() // always Abort() after ReturnError in middleware
return // always return immediately after ReturnError in handlers
```
**The early-return pattern is non-negotiable.** Every error path ends with `ReturnError(...); return`. `ctx.Abort()` should always follow in middleware since gin does not stop the handler chain on its own — `middleware/whitelist.go`'s `WhitelistIPMiddleware` currently has one path that returns without calling `ctx.Abort()` (invalid client IP); that is a gap to close, not an accepted variant.
## HTTP Status Code Mapping
| Code | Constant | When to use |
|------|----------|-------------|
| 200 | `SUCCESS_CODE` | Successful operation |
| 201 | `CREATED` | Resource created |
| 400 | `INVALID_PARAMS_CODE` | Malformed or invalid input |
| 401 | `ERROR_AUTH_CHECK_TOKEN_CODE` | Missing or invalid JWT |
| 403 | `ERROR_AUTH_CODE` | Valid JWT but insufficient permission |
| 404 | `ERROR_NOT_FOUND_CODE` | Resource not found |
| 429 | `ERROR_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS_CODE` | Rate limit exceeded |
| 500 | `ERROR_CODE` | Unexpected server error |
All code constants are defined in `common/common.go`. Add new codes there — do not inline numeric literals in handlers.
## Structured Logging with Zap
Log at the call site before returning an error. Use typed field helpers — never `fmt.Sprintf` in zap calls.
```go
// Preferred pattern
logger.Error("rate limit exceeded",
zap.String("path", path),
zap.String("client_ip", ctx.ClientIP()),
zap.Int("errorcode", code),
)
// For error values
logger.Error("validate token error", zap.Error(err))
// For complex types
logger.Debug("permissions resolved", zap.Any("permsWithType", permsWithType))
```
**Log levels**:
- `Error` — operation failed, client or server fault
- `Warn` — recoverable edge case (e.g., retried operation succeeded)
- `Info` — key lifecycle events (server start, config load)
- `Debug` — diagnostic detail, disabled in production
**Never log**: JWT tokens, passwords, secret keys, or full request bodies containing sensitive data.
## C Error Propagation
Return negative errno-style codes for C daemon errors. Use the `errnox.h` definitions from `src/include/xce/`. Check and propagate immediately — do not continue on error:
```c
int rc = xce_send_request(&req);
if (rc < 0) {
log_error("send_request failed: %d", rc);
return rc;
}
```
**Controller daemons MUST NEVER self-terminate on an operational condition.** A controller exits only on a genuine crash or an admin/supervisor kill — never via `exit()`/`_exit()`/`abort()`/`tlog_exit()` as a designed response to an operational failure (unrecoverable/corrupt WAL, lost quorum, unreachable peer, failed catch-up). "Fail loud" here means: log a loud operator-visible ERROR (with the actionable boundary), enter a permanent non-promotable/fenced state, **stay alive, and keep retrying** so the node self-heals when conditions recover — never terminate (a self-exited controller needs manual recovery and degrades quorum meanwhile). `assert()`/abort is reserved for genuine programming-invariant violations only. Authoritative statement: `ha-async-io.md` (process-lifecycle invariant) and `src/controller/CLAUDE.md` ("Process Lifecycle"); precedent: `ha-commit-durability`'s `persist_recover_loud_fence_if_unrecoverable` + `recovery_unrecoverable` sticky fence.
## Input Validation Pattern
Validate at the controller boundary in two steps: bind the request body with `utils.BindJSONStrict`, then pass the already-bound struct pointer to a `preCheck{Resource}Request()` helper before touching services:
```go
func (j JobController) CreateJob(ctx *gin.Context) {
var req models.JobSubmitRequest
if err := utils.BindJSONStrict(ctx, &req); err != nil {
ReturnError(ctx, common.ERROR_CODE, err.Error(), nil)
return
}
parsedIndices, err := preCheckJobRequest(&req)
if err != nil {
ReturnError(ctx, common.ERROR_CODE, err.Error(), nil)
return
}
// ... service call
}
```
Keep `preCheck*` functions in the same file as the handler. They take the already-bound request struct pointer (never `ctx`) and return `error`, or `(extra, error)` when the caller also needs derived data — e.g. `preCheckJobRequest(req *models.JobSubmitRequest) ([]int, error)`, `preCheckHostControlRequest(req *models.HostControlRequest) (bool, error)`. They never bind the request themselves and never return the request struct — binding is always the separate `utils.BindJSONStrict` step shown above. Note that handlers choose the response code for bind/precheck failures per-endpoint; `common.ERROR_CODE` (500) and `common.INVALID_PARAMS_CODE` (400) both appear in practice depending on the handler.