Investigation & fixes (failover committed-job loss): - root-cause bug-851 on an owned 3-node cluster: chaotic failover causes silent committed-prefix divergence (WAL hdr.term always 0; two leaders per term; no (term,lsn) reconcile). Evidence in repro-851/ + INVESTIGATION. - live-validated fixes 848/849/850 (recovery-on-promotion, advertise real applied_lsn, persist-layer contiguity guard); add waldump WAL inspector. Specs (strict raft.tla conformance — library owns the log): - TLA-gap-analysis.md: impl vs raft/raft.tla, gaps G1-G6. - raft-log-replication, raft-commit-safety, raft-sim-conformance: extend src/lib/raft to own log/commit/verification via callbacks (specs generated, cross-spec review passed). - ha-term-safety: controller-side adapter + config marker (R1-R7); design done. - config-upgrade-snapshot: R8 descoped here (deps entity-bearing-snapshots, bug-857). - roadmap + buglog (851/854/857) + .wolf knowledge updated.
2.7 KiB
Brief: raft-sim-conformance
Problem
Once the library owns the full Raft protocol (election via raft-library, log via raft-log-replication, commit safety via raft-commit-safety), XCE needs an independent verification harness that proves the consensus core conforms to raft/raft.tla — without a live cluster, threads, or sockets. Today raft_sim.c exists but only exercises the election half; there is no oracle for the four Raft safety invariants. This is the "use the verified spec to help" payoff: a deterministic regression oracle that would have caught bug-851 before it shipped.
Approach
Extend src/lib/raft/raft_sim.c into a conformance harness that drives N library instances purely in-process through transitions equivalent to the raft.tla Next actions, and continuously checks the TLA+ safety invariants.
TLA+ actions to drive (raft.tla Next, line 454)
Restart, Timeout, RequestVote, BecomeLeader, ClientRequest, AppendEntries, AdvanceCommitIndex, Receive (vote/AE request+response, UpdateTerm, drop-stale), DuplicateMessage, DropMessage. The harness owns a message bag and per-node state mirroring raft.tla's variables.
Invariants asserted every step (the four Raft safety properties)
- Election Safety — at most one leader per term.
- Log Matching — if two logs share an entry at
(index, term), all prior entries are identical. - Leader Completeness — an entry committed in term T is present in every leader's log for terms > T.
- State Machine Safety — no two nodes apply different commands at the same index.
Scope
- In: a deterministic, seedable driver (randomized + targeted scenarios: partitions, restarts, message drop/dup/reorder, Figure-8); per-step invariant checks; failure reproduction (print the action trace that broke an invariant); CI-runnable test target alongside the existing library tests. Optionally: emit a trace consumable by TLC, or compare against TLC-generated traces of
raft.tla. - Out: the protocol implementation itself (owned by the three upstream specs); the live controller /
/xce-deploy-haintegration (that isha-term-safety's chaotic-failover regression); config markers/snapshot.
Verification
The harness IS the verification. Acceptance: it reproduces a bug-851-class divergence on a deliberately-broken build (e.g. term stamping disabled, or (term,lsn) truncation removed) and passes on the correct build; it runs M randomized seeds in CI with zero invariant violations.
Dependencies
raft-log-replication, raft-commit-safety (HARD — the harness checks invariants over the log + commit behaviour they add). Complements ha-term-safety's live regression (this is the in-process oracle; that is the end-to-end one).