Rongsong Shen
d26ff8870d
The buglog was one 27K-line JSON file whose fields covered only symptom,
root cause and fix, as free text: 2% of entries named the code version a
bug was found on, 12% the build profile, 36% a way to reproduce, and 58% of
the file was OpenWolf hook auto-detections ("Missing guard clause",
"Function not marked async" on .md files).
- .claude/skills/buglog/bug-record.md: the record standard. Eight
sections (Summary as the title, Description, Environment, Reproduction;
Root cause, Fix, Verification, References once fixed), each with the
content it must contain -- e.g. Environment needs the OS, the libc the
failing binary loads (from its ELF interpreter: glibc 2.42 in the nix
shell vs 2.40 on the host), toolchain, build profile and commit.
- .wolf/bugs/<id>.md: 500 records migrated from buglog.json; every field
verified to round-trip. They carry legacy: true and an explicit "not
recorded" where the old log had no such field; component derived from
file paths, severity from keywords (else unknown), fix_commits from
hashes in status_note/fix that git resolves (91 of 463 fixed).
- .wolf/buglog-archive.json: the 710 hook auto-detections, verbatim.
- .wolf/buglog.json is now an index generated from the records, keeping
the fields OpenWolf's hooks and `openwolf bug search` read.
- scripts/buglog.py rewritten: new (template + Environment collected from
the machine and --binary), check, status (refuses a status the record
doesn't support; fixed needs Root cause, Fix, Verification and
--commit hashes git resolves), note, recur, set, show, list, triage,
env, index. 29 unittest cases in scripts/tests/test_buglog.py.
- scripts/git-hooks/pre-commit runs `check --staged`: incomplete staged
records, a legacy record hand-changed to fixed without the fix-time
sections, a new record claiming legacy: true, or a stale index refuse
the commit.
- scripts/gitea-sync.py reads the records: issue body = the record's
sections plus linked fix commits (origin remote, GITEA_COMMIT_REPO to
override), and a body hash so an issue's text is refreshed when the
record changes.
- bug-1866 rewritten to the full standard as the worked example.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.4 KiB
| id | status | status_updated | status_note | component | severity | timestamp | last_seen | occurrences | files | tags | related | legacy | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| bug-1498 | fixed | 2026-09-24 | scheduler | security | 2026-08-05T00:00:00Z | 2026-09-19T09:00:00Z | 1 |
|
|
true |
bug-1498: test_toctou_hardlink_planted_after_validation_rejected FAILED: Expected Non-NULL -- fgets() on the…
Description
test_toctou_hardlink_planted_after_validation_rejected FAILED: Expected Non-NULL -- fgets() on the outside 'victim' file returned NULL (file was 0 bytes) after the TOCTOU regression test ran, even though sched_record_start()/the reproduced open-hardening sequence both correctly REJECTED the hard-link swap and returned an error.
Environment
Not recorded (migrated from buglog.json).
Reproduction
Not recorded (migrated from buglog.json).
Root cause
sched_record_start()'s TOCTOU-hardened open used O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW. O_TRUNC truncates the target atomically as PART OF the open(2) syscall itself, before any userspace code -- including the fstat()+st_nlink==1 safety check right after open() -- ever runs. Against a hard-linked victim (same inode as the outside file, no symlink involved so O_NOFOLLOW never triggers), open() succeeds and O_TRUNC immediately zeroes the shared inode's content; the subsequent st_nlink>1 check then correctly rejects and closes the fd, but the outside victim file was already corrupted by that point. The check ran too late to matter -- classic 'check-after-side-effect' TOCTOU-adjacent bug, caught by the test's own outside-file-content assertion (added specifically to prove containment, not just that the return code was negative).
Fix
Removed O_TRUNC from the initial open() flags (now O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW). After fstat()+st_nlink==1 passes, explicitly call ftruncate(fd, 0) to get the same truncate-on-legitimate-overwrite behavior, but only once safety is verified. Same fix applied to the test's own toctou_hardened_open() helper (a verbatim reproduction of the production sequence, used because a literal multi-threaded race against sched_record_start()'s few-instruction internal window would be flaky).
Verification
Not recorded (migrated from buglog.json).
References
Not recorded (migrated from buglog.json).