1.9 KiB
1.9 KiB
| id | status | status_updated | status_note | component | severity | timestamp | last_seen | occurrences | files | tags | related | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| bug-1950 | open | 2026-10-10 | newly logged | apiserver | security | 2026-10-10T08:15:11Z | 2026-10-10T08:15:11Z | 1 |
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bug-1950: apiserver JWT validation does not pin the signing algorithm
Description
Observed: (source reading, .kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md (P0); to be confirmed by a failing test before the fix)
The middleware's parse callback returns the key without checking token.Method (middleware/validatehandler.go:102-104), unlike the other parse path (controllers/auth.go:186).
Expected: Only the configured HMAC algorithm is accepted.
Impact: Security hardening: algorithm-confusion class of attacks is not ruled out.
Found by: review: .kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md (P0)
Environment
- OS: no /etc/os-release; Docker container; NixOS kernel; kernel Linux 6.18.33 x86_64
- libc: glibc 2.42-47 (interpreter /nix/store/wb6rhpznjfczwlwx23zmdrrw74bayxw4-glibc-2.42-47/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2)
- Toolchain: gcc (GCC) 15.2.0, meson 1.9.1
- Build: asan (xce.build)
- Code: scheduler-framework @ 94472ee3-dirty
- Deployment: any (found by source reading; the failing test that confirms it is named in Verification)
Reproduction
- Present a token signed with another algorithm family; validation does not reject it on the algorithm.
- Frequency: deterministic (by code reading; confirmed by the RED test of the fix)
- Evidence: the code sites quoted in Description; no logs kept.
Root cause
TODO: required for fixed/partial
Fix
TODO: required for fixed/partial
Verification
- Test: TODO: name + file; RED before the fix, GREEN after
- Suites: TODO: suite results and build profile
- Live: TODO: soak/deploy run, or n/a and why
References
- Related: none