myxce/.wolf/bugs/bug-1952.md
Rongsong Shen 2fed7a6e5f
docs(buglog): log P0 defects from the 2026-10-10 review (bug-1936..bug-1952)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-10 08:15:28 +00:00

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2.2 KiB
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---
id: "bug-1952"
status: "investigating"
status_updated: "2026-10-10"
status_note: "suspected from source reading; confirm with a test before fixing"
component: "apiserver"
severity: "security"
timestamp: "2026-10-10T08:15:16Z"
last_seen: "2026-10-10T08:15:16Z"
occurrences: 1
files: ["src/frontend/apiserver/controllers/users.go"]
tags: ["apiserver", "security", "rbac"]
related: []
---
# bug-1952: apiserver user role changes check a narrower rbac:control grant only against the target user
## Description
**Observed:** (source reading, `.kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md` (P0); to be confirmed by a failing test before the fix)
Suspected (needs verification): in add/delete roles for a user, a non-`all` `rbac:control` grant is only checked against "is the target me?" (`controllers/users.go:404-412,455-462`), so such a grant could let a user give itself `cluster_admin`. Built-in roles grant `rbac:control` only with domain `all` (`config/rbac.yaml:100-102`), so this is latent.
**Expected:** A user can never grant itself a role with more rights than it already holds.
**Impact:** Security (latent): privilege escalation through a custom role.
**Found by:** review: `.kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md` (P0)
## Environment
- OS: no /etc/os-release; Docker container; NixOS kernel; kernel Linux 6.18.33 x86_64
- libc: glibc 2.42-47 (interpreter /nix/store/wb6rhpznjfczwlwx23zmdrrw74bayxw4-glibc-2.42-47/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2)
- Toolchain: gcc (GCC) 15.2.0, meson 1.9.1
- Build: asan (xce.build)
- Code: scheduler-framework @ 94472ee3-dirty
- Deployment: any (found by source reading; the failing test that confirms it is named in Verification)
## Reproduction
1. Define a role with `rbac:control` scoped to `self`, assign it to a user, then add `cluster_admin` to that same user via the users API.
- Frequency: deterministic (by code reading; confirmed by the RED test of the fix)
- Evidence: the code sites quoted in Description; no logs kept.
## Root cause
TODO: required for fixed/partial
## Fix
TODO: required for fixed/partial
## Verification
- Test: TODO: name + file; RED before the fix, GREEN after
- Suites: TODO: suite results and build profile
- Live: TODO: soak/deploy run, or n/a and why
## References
- Related: none