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XCE Deployment Guide
Covers building and running all four daemons (controller, worker, scheduler, apiserver) and using xceadmin to author and push cluster configuration. Local dev/test deployment is fully automated; production process supervision (systemd/Docker/etc.) is not shipped in this repo — see Production Gaps before treating anything here as a production runbook.
Component Overview
xceadmin (Python CLI) --config push (TLS)--> controller (C, HA cluster, 1..N nodes)
^ ^
TLS join | | TLS join
| |
worker (C) scheduler (C)
^
CGO-linked libxce client (TCP, TLS, HA-aware)
|
apiserver (Go, REST) <-- xcecli (Go CLI, REST)
- controller (
xce_controller) — the only stateful daemon. Runs as 1 or 3+ nodes for HA (Raft-style election + replication). All other components are its clients. - worker (
xcecd) — one per compute host, runs jobs, joins a controller. - scheduler (
xce_scheduler) — job-to-node placement engine, joins a controller. - apiserver (
xce_apiserver) — Go REST API, joins the controller cluster as a client role (HostRole_apiserver) via a CGO-linkedlibxceclient, not a plain HTTP backend call. - xcecli — Go CLI, talks to
apiserverover REST, never touches the controller directly. - xceadmin — Python CLI, the only tool that compiles and pushes cluster configuration (
cluster.bin) to the controller. Separate concern from the four daemons above.
Every connection into the controller is TLS-encrypted — controller↔controller HA replication, and every libxce-client connection (worker→controller, scheduler→controller, apiserver→controller, xceadmin→controller). The controller runs a single iomgr bound to one server SSL_CTX (myapp.c); endpoint_accept()/endpoint_connect() in src/lib/netio.c have no plaintext code path at all — every accepted or outgoing socket is wrapped in SSL_new() before use. What's actually missing is client authentication and identity verification, not encryption: TLS verification is SSL_VERIFY_NONE everywhere in this codebase (server and client contexts alike, no client certificates), so any of these connections buys you encryption-in-transit, not authentication of who's on the other end.
Building
Two different Nix entry points, for two different jobs — don't conflate them:
nix develop --command— single-component dev builds./xce-buildis not a separate build system; it'snix develop ./src --command bash src/tools/xce-build.sh <component> <profile>under the hood, i.e. the hermetic dev shell driving meson/ninja for exactly one component. This is the reproducible way to build justcontroller, justworker, etc.nix build— whole-stack production packaging. A packaged Nix derivation, all-or-nothing (see Production Gaps item 6) — it always produces every daemon in oneresult/, never a single one.
# Dev loop, per component (debug + ASAN, runs tests) — wraps `nix develop ./src --command ...`
/xce-build lib # libxce only
/xce-build controller
/xce-build worker
/xce-build scheduler
/xce-build apiserver # also builds xcecli in the same pass (same meson step)
/xce-build xcecli # xcecli alone, if you don't need apiserver
/xce-build xceadmin
/xce-build # all components
# Profiles: /xce-build [component] [profile]
# asan (default) -> xce.build/ debug+ASAN, runs tests
# debug -> build.dbg/ -O0 -g3, no sanitizer, gdb-friendly
# release -> build.release/ -O3, no sanitizer, build-only
# Production packaging (Nix, whole stack only)
nix build .#xcecore # controller + worker + scheduler + apiserver + xceadmin + AppImage, one derivation
nix build .#xcecore_debug # same, debug + ASAN (this flake's default package)
nix build .#xcecli # xcecli, as its own separate Nix *package* derivation (Go-only, no C toolchain) — `/xce-build xcecli` above gets you the same binary without going through `nix build` at all
nix build .#xcecore is all-or-nothing — there is no per-daemon Nix target. It produces one result/bin/ containing xce_controller, xcecd (+ xcecd_worker, xcecd_virtual), xce_scheduler, xce_apiserver, the xceadmin venv wrapper, and xce (the AppImage dispatcher script, see below). nix build .#xcecli is the one genuinely separate target.
AppImage (xce-x86_64.AppImage, from nix build .#xcecore) wraps src/tools/appimage/entry.sh, a thin per-daemon dispatcher — it runs exactly one daemon per invocation, never the whole stack:
./xce-x86_64.AppImage controller --myname ctrl-1 --peers "ctrl-1=h1:9990,ctrl-2=h2:9990,ctrl-3=h3:9990" ...
./xce-x86_64.AppImage worker -c /etc/xce/worker.yaml
./xce-x86_64.AppImage scheduler --peers node1=h1:9990
./xce-x86_64.AppImage apiserver -d /opt/xce/apiserver
./xce-x86_64.AppImage shell # interactive bash with all binaries + haproxy/glow/less on PATH
Run it once per daemon (likely on different hosts) to stand up a cluster.
xceadmin — Cluster Configuration
xceadmin is the only supported way to turn operator-authored YAML into the cluster.bin binary the controller loads, and to push it to a running cluster. It speaks the same raw TLS + Cap'n Proto wire protocol controllers use with each other (no client certificate — verify_mode=ssl.CERT_NONE, matching the controller's own outbound posture).
Install
# Dev, editable, fast iteration (must run inside `nix develop ./src`)
cd src/xceadmin && pip install -e .
# Production / CI (what /xce-build and `nix build .#xcecore` actually use)
/xce-build xceadmin
/xce-build xceadmin always does a clean, non-editable pip install into an out-of-tree venv (--system-site-packages, inheriting nix-provided pycapnp/pyyaml/jsonschema), runs the full pytest suite, syncs the bundled schemas fresh from src/schema/, and produces a standalone xceadmin wrapper script — this is what ships in the AppImage and nix build output.
This venv only works from inside nix develop ./src (or the AppImage's bundled env) — it is not a portable, standalone venv. --system-site-packages means pip install sees click/pycapnp/pyyaml/jsonschema already satisfied by nix's site-packages and skips vendoring its own copies — deliberately, since pycapnp is ABI-sensitive to the exact capnproto C library version, and letting pip resolve/build its own would risk a version mismatch that crashes at runtime. If you source .venv/bin/activate (or run the xceadmin binary directly) outside nix develop, none of those packages are on sys.path and you'll hit ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'click' (or similar) immediately. Either stay inside nix develop ./src when invoking the built xceadmin, or use the AppImage, which bundles a working environment on PATH already.
Usage
# Compile YAML config into a binary, print its SHA-256 to stderr
xceadmin config build /path/to/configs -o cluster.bin
xceadmin config build /path/to/configs -o - # to stdout instead of a file
# Push a compiled config to a running controller (any node — primary or standby; redirects to primary automatically, up to 3 hops)
xceadmin config push cluster.bin --controller 127.0.0.1:9991 # host:port; defaults to localhost:9991
# Check whether the controller would accept it, without committing
xceadmin config push --dry-run cluster.bin --controller 127.0.0.1:9991
config build reads a fixed set of source files from the given directory — xce.yaml, hosts.yaml, queues.yaml, resources.yaml, users.yaml, limits.yaml, scaler.yaml (a missing file → empty section, not an error) — validates each against a bundled JSON schema, runs hard-fail business checks (reserved names, duplicates) and warn-only checks (undefined cross-references), then maps everything into a ClusterConfig Cap'n Proto message. Building twice from identical input is byte-for-byte deterministic (no wall-clock/hostname ever read). Fields that are never settable from YAML: port, hash-table-size tuning, xstrings, candidates (peer membership), configGeneration (controller-assigned).
config push exits non-zero unless the controller's reply reports ackedCount > 0 and no error string; --dry-run exits non-zero on any rejection reason the controller returns.
Known limitations (as of this writing)
— Fixed 2026-07-30.config pushagainst a real controller fails with a client-side decode crashdecode_reply()(src/xceadmin/src/xceadmin/discovery.py:46-77) now unwraps the outerRequest{opcode: OPCode_reply, body.replymsg: RequestReply{...}}envelope before decoding the innerRequestReply. Both_redirect_target()andpush_config()go throughdecode_reply(); the old bare-RequestReplydecode path is gone.decode_reply()validatesbody.which() == "replymsg"and raisesReplyDecodeErroron anything else. Live-verified against a real deployed controller.— Fixed 2026-08-09 (bug-1506/1507). The controller gained a realconfig push --dry-run's "OK" result is not meaningful evidence of anythingOPCode_probeConfigTaghandler (config_repl.c:handle_probe_config_tag) that returns the currentconfig_version_tagthrough the standardRequest/RequestReplyenvelope.probe_config()now wraps the probe in aRequestenvelope and goes throughfollow_redirects→decode_reply(same aspush_config), soaccepted=Truemeans the controller actually replied with a valid tag, and--dry-runreports the real generation number from the cluster.- No
config diff, no rollback, no version history command.xceadmintoday has exactly two subcommands:config buildandconfig push [--dry-run]. - No client authentication — the trust model is "same posture as controller-to-controller TLS," i.e. encryption without identity verification.
Deploying the Controller
The controller is the only daemon with real config-file/CLI complexity for cluster topology.
xce_controller \
--myname ctrl-1 \
--peers "ctrl-1=host1:9990,ctrl-2=host2:9990,ctrl-3=host3:9990" \
--workdir /var/lib/xce/controller \
--certdir /var/lib/xce/certs \
--logfile /var/log/xce/ctrl-1.log \
--vcpus 4
- Omit
--peersfor a single-node, non-HA controller. --workdirholds per-nodeconf/(cluster config) anddata/(WAL + checkpoint) subdirectories.--certdirmust containxce.crt/xce.key— this is the only TLS material in the whole stack, and the controller loads it into the single serverSSL_CTXused for every inbound connection it accepts: controller↔controller HA traffic and every worker/scheduler/apiserver/xceadmin client join. Generate a self-signed pair for local/dev use:
TLS verification isopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 3650 \ -keyout /var/lib/xce/certs/xce.key -out /var/lib/xce/certs/xce.crt -subj "/CN=xce"SSL_VERIFY_NONEeverywhere in this codebase — no hostname/identity check is enforced regardless of CA, so a CA-signed cert buys you encryption, not authentication.- Exactly one node (conventionally the first started) needs its
conf/seeded with an initialcluster.bin(viaxceadmin config build) before first boot; other nodes receive config over the wire via config-push once joined. - WAL and snapshot retention in
data/is fully automatic — no manual purging needed. Every checkpoint trims WAL segments below a replication-safe floor (a segment is never deleted while any standby still needs it to catch up) and rotates old snapshots down tosnap_keep_nmost recent (default 2 — current + one previous, kept as a last-known-good fallback if a checkpoint is later found corrupt).snap_keep_nis tunable via the cluster config'sPersistConfig.snapKeepNfield, not a CLI flag.
Local dev cluster (fully automated)
/xce-deploy-ha localhost:9991 localhost:9992 localhost:9993
This is the xce-deploy-ha skill wrapping src/tools/deploy-ha.sh, which does everything above automatically: generates certs, builds an initial config from src/configs/*.yaml via xceadmin, and writes scripts/start.sh ctrl-N [extra flags] / scripts/cleanup.sh under the deploy directory. Start nodes with a short stagger for clean election ordering:
scripts/start.sh ctrl-1 -vvv &
sleep 0.5
scripts/start.sh ctrl-2 -vvv &
sleep 0.5
scripts/start.sh ctrl-3 -vvv &
(-vvv is a positional arg to start.sh, not VERBOSE=-vvv — the skill's own docs have this wrong.)
scripts/cleanup.sh wipes logs and every node's data/, plus conf/ for nodes 2..N — ctrl-1's config and all certs survive a cleanup, giving a clean restart without regenerating TLS material or re-authoring config.
Deploying the Worker
xcecd -c /opt/xce/conf/worker.yaml
# or, without a config file:
xcecd -m controller-host -p 9990 --peers "ctrl-1=h1:9990,ctrl-2=h2:9990" -l /var/log/xce
- Must run as root —
check_user()exits immediately otherwise. - Default config path is
/opt/xce/conf/worker.yamlif-cis omitted (and it must exist, or the daemon exits). -c, if given, wins over-m/-p(those flags are ignored with a warning).- Minimal
worker.yaml:workerconf: management_list: ["ctrl-1-host"] controller_port: 9990 log_level: "info" log_dir: "/var/log/xce" --peers "[name=]host:port,..."enables HA-aware controller discovery: the worker tries each candidate in turn (every 5s by default) until one accepts the join.- Worker↔controller traffic is TLS-encrypted (via the shared
libxceclient,xcecli_ctx_init()→xce_ctx_init()), same posture as everything else in the stack: no client certificate,SSL_VERIFY_NONE.
Deploying the Scheduler
xce_scheduler --peers "ctrl-1=controller-host:9990" -l /var/log/xce/scheduler.log -v
- No config file at all — pure CLI (
argp). - Gotcha: the default controller target is hard-coded to
localhost:9990. There is no-m/-pequivalent — the only way to point the scheduler at any other host or port, even a single non-HA controller, is--peers. Forgetting--peerssilently targetslocalhost:9990regardless of where your controller actually is. -vis repeatable for more verbose logging; default log file is/tmp/xce_scheduler.log.- TLS-encrypted to the controller, same as the worker (same shared
libxceclient path). - Scheduling policies (fcfs, limit, parallel/sequential-job allocators) are compiled into the binary through the picker plugin interface (
builtin_fcfsis the registered default), not dynamically loaded.
Session recording (live cluster)
Every normal-mode scheduler can record its scheduling sessions to a .replay file for later offline replay/debugging — off by default, no overhead when disabled:
xce_scheduler --peers "ctrl-1=controller-host:9990" --record-dir /var/log/xce/scheduler-recordings -v
--record-dir DIRsets where recordings are written (default/var/log/xce/). This is the only wayrecord_diris provisioned — there is no per-request override.- Recording itself is controlled at runtime, not via a startup flag, through the controller:
These go through a newxceadmin scheduler record start [FILENAME] --controller 127.0.0.1:9991 # filename optional, auto-generated if omitted xceadmin scheduler record status --controller 127.0.0.1:9991 xceadmin scheduler record stop --controller 127.0.0.1:9991OPCode_schedAdminrequest the controller pass-through-forwards to its attached scheduler (xceadmin→ controller → scheduler → reply, same primary-redirect behavior asconfig push). The controller holds no recording state itself. FILENAME(if given) must be a bare filename — no/and no..segment. The scheduler resolves it under--record-dirand rejects anything that would escape that directory ("invalid record file name").- A
.replayfile is a single self-contained Cap'n Proto binary stream (header + snapshot + interleaved events/decisions + periodic checkpoints) — inspect one offline, no running cluster needed:xceadmin scheduler dump /var/log/xce/scheduler-recordings/some-session.replay
Simulation mode (offline debugging, no controller connection)
--sim runs the scheduler as a standalone replay tool against a previously recorded (or hand-built) .replay file — zero connection to any controller, safe to run against a production recording on a laptop:
xce_scheduler --sim /path/to/session.replay --sim-speed 0 # replay as fast as possible
xce_scheduler --sim /path/to/session.replay --sim-verify # replay + diff against the recorded decisions
xce_scheduler --sim /path/to/session.replay --sim-output /tmp/resim.replay --sim-alt-events /path/to/edited-events.replay # "what-if": substitute events, record the new decisions
xce_scheduler --sim /path/to/session.replay --interactive # step through it interactively (REPL)
--sim-speed:0= as-fast-as-possible,1= real-time (default),N>1=Nx real-time.--sim-verifyre-derives decisions from the recorded events and asserts they match the decisions the file already recorded — the feature's core "deterministic replay" regression check, usable ad hoc against any recording.--sim-alt-events FILEswaps in a different event stream after the initial snapshot for what-if branching;--sim-output FILErecords the resulting decisions as a new.replayfile.--interactiveopens a REPL (step,continue, breakpoints, state inspection, snapshot capture) driving the same simulation run a batch--simwould — REPL and batch produce byte-identical decisions for the same input, only the pacing differs.- Simulation mode never opens a socket to any controller and never touches
--peers/--record-dir— see.kiro/specs/scheduler-core/design.md's Boundary Commitments for the full isolation contract.
Deploying apiserver
apiserver -d /opt/xce/apiserver
-d <top_dir> is mandatory despite the --help text implying a default — omitting it exits immediately. <top_dir>/config/ must already exist and contain:
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
app.yaml |
HTTP(S) port, JWT secret/expiry, rate limits, CORS, IP whitelist, and the backend: block (address, port, from, key, optional peers for HA) pointing at the controller. |
auth.yaml |
Auth provider selection (config_file | pam | ldap | oauth2); for config_file, embeds usernames/passwords/roles directly. |
rbac.yaml |
Permission catalog + role→permission mappings (domains: self, self_ug, etc.). User→role binding comes from auth.yaml, not this file. |
logger.yaml |
zap logger level/encoding/rotation. |
Both app.yaml and logger.yaml are JSON-Schema-validated at startup (fail-fast on malformed config).
Build gotcha — use the Meson/Nix build, not make build-server
make build-server (src/frontend/Makefile) runs a bare go build with no CGO_CFLAGS/CGO_LDFLAGS set. The real controller-connection code (backend/clib.go) is CGO and needs those flags to find libxce's headers. Depending on your environment this either fails to compile, or — if CGO_ENABLED=0 is ambient — silently links backend/stub.go instead, producing a binary where every backend call returns errNoCGO: backend requires CGO. There is no startup warning; the HTTP server comes up fine and only fails at request time.
Use /xce-build apiserver (or nix build .#xcecore) for anything that needs to actually talk to a controller — it computes the correct CGO_CFLAGS/CGO_LDFLAGS from pkg-config and produces xce_apiserver under src/xce.build/frontend/apiserver/ (or the equivalent path for other profiles). Reserve make build-server/make test for the pure-Go unit-test loop (CGO_ENABLED=0 is intentional there).
Relationship to the controller
apiserver is a separate OS process, network-connected to the controller — not embedded, not in-process. It joins the controller's cluster protocol as HostRole_apiserver via a CGO-linked libxce client (the same join mechanism workers/schedulers use), configured entirely by app.yaml's backend: block. If backend.address is empty, apiserver logs "running in stub mode" and serves HTTP, but every job/host/queue/cluster handler will fail. This connection is TLS-encrypted, same as every other libxce client (no client certificate, SSL_VERIFY_NONE) — do not confuse it with apiserver's own separate HTTPS termination for its REST API, covered next.
TLS
apiserver can self-terminate HTTPS (app.yaml's security.https.enabled + cert_file/key_file, default a checked-in self-signed dev cert). A reverse-proxy pattern (sample config/nginx.https.conf, HAProxy mentioned in steering docs) is the intended production direction but is not wired into any startup automation — you'd have to set it up yourself.
Putting It Together: A Full Local Cluster
# 1. Build everything
/xce-build all
# 2. Bring up a 3-node HA controller cluster
/xce-deploy-ha localhost:9991 localhost:9992 localhost:9993
# (start ctrl-1, then ctrl-2/ctrl-3 with a 0.5s stagger, per the deploy script)
# 3. Start a worker pointed at the cluster
xcecd -m localhost -p 9991 --peers "ctrl-1=localhost:9991,ctrl-2=localhost:9992,ctrl-3=localhost:9993" -l /tmp/xce-worker
# 4. Start a scheduler pointed at the cluster
xce_scheduler --peers "ctrl-1=localhost:9991,ctrl-2=localhost:9992,ctrl-3=localhost:9993" -v
# 5. Start apiserver (needs its own config/ dir prepared first — copy from src/frontend/apiserver/config/,
# at minimum set backend.address/port to match the controller and use auth.yaml.example, not the checked-in auth.yaml)
apiserver -d /path/to/apiserver-topdir
# 6. Use xcecli against apiserver, or xceadmin against the controller directly
xcecli job submit myjob.json
xceadmin config push cluster.bin --controller localhost:9991
Production Gaps
Be aware of these before treating anything above as a production runbook — they are honest gaps in this repo today, not documented-but-hidden features:
- No process supervision is shipped. No systemd unit, no Dockerfile, no docker-compose, no supervisord config exists anywhere in this repo for any of the four daemons. A systemd-unit sketch exists in
src/docs/config-replication-design.mdbut has a wrong binary name (xcecontrollervs the realxce_controller) and specifiesType=notify, which the controller does not support (it never callssd_notify) — using it as written will hang at startup and time out. If you adapt it, switch toType=simpleand fix the binary name. src/frontend/apiserver/config/auth.yamlships plaintext dev credentials checked into git: four accounts total —admin/adminandop7x2k9/CHANGE_ME_dev_only(both rolecluster_admin), plususer1/user1anduser2/user2(rolebasic_user). Treat all of them as exposed by default — don't ship the checked-in file as-is; copyauth.yaml.exampleand set real credentials/an external auth provider instead.- All controller-bound traffic is encrypted but not authenticated. Controller↔controller HA replication and every
libxceclient (worker→controller, scheduler→controller, apiserver→controller, xceadmin→controller) run over TLS, butSSL_VERIFY_NONEis used throughout — no client certificates, no hostname/identity verification. This buys confidentiality and tamper-resistance in transit, not authentication of the peer; anyone who can reach the port and complete a TLS handshake is treated as trusted the moment the transport-level join succeeds. - apiserver's own TLS uses a checked-in self-signed cert with no CA trust story;
xceclihardcodesInsecureSkipVerify: trueagainst it. A reverse-proxy-terminated-TLS model is sketched (nginx sample config) but not automated. (This is apiserver's REST-facing HTTPS, separate from its TLS-encryptedlibxceconnection to the controller in item 3.) xceadmin config pushagainst a real cluster — the decode-crash bug is fixed (2026-07-30,decode_reply()unwraps theRequestenvelope), but--dry-runstill has no real controller-side handler (see Known Limitations item 2).nix build .#xcecore(the packaged derivation) is all-or-nothing — there's no per-daemon Nix package target. For a single component, use/xce-build <component>, which itself runs inside the Nix dev shell (nix develop ./src --command ...) rather than throughnix build.
Quick Reference
| Daemon | Binary | Config | Controller-pointing flag | TLS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Controller | xce_controller |
none (CLI only) | --peers (omit for single-node) |
Yes, all inbound (peers + clients), no client cert |
| Worker | xcecd |
worker.yaml (or CLI) |
-m/-p (config file wins) or --peers |
Yes, no client cert |
| Scheduler | xce_scheduler |
none (CLI only) | --peers (required even for a single non-default controller) |
Yes, no client cert |
| apiserver | xce_apiserver |
config/{app,auth,rbac,logger}.yaml |
app.yaml's backend: block |
To controller: yes, no client cert. Own REST API: optional, self-terminated |
| xceadmin | xceadmin (Python) |
none — takes YAML source dir | --controller host:port |
Yes, no client cert |