limit_seed_config_impl() key_add()ed each pushed limit into the existing
table and returned at the first failure, so on any second push (live
config upgrade, or a simulator CONFIG_PUSH since bug-1964) the first
already-present name failed with -EEXIST: changed limits kept the old
definition and later new limits were never added.
A push now builds the whole new limit set into a fresh table and swaps it
in (all-or-nothing: on any build/register failure the previous set and its
instances stay). Usage instances are carried across: an instance of a kept
limit whose scoping and resource are unchanged is rebound to the new
definition; an instance of a removed limit, or of one whose per-consumer
scoping, resource or percent changed, is dropped and re-created on the next
match. Usage itself lives in the resource manager under the instance's
virtual resource, so counts survive either way. Not part of the snapshot
(a snapshot carries the config and reseeds from it).
The seed moves to plugins/limit_config.c (limit.c is near the 800-line
cap) with the private data type in plugins/limit_internal.h. Two REPL
limit-table fixtures relied on the additive behaviour (two single-limit
pushes) and now configure both limits in one push.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: parjob's allocation now draws candidate hosts from the shared
sched_host_iter_next() (host_iter.c) instead of its own
sched_collect_workers() loop, so skip_bad_worker_ lost its only caller
(the compiler warns it is unused). seqjob's copy was already removed when
it moved onto the shared iterators (b18c5f78).
Fix: remove it. Its only check (a NULL worker) is done by
sched_host_iter_next(), which is also where host filtering now lives
(closed hosts, bug-1939; unavailable and reconciling hosts, bug-1963).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: live applies every pushed config through sched_init_config(),
whose plugin_config_update() runs each plugin's config_hook (the limit
plugin builds its limits there). The simulator seeded the limit plugin
only at bootstrap (sim_bootstrap_limit_plugin()); the core's CONFIG_PUSH
event loaded groups, resources and queues but never told the plugins,
so a limit added during a replay never existed in sim.
Fix: one shared fan-out, plugin_config_update_core(core, config), which
live's plugin_config_update() now delegates to. The core's CONFIG_PUSH
calls a driver-registered xce_core_config_cb_t after loading groups (live
order), keeping the core free of plugin.c; the simulator registers the
fan-out in sim_bootstrap_limit_plugin(). limit_update_config() reads the
honestly-typed plugin->core instead of casting plugin->sched, so the hook
is safe on the sim core; the hand-built plugin fixtures in
test_limit_plugin.c/test_repl_limit_table.c now set plugin->core as
plugin_register() does. test_sim_limit_config_push_parity.c covers it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: sched_host_iter_next(), the one candidate-host source of the
seqjob and parjob allocators on both drivers, skipped only admin-closed
hosts (bug-1939). A host marked XCE_WORKER_UNAVAIL or
XCE_WORKER_RECONCILING was still offered, and its frozen resInUse
(bug-1799/1801) does not reject it, so new jobs were placed on it.
Fix: skip IS_WORKER_UNAVAIL/IS_WORKER_RECONCILING hosts next to the
closed-host check. test_host_unavail_reconciling.c covers serial and
parallel jobs on the normal-mode and sim-mode fixtures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Since the controller rejects submissions to closed or unknown queues
(E_XCE_QUEUE_CLOSED, E_XCE_BAD_QUEUE), the apiserver answered them as a 500
"xcecli_jobsubmit failed: -10016". SubmitJob now maps them to
backend.ErrQueueClosed / ErrQueueInvalid (numbers checked against errnox.h
at compile time), and the submit and restart handlers answer 400 naming
the queue, as the apiserver's own pre-check does. This covers a queue
closed between that check and the controller's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: handle_jobsubmit() never looked at the target queue, so a
submission that bypassed the apiserver's check (libxce, harness
xce_test, or a REST submit without a queue name) was accepted into a
closed queue, an unknown queue, or the reserved lost_and_found queue.
Fix: jobsubmit_check_queue() reads the queue's in-memory state under the
qmgr/queue read locks. handle_jobsubmit() calls it after the field
checks and before the in-flight jobid registry and any WAL append, for
single jobs and job arrays. It replies -E_XCE_QUEUE_CLOSED (new code,
"queue is closed") for a closed queue and -E_XCE_BAD_QUEUE for an
unknown or reserved one. Apply/replay (restore_job) is unchanged, so
committed submit facts for a now-closed queue still apply.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: the apiserver and all components ran go test on a fixed list
(./store/... ./utils/... ./controllers/... ./backend/...), so the
middleware, router, cmd and models tests (several security tests among
them) never ran in /xce-build; a deliberately broken middleware test left
the build green.
Fix: run ./... (vendor/ is excluded by the pattern) in both places.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: the handler annotations referenced types that do not exist
(models.Error, ErrorResponse, JobsResponse, JobSignalRequest,
JobControlResponseSummary, unqualified JobSubmitRequest), had malformed
@Param/@Failure lines and /api/v1 paths, and there was no general API
info, so `swag init -g cmd/main.go` failed and docs/ stayed a stale stub.
Fix: use the real response envelopes (JsonStruct / JsonErrStruct) and
request models, the real routes under @BasePath /xce/v1, add general info
to cmd/main.go, and regenerate docs/ with `swag init -g cmd/main.go -o
docs`; the spec now has /jobs/{jobids}/control and /jobs/control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: preCheckJobRequest (controllers/jobs.go) ran the reserved-name,
existence and closed checks only when a queue name was given; an empty
name was set to "normal" and skipped them, so jobs were accepted into a
closed default queue.
Fix: default the name first, then run the same checks for every
submission. Two existing tests now seed the default queue. (The controller
side of bug-1960 is fixed separately.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: isExcludedPath (middleware/validatehandler.go) dropped the last
character of every excluded entry and prefix-matched, so /ping excused any
path starting with /pin (e.g. /pinX) from JWT validation, while
/swagger/*any (trimmed to /swagger/*an) never matched.
Fix: entries match exactly; an entry whose last segment is a gin catch-all
(/swagger/*any) matches any path under the part before the "*".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: validateHost (controllers/hosts.go) wrote a 403 via ReturnError
without aborting, so ControlHost's ctx.IsAborted() check never fired and it
went on to write a second (202) response; the permission was also checked
once per host and not at all for an empty host list.
Fix: validateHost writes no response; it checks host:control once up front
and returns an error, on which ControlHost writes a single 403 and returns.
For "all", the host list is resolved before the one validateHost call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: RoleController.CreateRole, AddPermissionsForRole and
DeleteRoleAndPermissions relied on RequirePermission("rbac:control"), which
accepts any scope, so a user with rbac:control scoped to self could add
cluster:control to a role it holds.
Fix: checkRoleChangePermission() in controllers/roles.go refuses with 403
unless one of the caller's grants (checked before deduplication) is
rbac:control with scope all, reusing canChangeUserRoles from bug-1952.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The control API already takes `signal` (kill only: that signal once,
instead of the graceful INT, TERM, KILL sequence) and `force_kill`
(SIGKILL at once); xcecli could not send either. `jobs kill` now has
-s/--signal <name|number> (names in any case, SIG prefix optional, sent
upper case without it) and --force, in both the job-ID and the filter
request; using both at once, or an empty signal, is refused before any
request. stop and resume get neither (the server rejects a signal there).
Kill help and docs/xce.md "Killing and stopping jobs" document the flags.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
xcecli logout only removed the token from the local config, so the token
stayed valid on the server until it expired. It now first sends
POST /xce/v1/auth/logout with the bearer token (APIClient.Logout), which
revokes it server side since bug-1946. Best effort: if the server is
unreachable or rejects the token, the local login info is still cleared
and a warning says the revocation could not be confirmed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- src/docs/xce.md: explicit signal and force kill are REST-only (signal,
force_kill); xcecli has no signal option yet.
- src/docs/deployment.md: app.yaml row lists the job block
(max_array_size, terminate_interval) and trusted proxies.
- xcecli jobs kill/stop/resume help describes the signal sequences.
- REST: control endpoint annotations and the signal/force_kill model fields
describe the behaviour (swagger output not regenerated: swag fails on an
unrelated annotation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The loader now stores the effective interval (10 s when unset or 0, LSF's
JOB_TERMINATE_INTERVAL default) and refuses a negative one; app_schema.json
describes the setting; src/docs/xce.md documents kill/stop behaviour and
the interval.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A plain kill sent one SIGTERM and never escalated, and a plain stop sent
one uncatchable SIGSTOP. Following LSF's TERMINATE and SUSPEND actions, a
plain kill now sends SIGINT, then SIGTERM, then SIGKILL, and a plain stop
sends SIGTSTP (the job can catch it, prepare and stop itself), then SIGSTOP
if it has not stopped; each next signal follows after the grace period and
only while the job is alive (or not yet stopped). A resume cancels a
pending stop; the job's exit ends any sequence. An explicit signal is
delivered once; a force kill is SIGKILL at once.
- JobSignal gains grace (capnp @2, xce_signal_t.grace): > 0 asks for the
sequence, in seconds between signals.
- apiserver: job.terminate_interval (default 10 s, LSF's
JOB_TERMINATE_INTERVAL); jobCtrlParams sends kill = SIGKILL and stop =
SIGSTOP with that grace when no signal is given; the handler no longer
pre-fills a default signal.
- worker: grace travels through the job-control task, the kept-signal table
(pending_signal_*_ex) and the IPC message; the job process runs the
sequence (job_signal_seq_*, uv timer) and checks stop state in /proc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only a head-host job start opened the pending-signal window (bug-1908), so a
kill for a remote task of a multi-host job that this host had accepted
(runtasks) but not yet registered was dropped with "Failed to find worker".
handle_runtasks() now opens the same window before queuing the task and
closes it if queuing fails; the signal is delivered when the task runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
worker_signal_callback() sent SIGTERM for a KILL request without force and
SIGSTOP for any TSTP request. job_signal_to_deliver() (new job_signal.c) now
delivers the requested signal; only a forced terminate escalates to SIGKILL.
The apiserver's default signal for a plain stop becomes SIGSTOP (it was
TSTP and relied on the worker's substitution), so a plain stop still
suspends jobs that ignore SIGTSTP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
preCheckJobRequest() returned from inside its job-name branch, so every
named or array job skipped the description, project and resreq checks,
resreq validation and the shell-limit conversion that follow. The name now
only sets the job count and array flag, and every submission runs the rest.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
deployment.md: auth.yaml now holds bcrypt hashes of the (still public)
dev credentials with startup warnings; JWT secret from XCE_JWT_SECRET or a
random per-process secret; logout revocation is per process;
security.trusted_proxies for reverse proxies.
security.md steering: JWT parsing, revocation, secret resolution,
trusted proxies, middleware abort rule, bcrypt and role-change rule.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: AddRolesForUser and DeleteRolesForUser let an rbac:control grant
narrower than all (e.g. scope self, an accepted domain type for rbac
permissions) change roles whenever the target user was the caller, so a
user holding only rbac:control/self could grant itself cluster_admin
(confirmed by TestAddRolesForUser_SelfScopeCannotGrantItselfRoles: HTTP
200 and cluster_admin assigned).
Fix: canChangeUserRoles requires an rbac:control grant with scope all
(checked over every grant, before deduplication prefers a narrower scope)
to grant or revoke roles for any user, the caller included; anything else
gets 403. Chosen over a "cannot grant permissions you do not hold" rule
because a scoped role change has no safe meaning here and the subset
check across domains would be complex and easy to get wrong.
Tests: TestAddRolesForUser_SelfScopeCannotGrantItselfRoles,
TestDeleteRolesForUser_SelfScopeRejected, TestUserRoleChanges_AllScopeAllowed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: Logout only deleted tokens/<user>/token, a file that token
validation (ValidateHandler / GetUsernameFromToken) never reads, so a
logged-out token stayed valid until its expiry (24 h by default).
Fix: an in-memory revocation set (controllers/token_revocation.go) keyed
by the token's jti (generateJWT now sets a random uuid jti, so two logons
in the same second give different tokens) or, for tokens without a jti,
by SHA-256 of the token; each entry is kept until the token's expiry and
expired entries are purged on every revocation. Logout revokes the token;
the shared ParseTokenClaims (used by ValidateHandler, RequirePermission
and handlers via GetUsernameFromToken) rejects revoked tokens. A missing
token file no longer fails logout. Scope: per process, not persisted and
not shared between apiservers.
Tests: TestLogout_RevokesToken (middleware), TestTokenRevocations_*,
TestIntegration_PostLogoutTokenRejected (replaces the design-gap test).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: config/app.yaml shipped secretKey "xce-api-key" and
resolveJWTSecret used it whenever XCE_JWT_SECRET was unset, so anyone
could forge tokens for any user on such a deployment.
Fix: resolveJWTSecret uses XCE_JWT_SECRET, else the config value, but
treats an empty value or the old public default as unset; then it
generates a random 256-bit per-process secret and InitConf logs a warning
(secret never logged): tokens do not survive a restart and apiservers
sharing one endpoint must set the same XCE_JWT_SECRET. The shipped
app.yaml no longer carries a secret. The controllers test secret is no
longer the old default.
Tests: TestResolveJWTSecret_NeverUsesKnownDefaultOrEmpty,
TestShippedAppYAML_NoJWTSecret, TestInitConf_NoJWTSecretGeneratesAndWarns,
TestInitConf_JWTSecretFromEnvNoWarning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: the router used gin.Default() without SetTrustedProxies, and gin
then trusts forwarding headers from every peer, so ClientIP() returned
whatever X-Forwarded-For a client sent: the IP whitelist and the IP bound
into JWTs could be spoofed.
Fix: new app.yaml option security.trusted_proxies (IP or CIDR list,
default empty = trust no proxy, validated at startup) passed to
SetTrustedProxies in Router(); an invalid list falls back to trusting
none. The nginx samples note that the proxy must be listed there.
Tests: TestRouter_IgnoresForwardedForByDefault,
TestRouter_HonoursForwardedForFromTrustedProxy, TestResolveTrustedProxies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: ReturnError only writes the response and never aborts the gin
chain; RequirePermission (token error) and WhitelistIPMiddleware (invalid
client IP) returned after ReturnError without ctx.Abort(), so the route
handler still ran after the rejection.
Fix: ctx.Abort() after ReturnError at both sites (and, for clarity, on the
ValidateHandler body-check path, which validateRequestBody already
aborted). RequirePermission now answers a bad token with 401 instead of
500. ReturnError stays non-aborting (documented): handlers such as
ControlHost call it from helpers and then test ctx.IsAborted(), so a
global abort would change handler flows, and it adds nothing in handlers.
Tests: TestRequirePermission_AbortsOnInvalidToken,
TestWhitelistIPMiddleware_AbortsOnFailure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: the ValidateHandler parse callback (middleware isValidToken)
returned the secret without looking at token.Method, and
GetUsernameFromToken accepted any HMAC variant, so tokens signed with
HS384/HS512 were accepted although the server only signs HS256.
Fix: one JWTSigningMethod (HS256) used for signing, plus a shared
JWTKeyFunc (rejects any other alg) and JWTValidMethods parser option used
by both parse paths.
Tests: TestIsValidToken_PinsSigningAlgorithm (middleware),
TestGetUsernameFromToken_PinsSigningAlgorithm (controllers).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: ConfigFileProvider.Authenticate compared the stored plaintext
password with != (timing side channel, passwords readable from the file),
and config/auth.yaml shipped admin/admin, user1/user1 etc. as plaintext
with nothing reporting that a default credential was active.
Fix: auth.yaml passwords may be bcrypt hashes (golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt,
v0.23.0 as already pinned in go.mod, now vendored); plaintext entries are
still accepted but compared in constant time (SHA-256 + subtle), and an
unknown user costs the same bcrypt work. The provider reports startup
warnings (SecurityWarner, logged by main) for every plaintext entry and for
every shipped default credential still active. The shipped auth.yaml and
auth.yaml.example now store bcrypt hashes of the same dev passwords, so
tests/regression/run.sh (admin/admin) keeps working. tools/encrypt gains
-action=hash to generate entries.
Tests: TestConfigFileProvider_BcryptPassword,
TestConfigFileProvider_SecurityWarnings, TestShippedAuthConfig_HashedDefaults.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: NewConfigFileProvider read cfg.ConfigFile.Users without checking
that the optional config_file block was present, so provider: config_file
with no block panicked with a nil-pointer dereference at startup.
Fix: return a clear configuration error when the block is missing.
Test: TestNewConfigFileProvider_Errors/missing_config_file_block.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: job_ctrl (job.c) sent kill/stop/resume only to allocs[0]->host.
The tasks on the other hosts are started through runtasks (by the head
worker for a parallel job, or by xrun as the MPI launcher's rsh agent)
and run under their own worker entry on each host; the head worker
signals only its local process group and forwards nothing, so they kept
running.
Fix: job_ctrl sends the request to every allocated host through
job_ctrl_to_host. The head decides the result as before; an unconnected
remote host is logged and skipped (its tasks belong to host failure
handling). Sends are non-blocking enqueues. Test:
testsuite/test_job_ctrl_hosts.c.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: job_ctrl (job.c) sent kill/stop/resume of a running job only when
the host's status was exactly 0, so any status bit (CLOSED,
CLOSED_BY_ADMIN, BUSY, LOCKED...) refused the request, and the refusal
returned -errno, i.e. whatever errno happened to hold (often 0 or
-ENOENT).
Fix: new job_ctrl_to_host sends the request whenever the worker is
connected (endpoint present, no XCE_WORKER_UNAVAIL); an unknown or
unconnected worker fails with -E_XCE_BAD_WORKER and an ERROR naming the
host. Nothing else changes for jobs on dead hosts. Test:
testsuite/test_job_ctrl_hosts.c.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: ControlJob (backend/clib.go) looked its content argument up as a
signal name, but the job control handlers pass a JSON JobControlEvent, so
the lookup always missed and every kill sent TERM (stop TSTP, resume
CONT); sig.force and ckpt.kill were hard-coded to 0 and the checkpoint
method was never set.
Fix: new pure jobCtrlParams (backend/convert_pure.go) decodes the event
(or a bare signal name/number), validates the signal against
JobSignalMapTable and returns an error instead of falling back, and maps
force_kill to xce_signal_t.force (kill) or xce_ckpt_options_t.kill
(checkpoint) plus the checkpoint method. ControlJob fills the C structs
from it. Tests: backend/jobctrl_params_test.go.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: the apiserver writes file transfers to exdata as "transfer_files"
(controllers/jobs.go processJobRequest), but parse_exdata() only matched
"transfer_file", so the transfers were logged as an unknown key and
dropped.
Fix: parse_exdata() accepts "transfer_files" and still the older
"transfer_file"; if both are present the first list wins instead of
leaking it. New worker unit test test_exdata_parse.c parses the exdata
JSON the apiserver produces (transfers, env, interactive, limits).
Stage-in/out itself is still not implemented in the worker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cause: modelJobToSubmit() filled only cmdline, execuser, launch_type and
pre/post-exec of job_startinfo_t, so the extended data the submit handler
builds (env, *_limit incl. -W run limit, file transfers, interactive mode),
the cwd and the exec home never reached the controller or the worker.
Fix: map the start info in a pure submitStartInfo() (exdata from
ExtendData, execcwd from ExecCWD or CWD, exechome from ExecHome) that
modelJobToSubmit copies into the C struct; decode exdata back in
cJobToModel/cJobArrayToModels so the store keeps ExtendData and CWD.
Reject extend_data the worker's parse_exdata() cannot take (not a JSON
object, over EXDATA_LENGTH-1 bytes) and drop an empty transfer list
instead of sending a null.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both job-fields update paths, the core JOB_UPDATE event (core_events.c,
used by the live and sim drivers) and sched_update_existing_job()
(schedobj.c), set job->priority to the new queue's priority when a job
changed queue, while ingest gives every job 0. builtin_fcfs orders a
queue's jobs by job priority first, so a moved job overtook every job
already pending in the target queue (and snapshot restore, which sets 0,
disagreed with live for moved jobs).
Moving now only re-points job->queue; queue priority still orders the
queues themselves. test_job_move_priority.c moves a job into a priority-10
queue and checks it keeps priority 0 and does not take the only slot from
the queue's first job; test_job_update.c's in-place update case asserted
the old behaviour and now expects the job's priority to be kept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only live's sched_init_config() (scheduler.c) registered the config's
named user and host groups into core.ugmgr/hgmgr. The simulator takes its
config from the replay snapshot (snapshot_load.c) and later pushes through
the core CONFIG_PUSH event (core_events.c); neither loaded groups, so a
limit whose users name a group ("ug1") never matched in sim, while the
same limit matched in live.
New xce_core_load_groups() (core.c) is the one loader, called by
sched_init_config(), the CONFIG_PUSH event and snapshot restore, each
before limit consumers are built. snapshot.c's field notes now say the
groups are rebuilt from the snapshot's config.
test_sim_group_limit_parity.c checks a ug1-scoped limit matches the same
job on both drivers and that CONFIG_PUSH alone registers ug1 and hg1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
No scheduler code read XCE_WORKER_CLOSED / XCE_WORKER_CLOSED_BY_ADMIN:
sched_host_iter_next() (host_iter.c), the candidate-host source for both
the seqjob and the parjob allocator, filtered only on the select
expression and resource availability, so jobs kept landing on a host an
admin had closed (parjob's skip_bad_worker_ hook is empty and unused).
sched_host_iter_next() now skips a host with either closed bit before
opening its trace scope, which covers every new placement for serial and
parallel jobs on the live and simulation drivers. Accounting of jobs
already running on the host is unchanged. No new pend-reason code: a
closed host is simply not a candidate. test_host_admin_close.c covers a
serial and a parallel job on both fixture shapes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
sched_queue_is_ready() in core.c was a `return 1` stub, so the picker
(builtin_fcfs and the legacy fcfs) took jobs from every queue and admin
queue inactivation never reached dispatch.
It now returns false for a queue with QUEUE_STAT_INACT_ADMIN or
QUEUE_STAT_INACT_WINDOW set, so an inactive queue's jobs stay pending.
QUEUE_STAT_CLOSED is deliberately not a gate (LSF semantics: closing only
blocks new submissions; already-pending jobs still dispatch). The status
reaches the core through the same queue add/update paths in both drivers,
so live and sim behave identically. test_queue_admin_control.c covers
open, closed and inactive queues on both fixture shapes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
27 cross-spec conflicts among the 30 pending specs (5 high), code gaps
against the five product goals and the no-shared-storage use case (silent
failures such as unenforced queue/host close and REST submit dropping job
limits, cwd, env and file transfers; inter-component and apiserver
security; file staging; monitoring and accounting; scheduling policy;
operations), and a tiered priority list (spec hygiene, P0 defects, P1
foundation specs, P2 features, P3 initiatives).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
