Rongsong Shen
4ec401672b
bug-1463: commit 94f50ce6 (bug-1453 CA-cert-plumbing removal) missed
GetJobOutput's dead tls.Config/loadRootCAs block in request.go, plus
peek.go's SetRootCAs call and serverInfo.CACert field access (the
field no longer exists on APIServerInfo) -- broke the xcecli build.
Removed all three dangling references. Also enabled NewAPIClient's
previously-commented-out InsecureSkipVerify TLS config, since no
xcecli method set any TLS config at all -- any https:// apiserver URL
would have failed cert verification, not just GetJobOutput. Matches
bug-1453's documented design (server-side TLS only, no peer
verification, mTLS deferred as P3 hardening).
Documented both the api-server (http+https) and controller
(server-side-cert-only, no client certs) TLS postures in
.kiro/steering/security.md, replacing a stale line claiming TLS is
handled at the network layer, plus a follow-up note for the planned
HAProxy TLS-termination reverse proxy once its cert type and
apiserver's own listener fate are decided.
69 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
69 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Standards
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## Philosophy
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Defense in depth, least privilege, fail closed. Authentication verifies *who*; authorization verifies *what they can do*. Centralize both — never duplicate permission checks across handlers.
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## RBAC Enforcement
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All protected routes use `RequirePermission` middleware attached at registration time:
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```go
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// In router/routers.go
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hostsGroup.GET("", RequirePermission("host:view"), handler)
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hostsGroup.POST("/control", RequirePermission("host:control"), handler)
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```
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`RequirePermission` in `controllers/rbac_check.go` resolves the user from the JWT, looks up their effective permissions (including inherited role permissions), and aborts with 403 if the required permission is absent.
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**cluster_admin** bypasses all permission checks via early return — do not add new bypass paths outside this single mechanism.
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## Permission String Format
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`"action:scope"` — e.g., `"job:submit"`, `"host:view"`, `"queue:manage"`.
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Scopes: `all` (unrestricted), `self` (own resources), `cluster`, `hostgroup`, `self_ug`, `self_hg`.
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Permissions are defined in `config/rbac.yaml`. Roles support inheritance via `includes:` — resolution is recursive. Add new permissions to the YAML first, then wire them onto routes.
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## JWT Authentication
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Token flow:
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1. `POST /auth/logon` → validates credentials via configured auth backend → issues JWT with `{username, IP, expiry}` claims
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2. Every subsequent request: `Authorization: Bearer <token>` header
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3. `middleware/validatehandler.go` strips the prefix, parses with golang-jwt, **validates the IP claim against the request IP**
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IP-bound tokens prevent token theft across network boundaries. Do not remove the IP validation.
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Token secret is loaded from `config/auth.yaml` at startup. It must never appear in source code or logs.
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## Auth Backends
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Backend selection is controlled by `config/auth.yaml`. Supported: `configfile`, `ldap`, `oauth2`, `pam`. All backends implement the same interface — adding a new backend means implementing that interface, not modifying middleware.
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## Input Validation
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Validate at the API boundary inside `preCheck{Resource}Request()` helpers — before any service or store access. Return 400 with a clear message on validation failure. Do not pass unvalidated input to downstream layers.
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## Secrets
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- JWT secret key: `config/auth.yaml` (file-system protected, chmod 0600)
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- LDAP bind credentials: `config/auth.yaml`
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- **Never log** tokens, passwords, secret keys, or full request bodies containing credentials
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- Validate all required config at startup; fail fast with a clear error if missing
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## Rate Limiting and IP Whitelist
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Rate limiting (`middleware/rate_limit.go`) and IP whitelist (`middleware/ip_whitelist.go`) are applied before JWT validation in the middleware chain. They use `ctx.ClientIP()` and abort with 429 / 403 respectively. Both are configured in `config/` YAML — do not hardcode thresholds.
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## Transport
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All daemon-to-daemon communication is over TCP. The WAL and replication wire format uses Cap'n Proto — schema files in `src/schema/`. Do not add unvalidated deserialization paths for external input.
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XCE uses **server-side TLS only** — encryption without peer certificate verification. There is no mTLS and no CA-pinning anywhere in the system; peer verification is deferred as optional P3 hardening (see bug-1453, which deleted all CA-cert/client-cert plumbing from both the C tier and the Go tier as dead code). Do not reintroduce CA-cert loading, client certificates, or cert-pinning without a design doc — this posture is intentional, not an oversight.
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**Clients talking to the API server** (xcecli, or any HTTP client of `apiserver`) must support **both `http://` and `https://`** — the scheme is a per-deployment/user choice (`APIServerInfo.URL`), not something the client hardcodes. When the scheme is `https://`, set `InsecureSkipVerify: true` on the TLS client config (see `xcecli/common/request/request.go`'s `NewAPIClient`) rather than attempting cert validation — the API server's cert is typically self-signed/auto-generated and the client has no CA to validate it against.
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**Clients talking to an XCE controller directly** (worker, scheduler, and any other libxce-based client via `cluster.c`'s `do_connect()`) need **only server-side certs — no client-side certs are required or supported**. `xce_cluster_config_t` has no `ca_cert_path`/client-cert fields; do not add any. TLS verification mode is `SSL_VERIFY_NONE` throughout — this matches the API-server posture above, just at the C/libxce layer instead of Go/HTTP.
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**Known follow-up (not yet scoped):** a HAProxy reverse proxy in front of `apiserver` is planned to terminate HTTPS, likely with a CA-trusted cert (Let's Encrypt candidate, unconfirmed), and whether `apiserver`'s own `RunTLS`/`httpsConfig.Enabled` listener stays in the picture is also undecided. Once both are settled, revisit xcecli's blanket `InsecureSkipVerify: true`: if the client-facing endpoint ends up CA-trusted, default to real verification (Go's default `tls.Config{}` validates against the system trust store with no extra plumbing) and make skip-verify an explicit opt-in for self-signed deployments only — matching the automated security review's suggested fix. Don't implement this speculatively; the right shape depends on which of those two decisions lands where.
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