myxce/.wolf/bugs/bug-1948.md

id	status	status_updated	status_note	component	severity	timestamp	last_seen	occurrences	files	tags	related
bug-1948	open	2026-10-10	newly logged	apiserver	security	2026-10-10T08:15:06Z	2026-10-10T08:15:06Z	1	src/frontend/apiserver/router/routers.go	apiserver security whitelist

bug-1948: apiserver trusts X-Forwarded-For from any client, so IP whitelist and JWT IP binding can be spoofed

Description

Observed: (source reading, .kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md (P0); to be confirmed by a failing test before the fix) The router uses gin.Default() (router/routers.go:19) and never calls SetTrustedProxies, so ClientIP() honours X-Forwarded-For from any peer.

Expected: Forwarded headers are only honoured from configured trusted proxies. Impact: Security: a client can claim any IP and bypass the IP whitelist and the IP bound into its JWT. Found by: review: .kiro/reviews/project-gap-review-2026-10-10.md (P0)

Environment

• OS: no /etc/os-release; Docker container; NixOS kernel; kernel Linux 6.18.33 x86_64
• libc: glibc 2.42-47 (interpreter /nix/store/wb6rhpznjfczwlwx23zmdrrw74bayxw4-glibc-2.42-47/lib/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2)
• Toolchain: gcc (GCC) 15.2.0, meson 1.9.1
• Build: asan (xce.build)
• Code: scheduler-framework @ 94472ee3-dirty
• Deployment: any (found by source reading; the failing test that confirms it is named in Verification)

Reproduction

1. Send a request with X-Forwarded-For: <whitelisted IP> from a non-whitelisted host.
2. It passes the whitelist.

• Frequency: deterministic (by code reading; confirmed by the RED test of the fix)
• Evidence: the code sites quoted in Description; no logs kept.

Root cause

TODO: required for fixed/partial

Fix

TODO: required for fixed/partial

Verification

• Test: TODO: name + file; RED before the fix, GREEN after
• Suites: TODO: suite results and build profile
• Live: TODO: soak/deploy run, or n/a and why

References

• Related: none