The apiserver's 30s heartbeat sends a fire-and-forget nop (xce_nop) that
never waits for the reply. The controller replies to every nop, and
xce_handle_reply's default case returned -ENOENT for OPCode_nop, so
vtask_entry called xce_wakeup and left the nop's status sitting in the
single-slot wbuf. The next blocking request (xce_fetchfile / xce_jobsub
/ xce_jobctrl) then consumed that stale status as its own reply:
the fetchfile waiter woke with status=0 but ctx->reply.u.fetchfilereply
still NULL -> 'nil reply' -> job peek 501.
Return 0 for OPCode_nop replies so they never touch wbuf. Control-op
replies (jobctrl/queuectrl/hostctrl) legitimately hit the default case
and still wake.
Regression test: test_handle_reply_nop_does_not_wake (red->green).
bug-1506 (controller): sched_worker_change pointed w->host.resvals_to_sched
at resvalist.data, then xlist_fini freed it — a concurrent reader (the
WORKER_JOIN hook encoding the worker's resvals) hit an ASAN
heap-use-after-free that crashed the controller and failed every job. Take
ownership of the resval data via MOVE_PTR (mirrors collect_resvals_workers);
the prior array is intentionally leaked (freeing it races the same readers).
bug-1507 (worker): the apiserver's bug-1500 execuser fix sent the submit
user ("admin") as execuser, but that user does not exist in the worker
host's /etc/passwd. systemd failed the worker unit with EXIT_USER (217),
so every job died immediately after submit. job_start_local_task now
checks the execuser with getpwnam() and falls back to "nobody" when the
user does not exist.
Verified with a full job lifecycle (submit -> RUN as nobody -> DONE) on
the clean build: all 4 daemons healthy, zero ASAN.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
`xcecli jobs list -a` returned "no job found" even when jobs existed.
FilterRows routes every condition on a bitmask field (job_status /
host_status) to MatchesBitmaskCondition, which only implemented OpEQ/OpNE
bitmask semantics — the `-a` filter compiles to `job_status notnull`
(OpNOTNULL), which fell through to `return false` and filtered out every
job. (The default list's `notin(EXIT,DONE)` is compiled to OpEQ(mask), so
it was unaffected.)
Add OpISNULL/OpNOTNULL branches to MatchesBitmaskCondition that test the
raw field value. New query_test.go: 3 regression tests (notnull matches
all, null matches none, bitmask notin path unaffected), RED->GREEN.
Verified live: `xcecli jobs list -a` now lists all jobs including DONE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Job PEND root cause when the scheduler registered before the worker:
xcesched_push_workers only fires on scheduler join (sched.c on_scheduler_join),
so a later worker join's slots (set_host_slots from hconfig->mxj=8) is never
re-pushed to the scheduler -> allocation unsatisfied (slots total 0) -> PEND.
Operational fix (no code change): start controller -> worker -> scheduler so
the scheduler's join-time schedworkers push carries the worker's slots.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The RUSAGE_UPDATE job hook fires with (cluster_t*, xce_job_rusages_t*) as
its varargs — the apiserver and scheduler subscribers parse exactly that
contract — but persist_job_hook_fun's default case treated the second arg
as a job_t* and read j->job.state at offset 56. A xce_job_rusages_t is 56
bytes and shares only jobid@0 with xce_job_t (which is why the jobid read
coincidentally worked), so the state read landed one byte past the struct:
ASAN heap-buffer-overflow (READ of size 4) in thread T7 whenever a job runs
and the worker pushes rusage updates. This was the recurring controller
crash (term 3/4/5) blocking job-PENDING verification.
Add a dedicated HOOK_DETAIL_JOB_RUSAGE_UPDATE case that reads jobid from
the xce_job_rusages_t* and bakes the job's current state from a jobmgr
key_find on the vararg cluster_t* (race-free: the sole caller
update_job_rusages() holds that job's write lock while firing the
AFTER_EVENT hook; re-locking the job inside the hook would deadlock).
Regression test: test_job_hook_rusage_writes_wal_entry now passes a real
56-byte xce_job_rusages_t instead of a full job_t (which masked the
overflow) — ASAN stack-buffer-overflow under the old code, PASS under the
fix. Full controller unit suite: 458 tests, 0 failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
tryConnect built the xce_client_config_t with C.CString(host/from/key), then a
defer freed all three. But xcecli_ctx_init stores the config POINTER
(ctx->conf = config), not a copy — client_failover.c dereferences
config->masters/from/key for the client's ENTIRE lifetime (e.g.
xce_failover_next_target strncpy's a master host on every write-fail/redirect).
Freeing the strings left config->masters[0] dangling → ASAN heap-use-after-free
(strncpy in the background C thread) after a few submits.
Fix: keep the three C strings for the process lifetime (tryConnect runs once at
startup, gCtx is a process-global); free them only on the init-failure path.
Verified: 6 consecutive job submits, apiserver stays up, 0 ASAN errors
(previously crashed after ~2-3 submits).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
modelJobToSubmit built the C job_startinfo_t without setting execuser, so the
controller forwarded a NULL execuser in the startjob request and the worker
ran every job as "nobody". Now the submit carries the resolved exec user: an
explicit exec_user wins, otherwise the job runs as the submitting user.
- add resolveExecUser() (plain-Go, unit-testable) + TestResolveExecUser
- set si.execuser in modelJobToSubmit, free it in freeJobSubmit
Note: deploying this exposed an ASAN heap-use-after-free in the apiserver's
submit/notification path (strncpy reading freed memory); the fix is committed
but needs the memory-lifecycle investigation before it can ship safely.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
bug-1498 (re-dispatch): sched_job_is_ready() was a stub returning 1, so any
job lingering in the fcfs pendJobs queue was always elected. A dispatched job
was never marked non-PEND (the controller defers its schedStartJob notify to
the not-yet-implemented apply pump, controller/job.c), so fcfs_update_job
re-enqueued it on every job update and the election thread re-dispatched the
running job — the worker got conflicting signals and the job was SIGTERM'd.
- sched_job_is_ready: elect only PEND, non-suspended jobs
- sched_commit_decision (dispatch): mark the job JOB_STAT_RUN on dispatch so
it leaves the PEND set and is no longer re-electable
- fcfs_update_job: dedup via ordq_peek before enqueue
bug-1497 (double-free): sched_update's resval paths transferred ownership of
rv->val to sharedInst/w->resvals but left the request pointer set, so
sched_pend_update_killer double-freed it -> use-after-free in
build_host_eval_ctx. Clear rv->val = NULL on transfer.
Tests: new scheduler/testsuite/test_redispatch.c (8 cases): sched_job_is_ready
PEND gating + dispatch-commit marks the job RUN. Full scheduler meson suite
green. Live-verified: a `sleep 60` job is elected exactly once, runs the full
duration and exits 0 (`completed successfully`); before the fix it was
re-dispatched at ~11s and killed (SIGTERM 143).
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
put_resvals (resource.c) used `idxs[i] <= 0` to skip "invalid" resource
indexes, but index 0 IS valid — it's the first resource in the table
(e.g. "slots"). For idx 0 the val was never allocated (xvals[i] stayed
NULL) and the write loop then SEGV'd. bug-1495.
Fix: skip only negative indexes (`idxs[i] < 0`), and NULL-guard the
write loop defensively.
Verified end-to-end: a locally-built scheduler now connects to the t1
controller and dispatches all 5 test jobs to node t1 (exec_hosts
populated, jobs run and exit). This was the final blocker for job
scheduling (bug-1494: all jobs PEND).
Also: add the t1 host definition to hosts.yaml (worker join was rejected
with -EINVAL because no matching hostconfig existed for hostname "t1").
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
worker/src/resource_sync.c init_builtin_load_indices registers 11 load
indices (r15s/r1m/r15m/ut/pg/ls/it/swp/mem/tmp/io) but resources.yaml only
defined r1m/r15s/mem/tmp. The 7 missing ones (r15m/ut/pg/ls/it/swp/io) caused
controller "update_resval: Success" ERRORs and scheduler "unknown resource in
per-worker resvals update" warnings, leaving the worker resource view
incomplete. Add the 7 definitions matching the existing r1m/r15s pattern.
Docs: log bug-1494 (all jobs PEND, scheduler never dispatches; after this
config fix jobs still PEND — remaining suspect is the scheduler→controller
join path after restart), update design doc + verification manual known-issue
tables and root CLAUDE.md cluster-verification status.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The apiserver returns list rows in OrderMap columnar form —
{"Fields":["col",...],"Data":{"col":val,...}} — but the read clients
unmarshalled each row as a flat object, so every field came back empty
(counts were right, values were all zero/"").
Fix: decode rows as apiRow{Fields, Data map[string]json.RawMessage} and
pull named fields out of Data via rowStr/rowInt/rowInt64/rowFloat helpers.
ListNodes, ListQueues, and getJobs (ListJobs/GetJob) all use apiRow now.
TDD: 3 new ordermap_test.go tests built from live-captured apiserver
response shapes (red: fields empty → green: parsed). Live-verified against
t1: node name=t1 cores=8, 4 queues active, 3 jobs with real fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
New §5 in src/docs/chatbot-verification.md: how to connect Claude Code to
the scheduler-agent MCP server. Covers building the mcp-server binary,
`claude mcp add` CLI registration (verified against installed CLI
v2.1.220), the .mcp.json project config schema, the three scopes
(local/user/project), the first-run approval gate, verification commands,
and stdio/env gotchas. Original §5-§7 renumbered to §6-§8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
New src/docs/chatbot-verification.md: reproducible steps to deploy the
scheduler-agent stack on the t1/t2/t3 test cluster (AppImage build, store
sync, controller/apiserver/scheduler/worker startup) and verify Phase 0-1
(login, mcp_operator API key, read ops, submit). Documents the vcpus quirk,
setsid launch pattern, conf/current pointer mechanism, and known bugs
(job-control HTTP 500 = bug-1490, HA election deadlock).
Also add the manual to the design doc's related-documents index.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three fixes found during scheduler-agent Phase 1 cluster verification:
- whitelist.go: add /xce/v1/apikeys to WhitelistPOSTURL (Phase 0 added the
route but never whitelisted it → 403 "URL is not allowed"). bug-1489.
- jobs.go: fix job_status int64 assertion in job control. store.Jobs returns
status as int/float64; the `.(int64)` assertion broke control with
"job_status is not an int64". Add normalizeJobStatus() accepting int/int32/
int64/float64/json.Number.
- rbac.yaml: mcp_operator role gains queue:control (the job-control handler
also checks queue:control on the job's queue); add rbac_mcp_operator_test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Complete design spec for the natural-language scheduler agent:
- Layered architecture (UI/LLM/Agent core/Adapter/Scheduler)
- Unified Resource Model (URM) types and principles
- SchedulerAdapter interface + per-backend strategy
- Language selection strategy (Go primary)
- MCP protocol tool set (read/write/advanced)
- Security model (write-protected by default, API Key auth)
- Event stream design with current-state research
- Implementation roadmap Phase 0-4
- Testing strategy with golden tests
- Design principles + ADR decision records
- Current progress status and blockers
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two pre-existing failures (2026-05-13, commit 491c255) surfaced by the
controller unit-test suite (1070 Tests 2 Failures), both in the config
version storage path:
1. conf_trim_old_versions sorted cluster.bin.* versions by
second-granularity st_mtime. Versions saved within the same second
(rapid replication, or the trim test's 15ms-spaced saves) tie, glibc's
stable mergesort keeps creation order, and the newest (current-pointer)
entry lands at the protected keep_n index — so nothing is pruned and
keep_n+1 files remain. Store st_mtim (struct timespec) and compare
tv_sec then tv_nsec.
2. cr_setup() built its tmpdir path from (pid, time(NULL)) at second
granularity; a Unity assertion failure longjmps past cr_teardown(),
leaking the dir, and the next test (same pid+second) silently inherited
the leftover conf/current — cascading a second failure
(test_conf_get_saved_tag_no_config read a real tag instead of 0). Add a
per-invocation counter to the path so no two tests share a dir.
Verified: nix develop ./src --command bash src/tools/xce-build.sh all →
meson 9/9 Ok 0 Fail, controller 1070 Tests 0 Failures, xceadmin 172
passed, frontend Go all ok.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
The merged origin/working commit e0c5e8b pins capnpc's source to an
immutable commit directly in src/nixSupport/xce.nix (bug-918 canonical
fix, verified with a full controller_unit_test build: 978 Tests 0
Failures). The flake.nix overlay from 98066db solved the same bug with a
ghfast.top-proxied fetchurl tarball; keeping both is redundant and the
proxied tarball hash differs from GitHub's git-archive. Keep the
fetchFromGitHub pin in xce.nix (idiomatic, no third-party mirror,
scoped to the build), drop the global pkgs overlay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Host admin-state (open/closed/locked) now in scope for the upgrade
snapshot; host and queue admin-state frames migrate to independently-
extensible Cap'n Proto structs (one format-version bump covers both)
- bug-1418 blocker cleared: fixed 2026-07-09 via raft-apply-decoupling,
independently re-verified 2026-07-23 with a clean 10-round chaotic soak
- New Design Invariants section (6 standing rules) and Requirement 7
(regression coverage for host-placeholder/rejoin, overlapping upgrades,
format-mismatch rejection, WAL-trim-under-chaos)
Spec reached GO with 15/15 tasks complete (see prior task-confirmation
commits); these doc artifacts were generated during the design/research
phases but never separately staged.
wal_type_name() never had a case for WAL_CONFIG_MARKER (type 50) -- every
config-change marker entry printed as UNKNOWN instead of a real, defined
type. Added the case plus payload decode (tag/sha256) matching config_repl.c's
config_marker_encode/_decode byte layout, hand-decoded here rather than
linking config_repl.c into xce_test's link graph.
Gap detection also had no way to tell "committed prefix missing!" (real
loss) apart from a normal checkpoint-triggered WAL trim (persist.c's
trim_wal_segments, floor-guarded so it never removes a segment a standby
still needs) -- every long-running node's WAL, once checkpointed, would
false-alarm on every inspection. Cross-checks the sibling data/snap/
directory (snapshot LSN is literally in the filename, snap-<hex>.capnp)
and downgrades the message when a snapshot covers the gap.
Adds waldump_stats_t.leading_gap_explained and 3 new tests plus one
assertion on the existing gap test.
trim_wal_segments + rotate_snapshots run on every checkpoint --
operators don't need to manually purge data/. Documents the
snap_keep_n=2 default and that it's a cluster-config field, not a CLI
flag.
--system-site-packages means pip skips vendoring click/pycapnp/pyyaml/
jsonschema since nix already provides them -- deliberate, to keep
pycapnp's ABI-sensitive build pinned to the exact capnproto C library
nix built it against. Activating the venv outside nix develop (or the
AppImage) hits ModuleNotFoundError immediately; not a packaging bug.
Standby-redirect half is done and correct: OP_upgradeConfig has no
server-side redirect wiring today, matches design.md's own documented
"Out of Boundary" gap, and this test locks in the real current
rejection behavior.
Primary-push success-path half is unreliable (~24/25 live fails in one
investigation round, see bug-1485) -- the elected primary was observed
as a <defunct> zombie shortly after promotion, but a dedicated debug
pass could not reproduce it in 26+ clean runs on an idle host and
captured no crash evidence either way. tasks.md marks 6.3 _Blocked:_
pending re-verification on an idle host with real stderr capture.
30-round chaotic soak reported committed_job_loss=1 at round 25, but the
flagged job was confirmed present on every later verify and the final
sweep -- a real loss never comes back. Root-caused from ctrl-1/ctrl-2/ctrl-3
logs, no controller change needed: a newly-elected primary cannot fold a
prior-term entry into its own committed_lsn merely because it holds it
durably (Raft Figure-8 safety via ha_arm_own_term_gate) -- it needs a fresh
majority ack for its own-term WAL_NOOP first. That normally closes in
<200ms, but chaotic mode's overlapping-restart design let it stretch to
6.232s this run (the peer whose ack was needed was itself mid-catch-up from
its own recent restart). verify_classify ran its expect-job check
immediately on primary detection with no settle/retry, unlike verify_no_loss
(bug-1422) or wait_for_full_convergence, so it landed inside that window.
Added a bounded retry (5 attempts, 2s settle) around the LOSS classification
only, mirroring verify_no_loss's precedent -- a job still missing after that
still counts as a genuine loss. Verified with a fresh 30-round chaotic
re-soak: committed_divergence=0 committed_job_loss=0 result=PASS.
rshen/Letmein was a live, checked-in cluster_admin credential in
auth.yaml. Renamed to a non-identifying username with a clearly-marked
placeholder password.
docs: add full ops deployment guide (src/docs/deployment.md)
Covers building and running all four daemons plus xceadmin, based on
direct source verification (CLI flags, config file shapes, TLS posture)
and a live single-node deploy. Documents real production gaps (no
process supervision, plaintext non-controller traffic, exposed dev
creds) rather than treating the repo as a finished runbook.
Standby-redirect coverage is done and correct (redirect wiring for
OP_upgradeConfig genuinely doesn't exist server-side yet, matches
design.md's own documented gap). Primary-push success-path test is
flaky (bug-1485) -- a dedicated debug round could not reproduce the
crash in 26+ clean runs, so root cause is unconfirmed. Test files left
uncommitted in the worktree pending re-verification on an idle host.
Deploys a real xce_controller (no HA peers) and runs real xceadmin
config build/push over actual TLS+capnp -- no mock server -- regression
locking task 6.1's envelope fix. Skips cleanly when no controller binary
is available. Surfaced a real, out-of-scope finding: single-node pushes
always report ackedCount==0/exit 1 even on full server-side success,
since there are no standbys to ACK.
config push crashed on every real controller with a capnp KjException --
xce_reply() wraps every reply in an outer Request{body.replymsg} envelope,
but discovery.py/push.py decoded raw wire bytes directly as a bare
RequestReply. Adds a shared decode_reply() unwrap point used by both call
sites, and fixes the same wrong-shape assumption baked into task 5.6's
and test_cli.py's mock-server fixtures.
Found a clean, reusable fault-injection technique: vote/PreVote
endpoints are TLS, and endpoint_connect() succeeds at the TCP level
independent of the handshake, so an accept-then-close impostor
listener on a peer's port deterministically causes an async
SSL_do_handshake failure post-connect -- landing in
vote_ep_err_handler/pre_vote_ep_err_handler (task 3.1's fix target),
never the already-fixed bug-1423 connect-refused path.
Independently reproduced by the reviewer from scratch: both a
RequestVote round and a PreVote round resolved via the fast
all-replied-no-quorum path in single-digit milliseconds, vs the
5000ms configured election timeout (confirmed firing later as a
no-op). Requirements 4.2, 4.3, 4.5 proven live, both vote kinds.
All 15 raft-adapter-conformance sub-tasks now complete. 1067 tests,
0 failures, 8 commits' worth of production fixes (config-push reply
integrity, vote/PreVote failure routing, dormant-sender
documentation), plus 6 regression-lock/confirmation/live-soak tasks.
Two residual gaps logged as new bugs during the sweep (bug-1483,
bug-1484), both pre-existing and out of this spec's scope.
Live 3-node cluster soak confirmed handle_repl_config_push's SHA-256
mismatch reject branch fires in production: 3/3 injected mismatched
pushes against a live standby produced a decoded
ReplConfigPushReply{accepted=false, term=<live raft term>, status=0},
seq-correlated, corroborated by the standby's local WARN log. Cluster
stayed healthy throughout (no crash/step-down/fence).
One rejection round: the real elected primary's own push has no
TOCTOU window to inject a mismatch without new relay code (confirmed
by reading config_commit_change/push_config_to_standbys), so the soak
plays the sender/primary role directly against a standby instead --
remediated from log-inference-only to actual decoded wire-reply
verification per reviewer's cheap-fix path.
No production/test code changed -- pure live observation.
Verified 190 tests across 8 files cover Requirements 2.4, 3.1-3.4,
4.1, 4.4, 7.1-7.3, 7.5, 8.1-8.4. 1067 tests, 0 failures -- unchanged,
zero-diff verification task.
Task 7.2's sweep surfaced a real, pre-existing gap (bug-1421, not
this feature's fault): no test anywhere drives the real
repl_ack_decode_and_dispatch path and asserts term adoption fires for
the heartbeat-reply or WAL-NACK term-discovery vectors -- only the
config-push vector this feature added (task 2.2) is actually tested.
Logged as bug-1484; outside this spec's task list to fix.
Verified all 17 cited tests in test_commit_barrier_rollout.c,
test_commit_barrier_reply.c, and test_term_safety_adapter.c exist and
pass, covering Requirements 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 6.1-6.4. 1067 tests, 0
failures -- unchanged, as expected for a zero-diff verification task.
CLAUDE.md's TLA+ Action-to-Code Mapping table gains corrected/new rows:
production vs. dormant AppendEntries send mechanisms, WAL catch-up and
config-push reply integrity, and vote/PreVote failure routing across
all failure timings -- each citation independently re-verified against
live source. The old AppendEntries row's citations had already drifted
onto unrelated code before this task; corrected, not just appended to.
Protocol Verification Checklist gains 3 new items for the guarantees
this feature closes.
ha-term-safety/spec.json's known_limitations entry for the dormant
send-path drift gets an additive RESOLVED pointer back to this spec's
disposition, so a future reader lands on the answer instead of
re-discovering the drift.
Requirement 1 (systematic conformance audit deliverable) complete.
Adds test_batch_payload_persist_failure_propagates_to_whole_batch,
proving persist_submit_job_payloads_async resolves every payload in a
3-entry batch with the same first-failure rc when the first payload's
append fails, rather than letting later payloads independently
succeed (Req 5.3).
Fault injection: chmod the WAL leaf directory to 0500 to force
open_new_segment's EACCES (surfaced as -EIO), restored the instant the
first failure is observed -- a transient fault, not a permanent one,
so the test genuinely distinguishes propagation from independent
per-payload failure. No existing fault hook was reachable from this
code path; this is a real, previously-uncovered gap.
1066 -> 1067 tests, 0 failures. Task 5 (regression-lock tests for
already-shipped/already-conformant behavior) now complete -- Core
phase of raft-adapter-conformance finished (tasks 1-5).
Adds test_5_1_wal_catchup_reject_sends_nack_reply, driving a genuine
(term,lsn) conflict against a real persisted WAL entry through
ha_apply_term_entry_via_library and asserting
ha_send_wal_ack_reply_ex(success=0) fires via ha_wal_ack_send_hook.
Note: test_config_repl.c's test_bug1479_ae_reject_sends_nack_not_silence
already covers the same call site via a different (forward-gap)
stimulus, added in the original bug-1479 commit. design.md's own File
Structure Plan explicitly calls for this new test in this file
regardless, so this is disclosed, design-sanctioned defense-in-depth,
not accidental duplication -- both tests independently confirmed to
fail together when the reply call is removed.
1065 -> 1066 tests, 0 failures.
New test drives repl_broadcast and ha_stream_wal_to_standby through
real production fixtures (reused from tasks 2.3/6.2), asserts both
actually fired (non-vacuous), and asserts
ha_send_append_entries_stub_call_count stays 0 throughout -- the
Requirement 3.3 non-regression guard. RED-verified: manually invoking
ha_cb_send_append_entries_for_test inside the test reliably trips the
assertion; reverted for GREEN.
1064 -> 1065 tests, 0 failures. Task 4 (dormant sender documentation +
guard) now complete.
ha_cb_send_append_entries_stub's doc-comment now plainly states it is
reachable only via raft_send_append_entries (zero production callers,
grep-confirmed), and names repl_broadcast/ha_stream_wal_to_standby as
the actual production send/retry/backoff mechanism (Req 3.3, amended
to permit this documentation-only resolution over retire-or-wire-in).
Adds an XCE_TESTING-only ha_send_append_entries_stub_call_count
counter, mirroring the ha_wal_ack_send_hook idiom, as the guard against
this ever silently regaining a production caller. Task 4.2 will drive
the real production path and assert it stays zero.
1063 -> 1064 tests, 0 failures. Zero behavior change to any production
send path.
Adds pre_vote_ep_err_handler_for_test (XCE_TESTING-guarded) and two
tests: PreVote post-connect failure reaches pre_vote_reply_dispatch's
tally (Req 4.3), and a round mixing that failure mode with a delivered
reply reaches its quorum decision via the fast all-replied path
without the full round timeout (Req 4.5). Real-vote coverage (Req 4.2)
was already proven by task 3.1's own test, cited not duplicated.
pre_vote_reply_dispatch has no mock hook seam, so both tests assert
directly on raft_state_t's tally fields, mirroring test_ha_prevote.c's
existing verification technique.
1061 -> 1063 tests, 0 failures.
Found during raft-adapter-conformance task 3.2; not fixed (out of that
task's boundary), avoided via the existing stub-and-reset workaround
already used by test_ha_prevote.c's LOST-path tests.
Splits vote_ep_err_handler into a real-vote handler and a new
pre_vote_ep_err_handler, each registered at its existing (already
separate) connection-setup call site. Extracts the identical
CTRL_PRIMARY-role cleanup into a shared vote_ep_handle_promoted_disconnect
helper, behavior unchanged.
Each handler's election-phase branch now routes a post-connect failure
(RDHUP/SSL-error/remote-close after connect, before any reply) through
the same production tally the connect-time failure branches already
use (vote_reply_dispatch / pre_vote_reply_dispatch, bug-1423/1424's
fix), instead of the legacy handle_request_vote_reply that never
updated the tally. Closes the one failure window bug-1423 didn't cover.
1060 -> 1061 tests, 0 failures. PreVote-specific test coverage is
task 3.2's scope (pre_vote_reply_dispatch has no hook seam analogous
to xce_vote_reply_hook; verified only by code symmetry + full-suite
regression here).
